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Abstract
The thesis engages with recent debates surrounding the relationship between 
culture, ideology and politics in Venice under Italian Fascism. It aims to establish if 
the Fascist project for the ‘nationalization of the masses’ through culture was 
successfully promoted in Venice, or whether local economic interests were afforded 
a higher priority by the town authorities. It argues that local elites were not 
primarily concerned with the endorsement of Fascist ideology through cultural 
politics but considered exhibitions, plays, concerts and festivals to be the route to 
boosting economic growth through the development of the tourist industry.
The thesis examines the ways in which the Venetian municipality was able 
to work with the Fascist regime, co-operating with national political directives 
provided these did not contradict the primary objective of restructuring and 
reviving the Venetian economy. Cultural policies in Venice were thus less a vehicle 
for Fascist ideology than a pragmatic means of injecting new life into the flagging 
post-war economy through the development of new forms of ‘cultural tourism’. 
Festivals, exhibitions and traditional events were placed at the service not of the 
Fascist programme of mass cultural mobilisation, but of local business and political 
elites whose interests ultimately depended upon the revitalization of commercial 
tourism and the economic and social rejuvenation of the Veneto region. The 
familiar image of a ‘totalitarian’ state penetrating deep into all aspects of society is 
in need of serious qualification and a more realistic interpretation of Fascism in 
Venice must take account of the complex and sometimes ambiguous relationship 
between the national interest, as constructed by ideologically-driven Fascist organs 
and agencies, and the requirements of institutions and elites at the local level.
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1. Introduction
Nearly six decades after the end of the Second World War and the final 
collapse of the Fascist regime, the nature of Italian Fascism and its relationship with 
the cultural sphere still remains elusive. An enormous and seemingly ever-growing 
literature has focused on the Fascist political system, the necessary preconditions 
for the emergence of Fascist parties, the methods by which the Fascists succeeded 
in seizing power, the defining features of Fascist ideology, the nature of Fascist rule 
after the regime had been established, and the atrocities committed against internal 
dissidents and external opposition. It was long held that Italian Fascism had neither 
an original ideology nor a specific historical place and that it lacked a genuine 
culture of its own. This view was first expressed by the liberal thinker Benedetto 
Croce who saw Fascism as a ‘parenthesis’ in history, a period which did not 
properly reflect developments in Italian society and politics before 1919, and which 
left few traces on the subsequent phase of Italian democratic progress after 1943.1
Our image, of Fascism has been heavily influenced not only by the 
repressive systems imposed upon several European countries but also by ‘the 
inability of much of the earlier post-war Marxist historiography to recognize in 
[Fascism] anything but false consciousness, economic stagnation and social 
regression’. This post-war Marxist interpretation, ‘intricately bound up in the 
partisan experience, saw Fascism’s relationship to culture as it did its relationship 
to society -  namely, as the superstructure built upon the base of a reactionary 
capitalist dictatorship. Here Fascist cultural policy directly replicated larger 
processes of domination and control; its official culture obfuscated reality and 
confused audiences with distorted perceptions’.3 Culture under Fascism was 
therefore considered merely as an arm of propaganda for the ‘purpose of 
indoctrination and suppression’.4
1 See for instance, Benedetto Croce, Scritti e Discorsi Politici (1943-1947), vol. I, Bari, Laterza, 
1969, pp. 7-16.
2 David Forgacs (ed.), ‘Introduction: why rethink Italian Fascism’, in Rethinking Italian Fascism: 
Capitalism, Populism and Culture, London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1986, p. 4.
3 Marla Stone, The Patron State. Culture and Politics in Fascist Italy, Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 1998, p. 11.
4 Ibid.
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Norberto Bobbio, taking the argument a step further, has dismissed the very 
idea of a genuine Fascist culture, and viewed the cultural products offered by the 
dictatorship as mere appendages to its instruments of control and oppression.5 
According to Bobbio, because Fascism did not produce any high culture, it did not 
have any cultural appeal at all, confining itself instead to the vulgar realms of 
rhetoric and propaganda.6 In his work on the iconography of the Fascist press, 
Mario Isnenghi analysed the role of Fascist imagery in the construction of Fascist 
identity, yet, neglected the field of high culture entirely,7 while Edward 
Tannenbaum also reduced regime-sponsored culture to an element of its 
propaganda campaign in his The Fascist Experience (1972).8
Historian Alberto Asor Rosa, however, in the 4th volume of Storia dTtalia, 
did engage systematically with the intellectual culture produced during the Fascist 
Ventennio. He located the origins of Fascism in the ‘anti-Giolittian’ mood prevalent 
amongst Italian intellectuals before Mussolini came to power and, more generally, 
in widespread feelings of disillusionment with capitalist society, liberalism, 
socialism and democracy.9 Liberalism had failed to establish a liaison with 
intellectuals, while at the same time proving unable to compete with the ability of 
the emerging Fascist movement to appeal to the masses. Yet, when it comes to 
defining the relationship of Fascism with the intellectuals, and the question of 
forging consent through culture, Asor Rosa seems confined to a kind of Crocean 
idealism where Fascist ideology was a purely negative phenomenon, representing a
5 Norberto Bobbio, ‘La cultura e il fascismo’, in Guido Quazza (ed.), Fascismo e Societa Italiana, 
Torino, Einaudi, 1973, pp. 224-26,235, 243.
6 Ibidem, ‘Profilo ideologico del Novecento Italiano’, in Cecchi E., Sapegno N., (eds.), Storia della 
Letteratura Italiana. II Novecento, Milano, Garzanti, 1987, pp. 172-3. ‘For the Croceans, ‘true’ 
culture created between 1922 and 1945 necessarily transcended political realities and responded to 
timeless aesthetic categories. Remaining ‘uncontaminated’, Italian culture waited in a holding 
pattern for the fall o f the dictatorship in order to resume its authentic trajectory. This interpretation 
had the convenient corollary that ‘true culture’, by definition, was estranged from the rhetorical 
propaganda that made up official culture; therefore, the cultural forms produced in the service o f the 
regime or under its umbrella a priori could not be considered ‘art’, nor could its practitioners be 
called ‘artists’ ’ (Stone, The Patron State, p. 11).
7 Mario Isnenghi, Intellettuali Militanti e Intellettuali Funzionari. Appunti sulla Cultura Fascista, 
Torino, Einaudi, 1979.
8 Edward Tannenbaum, The Fascist Experience. Italian Society and Culture 1922-1945, New York, 
Basic Books, 1972.
9 Alberto Asor Rosa, ‘La Cultura’, in Romano R., Vivanti C., (eds.), Storia d ’ltalia. DalTUnita ad 
oggi, 4° vol., 2° tomo, Torino, Einaudi, 1975, pp. 1358-65.
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powerful combination of anti-Marxist, anti-Enlightenment, and anti-Liberal 
tendencies. For Asor Rosa, since Fascism emerged as a negative intellectual force 
pitting itself against the very essence of modem thought, it was by its very nature, 
anti-culture.10 Fascism, when it has been deemed worthy of being considered as a 
cultural movement at all, has tended to be dismissed as archaic and backward,11 
while the Fascist regime has been regarded as the more ‘serious’ side of the 
dictatorship as it became institutionalised, and deployed its ideological and 
technical resources to gain consent among the intellectuals.12
Logically, therefore, Fascist culture could not and did not equate to national
culture since, as a flawed totalitarianism, Fascism could never hope to achieve
1 ^‘total hegemony’ over Italians. For Asor Rosa, this failure was symbolised by 
Croce’s intellectual refusal to accept Fascism. Indeed, Asor Rosa appeared to 
regard Croce as something of a ray of light in the dark ages of the Ventennio who 
was perhaps the only Italian philosopher who bore comparison with Antonio 
Gramsci.14 Within this rather limited conceptual framework, it was natural for Asor 
Rosa to deny the existence of a genuine Fascist culture. Fascism, he observed, did 
not produce any literature of value, with any literary developments that did occur 
during the Ventennio doing so independently of the regime. In this way, the 
existence of ‘autonomous literary societies’ could become evidence for the case 
against the Fascist regime.15 A similarly dismissive attitude is in evidence when 
Asor Rosa came to consider the avant-garde movements, or the literary school 
Novecento letterario}6 Caught between apparently contradictory perceptions of
10 Ibid, p. 1365.
11 Ibid, p. 1376.
12 Ibid, p. 1381. For Asor Rosa, ‘II Fascismo movimento non e’ altro, a guardar bene, che la 
‘cultura’ del Fascismo, cioe’ il coacervo delle ambizioni insoddisfatte e delle illusioni sbagliate, 
questo impasto policefalo di vocianesimo, prezzolinismo, papinismo, sofficismo, gentilianesimo, 
futurismo, sorelismo, dannunzianesimo, ruralismo reazionario, controriforma, -la fogna insomma in 
cui va a sboccare tutto l’aspetto arcaico, arretrato, provinciale e schizofrenico della cultura italiana 
postunitaria’ (Ibid, p. 1386).
13 Ibid, p. 1471.
14 Ibid, p. 1537.
15 Ibid, p. 1514. The original text read: ‘Una societa delle lettere e una smagliatura del sistema 
totalitario, una testimonianza della sua incompiutezza, o ne rappresenta la conseguenza logica, il 
prodotto ow io e naturale sul piano dell’evasione? (...) In questo senso, appare abbastanza chiaro che 
un concetto di letteratura come valore non rientra negli schemi dell’ideologia del regime o e quanto 
meno, una posizione eretica’ (Ibid).
16 Ibid, pp. 1501, 1507.
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Fascism as essentially non ideological and as a repressive and coercive regime, 
Asor Rosa failed to appreciate or escape the limitations of his own normative
• • 1 7position. When he engaged with the role of corporatism as an embodiment of the 
Fascist ‘Third Way’, he focused on the rigidity of corporations as mediators, the 
rhetoric of cultural production, and the ability of the dictatorship to deploy 
powerful means of coercion.18 Yet, in his conclusions, Asor Rosa risked 
contradicting this general argument by claiming that the ‘fascistization of culture’ 
often did not entail ideological inculcation, ‘just the institutional management of 
different sections of cultural producers’.19
In all these accounts, it seems that the historiographical debate has been 
limited to a bipolar .system pitting ‘Fascist’ versus ‘anti-Fascist’. According to 
Marla Stone, ‘the post-World War II political and moral settlement stood on a set of 
dichotomies: fascist and antifascist; totalitarian and democratic, and, in the sphere 
of the arts, reactionary representational aesthetics and modernist democratic
7ftabstraction’. In the field of culture, however, such rigid binary distinctions and 
discourses have proved of limited use. Lino Pertile, for instance, has argued that in 
the early years of the Fascist regime the government had no cultural policy, and that 
high culture was given a good deal of freedom to continue through the traditional 
channels of the pre-Fascist liberal elite,21 while Geoffrey Nowell-Smith has made a 
convincing case that the Italian Fascist government, rather like the British 
government of the same period, behaved towards the cinema with a certain amount
77of indifference.
In the case of Venice, even though the city had its Fascist administration, 
the local ruling class was clearly able, in the field of cultural tourism, to retain its 
traditional aims of using cultural showcase events to promote economic resurgence
17 Ibid, p. 1401.
18 Ibid, p. 1489. ‘Essa [corporazione] presupponeva un’articolazione estremamente rigida del lavoro 
intellettuale, una fissit£ di temi ideologici e culturali ruotanti in una gamma estremamente limitata. 
(...) Dietro il velo ideologico delle corporazioni, riemergono semplicemente le strutture dello stato 
totalitario, con le sue capacita di pressione e di persuasione articolate e potenti, ben intrecciate con 
quelle della repressione e della coercizione’ (Ibid, pp. 1487-8).
Ibid, p. 1483.
20 Stone, The Patron State, p. 10.
21 Lino Pertile, ‘Fascism and Literature’, in Forgacs (ed.), Rethinking Italian Fascism, p. 162.
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rather than the indoctrination of the masses. Here, the argument that local interests 
sought to exploit the central Fascist authorities through an appeal to their 
ideological sensibilities is not to be rapidly dismissed. While Venice accepted 
Fascism provided she could carry on with her own business, Fascism accepted that 
‘fascistisation’ in Venice had to come to terms with the needs of international 
tourism and culture, imbued with commercial possibilities instead of Fascist 
ideology. The term ‘accommodation’ rather than ‘coercion’ or ‘consent’ can better 
define the complex webs that were established between the Fascist regime and the 
Venetian populace.
In the past, little attention was given to the attraction Fascism offered to 
millions of people, and to the subtle strategies of persuasion employed by the 
regime to win over the masses to their cause. Some scholars still seem reluctant to 
relate artistic manifestations such as painting, sculpture or architecture with the 
historical analysis of Fascism, confining them to the realm of history of art. 
Recently, however, cultural historians have become increasingly wary of 
interpretations which focus on elements of high culture presented as virtually 
untouched and untainted by Fascism.23 Instead, in the last few years, serious 
research has centred on the importance of culture and aesthetics in the construction 
and consolidation of the twentieth century’s political ideologies.24 Scholarship of 
this kind has demonstrated the benefit of approaching Fascism from this new 
perspective.
For instance, the so-called ‘culturalist school’ pioneered by Roger Griffin, 
Alexander De Grand, James Gregor, George Mosse and Roger Eatwell, focuses on 
the primacy of culture and ideology as being at the very heart of Fascist thought25 
In contrast to earlier interpretations in which Fascism was denied any viable 
cultural value of its own, Gregor considers the phenomenon to have viewed itself as
22 Geoffrey Nowell-Smith, ‘The Italian Cinema under Fascism’, in Forgacs (ed.), Rethinking Italian 
Fascism, p. 143.
23 See for instance, Bobbio, ‘La cultura e il Fascismo’, in Quazza, Fascismo e Societa Italiana, p. 
229.
24 See for instance, Richard J. Golsan (ed.), Fascism, Aesthetics and Culture, Hanover/NH, 
University Press o f New England, 1992.
25 See for instance, Roger Griffin, ‘The primacy o f culture: the current growth (or manufacture) of 
consensus within Fascist studies’, Journal o f  Contemporary History, 37, 1, January 2002, p. 36.
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*)£\part of a general ‘cultural rebirth’ committed to the regeneration of the nation 
involving an ideological preparation of the ground by elites keen to mobilise the 
power of language, culture and rhetoric in order to redefine the nation and 
reconstitute the people in keeping with the predominant myth of ‘rebirth’.27 
Therefore, it might be argued that any valuable reassessment of Fascism in 
acknowledging the recent historiographical developments must take into account 
the fact that the Fascist phenomenon did at least seek to forge a political culture of 
its own. Only in this way is it possible to produce a serious contribution to the 
existing scholarship.
Building on Antonio Gramsci’s distinction between ‘force’ and ‘consent’, 
Axel Komer, in his work on Bologna after the Unification, points to the paramount 
importance of cultural activities in the process of formation of social realities. The 
symbolic language of visual arts, music, theatre, architecture and their social 
meaning can be used, he argues, to build up and consolidate political consensus. 
Social historians, Komer claims, should recognize the very real role of cultural 
production in the formation of groups and constituencies favourable to the ruling 
class.28
The usage of culture made by Fascism has been explored by Emilio Gentile, 
too, who has centred on the importance of ‘theatricality’ in Fascist politics, and the 
collective function assigned to symbols, myths, festivals, parades and ceremonies in 
winning mass popularity for the regime.29 According to Gentile, this 
‘theatricalisation’ of politics was fundamental in shaping the spirit of the masses
-1A
and securing their consent. He argues that
26 As cited in Griffin, ‘The primacy of culture’, p. 29: James Gregor, Phoenix: Fascism in our Time, 
New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction Pub., 1999, p. 189.
27 Ibid.
28 Axel K6mer, ‘The construction o f bourgeois identity in national and urban contexts: Bologna after 
the Unification’, in Strath B., Witoszek N., (eds.), The postmodern challenge: perspective East and 
West, Postmodern Studies, 27,1999, pp. 171-5.
29 See for instance, Emilio Gentile, II Culto del Littorio: la Sacralizzazione della Politica nell ’Italia 
Fascista, Bari, Laterza, 1993; Ibidem, Le Religioni della Politica. Fra Democrazie e Totalitarismi, 
Bari, Laterza, 2001.
30 Ibidem, ‘Theatre o f politics in Fascist Italy’, in Gunther Berghaus (ed.), Fascism and Theatre. 
Comparative Studies on the Aesthetics and Politics o f  Performance in Europe, 1925-1945, 
Providence, RI, Berghahn Books, 1996, pp. 79-80.
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‘All ‘sacred’ and ‘secular’ Fascist mass spectacles were instruments to manipulate public 
opinion, to enforce obedience and to obtain consent by appealing to people’s emotions, 
fantasies and desires. In the period of greatest economic crisis, the mass spectacles 
compensated for the privations suffered by the lower classes o f society’.31
To a large degree, Fascism’s ‘educational’ effort was dedicated to the 
propagation of a ‘campaign of faith’, drawing upon those symbols and rituals which 
could consolidate popular belief in Fascist myths, and strengthen the commitment 
of the masses to the regime.32 ‘Fascism never lost sight of this goal: the total 
politicisation of individuals and the masses’,33 and the regime, according to Gentile, 
made extensive use of this ‘aesthetic dimension of politics to implant its ideology 
into the heart of the* Italian populace and to transform it into a community of 
believers’.34 He is adamant that ‘Fascism was the first totalitarian, nationalist 
movement of this century which used the power of a modem state in an attempt to 
bring up millions of men and women in the cult of the nation and the state as being 
supreme and absolute values’,35 and has consistently argued that Fascism 
penetrated deeply into the moral and cultural fabric of Italian society.36
For Roger Griffin, the mobilisation of culture in the service of shaping a 
particular national consciousness, evident in the politicised employment of various 
myths, rituals and popular festivals, was by no means an exclusive feature of Italian 
Fascism, being a relatively consistent characteristic of fascism in general. He 
claims that
‘One of the most important consequences o f the fascist dream o f creating a cohesive 
national State not only simultaneously democratic and aristocratic but charismatic, was the
31 Ibid, pp. 90-1.
32 Ibidem, ‘Fascism as political religion’, Journal o f  Contemporary History, 25, 2-3, May-June 
1990, p. 241.
33 Ibidem, ‘Fascism in.Italian historiography: in search o f an individual historical identity’, Journal 
o f  Contemporary History, 21,2, April 1986, p. 202.
34 Ibidem, ‘Theatre o f politics in Fascist Italy’, in Berghaus (ed.), Fascism and Theatre, pp. 90-1.
35 Ibidem, ‘Fascism as political religion’, p. 248.
36 This view has been challenged by the work of Richard Bosworth, who has argued that ‘the 
evidence of an actual Fascist construction o f new men and women, o f a successful Fascist 
nationalization of the masses, is at best partial’ (Richard Bosworth, ‘The Touring Club Italiano and 
the nationalization o f the Italian bourgeoisie’, European History Quarterly, vol. 27, n. 3, 1997, p. 
373).
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pervasive aestheticisation o f politics. ( ...)  This expresses itself in the continual creation o f a 
cultic social environment, both in the forging o f ‘sacred’ spaces through monumental 
public building schemes, and through the constant invention of public ceremonies and 
rituals imbued with symbolic significance for the regeneration of the national community, 
whether overtly political (party rallies, state funerals for national ‘martyrs’), apparently 
apolitical (sporting events, arts exhibitions), or quasi-religious (harvest festivals, solstice 
festivals, national feast days)’.37
Although it is possible to address the question of Fascism and culture from a 
variety of perspectives, it seems increasingly difficult, cultural historians claim, to 
neglect the power of cultural activities in binding the Italian nation to the Fascist 
regime. Several scholars have pointed to the idea of a crisis of political legitimacy 
as a consequence of the Great War, with the result that in the aftermath of the 
conflict it had become extremely hard to convince the masses to support the 
national cause. ‘The traditional forms of authoritarian rule were no longer 
appropriate’: for the Fascist state it became necessary to mobilise the population 
without allowing it effective participation in the processes of national policy- 
making. Therefore, cultural involvement in the affairs of the nation became all the 
more important in persuading the masses to give active and unconditional consent 
to the regime.
Simonetta Falasca-Zamponi ventures an explanation of what drew and 
bound Italians to Fascism through a deconstruction of Fascist rhetoric, ritual, myth 
and symbol. She confronts the contradictions of Fascist ideology and its flexibility 
in practice, and details the ideological, cultural and rhetorical innovations and 
appropriations which Fascism mobilized to reshape Italian political culture and 
national identity. Faspism depended above all upon an aestheticized politics, and
39public spectacle was the way in which the regime expressed its political culture. 
Another scholar to posit the absolute centrality of public ritual to the forging of
37 Griffin, ‘Staging the nation’s rebirth’, in Berghaus (ed.), Fascism and Theatre, p. 23.
38 Reinhard Kiihnl, ‘Cultural politics o f fascist governments’, in Berghaus (ed.), Fascism and 
Theatre, p. 33.
39 Simonetta Falasca-Zamponi, Fascist Spectacle: the Aesthetics o f  Power in Mussolini’s Italy 
(Studies on the History o f  Society and Culture), Berkeley, University of California Press, 1997.
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consensus for Fascist rule is Reinhard Kuhnl (even though his analysis is focused 
upon generic rather than Italian Fascism). Kuhnl argues that:
‘Culture had a significant function in the process of creating a mentality that forced people 
to submit to the dictates of their fascist governments. (...) The ultimate task assigned to art 
and other cultural activities was to offer ideological support to the ruling class, but also to 
prepare and mobilise the people for the war of conquest. (...) Mass spectacles helped to 
forge a national community, whereas theatrical entertainment (farces, comedies, music-hall, 
operetta, etc.) kept the population and the troops in a good mood’.40
Similarly, Jeffrey Schnapp ‘has alleged that the regime elaborated a total 
concept of spectacle, founded on a wholesale Fascist theatricalisation of Italian 
life’.41 In his work upon cultural politics under Fascism, Schnappp held that the 
regime had never taken too seriously the texts and contents in play in Fascist 
theatre, since these texts were, he argued, riddled with contradictions. What 
mattered was ‘the aesthetic over-production through which the regime sought to 
compensate for, fill in, and cover up its unstable ideological core’.42 The 
mythological reworking of Fascist ideals and ethics, acted out and given life 
through various rituals, provided a far more effective set of tools for the 
manufacture of consent towards the regime than the conduct of more conventional 
propaganda could ever hope to achieve:
‘( ...)  II Duce called for a new kind of theatre altogether; a theatre for the masses if not of 
the masses. The ground for a mass theatre was prepared in Italy and elsewhere. Apart from 
open-air theatre, the thespian cars, a fleet o f mobile modular theatres, were already in 
operation throughout the country. The primary purpose of these productions was hardly to 
advance the theatrical repertory. Rather, as Schnapp shows, it was to bind a disparate 
people into a linguistic group that was also a political mass, one national-ideological body.
40 Kuhnl, ‘Cultural politics o f fascist governments’, in Berghaus (ed.), Fascism and Theatre, p. 35.
41 As cited in Bosworth, ‘Tourist planning in Fascist Italy and the limits o f a totalitarian culture’, 
Journal o f  Contemporary European History, Cambridge UniversiWPress, vol. 6, part I, March 
1997, p. 2: Jeffrey T. Schnapp, ’18 BL: Fascist mass spectacle’, RepreHnta&ons, vol. 43, n. 1, 1993, 
pp. 92-3.
As cited in David Roberts, ‘How not to think about fascism and ideology, intellectual antecedents 
and historical meaning’, Journal o f  Contemporary History, vol. 35, no. 2, April 2000, p. 204: 
Schnapp, Staging Fascism: 18 BL and the Theater o f  Masses fo r Masses, Stanford, California, 
Stanford University Press, 1996, p. 6.
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And in this binding, the medium was the message: these productions presented the fascist 
regime as a ubiquitous agent committed to modernizing the nation, to turning Italy into a 
totality at once aesthetic, technological and political -in  a word spectacular’.43
If this ‘new cultural history’ has a major flaw, it is its willingness to take at 
face value Fascist rhetoric about the construction of a ‘totalitarian society’ in which 
the regime had accessed every aspect of the Italian nation. An interesting set of 
questions arise when, having taken on board many of the arguments and methods of 
the new cultural historians, other scholars have tended to examine life under the
44regime in a systematic way.
This study will utilise detailed archival research to look at one aspect of 
Fascist cultural politics. It will examine the cultural policies of Venice between the 
two world wars. Its focus will be upon Venice, a town caught between the Fascist 
regime and the demands of the local economy. Venice, under Fascism, represented 
an outstanding example of a cultural resort existing between local economic 
interests, national directives and the European tourist economy. The history of the 
relationship between the Fascist state and Venetian cultural politics tells us much 
about the ambiguous nature of the project to ‘nationalise the Italian masses’.45
Since the late nineteenth-century, the ‘nationalisation of the masses’ had, in 
various forms, been a consistent feature of the nation-building ambitions of Italy’s 
ruling elites.46 Gentile has argued that Fascism ‘intended to integrate and 
‘nationalise’ the masses within the structures of a new totalitarian state 
transforming them into an organised moral community under the command of a 
hierarchy, inspired by a limitless belief in Fascism’s myths, which were to be 
transmitted to them through organisations, symbols and rituals’ 47 Given the 
absence of any single Fascist style, however, it is difficult to evaluate the complex 
relationship between art and Fascist rhetoric, and it is not the point of this study to
43 Hal Foster, ‘Forewofd’, in Schnapp, Staging Fascism, p. XIII.
44 See for instance, Bosworth, “ Venice between Fascism and international tourism 1911-45’, 
Modern Italy, 4, 1, 1999.
45 The term ‘nationalisation’ indicates the process through which a population is integrated by the 
state into the nation also in order to achieve its consensus to rule.
46 See for instance, George L. Mosse, The Nationalisation o f  the Masses. Political Symbolism and 
Mass Movements in Germany from the Napoleonic Wars through the Third Reich, New York, 
Howard Fertig, 1975.
18
establish the level of ideology incorporated by the cultural events staged in Venice. 
For the purposes of this work, the content of the cultural showcases is less 
important than how the Venetian municipality attempted to use them as a means of 
pursuing the locally determined interests of the town, in particular through their 
being placed at the service of the all-important local tourist economy.
It is the aim of this thesis to investigate the attitudes of the Venetian ruling 
class to the Fascist national project of the ‘aesthetization of the masses’48 through 
culture and the extent to which local elites regarded Fascist ideological objectives 
as compatible with their own regional interests. Analysing the Venetian case, the 
thesis will demonstrate that local elites were not primarily interested in the 
promotion of the Fascist ideology in the city through cultural politics, but rather 
that when staging exhibitions, plays, concerts and festivals, they were simply 
prioritising economic growth and the vitality of the tourist industry, closely inter­
related objectives that clearly pre-dated Fascism’s rise to power. The thesis will 
also explore the ways in which the Venetian municipality found a ‘niche’ within 
Fascism, taking advantage of national politics to satisfy its own dream of wealth 
and prosperity, regardless of ideological motivations.
These themes are developed through the process of addressing a number of 
fundamental questions. Were the cultural politics of Venice a straightforward 
vehicle for Fascist rhetoric and the creation of a national consciousness, or were 
such concerns combined with and balanced against pragmatic, non-ideological 
purposes? How did the Fascist regime’s expressed desire for a ‘mobilisation of 
mass culture’ interact with the city authorities’ own priority of revitalizing the 
economy through the benefits of traditional cultural events? How far, and with what 
degree of commitment, did Venice acknowledge Fascist rhetoric within her 
economic plans to rejuvenate the area? These questions raise numerous important 
issues, and the answers to them may produce an interpretation of Italian Fascism 
that sits uneasily with the image of a totalitarian state penetrating every level of 
Italian society, a view of the regime commonly associated with the new cultural
47 Gentile, ‘Fascism as political religion’, p. 241.
48 The term indicates a process of nationalisation through messages conveyed by using aesthetic 
stances.
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historians.49 Instead, it can be demonstrated that life in Italy under Fascism could in 
several important respects remain relatively unaffected by state or party intrusion 
and were more usually characterised by a sense of continuity from the Liberal era 
through to the post-war Republican regime.
1.1 The importance of cultural tourism in Venice
According to Richard Bosworth, for an entire century, between 1860 and 
1960, Italy’s most profitable industry (and certainly the one with the largest number 
of employees) was tourism. Tourism in Italy pre-dated the process of Italian 
unification. From the seventeenth century onwards, tourism played an increasingly 
significant role in the economic and social life of a range of Italian towns and 
states. It is against this historical background that the emergence of Venice as 
Italy’s most popular twentieth century tourist destination must be understood, 
indeed, the first major bathing establishment opened as early as 1833.50
Almost a century later, in 1931, Mussolini publicly associated himself with 
this tradition and boldly pronounced tourism to be one of Italy’s four major routes 
to prosperity.51 For Bosworth, tourism was now considered as Italy’s second most 
important industry (after agriculture) and, it was commonly believed, contained 
significant potential for further expansion. Developing the tourist industry was thus 
recognised as a matter of great importance at the highest levels of government (and 
the mounting economic crisis of the 1930s surely influenced Mussolini’s 
consideration of the requirements of the industry at this particular point). In the 
years immediately after the Fascist seizure of power, Italy had enjoyed something 
of a tourist boom with the number of tourists in 1925 standing at 1,350,000, which
52represented an increase of more than 100 per cent on 1922 levels. Bosworth 
claims that tourism was estimated to have injected some 3,600 million lire into the 
national economy, wiping out 61 per cent of Italy’s budget deficit. Admittedly, the
49 See for instance, Gentile, ‘Fascism as political religion’, p. 241.
50 Bosworth, Italy and the Wider World 1860-1960, London and New York, Routledge, 1993, pp. 
174-5.
51 Ibid.
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figures for 1925 may have been slightly exceptional as 1925 was L ’Anno Santo 
(Holy Year), scheduled to occur only once every twenty-five years, and marked by 
a number of religious celebrations that brought many Catholic pilgrims to Rome in 
addition to the normal tourist visitors.
Nevertheless, for Bosworth, after 1925, the fortunes of the Italian tourist 
industry began to decline. An overvalued lira in 1927 acted as a strong disincentive 
to foreign travellers, and in 1929 there were only 900,000 tourist visitors, spending 
just 2,418 million lire (equivalent to just 35 per cent of the balance of payments 
deficit).54 While such statistics were being digested by treasury officials and tourist 
industry bureaucrats, further economic and financial woes struck the United States 
and Germany, both major sources of visitors to Venice. The crisis reached its low 
point in 1932, when tourism’s contribution to the national budget was estimated to 
be only 1,004 million lire. Industry spokesmen pointed out that this sum still 
amounted to 58 per cent of the budget deficit, but this can be easily explained if one 
considers the contracting size of the Italian economy and budget expenditure levels. 
Nevertheless, as Bosworth argues, tourism could still be said to be making an 
important contribution to the national economy, and industry insiders were proud to 
declare that Italy had confirmed its standing as the third most popular tourist venue 
in the world, behind France and Canada.55
In 1934, as part of the complex processes of bureaucratic enlargement and 
reorganisation of the Fascist state, responsibility for the national tourist industry 
had come under the control of Mussolini’s son-in-law Galeazzo Ciano, and it was 
his drive towards administrative centralisation that led to the establishment of the 
Direzione Generale del Turismo.56 In 1936, Mussolini reaffirmed his own 
commitment, delivering a forthright speech stressing the importance of tourism in 
Italy and declaring bluntly that ‘Tourism [was] an ideology’ and part of the path to 
an Italian modernity.57 Tourism brought benefits for hotels, summer and winter 
resorts, sport facilities, railway and road services; all industries ‘in need of
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibidem, ‘The Touring Club Italiano’, p. 394.
57 RafFaele Calzini, ‘Invito a rivedere lTtalia’, II Popolo d ’Italia, 6 August 1936.
21
modernisation’. The industry could also boast of a role in recruiting thousands of 
Italians, promoting a series of prestigious cultural and leisure activities as well as 
providing the impetus for the construction of new theatres, concert halls, cinemas, 
beach and skiing establishments.58 Essentially, however, tourism, for Mussolini, 
served two main functions. The first included both the import of foreign currency 
and the export of Italian currency abroad. The second entailed the fostering of 
Italian national prestige through promotion of greater awareness of the treasures of 
Italy. Tourist institutions, cultural associations, leisure companies and other 
powerful organisations such as the Touring Club59 and the Istituto LUCE60 were all 
vehicles for the dissemination of cultural and tourist propaganda: as an example, in 
1936, the central events of such policy were considered to be the Milan Triennale 
and the Venice Biennale.61
In the case of Venice, we have the example of a city serving the economic 
purposes of tourism (sustaining the import of foreign currency and the export of 
Italian currency as demanded by the Duce), but it cannot be said that the 
municipality dedicated itself to any broader Fascist ideological functions such as 
the representation of the nation at home and abroad if this did not create any direct 
economic benefit. Cultural tourism in Venice had always represented the main 
source of profit for the city, and cultural events were primarily understood as a 
necessary incentive for the tourist movement rather than reinforcing the Fascist 
ideological project. Despite Mussolini’s declarations, tourism in the lagoon had 
never operated as a predominantly ideological vehicle but was geared essentially 
towards practical concerns, and the tourist industry was more a centre of corporate 
opportunism than rigid Fascist fanaticism. In a city where the town council had
58 Ibid.
59 The Touring Club Italiano was an association founded in 1894 which aimed at the spread of 
‘cultural and qualitative promotion of tourism’ amongst Italians (Giuseppe Bozzini, ‘Turismo 
insieme: l’associazionismo e il Touring Club Italiano’, in Touring Club Italiano (ed.), 90 A m i di 
Turismo in Italia 1894-1984, Milano, TCI, 1984, p. 35).
60 Bom in 1924, the Istituto LUCE (L’Unione Cinematografica Educativa) was a body created by 
Fascism in order to ensure the presence of the state in the cinematographic industry which had, up to 
that point, been dominated by private hands. The Istituto LUCE aimed at promoting a type of 
educational and propagandistic production, isolated from commercial interests.
61 Calzini, ‘Invito a rivedere l’ltalia’. However, in his work on the Touring Club Italiano, Bosworth 
insists that the Club was ‘alien to any political commitment which [was] completely outside its own
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considered making degree-level qualifications compulsory for those acting as
ff)tourist guides, and where the town celebrations committee included as many as 
seventy members, keeping tourism alive was vital, particularly in the years of the 
Great Depression.
Even dedicated and cultured Fascists such as Ugo Ojetti,64 when looking at 
Venice, pointed to the practical economic benefits of cultural events, claiming that 
they should be arranged not only for the sake of education but also for their 
commercial potential. Noting the success of the Settecento Exhibition of traditional 
Venetian crafts65 the previous year, Ojetti urged that similar events be set up in the 
future.66 By the same token, according to Antonio Maraini, Secretary General of the 
Venice Biennale of International Arts from 1928, Venice should be keen to 
welcome to the Biennale retrospective exhibitions which had been so appreciated 
in the past, while the cultural initiatives of the Venetian municipality should cater 
for a broad local public, so as to contribute to the overcoming of the town’s 
economic difficulties. In addition, it was recognized that publicity and marketing 
for the programmes of cultural events in Venice wgl^crucial if the Venetian tourist 
industry was to be modernised, enabling it to do well in a competitive international 
tourist market. For Ojetti, therefore, the economic function of tourism was as 
important as the ideological function. As for the Biennale, as will be discussed in a 
later chapter, debates at meetings of the administrative committees often had more 
to do with the promotion of an entrepreneurial outlook and economic benefits than 
with artistic or propagandist^ factors.69
field of interest (...). The official stance thus was, and remained that the TCI had no politics’ 
(Bosworth, ‘The Touring Club Italiano’, p. 382).
62 Archivio Municipale di Venezia, Verbali delle sedute della Consulta Municipale di Venezia, 
session 8 October 1931.
63 ‘Feste Veneziane. Consensi e dissensi’, La Nuova Venezia. 6 August 1924.
64 Ojetti was a writer and journalist who founded and directed the cultural reviews Dedalo, Pegaso 
and Pan. He was a member'of the directive board of the Enciclopedia Italiana and was appointed 
Accademico d ’ltalia in J930.
65 The exhibition will be extensively discussed in chapter 4.
66 Ojetti, ‘Lettera al Conte Volpi di Misurata sull’Arte a Venezia’, La Gazzetta di Venezia, 2 October 
1930.
67 The exhibition will be discussed extensively in chapter 4.
68 Ojetti, ‘Lettera al Conte Volpi’.
69 Strikingly, for the Venetian notable Elio Zorzi, the success of a cultural enterprise could be 
quantitatively gauged by tourist numbers (Zorzi, ‘Bilancio consuntivo della Terza Mostra d’Arte 
Cinematografica’, Rivista delle Tre Venezie, September 1935).
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The emphasis on the importance of supporting cultural tourism in Venice 
became more prominent within Biennale records70 from mid-193 5 onwards, when 
the economic function of tourism was threatened by international hostilities. 
Although fascist ethics easily accommodated war, conflict and political instability 
represented a major danger for the tourist industry and Venetian commercial 
activities. In this regard, Giuseppe Volpi (the local business magnate and Fascist 
Minister who had been appointed President of the Venice Biennale in 193071) and 
his entourage worried mainly about the consequences any conflict might have in 
halting flows of holidaymakers towards Venice, especially given the town’s 
experience during the First World War.
In 1935, Volpi, in his reports to the Biennale committee, claimed that due to 
the present political situation, it was not safe to rely ‘on any long-term advantages 
bestowed by the tourist industry upon the Venetian economy’.72 Again, in 1939, he 
warned that political circumstances were adversely affecting the tourist sector, 
making it hazardous to predict future incomes other than those included in the 
official contributions made to the institution.73 In 1941, Romolo Bazzoni, 
Administrative Director at the Biennale, bemoaned the fact that the exhibition, 
despite a ceremonial inauguration in the presence of the king on 18 August 1940, 
had been doomed to failure because of the decline of tourism caused by 
international events and above all, Italy’s entry into the war on 10 June.74 Volpi, 
therefore, aimed at putting the emphasis on the strategic role of tourism in Venice 
in a difficult period: ‘Venice needs a conspicuous tourist movement which is not 
easily created in times like this. However, we have accomplished the task well due 
to our commitment to the Biennale festivals. This noble form of artistic attraction, 
between summer and autumn 1941, has contributed to the arrival of numerous
70 The Archivio Storico delle Arti Contemporanee, headed by Domenico Varagnolo, was 
inaugurated in November 1928 with the aim of keeping track of the life of the Biennale.
71 Regio Decreto Legge 13 January 1930, La Gazzetta Ufficiale del Regno d ’ltalia, n. 33, 12 
February 1930 (La Biennale di Venezia (ed.), La Biennale di Venezia. Storia e Statistiche, Venezia, 
Edizioni La Biennale di Venezia, 1932, pp. X-XIV). Volpi will be discussed extensively in chapter 
3.
72 Archivio Storico delle Arti Contemporanee di Venezia, Verbali delle Adunanze del Comitato di 
Amministrazione dell’Ente Biennale, vol. Ill, 28/01/35-30/01/43, session 31 July 1935.
73 Ibid, session 15 November 1939.
74 Ibid, session 21 April 1941.
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travellers in town: 400,000 more tourists have visited the lagoon this year,
compared to 1940’.75 Volpi then adopted a statistical approach, arguing: ‘Since
every individual has spent about 70 lire in town, we can assume that the tourist
movement has benefited the city to the extent of an extra 35 million lire over the
previous year. This figure is therefore particularly meaningful for us, and we wish
A lejandro
to announce it to Minister hniciano Pavolini, so that he may know that the sacrifice 
in financially supporting the festival undertaken by the Ministry of Popular Culture
• 76  •was worth it’. Unsurprisingly, Volpi never spoke in favour of the war during 
those meetings as it was substantially ‘against’ Venice’s interests, and tourism had 
to be protected by every possible means.77
This is another striking example indicating that local needs and hopes were 
quite different from what fascist ideology should, in theory, have dictated. De 
Felice has argued that Mussolini lost the consensus he had achieved amongst the 
Italian population in the 1930s over the war issue.78 This was all the more evident 
in cultural resorts resting upon tourism, such as Venice, where war threatened to 
fundamentally destabilise the local economy.
In The Culture o f Consent, Victoria De Grazia claimed that she ‘gradually 
understood the real political power of the modes of persuasion by which Fascism 
had penetrated every domain of social life from industrial enterprise and city 
neighbourhood to rural village’.79 The Venetian case suggests that this can at best 
be only partially true. Throughout this thesis, it will be argued that the municipal 
authorities were not heavily involved in soliciting popular consent to the regime 
through cultural activities, nor would they accept uncritically the claim that national 
politics and local interests would invariably overlap, leading to a marked reluctance 
to follow the former if it was believed that the latter might be adversely affected.80
75 Ibid, session 17 December 1941.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
78 De Felice, Mussolini II Duce. Gli Anni del Consenso, Torino, Einaudi, 1965, p. 156.
79 Victoria De Grazia, The Culture o f Consent. Mass Organisation o f  Leisure in Fascist Italy, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981, p. IX.
80 De Felice has showed that ‘the industrial bourgeoisie did not adhere totally to Fascism, from its 
very beginnings, was always mistrustful of its radicalism, and did not induce the March on Rome, 
but accepted it in the anticipation of a normalisation of politics along conservative and constitutional 
lines, and with no intention of establishing a totalitarian regime (...). The upper bourgeoisie never
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Artistic events staged in Venice, such as concerts, exhibitions, plays and festivals 
were, first and foremost, initiatives promoted by political and economic elites who 
were interested in the internationalisation of the city in the service of commerce and 
business. Therefore, culture in Venice had to translate into a viable commercial 
product to be sold to a distinctive, modem, twentieth century public.
Chapter 2 analyses the role of local cultural events in creating wealth and 
prosperity for the entire Venice community. The municipal Tourist Office had the 
vital task of arranging a continuous string of celebrations in order to keep the 
municipality financially afloat. Chapter 3 considers the career of Giuseppe Volpi, 
Venetian businessman and Minister of Finances under Fascism. Volpi strenuously 
promoted the project of the Greater Venice for which the Venetian district came to 
be divided into two distinct areas of economic development: Porto Marghera, with 
its industrial plants, and historic Venice, now entirely destined to cultural tourism. 
Chapter 4 explores the role of the Venice Biennale of International Arts as a 
champion of aesthetic diversification essentially for commercial purposes. In the 
1930s, the exhibition also established itself as a mediator between art production 
and art consumption, providing an important liaison between the world of the artists 
and that of their patrons. The chapter also considers the Settecento Exhibition of 
1929, and the introduction of decorative arts at the Biennale. The two moments 
were coordinated with the explicit aim of revitalizing the declining Venetian 
traditional activities, and incorporated, therefore, an economic function rather than 
an ideological one. Chapter 5 focuses on the birth of the Cinema Festival and the 
Casino Municipale as ‘tourist facilitators’, following the urban regeneration of the 
Lido beach resort as a site of elite tourism in the 1930s. Ultimately, the thesis 
locates itself within a developing revisionist literature which both challenges 
traditional interpretations of the nature of Fascist 'totalitarianism' and emphasises 
the extent to which local elites retained the ability to act independently of central 
government in order to pursue the goals which were identified as best serving their 
own economic interests.
accepted Fascism completely because of its fears about Fascism to extend its control over economic 
activities (As cited in Gentile, ‘Fascism in Italian historiography’, p. 189).
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2. Culture in Venice: commercial business or vehicle for Fascist ideology?
This chapter considers the celebrations and events held during the summer 
season in Venice, examining them both as tourist attractions and contributors to the 
local economy. It will show how the institution of the Venetian Tourist Office was 
central to the preparation of the cultural programme, thereby importing a strong 
element of commercial interest into what might otherwise have been a project 
dominated exclusively by artistic, aesthetic or Fascist ideological motivations. In 
turn, those cultural events were then taxed in order to provide revenue for 
institutions of tourism (including the Tourist Office), strongly suggesting that the 
relationship between culture and commerce was an important influence upon the 
shape and nature both of the Venice tourist industry and Venetian Fascism.
In the 1930s, the task of formulating a tourist programme of genuine 
popular appeal was vital, not only on a season-to-season basis, but also with the 
long term aim of reviving the tourist economy during a period of prolonged 
international recession. Fascist organs such as the Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro 
(OND) were, unsurprisingly, involved in this common effort, and cultural events 
staged by them also sought to relieve unemployment and boost tourism. Such 
objectives go some way to explaining the importance attributed to the 
implementation of new tourist techniques, and the massive publicity and marketing 
campaigns undertaken as inherent parts of the processes of commercialisation to 
which Venice’s cultural heritage was subject.
Tourism lay at the heart of the Venetian economy. Yet, the question of what 
kind of tourism should be developed prompted much debate and disagreement. As 
will be shown, when local tourist industry interests were encouraged by the state to 
foster a new mass Italian tourism drawn from a wide range of social groups cutting 
across traditional class boundaries, not all Venetian businessmen agreed. Some, 
particularly within the hotel industry, even when confronted with the argument that 
the development of mass tourism might well be of greater benefit to the entire town 
community, expressed a preference for continuing to appeal to elite customers. This 
tells us much about the reception of Fascist policies within the hotel industry; 
leading entrepreneurs were willing to follow Fascist directives provided that these
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did not interfere with their often narrowly defined commercial outlook. Economic 
well-being and self-interest ultimately mattered more than the conveyance of any 
ideologically driven Fascist message, and sometimes even more than the economic 
fortunes of the town itself.
2.1 Cultural events at the heart of the Venetian tourist calendar
Venice’s summer season revolved around the prestigious Biennale of 
International Arts, the opening ceremony of which traditionally marked the 
inauguration of the summer entertainments.1 According to historian Marco 
Fincardi, the city’s population was mobilised in the 1920s in order to welcome 
travellers, and prepare a series of celebrations and attractions covering the entire 
tourist season. A project of such scope involved agencies as important as the 
Compagnia Italiana dei Grandi Alberghi (the Ciga -one of the largest Italian hotel 
companies based in Venice), the Biennale’s commercial apparatus, and the OND, 
which, Fincardi claims, helped to forge a series of links between locals and 
foreigners through its cultural activities.
These practices continued well into the 1930s, when the calendar of local 
fairs, concerts, sport events and exhibitions was structured by the town council to 
provide a continuous string of attractions for a multi-faceted audience. It seems that 
in Venice, any festival, whether established by Fascism or inherited from the 
Liberal era, was cause for celebration. All were meant to complement and 
contextualize ‘the exceptional events held by the Biennale organisation’. The 
Music, Theatre and Cinema festivals, for instance, were established, first and 
foremost, with the aim of framing and enhancing the Biennale Exhibition of 
International Arts4 and were quite deliberately staged ‘at the time in which the art 
exhibit [was] being held at the Giardini Pubblicf.5 Throughout the 1930s, the
1 See for instance, ASAC, Serie Verbali delle Adunanze del Comitato di Amministrazione dell’Ente 
Biennle, vol. Ill, 28/01/35-30/01/43, session 28 January 1935.
2 Marco Fincardi, ‘Gli ‘Anni Ruggenti’ dell’antico leone. La modema realta del mito di Venezia’, 
Contemporanea, IV, n. 3, July 2001, p. 451.
3 AMV, Determinazioni Podestarili, ‘Turismo. Festeggiamenti 1936’, trim. II, 1936, n. 1292.
4 Archivio di Stato di Venezia, Gabinetto della Prefettura di Venezia, anni 1893-1936, pacco n. 15, 
busta ‘Spettacoli, trattenimenti, pellicole cinematografiche’.
5 Alberto Zajotti, ‘Origini, scopi e mezzi del Festival Musicale di Venezia’, La Rivista di Venezia, 
August 1930. The film festival, however, went on to achieve enough popularity to enable it to
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Biennale maintained its status as the highest profile event upon the summer 
programme, encapsulating the essence of prestigious cultural tourism by which 
Venice sought to identify itself. If, for the Fascist regime, the Biennale had by 1930 
come to embody the apex of a national network of art exhibitions established by the 
syndical system,6 for the Venetian town council, it had always stood at the top of 
the tourist entertainment schedule arranged for the summer season.
Because any local celebration, fair or amusement, was planned to fit in with 
and complement the main Biennale attractions, not only was its administrative 
committee in charge of supervising the preparation of the relevant festivals -  its 
usual task -  it also sought to ensure that a significant number of additional events 
were staged in support of the Biennale during summer vacations. Once Volpi and 
his entourage dedicated themselves to ensuring the overall success of the tourist 
season, they became increasingly involved not just with the Biennale venture, but 
with the planning of the Venetian entertainment calendar as a whole, operating in
n
close connection with the Consulta Municipale.
As soon as Volpi was appointed President of the Ente Autonomo Biennale
o
in 1930, he started directing his energies towards the organisation of as many 
events as possible in order to attract the widest public. For example, during one of 
the various committee meetings, Volpi turned his attention to a forthcoming 
Japanese Exhibition prepared by Baron Aloisi and Baron Okura from Tokyo, in the 
hope of staging it in Venice, 4 so that the Biennale might be enhanced by an 
additional attraction which would bring a larger attendance’.9 Another project 
backed by Volpi entailed the nocturnal illumination of the exhibition pavilions in 
order to open them to evening visitors.10
acquire a distinctive cultural identity of its own.
6 Regio Decreto Legge 13 January 1930, La Gazzetta Ufficiale del Regno d ’ltalia, n. 33, 12 
February 1930 (La Biennale di Venezia (ed.), La Biennale di Venezia, pp. X-IV), with which the 
Venice Biennale was officially recognised as a state body.
7 ASAC, Serie Verbali delle Adunanze del Comitato di Amministrazione dell’Ente Biennale, vol. I, 
27/02/30-07/12/31, session 3 March 1930.
8 Regio Decreto Legge 13 January 1930, La Gazzetta Ufficiale del Regno d ’ltalia, n. 33, 12 
February 1930 (La Biennale di Venezia (ed.), La Biennale di Venezia, pp. X-IV).
9 ASAC, Serie Verbali delle Adunanze del Comitato di Amministrazione dell’Ente Biennale, vol. I, 
27/02/30-07/12/31, session 3 March 1930.
10 Ibid, vol. II, 01/01/32-06/07/34, session 15 November 1932.
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Throughout the 1930s, the municipal authorities prioritized the task of 
increasing tourist numbers. Various decrees from the Podesta, the Fascist official 
representing the local authority in Venice, and the head of the Consulta 
Municipale}x were aimed at this target. In this light, in 1931, the Podesta allocated 
50,000 lire as a contribution to the Easter symphonic concerts. Under the sub­
heading ‘The necessity of prolonging the tourist season’, the decree observed that 
‘the previous symphonic season successfully boosted tourism with great benefit to 
the hotel industry and the citizens’ interest in general’.12 A year later, the official 
determined that the town council would ‘support with conspicuous funds any 
responsible civic enterprise which aimed at the creation of a post-tourist season 
[stagione anti-turistica]' allowing Italian and foreign travellers to extend their stay 
in Venice’.13
On 5 February 1936, Volpi made clear that it was essential to the very 
success of the Biennale to establish a number of ‘cultural showcases of a 
spectacular character’.14 While he argued that the Cinema section did not need any 
additional support to maintain its existing popularity, he did express some concern 
about the Music Festival which had in past years, he observed, ‘proved extremely 
costly without meeting the expectations of the public’.15 He went on to mention 
how Antonio Maraini (Secretary General at the Biennale), during a recent trip to 
Budapest, had been introduced to the Hungarian National Ballet, whose shows 
‘could easily represent an artistic attraction to fit the Venetian celebrations’.16 As
11 The Consulta Municipale in 1924 replaced the town council as a liberal body of local 
administration directly elected by the citizens. The members of the Consulta were in fact nominated 
by the Prefect of Venice, the official representing the central government in the city.
12 AMV, Determinazioni Podestarili, ‘Turismo. Contributo per concerti orchestrali sinfonici di 
Quaresima 1931’, trim. I, 1931, n. 93.
13 Ibid.
14 ASAC, Serie Verbali delle Adunanze del Comitato di Amministrazione dell’Ente Biennale, vol. 
Ill, 28/01/35-30/01/43, session 5 February 1936.
15 Ibid. As early as 23 July 1930, the Prefect of Venice wrote to Guido Beer, member of the Grand 
Council, about the first Music Festival: ‘(...) I am doubtful about the public consensus given to the 
festival, considered the economic crisis affecting this city, too. Moreover, during the autumn season, 
all the Venetian manorial families are reaching to the countryside, while it is difficult to make any 
accurate predictions about the more elite foreign visitors better able to understand and appreciate 
this kind of events’ (As cited in Enzo Scotto Lavina, ‘1927, 1936. Frammenti di un decennio di 
politica culturale tra Roma e Venezia’, in La Biennale di Venezia (ed.), Venezia 32, 82, Venezia, 
ERI-Edizioni Rai, 1982, p. 22). The Music Festival will be later taken away from the Biennale’s 
domain for economic reasons (see chapter 3).
16 ASAC, Serie Verbali delle Adunanze del Comitato di Amministrazione dell’Ente Biennale, vol.
30
for the theatre productions, Volpi announced that a definite programme was not 
available at that moment, but his idea was to stage, with the aid of the Ispettorato
17del Teatro, two plays by Carlo Goldoni. Additionally, he tackled a proposal for 
horse racing from the Olympic Committee, asserting that the final decision should 
rest with the Consulta}* Even in wartime, Sunday concerts within the Biennale 
gardens were organised ‘with the hope of increasing the number of visitors and 
sales’.19
Because of its strategic importance, the planning of the tourist calendar of 
events was a most delicate task. To a large extent, public success directly depended 
upon the right timing and blend of cultural showcases. To Volpi, creating an 
appealing tourist schedule entailed the use of his trademark business rationality in 
order to offer high-quality commodities to an identifiable market. A fundamental 
rule was the rationalisation of the programme, so as to differentiate and stagger 
cultural products throughout the summer season. A glance at the typical calendar of 
events gives some idea of how hectic the Venetian summer season had become in 
its efforts to provide for the tourists and stimulate economic activity in the lagoon. 
In 1931, the monthly review La Rivista di Venezia published the programme of 
forthcoming summer events announcing that the Tourist Office in Venice had 
compiled the schedule of entertainment taking place during the ‘tourist year’:20
1-31 May: International Exhibition of physical education and sports;
Ceremonial inauguration of the exhibition at the Palazzo dell’Esposizione 
Biennale in the public Giardini Castello;
8-17 May: Male and female federal competitions of gymnastics. 10,000 lire of 
prizes awarded;
12-13 May: International convention of the ‘Amici dell’Educazione Fisica’ in the
III, 28/01/35-30/01/43, session 5 February 1936.
17 The Ispettorato del Teatro, directed by Nicola De Pirro, depended from the Minister of National 
Education and dealt with the national theatrical production.
18 ASAC, Serie Verbali delle Adunanze del Comitato di Amministrazione dell’Ente Biennale, vol. 
Ill, 28/01/35-30/01/43, session 5 February 1936.
19 Giuliana Tomasella, Biennali di Guerra. Arte e Propaganda negli Anni del Conflitto (1939-1944), 
Padova, II Poligrafo, 2001, p. 37.
20 ‘L’estate turistica 1931 a Venezia e Lido’, La Rivista di Venezia, August 1931.
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Napoleon Hall in St. Mark’s Square;
21 June: III Pavia-Venice Motorboat race. Lavish prizes and honour cups;
28 June: Grand Festival of the Sea. Glorification of the Italian sailor. Offering of 
flowers, with historic and modem parades;
First decade of July: Grand Night Festival of the ‘Venetian Shawl’ at the Lido. 
Election of the Queen of Shawls. Gifts and prizes;
18 July: Traditional ‘Redentore’ Festival21 on the Giudecca Canal;
First decade of August: Pro ‘remi velisque’. Regattas. Honour prizes;
August at the Lido: Grand mid-August fair. Exhibition of agricultural produce. 
Special chorus and band performances. Traditional Night Festival on the Grand 
Canal;
First ten days of September: Inauguration of the XV International Maritime 
Convention under the patronage of president right honourable Giovanni Giuriati; 
1-29 September: Culture courses for foreigners and Italians organised by the 
Istituto Internazionale Italiano at Ca’ Foscari University;
1-6 September: III International Tennis tournament at the Lido;
6 September: Grand Historic Regatta of gondolas along the Grand Canal. Prizes; 
7-12 September: International golf competitions at the Lido;
13-20 September: III International nautical competition. Lavish prizes; 
August-September: Fashion events and beach festivals at the Hotel Excelsior. 
Outdoor dancing. Exceptional music concerts of the town band. Airborne 
excursions. Evening concerts in St. Mark’s Square. Dancing at the Giardini 
Castello. Night boat trips. Amusement Park at the Lido.
Although none of the Biennale festivals were programmed for 1931, the 
summer calendar clearly highlighted the desire to achieve a continuous
' 99‘mobilisation’ of tourists, and to ‘satisfy the tastes of both natives and foreigners’. 
In 1932, when the Biennale art exhibit and the supplementary festivals were 
included in the summer programme, various celebrations and amusements for a
21 The Festa del Redentore is one of Venice’s most ancient popular festival which takes place at the 
end of July every year with a regatta and fireworks. It marks the end of the 16th century plague that 
hit the area with devastating effects.
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popular audience were accompanied by a string of more elitist cultural attractions 
which the town council had labelled ‘art festivals promoted by the Biennale’, and 
placed ‘under the high patronage of the right honourable Head of Government’.23 
The Committee of Honour formed for the art festivals included several Fascist 
gerarchi such as Giuseppe Bottai, Galeazzo Ciano, Achille Starace and Alfredo 
Rocco, but the ‘executive committee’ was made up of three familiar names: Volpi, 
Maraini and the Podesta, Mario Alvera.24 The 1932 celebrations were scheduled as 
follows:
24-25 April or 4 May: Inauguration of the Biennale of International Arts;
27-28 April or 6-7 May:'Convention on Contemporary Art;
1-15 June: Contemporary Art Courses;
15-20 July: Poetry Convention and Literary Prize;
1-15 August: Cinema Festival;
1-15 September: Music Festival;
• • 7  ^1-28 October: Competitions for the celebration of the March on Rome.
It was important that these events celebrated grand local traditions, and the 
Podesta had made sure that programmes of amusements included ‘various feste of
♦ 7Apurely Venetian character’. However, the final tourist programme combined 
established local fairs with internationally acclaimed festivals; in formulating a 
viable commercial plan, it was vital to combine the charm of Venetian traditions 
with events of undoubted cosmopolitan appeal in order to meet the expectations of
7 7foreign visitors. Celebrations of Venice, far more than being for the exclusive 
benefit of the local population, were in fact the product of a sophisticated tourist
22 AMV, Determinazioni Podestarili, ‘Turismo. Spesa per le feste tradizionali’, trim II, 1932, n. 907.
23 ASAC, Serie Scatole Nere, busta n. 44, ‘Feste d ’arte promosse dalla Biennale di Venezia 1932’.
24 The executive committee retained the right to determine the life of the Biennale whereas the 
Committee of Honour provided the symbolic support to the event.
25 The document was actually a draft of the schedule, therefore dates were not definite yet.
26 AMV, Determinazioni Podestarili, ‘Feste tradizionali veneziane’, trim. II, 1931, n. 1259.
27 ‘The more exotic events would constitute an attraction for foreigners coming from distant nations 
and an enormous advantage to the city of Venice’ (As cited in Fincardi, ‘I fasti della ‘tradizione’. Le 
cerimonie della nuova venezianita’, in Mario Isnenghi, Stuart Woolf, (eds.), Storia di Venezia. II 
Novecento, vol. Ill, Istituto dell’Enciclopedia Italiana, Roma, 2002, p. 1497: Antonio Pellegrini, 11
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machine designed to attract the international bel mondo, whilst, at the same, time, 
also satisfying the local elites who cherished their ‘time-honoured rituals of social 
distinction’.28
Fincardi has argued that the ‘Venetian traditional costume fashion shows of 
1928 [were] definitely inspired by a nationalist ideology’.29 However, cultural 
autarchy and nationalism could not always sit easily with Venetian 
cosmopolitanism and the requirements of a multinational audience. In 1935, for 
example, and in spite of mounting anti-English feelings, Maraini praised the Ente 
Biennale for having included Shakespeare’s ‘The Merchant of Venice’ in the 
Theatre Festival programme, its production within natural Venetian settings 
enhancing the beauty of the performance.30
According to Emilio Gentile, in order to reinforce its own ideological 
positions and national mythologies in the public mind, the regime had tabled an 
entire calendar of celebrations, in which the key events of a mythological Fascist 
history (such as the birth of Rome and the stages of the Fascist Revolution) were 
commemorated in a series of ritual events. ‘From the very start of the movement’, 
Gentile argued, ‘Fascism’s main public ceremonies were organized not only to 
create evocative images of its power, but also to present symbolically the myth of 
the new Fascist state, in terms of its being a ‘moral community’ founded on a 
common faith, which united both classes and generations in the cult of the 
nation’.31
In Venice, however, public ceremonies were predominantly designed to 
contribute to an extended calendar of events intended for tourist consumption over 
and above ideological inculcation. Fincardi’s argument, placing the emphasis on the 
pragmatic side of these representations rather than the spiritual is therefore more 
convincing than Gentile’s.32 In 1935, the Grand Festival of the Sea might have been
Dopolavoro a Venezia ed i Raduni dei Costum Italiani, Scarabellini,Venezia, 1929, pp. 256-7).
28 Fincardi, ‘I fasti della ‘tradizione” , in Isnenghi, Woolf, (eds.), Storia di Venezia. 11 Novecento, p. 
1485.
29 Ibid, p. 1486.
30 ASAC, Serie Verbali delle Adunanze del Comitato di Amministrazione dell’Ente Biennale, vol. 
Ill, 28/01/35-30/01/43, session 15 February 1935.
31 Gentile, ‘Fascism as political religion’, pp. 244-5.
32 Fincardi, ‘I fasti della ‘tradizione” , in Isnenghi, Woolf, (eds.), Storia di Venezia, p. 1501.
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replaced by the Festival of the Light, and the boat racing by a ‘best of breed’ dog 
show,33 but the guiding spirit remained unchanged.34 For Venice, the primary role 
of cultural attractions was their position at the centre of an extraordinarily busy 
summer schedule, while their function as agencies for the creation of consent to 
Fascism was clearly of secondary significance.
2.2 A vital activity: long-term planning and the tourist season
The town council in Venice was responsible for formulating a summer list 
of events which was then implemented by the Tourist Office as part of its own 
agenda of expanding levels of tourism in the lagoon. However, planning a viable 
programme of leisure activities went beyond the single summer season, as the town 
council was well aware of the need to think in the long term. Since the various 
Biennale festivals only took place in even years,33 during the 1930s, it became 
essential to discover alternative attractions to be established in the odd years, when 
the festivals were not held.
Ideally, these events would be as prestigious as those of the Biennale and 
equally successful in drawing visitors to Venice. In this way, the entire decade 
might resemble an extended, continuous festival of culture where each year would 
be remembered for one particularly outstanding cultural event. To this end, it was 
decided that major exhibitions of well-known Venetian painters would be staged to 
create attractions of unquestionable popularity that could stand at the pinnacle of 
the summer agenda. It was in line with this approach that the exhibition of Titian in 
1935, the exhibition of Tintoretto in 1937, and the exhibition of Paolo Veronese in 
1939 were hosted. Significantly, the Biennale executive committee took charge of 
their organisation, so in many ways they can be regarded as a ‘continuation’ of the
33 ‘Water Festivals, art and sports events fill brilliant Venetian summer calendar’, New York Herald, 
26 May 1940.
34 Moreover, in 1935, the Minister for the Press and Propaganda had made clear to the Prefect of 
Venice that the local travel agencies could charge an additional 2, 3 or 5 lire to those tourists 
benefiting from travel discounts to Venice during the summer-autumn season only if they provided 
their customers ‘with a programme of events of paramount importance’ (AMV, Affari Generali del 
Comune di Venezia, quinquiennio 1931-34, fascicolo 34/X/3, ‘Facilitazioni ferroviarie per la 
stagione estivo-autunnale’).
35 This did not include the Biennale Film Festival which, from its start in 1932, took place every 
year.
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Exhibition of International Arts. According to Margaret Plant, these retrospectives 
retained ‘considerable prestige at a time when cultivation of the past determined 
many cultural initiatives’.37 For the municipal authorities, exhibitions 
commemorating classic Venetian artists signified both a celebration of the
38‘Venetianness’ of the enterprise and a confidence in their national and 
international profile and status.
The minutes of the meetings of the Consulta Municipale reveal that, at the 
beginning of the 1930s, members were seriously concerned about the financial 
position and the total expenditures of the comune. The discussions suggest that 
these events were regarded as a practical contribution to tourism and its related 
commercial activities as part of the town’s response to the onset of the Great 
Depression. Breathing new life into the tourist industry was arguably the primary 
strategy for dealing with the economic crisis.39 During the meeting of 12 February 
1935, the Podesta announced that the financial health of the municipality had 
dramatically improved since the end of the First World War, with the deficit having 
been reduced from 22 million lire to 3 million lire. According to the Podesta, the 
intense activity of the local Tourist Agency was responsible for this radical 
financial improvement. He made clear that the Office, acting under his ‘strict 
supervision’40 had introduced, for the upcoming season, ‘an art event of world 
magnitude, the exhibition of masterpieces by Titian which would be the focus for a 
major influx of Italian and foreign visitors’. ‘Tourism’, he argued, would ‘benefit 
greatly, and those who fear a decline of the tourist industry should only have to 
look at the positive returns’.41 With this in mind, the Podesta declared that the 
municipality had regularly produced a programme of celebrations ‘which in 
combination with the natural and artistic beauty of Venice contribute[d] to the 
expansion of the tourist movement in the city’.42 Alongside the standard sequence
36 AMV, Verbali delle sedute della Consulta Municipale di Venezia, session 12 February 1935.
37 Margaret Plant, Venice, Fragile City 1797-1997, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 
2000, p. 305.
38 The term indicates a blend of Venetian history and local traditions.
39 AMV, Verbali delle sedute della Consulta Municipale di Venezia, session 12 February 1935.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 AMV, Determinazioni Podestarili, ‘Turismo. Rappresentazione de ‘II Mercante di Venezia’ in 
campo S. Trovaso e Festa del Plenilunio in Piazza San Marco’, trim. Ill, 1935, n. 1140.
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of entertainments, some ‘extraordinary attractions’43 such as the Titian exhibition,44 
Shakespeare’s classic play ‘The Merchant of Venice’, and the Festival of the Full 
Moon were scheduled, for which the Podesta had allocated a grant of some 200,000 
lire.45
In the event, the profits of the Titian Exhibition went beyond all 
expectations,46 and the success led to a repetition of the experiment in 1937, with 
the exhibition of another Italian master, Tintoretto. In 1936, the Podesta had 
contacted the President of the Council of Ministers and the Ministry of 
Communications via the Prefect, demanding authorisation for the Tintoretto 
exhibition for the upcoming ‘tourist season’.47 According to the Prefect of Venice, 
the event would be entirely compatible with the cultural policies of the regime in
48that it would ‘both glorify Italian art and educate the nation’. However, the 
detailed report that the Podesta included with his request placed the emphasis on 
the commercial appeal of the commemoration rather than any spiritual or moral 
improvement of the population. The report stated:
‘An event such as the Tintoretto Exhibition which attracts so many tourists every year, 
more than any other enterprise embodies an initiative that may secure remarkable profits to 
the city. The immense popularity obtained by the Titian exhibition demonstrates that the 
Italian and international public of scholars and the general audience pay the greatest 
attention to retrospective exhibitions’.49
The Tintoretto exhibition was subsequently approved by the Direzione 
Generale per il Turismo (Undersecretary for Tourism, a body directly accountable
43 Ibid, ‘Turismo. Festeggiamenti estate 1935’, trim. Ill, 1935, n. 1358.
44 ‘The Titian Exhibition brought together works from Venetian churches and galleries, the Louvre,
and collections in Great Britain’ (Plant, Venice, Fragile City, p. 305).
45 AMV, Determinazioni'Podestarili, ‘Turismo. Rappresentazione de ‘II Mercante di Venezia’ in 
campo S. Trovaso e Festa del Plenilunio in Piazza San Marco’, trim. Ill, 1935, n.l 140.
46 ASAC, Serie Segreteria/Arti Visive, ‘Corrispondenza 1935’.
47 AMV, Determinazioni Podestarili, ‘Turismo. Esposizione del Tintoretto 25 April-4 November
1937’, trim. II, 1937, n. 834.
48 ASV, Gabinetto della Prefettura di Venezia, anni 1893-1936, pacco n. 4, busta ‘Esposizioni, 
mostre, congressi, fiere 1937’.
49 AMV, Determinazioni Podestarili, ‘Turismo. Esposizione del Tintoretto 25 April-4 November 
1937’, trim. II, 1937, n. 834.
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to the Minister for the Press and Propaganda).50 The official catalogue bore a list of 
dignitaries, aristocrats or Biennale representatives included in the committee of 
honour or in the executive committee. This was followed by an abstract of an 
article by Alberto Zajotti51 appearing in the Rivista di Venezia:
‘Whether upon aesthetics or administrative issues concerning the exhibition, the Duce 
always spoke clearly upon the matter. So he did, as soon as we started preparing the 
Tintoretto Exhibition, of which the Duce had been previously informed (...). This is an 
event which aims at celebrating not only the Maestro and the Venetian pictorial culture, but 
also the city of Venice itself. Tintoretto was indeed an artist who, more than anyone else, 
tied his image and his destiny to the city which jealously holds his masterpieces. Tintoretto 
has decorated every-Venetian church, and the biblical composition of San Rocco can still 
be seen in the Palazzo Ducale. This is an event well qualified to follow in the artistic 
footsteps of the Titian Exhibition of 1935 which is a worthy celebration of Venice.52
Here, in its trademark fashion, the Venetian ruling class was paying formal 
tribute to Fascism and to the Duce, while admitting that the event was arranged 
with the main aim of celebrating Venice. The search for approval from Fascism 
signified that the Tintoretto Exhibition was a Fascist event, in the sense that it had 
sought and acknowledged formal sanction from the regime, regardless of its 
content. Yet, its ultimate purpose was not the spread of the Fascist credo amongst 
its visitors as much as the benefit of the local community.
r  t
In 1939, after Tintoretto had enjoyed ‘a triumphant success’, it was the 
turn of another celebrated Italian artist, Paolo Veronese. Significantly, alongside 
Volpi, Maraini and Fascist notables such as Giuseppe Bottai and Ugo Ojetti, the 
membership of the committee responsible for the exhibition included Leone Rocca, 
the President of the Ente Provinciale per il Turismo in Venice.54 In 1941, the town
50 ASV, Gabinetto della Prefettura di Venezia, anni 1893-1936, pacco n. 4, busta ‘Esposizioni, 
congressi, fiere, 1937’.
51 Zajotti was a writer in the Rivista di Venezia and President of the cultural institution Opera 
Bevilacqua La Mas a from 1935 to 1938.
52 ASAC, Serie Scatole Nere, busta n. 58, ‘Official catalogue of the Tintoretto Exhibition 1937’.
53 ASV, Gabinetto della Prefettura di Venezia, anni 1893-1936, pacco n. 4, busta ‘Mostra della lacca 
veneziana del ‘700 a Ca’ Rezzonico’.
54 AMV, Determinazioni Podestarili, ‘Nomina del Comitato Generale per la Mostra di Paolo 
Veronese’, trim. Ill, 1938, n. 2660.
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council had planned other classic art exhibitions featuring ‘names equally 
prestigious as those of Tintoretto, Titian and Veronese’.55 These were supposed to 
be staged between 1st June and 30th September ‘when the number of visitors in the 
city reache[d] its peak’, but in the event the turbulent political situation did not 
allow it.56
What is noticeable is that the Venice comune, when staging cultural events 
of such magnitude, was able to link commercial potential (the popular appeal of a 
Titian Exhibition) with indisputable cultural value (Titian’s works being undeniable 
masterpieces). Clearly, the town council had understood the importance of 
celebrating painters whose artistic reputation was strictly tied to their 
‘Venetianness’, thereby'transcending any undiluted reference to Fascism. Titian, 
Tintoretto and Veronese were names of unquestionable ‘Italianness’,37 but at the 
same time, it was difficult for these names to be expropriated by the Fascist regime, 
since their fame and recognition long pre-dated the emergence of Fascism. Cultural 
showcases staged in Venice needed to satisfy the commercial tourist criteria as a 
matter of the first urgency, whilst representing Fascism remained something of an 
option. This strategy allowed the municipality to appeal to a wider public and to 
encourage national and international tourism. In such ways, Venice could preserve 
her much valued cosmopolitanism and attract the business of foreign tourists, while 
paying tribute to the cult of the nation at the same time.
2.3 The Venetian Tourist Office under Fascism
In Venice, much of the responsibility for the success of the tourist season 
rested upon the municipal Tourist Office (also known as the Azienda Autonoma di 
Cura, Soggiorno e Turismo), which was in charge of arranging, supervising and
• c ofinancing several cultural events. The Tourist Office was a local body working to
55 Ibid, ‘Turismo. Mostra degli incisori veneti del ‘700’, trim. I, 1941, n. 993.
56 Ibid.
57 Significantly, opening and closing dates for the Titian Exhibition, as for several others cultural 
events, were 25 April (St. Mark’s day, patron of Venice) and 4 November (Vittorio Veneto day).
58 See for instance, AMV, Determinazioni Podestarili, ‘Turismo. Festeggiamenti 1938’, trim. IV, 
1937, n. 976. When the Podesta provided grants for various festivals and exhibitions he drew upon 
the Tourist Office’s budget. However, major events such as the Biennale festivals or the Tintoretto 
Exhibition were subsidized not just by the Tourist Agency but also received state contributions. 
Moreover, they usually named their own executive committees (See for instance, ASAC, Serie
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promote local tourism, and was considered to be an institution of such importance 
that it was directly managed by the Vice-Podesta.59 It was in fact Vice-Podesta 
Leonida Macciotta who, during one of the meetings of the Consulta, expressed his 
concern about the excessive workload assigned to the Tourist Office. He 
complained that the bureau was over-burdened, and that at times the municipal 
authorities appeared to think it capable of ‘performing miracles’.60 Macciotta 
warned that state law had actually devolved limited responsibilities to the Tourist 
Office in Venice, and that these related above all to publicity for tourism and the 
preservation of the public gardens. ‘They do not concern the arrangement of large 
scale entertainment, in any case’,61 he asserted.
Apparently then,'the Venetian Tourist Office had been ‘arbitrarily’ charged
with the task of organising and funding the majority of the cultural entertainments
62performed in the city. Because of its broad field of activity, the Tourist Office 
eventually came to replace other cultural bodies which had traditionally been 
responsible for managing cultural events. In this regard, it is unsurprising to note 
that it was not the Tourist Office that assisted the Municipal Direction for Fine Arts 
in the artistic domain, but rather the other way round: the latter institution was the 
junior partner, instructed to co-operate with the Stazione di Cum, Soggiorno e
63Turismo in the ‘production of events and publications of an artistic nature’. The 
fact that administrators from the tourist industry were chosen to plan these events, 
rather than experts drawn from cultural elites, tells us much about commercial 
priorities in Venice. Exhibitions, concerts, theatrical productions and festivals were 
treated, first and foremost, as commodities to be bought and sold, their merits 
considered and assessed according to strict economic criteria. In order to appeal to 
the widest possible tourist market, both in Italy and overseas, a practical 
commercial mentality was predominant.
Scatole Nere, busta n. 44, ‘Feste d’Arte promosse dalla Biennale di Venezia 1932’).
59 AMV, Determinazioni Podestarili, ‘Delega di attribuzioni ai vice-Podesta’, trim. IV, 1934, n. 
2038.
60 AMV, Verbali delle sedute della Consulta Municipale di Venezia, session 10 October 1935.
61 Ibid.
62 AMV, Determinazioni Podestarili, ‘Istituzione della Direzione Municipale di Belle Arti’, trim. I, 
1934, n. 1174.
63 Ibid.
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Thus, considerable responsibility for the cultural events upon which the 
success of the vital tourist summer season rested, was placed in the hands of the 
Tourist Agency. The importance of putting together a busy and attractive summer 
agenda, providing a continuous sequence of celebrations for the tourist has already 
been emphasized.64 Yet, this was perhaps more striking in the case of Venice than 
other cities that were economically dependent upon the revenues of the tourist 
industry. That an institution such as the municipal band, ‘Claudio Monteverdi’, 
which, from the Fascist perspective had a strategic function of ‘education of the 
masses’65 was administered by the commercially-oriented Venetian Tourist Office 
is symptomatic of the priorities of the local authorities. The municipal band 
performed around one hundred concerts every season, both in St. Mark’s Square 
and at the Lido, providing a vital contribution to the creation of the classic 
perception of the city and its atmosphere held by tourist visitors.66 Like other 
cultural institutions, the town band was, first and foremost an institution of the 
tourist trade, and the responsibility for it was thus assigned to the Stazione di Cura,
f\lSoggiorno e Turismo. Yet, as the Vice-Podesta Macciotta had done hitherto, two 
members of the town council, an accountant, Enrico Bassani, and Gino Damerini, 
an amateur art collector and the director of La Gazzetta di Venezia, expressed
z o
doubts as to whether such an arrangement was entirely appropriate. Bassani 
claimed that there were so many responsibilities arbitrarily assigned to the Tourist 
Office, that it suffered from the extent of the burden placed upon it, and he saw the 
municipal band as a classic example. He expressed the hope that, at the very least, 
if the Tourist Office was to be expected to continue to shoulder such a burden, it 
should be endowed with considerably greater funds in order to meet its range of 
obligations.69 The Podesta simply confirmed that it was the desire of the central 
government that the band should be directly controlled by the Tourist Office. ‘After
64 See for instance, AMV, Determinazioni Podestarili, ‘Turismo. Festeggiamenti 1938’, trim. IV, 
1937, n. 976.
65 Ibid, ‘Turismo. Rinnovo repertorio Banda Musicale’, trim. Ill, 1938, n. 702.
66 AMV, Mario Alvera, L ’Amministrazione del Comune di Venezia dal 15 luglio 1930 al 15 luglio 
1934, Venezia, 1934.
67 Ibid.
68 AMV, Verbali delle sedute della Consulta Municipale di Venezia, session 7 November 1930.
69 Ibid, session 10 October 1935.
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all,’ he claimed, ‘the band constitutes a paramount element of tourist attraction’.70
There was still the question of the nature of the band’s musical repertoire to 
be decided, however. Would the band adopt a recognizably Italian set, more strictly 
in keeping with the Fascist cultural agenda, or would it endorse an international 
repertoire in order to complement Venice’s traditionally cosmopolitan atmosphere? 
In fact, the annual planning of the band’s repertoire was consistently done in such 
ways as to offer diverse musical programmes and high quality artistic entertainment 
to the cosmopolitan public which crowded St. Mark’s square.71 According to the 
Podesta, ‘the city band’s concerts had the function of making the foreign tourist’s 
stay in Venice more agreeable. Moreover, they [had] the duty of educating the 
population through the performance of pieces that ought to meet the favour of the 
Venetian and foreign public’.72 In the Podesta’s mind, concerts in Venice could 
serve as a means for the manufacturing of consent as long as this still left room for 
cultural pluralism, cosmopolitanism and a distinctly international flavour.
The Biennale administration, too, benefited periodically from the 
intervention of the Tourist Office which acted to alleviate its financial difficulties. 
Payments to the Ente Biennale were recorded under the heading ‘Extraordinary
7Tcontribution to the Biennale of International Arts’. Equally striking, on 18 July 
1930, La Gazzetta di Venezia, observed that ‘all the administrative functions of the 
First Music Festival were assumed by the Venetian Tourist Office.’74 Thereafter, on 
30 July, Adriano Lualdi, acclaimed composer under Fascism and head of the 
executive committee of the Music Festival, urged the central government (in the 
person of Balbino Giuliano, Minister of National Education) to contribute to the 
event to the tune of 60,000 lire. The sum was payable to the following: M/ Comune 
di Venezia, Ufficio Turismo, per il Festival Musicale\15 Furthermore, additional
70 Ibid.
71 AMV, Determinazioni Podestarili, ‘Rinnovo repertorio musica Banda Municipale anno 1940’, 
trim. I, 1940, n. 3435.
72 Ibid, ‘Turismo. Rinnovo repertorio musica Banda Municipale’, trim. Ill, 1938, n. 702.
73 Ibid, ‘Contributo Straordinario all’Ente Autonomo Esposizione Intemazionale d’Arte’, trim. IV, 
1933, n. 439.
74 ASV, Gabinetto della Prefettura di Venezia, anni 1893-1936, pacco n. 16, busta ‘Spettacoli, 
trattenimenti, pellicole cinematografiche’. The artistic functions were assumed by an executive 
committee (Ibid).
75 La Biennale di Venezia (ed.), Venezia 32, 82, p. 26.
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contributions of 35,000 lire, payable to the Venice Comune, were taken from the 
budget of the Tourist Office.76
In a similar fashion, one of the most outstanding cultural institutions in 
Venice, the Theatre La Fenice, enjoyed a highly privileged relationship with the 
Tourist Office. As an example, in order to defy the financial crisis affecting La 
Fenice in the 1930s, the Tourist Agency, seemingly quite prepared to renounce the 
theatre’s glorious dramatic tradition, made an offer in 1932 to transform it into a 
modem cinema, justifying this as a reform in keeping with the changing times and 
the only way to turn the theatre into a profit-making enterprise. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, however, the proposal met with a marked lack of enthusiasm from
77the theatre’s executive board.
Economic pragmatism and tourism remained central concerns in the process 
of arranging cultural events at the theatre. In 1934, the Fascist Syndicate of 
Musicians expressed a desire to stage concerts at La Fenice in order ‘to alleviate
70
unemployment amongst theatre personnel in general’. The Podesta, favourable to 
the initiative, instmcted the Tourist Office in Venice to contribute to it financially, 
whilst making municipal support for the project conditional upon the principle that 
‘every single performance employ[ed] a set number of Venetian musicians within
70
the orchestras’. Composers chosen for the various concerts included Wagner, 
Verdi, Bizet, Puccini and other internationally renowned names of opera. This 
cosmopolitan approach was justified, according to the Podesta, by the fact that 
Venice was the site of the Stazione di Cura, Soggiorno e Turismo, and that it was 
therefore ‘vital to support any initiative that served to attract tourists and liven up
OA #
their stay’. Why would the Tourist Office be interested in organising various 
concerts at the Theatre La Fenice if these made no economic contribution to the
o 1
advantage of Venetian tourism?
76 Ibid.
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Contributions from the Stazione di Cura, Soggiorno e Turismo in favour of 
La Fenice became more frequent when, in 1938, the responsibility for the 
administration of the theatre was taken out of private hands and placed under the 
auspices of the municipality, in accordance with the wishes of the Ministry for the 
Press and Propaganda. In fact, as early as 1935, the Consulta Municipale had 
expressed its willingness to consider assigning responsibility for the theatre to the 
Comune, it being no longer prepared to tolerate ‘the serious imbalance existing 
between summer and winter tourist seasons for the sake of those citizens employed 
in commercial activities (...). Once the agreement [was] to be signed, the 
municipality will [have] revive[d] the glorious theatre, benefiting all those people 
who eam[ed] a living from the theatre industry’. Despite the fact that Article One 
of the new charter made clear that ‘any musical events performed at the La Fenice
84Theatre must have solely artistic and no commercial goals’, Article Two 
established that the Stazione di Cura, Soggiorno e Turismo was to become a major 
financial backer of the theatre, ‘so that it might live up to the expectations of being 
a paramount institution in Venice’.85 The only economic force capable of reviving 
the town’s major theatre was tourism, and it was therefore concluded that La Fenice 
could only be transformed into a profitable business if it were placed under the 
authority of the Tourist Office. It was thus no coincidence that some of the most 
prestigious cultural sites and institutions in Venice were managed by local tourist 
agencies with remarkably little input from cultural elites. Clearly, it had been 
decided that the contributions such institutions could make to the economic well 
being of the town were simply too important to be left in the hands of those lacking 
the requisite business experience and commercial savoir-faire.
2.4 Culture taxed in favour of tourism
The thesis that culture in Venice was placed at the service of the 
commercial tourist agenda is further strengthened by the fact that profits generated 
by the numerous cultural events of the tourist seasons were actually taxed (either by
82 AMV, Verbali delle sedute dalla Consulta Municipale di Venezia, session 5 May 1936.
83 Ibid, session 12 February 1935.
84 Ibid, session 17 April 1935.
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the Venetian municipality or the central government), and the revenue generated 
subsequently invested in the local tourist industry and its affiliated institutions. In a 
city that made a living from any form of leisure activities, cultural practices had to 
pay their way and contribute to the economic well-being of the Venetian milieu.
As an example, major Venetian cultural events such as the Biennale of 
International Arts or the 1937 Tintoretto Exhibition were required to pay 
contributions to the Ente Provinciale per il Turismo*6 The Imposta di cura, 
soggiorno e turismo (a local tax) was levied upon cultural events set up within the 
domain of the Venetian Stazione di Cura, Soggiorno e Turismo and entailed a fee 
of 3% upon entrance tickets to cinemas, theatres and shows in general.87 This tax 
was justified, according to the Podesta, because those who ran (and profited from) 
cultural events, effectively benefited from the commercial and publicity campaigns
go
organised by the local Tourist Office. In a circular relationship, the Tourist Office 
supported cultural tourism in Venice, and the latter could therefore legitimately be 
taxed in favour of the former, an exchange that once again exposes the strong link 
existing between tourism and culture and between the commercial drive and the 
spiritual and artistic impulse.
As one may well imagine, however, strong opposition to the payment of the 
Imposta di cura was to be found amongst Venetian businessmen and entrepreneurs, 
even though supporting the local Tourist Office arguably benefited the entire 
community in the long term. As early as 1928, during one of the meetings of the 
Consulta Municipale, Antonio Revedin, manager of the Compagnia Italiana dei 
Grandi Alberghi, demanded that no increase in tax levels be permitted, given that 
the hotel industry was already experiencing a ‘painful crisis’, forcing many
» 8Qestablishments to reduce prices in order to attract customers. In 1929, the Podesta 
considered granting tax breaks and exemptions to some theatrical productions,90
85 Ibid.
86 See for instance, ASAC, Materiale da Riordinare, ‘Ufficio Stampa-Amministrazione 1936’.
87 AMV, Determinazioni Podestarili, ‘Contribuzioni speciali di cura’, trim. Ill, 1930, n. 2218.
88 Ibid, ‘Norme di esecuzione per le imposte e contribuzioni speciali per la Stazione di Cura, 
Soggiorno e Turismo’, trim. II, 1929, n. 2622.
89 AMV, Verbali delle sedute della Consulta Municipale di Venezia, session 14 November 1928.
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reflecting a general desire on the part of the central government to concern itself 
with the crisis afflicting Italian theatre as a whole.91 By the same token, the 
Podesta, taking into account the stagnation of the Venetian theatre and cinema 
industries, as previously outlined by the Section for Theatrical and 
Cinematographic Industries of the Fascist Industrial Union, took the important 
decision to further reduce tax levels, on condition that entrepreneurial proprietors 
not use the tax relief simply to subsidise reduced admission fees.92 As was the case 
with the ‘popular trains’ innovation (see below), the local hotel industry proved 
itself to be clearly business-oriented and narrowly self-interested, refusing to pay a 
local tax even if it was intended to promote the general well-being of tourism in the 
city. Given this self-serving (and possibly short-sighted) commercial perspective, 
one can imagine what the reaction would have been to the suggestion that private 
hotel-owners contribute financially to programmes designed to meet abstract 
ideological ends or to promote the spread of Fascist values.
With reluctance to accommodate local demands so marked within Venetian 
business circles, it is important to investigate attitudes towards taxation imposed by 
the central government. For instance, a similar situation developed when the 
Biennale administration tried to avoid payment of the centrally-imposed Imposta di
Q'y
Ricchezza Mobile. This event is significant as it indicates the way in which the 
Biennale entourage wanted the institution to be perceived, as an organisation ‘of 
essentially cultural and public utility that by statute [could] not have any profit- 
seeking goal’.94 Because of this perception of the Biennale’s special status as a 
‘non-profit body’, the administration wished to see all salaries and income earned 
by Biennale personnel exempted from the Imposta di Ricchezza Mobile tax. 
Romolo Bazzoni, on behalf of the administrative committee, tried hard to make the 
case that the institution should enjoy exemption from taxation on account of its 
being ‘a body of public right with no capital of its own and surviving on state and
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid, ‘Finalita della Stazione di Cura, Soggiorno e Turismo’, trim. I, 1929, n. 2675.
93 The Imposta di Ricchezza Mobile was a tax imposed on profits and salaries (tax on revenues).
94 Romolo Bazzoni to the Minister of Finance, 3 April 1931, ASAC, Serie Materiale da Riordinare, 
‘Ufficio Stampa/Amministrazione 1931’.
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local contributions’.95 According to Bazzoni, not only did the Biennale retain 
important tasks in the artistic and cultural domains, it had also benefited the tourist 
development of the Venetian area in the latest decades. The creation of a proper art 
centre such as the Biennale, argued Bazzoni, represented a unique asset for the city 
of Venice.96 Cultural benefits generated by the Biennale were much higher than the 
profits obtained. Most performances had produced revenues barely sufficient to 
cover expenses, and the books between January 1931 and December 1934 in fact 
revealed significant financial losses.97 The Biennale leadership tried to defend its 
case in writing to the Provincial Tax Office, which, after a thorough investigation, 
came to the conclusion that the institution was indeed susceptible to legitimate
QO
taxation under the Imposta di Ricchezza Mobile. Eventually the Biennale 
administration, after a last attempt in 1940 to reclaim past taxes,99 was forced to 
accept that it was considered by the regime as a genuinely commercial rather than a 
purely cultural institution.
Again this highlights the existence of minor clashes between local aims (in 
this case of the Biennale) and national directives. While the Biennale administration 
had wished to portray itself as an institution fully devoted to the state, far from 
having any profits or self-interests, the state, on the other hand, seemed to 
appreciate the real nature of the organisation as a body with a life of its own, 
receiving annual contributions, and earning profits like any other business 
enterprise. On a general level, it was clear that the tourist institutions of Venice 
were directing their efforts towards supporting Venetian cultural events (one only 
has to think about the Tourist Office funding cultural practices), which in turn were 
required to sustain the tourist industry through taxation. However, this was not 
enough to guarantee that all entrepreneurs were community-minded at a local, let 
alone the national level. Material aims generally outweighed moral, communal, and
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid. Along with declaring the ‘Venetianness’ or cosmopolitanism of the institution, the Biennale 
entourage, in that occasion, in order to please Rome, held that the Exhibition of International Arts, 
by its very nature, had always been a means of ‘articulating Italianness’ (AMV, Determinazioni 
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spiritual considerations.
2.5 Fascism and tourism in Venice: cultural events staged by Fascist organs
Having established that tourism was foremost among the motivations for 
staging cultural entertainment in Venice, and that the Venetian town council 
succeeded in tying its aspirations for economic development to the state’s project of 
nationalisation of the masses through cultural tourism, this section will analyse the 
relations between the local branches of the National Fascist Party, the Opera 
Nazionale Dopolavoro (OND), other Fascist organisations, and the cultural politics 
of Venice.
The Fascist dopoiavoro network included cultural and leisure circles set up 
by the regime targeting the working class. The activities offered by the 
organisation, including outings and sports, in addition to traditional pastimes such 
as choral singing and amateur theatrics, were designed to ‘instil in the workers a 
consciousness of the nation, a sense of duty, and a desire for harmony between 
labor and capital’.100 Drama classes and swimming courses were amongst the first 
initiatives started in Venice by the OND.101 According to Fincardi, the OND was
already functioning in Venice in 1926, and was heavily involved in banking, hotels,
* 102insurance companies, firms, shops and other enterprises.
De Grazia insists that the fact that the OND activity ‘was commonly known 
as the cultura dopolavoristica throughout Fascist Italy only emphasizes the 
pervasive influence this single institution exercised within the society as a whole in 
the formation of a culture of consent’.103 Yet, how did this institution function when 
caught between Fascism and local identities? Was it more concerned with forging 
consent to the regime of with enhancement of the Venetian population’s everyday 
life? The study of various records demonstrates that Fascist bodies in Venice were 
willing to contribute to the common effort in favour of economic rebirth even 
within the broader ideological project of ‘educating the masses’. Their activities 
were devoted to both the ‘spiritual tutoring of the people’ and material gains for the
100 De Grazia, The Culture o f  Consent, p. 29.
101 Fincardi, ‘Gli ‘Anni Ruggenti’ dell’antico leone’, p. 450.
102 Ibid.
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local community (this could be a result of the fact that in the late 1920s, as claimed 
by De Grazia, ‘the goals, programmes, and general tenor of the OND were still 
remarkably productivist’104).
For example, in 1936, the local division of the OND, pursuing its 
‘educational objectives for the people’,105 pleaded with the town council to 
subsidize preparations for the performance of the ‘Resurrection of Christ’ to be 
performed in St. Mark’s Square the forthcoming July. After some consideration, the 
Podesta allocated 22,500 lire in favour of the play, intending, in his words, ‘to 
instruct the masses and to benefit tourism’.106 Along these guidelines, it is 
interesting to notice that the contribution was taken from the budget of the Venetian
i  f\n
Tourist Office, and that the Podesta’s decree bore the heading ‘Tourism’. The 
Provincial OND itself reported to the Prefect Carlo Catalano that the ‘Resurrection 
of Christ’, together with the Sword Championship, would attract ‘thousands of 
Dopoiavoro members towards Venice, [and] contribute to the revival of the tourist 
activity which [was] such an essential element of the city’s everyday life’.108
As tourist services and the hotel industry were the primary beneficiaries of 
such performances, the Tourist Office was the natural choice to administer the 
events. In other words, the municipality was investing in those events, with the 
knowledge of a guaranteed monetary return.109 Significantly, every cultural 
showcase staged by the OND in the 1930s was also financed by the Tourist 
Office.110 Even a celebration such as the National Grape Festival, organised by the 
Ministry of Corporations, was put under the heading ‘Tourism’ on the Podesta’s 
decrees. It is also striking to notice that alongside the various Fascist Provincial
103 De Grazia, The Culture o f  Consent, p. IX.
104 Ibid, p. 51.
105 AMV, Determinazioni Podestarili, ‘Turismo. La ‘Resurrezione di Cristo’ in Piazza San Marco’, 
trim. Ill, 1936, n. 1489.
106 Ibid.
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108 ASV, Gabinetto della Prefettura di Venezia, anni 1893-1936, pacco n. 49, busta ‘Opera 
Nazionale Dopoiavoro’.
109 By the same token, in 1937, the Podesta determined a settlement of 145,000 lire in favor of the 
Provincial Fascist Federation in order to prepare some cultural and charity events. According to the 
Podesta’, they were expected to be financed ‘with the novel profits of Venetian tourism’ (AMV, 
Determinazioni Podestarili, ‘Contributo a favore della Federazione Provinciale Fascista sui nuovi 
proventi del turismo veneziano’, trim. Ill, 1937, n. 1816).
110 See for instance, AMV, Determinazioni Podestarili, ‘Turismo. Manifestazioni organizzate dalla
Unions (merchants, sharecroppers, etc.) included in the festival’s executive 
committee, there was also the Director of the Tourist Office.111
For Fincardi, under Fascism, Venice stood out amongst the other Italian 
communes. Precisely because tourism retained such a great importance, the 
celebration of traditions focused upon sea leisure activities and ‘maritime symbols’ 
rather than harvesting rituals which were instead confined to the hinterland. In the 
1930s, Venice and the lagoon remained largely isolated from the Fascist celebration 
of ‘ruralism’, and the so-called ‘Battle for Grain’, and the Carnival ballads of the 
‘Festa dell’Uva’ were never held in St. Mark’s Square or the main campi.u2 For 
this reason, Mestre, on the mainland, soon acquired the image of the area’s 
‘agricultural centre’ -a  paradox- as the town was rapidly developing and urbanizing 
around the industrial district of Marghera. It was Giovanni Giuriati, at the head of 
the Venetian PNF, who wished to promote the agricultural identity of Mestre, in 
contrast to the industrial project entailed by the Greater V e n i c e Every time the 
Podesta determined annual contributions in favour of the OND to stage various 
cultural events and celebrations in Mestre, references to tourism virtually disappear, 
and the sole motivations taken into account were ‘philanthropic aims’ and 
‘education of the masses’.114 Tourism and commerce no longer represented the 
main concern.115 However, later on, as Mestre could not live up to expectations of 
agricultural development, it was decided that harvesting rituals should be gradually 
moved to Marcon, another community in the Veneto’s hinterland.116
Every year, the OND arranged an outdoor film theatre in St. Mark’s Square 
in order to stage films promoting ‘Fascist and tourist propaganda’ which were 
sponsored by the Venetian Tourist Office.117 Yet, rather than Fascist propaganda,
OND per la stagione 1939’, trim. Ill, 1939, n. 2046.
111 Ibid, ‘Turismo. Spese sostenute per la IX Festa Nazionale dell’Uva’, trim. Ill, 1938, n. 2572.
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116 Ibid.
117 ASV, Gabinetto della Prefettura di Venezia, anni 1893-1936, pacco n. 6, busta ‘OND Programmi 
e manifestazioni anni 1938-1939’.
50
the movies focused above all upon tourist capabilities and facilities offered by 
Venice and the Lido, as in a proper publicity venture. Cultural events, sightseeing 
spots and the enchanting atmosphere of the historic city were combined with the 
glamorous nightlife and the possibility of sea cures, so as to promote the multi­
faceted character of the Venetian district. Transformed into an immense theatre, the 
‘aristocratic-bourgeois’ St. Mark’s Square became a host arena for the largest 
audiences in Venice, which gathered together to enjoy the modem rituals of mass
1 1 o
entertainment. The OND had to acquire projectors and screens of remarkable 
dimensions: 16x14 metres, the biggest in Italy. The equipment was mostly donated 
or borrowed from private patrons or the government in Rome. According to 
Fincardi, in past years, no similar use had been made of St. Mark’s Square, and the 
possibility of employing its potential to ‘modernise’ the entire Venetian citizenry 
had been neglected.119
The words ‘Fascism’ and ‘tourism’ and the intersection of ideology and 
pragmatism summon up the essence of Fascist organisations operating in Venice 
such as the OND. Not surprisingly, Le Tre Venezie (a monthly review edited under 
the auspices of the Fascist Provincial Federation of Venice) which was used to 
popularise the image of Venice and the Lido as internationally renowned tourist 
sites, had initially been run by the Compagnia Italiana dei Grandi Alberghi, largely 
responsible for Venetian tourist publicity.120 In this case, Venetian Fascism had 
inherited a function which had traditionally belonged to the local hotel industry. 
According to Fincardi, mass entertainment in Venice in the 1930s usually fell under 
the influence of the OND which appealed to potential customers by offering low 
prices and discounts. An exception to this was represented by elite pastimes directly 
managed by the Ciga, the Biennale entourage or other exclusive circles that had 
nothing to do with the Dopolavoro, meaning that elite tourism in Venice played a 
great role, in spite of the recent development of mass tourism. However, the areas 
of intervention of the OND and the elite circles with their relevant cultural offerings 
were always well integrated together with the local entertainment calendar thanks
118 Fincardi, ‘Gli ‘Anni Ruggenti’ dell’antico leone, p. 552.
119 Ibid.
120 Fincardi, ‘Gli ‘Anni Ruggenti’ dell’antico leone’, p. 452.
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to the co-ordinating action of the Tourist Office.121
What is significant here is that local Fascism was sharing the same positions
as the municipality, making an effort to fit in with the community outlook, and not
being guided just by the needs of spiritual edification but also by the material
elevation of the masses. In The Culture o f Consent, De Grazia argued that the OND
was utilised by the regime in the attempt to ‘forge responsive constituencies, blunt
worker resistance and gratify demands for consumption frustrated by its own wage 
122policies’. In Venice, too, losses on the shop floor for the worker determined by 
the regime, were compensated with alternative social policies. It is clear that the 
Consulta Municipale was financing cultural activities promoted by local Fascist 
organs to boost tourism: On the other hand, for the Venetian OND, encouraging 
tourism alongside the moral education of the population was vital if the necessary 
funds for its activities were to be obtained from the Podesta. Therefore, the 
‘educational’ and ‘tourist’ functions were not antithetical, and no contrast was 
created between Venice and the central government. Indeed, for Fascist 
organisations in Venice, the annual habit of requesting financial aid to the town
authorities (represented by the Tourist Office) in order to nurture ‘the economic
• 1 benefit resulting from the greatest tourist movement’, was a constant feature
since the establishment of the regime.124 Every year, the Ente Provinciale per il
Turismo gathered together the members of ‘those organisations in the local tourist
activity’ in order to reach agreement about the calendar of celebrations for the
forthcoming tourist season. It is striking to notice that, in addition to members of
the Venice municipality, guests usually included representatives of the Provincial
125Dopolavoro.
At times, the Biennale administration and the Municipal Casino (founded in
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1936) were invited to contribute to the financing of OND events, indicating that 
these two bodies were to benefit from the creation of additional tourism in the
176city. De Grazia herself claims that OND showcases were also frequently 
arranged with the support of local chambers of commerce, which viewed the 
festivals as the optimum means of boosting the tourist trade.127
This mixed approach, emphasising both spiritual and material gains for the 
local community was also reflected by the annual reports produced by the 
Provincial Fascist Federation of Commerce. The Federation aspired to ‘turning 
local commerce into a harmonious cell within the Fascist corporatist state’.128 It 
claimed that there was ‘not a single problem concerning the Venetian economy that
1 7Qhad not been dealt with’: Not only was the Federation committed to enhancing
Venetian economic activities, it also aimed at defending commercial businesses 
invested in the local area. Among various pursuits, the Federation took charge of 
staging several cultural events in order to improve commercial activities. For 
example, in 1932, it contributed to support choral concerts, music festivals, 
performances at the La Fenice Theatre, the International Boat Racing, sport 
competitions and the Venetian Carnival. In addition, it directly financed the Book
1 30Fair, the Toys Fair, the Grape Festival and the Peaches Festival. The case of the 
Federation once again reinforces the thesis that culture was in the service of 
commerce and tourism, in other words, material aims.
On other occasions, art performances or local fairs staged by Fascist bodies 
were specifically arranged to immediately relieve shortfalls caused by the economic 
crisis. For example, in 1933, the Fascist Interprovincial Syndicate was granted the 
right by the Podesta to arrange opera sessions at the Theatre La Fenice from 26 
December 1933 to 12 February 1934, when the Carnival was set up. Pieces to be 
performed were chosen from ‘II Crepuscolo degli Dei’ by Wagner, ‘Don Pasquale’ 
by Donizetti, ‘Falstaff by Verdi, ‘Mefistofele’ by Boito, ‘Boris Godunov’ by
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Mussorsgkij, and three new works for Venice, ‘II Segreto di Susanna’ by Wolf
Ferrari, ‘La Baronessa di Carini’ by Mule, and ‘II Finto Arlecchino’ by Malipiero.
Under the guidance of President Gino Damerini, the Syndicate in charge of running
the lyric season claimed to be acting with ‘artistic’ goals uppermost, to the
exclusion of ‘commercial motivations’. Despite these protestations, however, the
organisers openly admitted their aim of contributing to the relief of unemployment
by recruiting 80 musicians for orchestra, 65 choristers, numerous young cantors,
1 ^  1dancers and extras. The Podesta granted 200,000 lire to the event, to be provided 
from the resources of the Tourist Office, the Provincial Administration, the 
Consiglio Provinciale dell’Economia Corporativa, 132 the Provincial Federation of 
the Fasci di Combattimento, the Federation of Commerce, the Cassa di Risparmio, 
and other minor administrative bodies. Having praised the forthcoming event and 
committed himself to ensuring its success, the Podesta subsequently called for the 
support of similar initiatives which also served the purpose of boosting overseas
133tourism.
From 1933 onwards, the OND took over the arrangement of the prestigious 
Carnival in St. Mark’s Square and the Venetian campi,U4 staging a ‘Colombina’135 
puppet descending from the clock tower, a danza moresca, some forze d ’Ercole and 
horse racing, and celebrations and rituals of military power prepared during the 
sabati fascisti in the OND gyms.136 According to Fincardi, the municipality, 
together with the OND, hoped to make use of the Carnival to revitalize the winter 
tourist season. However, the central government decided to put to a halt the 
initiative fearing that the luxurious and expensive Venetian costumes would appear 
inappropriate and insensitive at a time of widespread economic crisis. At the end of 
the 1930s, the Carnival only took place at the Venetian Fair of Santa Margherita
131 AMV, Determinazioni' Podestarili, ‘Contributo per la stagione d’opera al Teatro La Fenice 
durante il Camevale 1933-34’, trim. IV, 1933, n. 2697.
132 When the corporatist framework was set up in the 1926, the liberal Chamber of Commerce was 
replaced by the Consiglio Provinciale dell ’Economia Corporativa.
133 AMV, Determinazioni Podestarili, ‘Contributo per la stagione d’opera al Teatro La Fenice 
durante il Camevale 1933-34’, trim. IV, 1933, n. 2697.
134 Venetian little squares.
135 A typical Venetian mask.
136 Fincardi, ‘I fasti della ‘tradizione” , in Isnenghi, Woolf, (eds.), Storia di Venezia, p. 1494.
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i ^ 7and at the Riva degli Schiavoni. Once again, this demonstrates the existence of 
disagreement between the aspirations of the Venetian Fascists and those of the 
central government.
Throughout the decade, the Podesta settled an annual contribution to the 
Provincial division of the OND, in favour of a series of concerts to be performed at 
the Conservatorio Musicale Benedetto Marcello. These events were considered 
‘useful’ to Venice ‘as they attracted numerous visitors to the city’.138 Also, they 
facilitated the recruitment of ‘local unemployed musicians in a period of the year 
when fewer job opportunities existed’.139 By the same token, in 1938, the Prefect of 
Venice informed the Minister of Interior that the Provincial Fascist Federation was 
planning to arrange concerts to be performed in St. Mark’s Square during summer, 
an initiative that was expected to be popular with the public and foreign tourists 
alike, thereby ‘making an important contribution to the city’s profits’.140 The 
Prefect also claimed that despite some citizens complaining about ‘the shameful 
waste of St. Mark’s Square’, the concerts not only helped to sustain the tourist 
industry, but acted for the ‘remarkable benefit of 500 people now in work for one 
month, who would otherwise be unemployed’.141
For Fincardi, the Venetian OND had, from its establishment, promoted only 
small, provincial and regional cultural events, making little effort towards the 
elimination of cultural parochialism; this in spite of the fact that by the end of the 
1920s, ‘regionalism’ of this type had been effectively condemned as ‘heresy’ by the 
regime.142 Similarly, De Grazia has argued that the Fascist regime, working through 
the OND, hoped to facilitate the formation of an ‘overriding national identity as 
opposed to regional or class identities’.143 De Grazia concluded that
137 Ibid.
138 AMV, Determinazioni Podestarili, ‘Spesa di 5,000 lire quale contributo per fesecuzione dei 
concerti organizzati dal Dopolavoro Provinciale di Venezia’, trim. II, 1937, n. 830.
139 Ibid, ‘Stagione di concefti 1937-38. Contributo di 5.000 lire al Dopolavoro Provinciale’, trim. Ill, 
1937, n. 2680.
140 ASV, Gabinetto della Prefettura di Venezia, anni 1893-1936, pacco n. 16, busta ‘Spettacoli, 
trattenimenti, pellicole cinematografiche’.
141 Ibid.
142 Fincardi, ‘I fasti della ‘tradizione” , in Isnenghi, Woolf, (eds.), Storia di Venezia, p. 1496.
143 De Grazia, The Culture o f Consent, p. 151.
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‘In its rhetoric and many of its programmes, the OND was thus especially concerned to 
emphasize its role as the organizer of a unified public -  a new national base for the regime 
and a counter to the regionalistic and class based associationalism of the past (...). The 
most far reaching of these [OND directives] were concerned with the attempt to manipulate 
those tendencies, endemic to capitalist development, that would potentially cut across class 
and regional lines (...). The mass media, as truly modem forms of entertainment, had 
undeniable propagandistic value and because of their content was readily controlled by the 
State, they offered the regime a potential means of organising leisure on an entirely new 
‘totalitarian’ basis’.144
However, a case study of Venice suggests that a rather different 
interpretation is plausible. Within an organisation such as the OND, regionalism 
and Venetian identity did indeed play a more important role than the simple 
confirmation of a unified national consciousness. As a result, the drive towards 
‘nationalisation’ was not infrequently subjugated to the demands of the local 
perspective. In Venice, ideology occupied a less important place than pragmatism, 
and local Fascists were forced to acknowledge and eventually encourage Venetian 
cosmopolitanism as a central feature of the tourist industry upon which Venice 
depended.
Fincardi’s argument that the OND in Venice succeeded in its efforts to 
combine the leisure activities of the local population with the complex needs of the 
tourist industry is thus a convincing one. A programme of entertainment for the 
average citizen as well as the tourist was put together by the OND, and outside this 
framework more elite events were directly managed by the Ciga or other bourgeois 
institutions.145 Fascist organs in the city combined their strategies for the education 
of the masses with the demands of local commercial and tourist interests. Their 
policies were visibly contingent upon the town’s social and economic needs, and 
were deeply immersed within the Venetian social milieu. For these reasons, it is 
difficult to accept uncritically the argument of De Grazia that the ‘cultura
144 Ibid, p. 164.
145 Fincardi, ‘Gli ‘Anni Ruggenti’ dell’antico leone’, pp. 450-51.
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dopolavoristiccC was intended primarily to perform ‘significant functions in 
legitimising Fascist rule’.146 Eventually, De Grazia concedes that
‘The overwhelmingly local and regional nature of these manifestations reinforcing, at least 
in appearance, the solidarity and self-consciousness of specific cpmmunities, in some 
respects conflicted with the essentially national orientation of the fascist regime. 
Encouragement of popular identification with the state, the nation, or race was -no  matter 
how ancient the resurrected ceremony- hardly to be found in a ‘revival of traditions’ based 
on regional or local distinctiveness’.147
2.6 The experiment of ‘popular trains’
In the 1930s, the regime proclaimed its intention of ‘going towards the 
people’.148 While the previous decade it had established and strengthened the 
structures of the corporate state, now Fascism wished to further its grip on Italian 
society in order to achieve a broader consensus. For example, the OND range of 
activities was enlarged to meet the directives for the nationalisation of the masses 
emanating from state authorities. As for tourism, the regime aimed at making ‘Italy’ 
available to the masses by encouraging leisure activities and holiday-making, and 
exploiting its propaganda potential. At this time, travelling by train to Venice 
became an important new means for fostering mass tourism in the city, especially 
when the relative cheapness of the costs of rail travel are taken into account. The 
railways were themselves viewed as representative symbols of technology, speed 
and efficiency, all features of ‘modernity’ with which the regime was eager to 
identify itself.
Thus, a major new stimulus to mass tourism in Venice was provided by the 
renowned ‘popular trains’’ (treni popolari or treni turistici) scheme promoted by the 
Minister of Communications, Costanzo Ciano, and inaugurated in August 1931. 
Italians were henceforth to be encouraged to visit Venice at discounted prices well
146 De Grazia, The Culture o f  Consent, p. 223.
147 Ibid, p. 214.
148 Mussolini announced the strategy o f ‘decisively reaching out to the people’ in a 1932 speech, ‘Al 
popolo Napoletano’, in Opera Omnia di Benito Mussolini, eds. Edoardo Susmel and Duilio Susmel, 
La Fenice, Florence, 1958.
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within the means of the average family.149 For the Fascist authorities, the popular 
trains clearly served as a commercial means to an ideological end as they enabled a 
much broader swathe of Italian society to travel around the country and grasp the 
true meaning of the spirit of Ttalianness’ (and therefore of Fascism) that the 
authorities wished to instil.150 Furthermore, and as De Grazia has astutely noted, the 
trains also represented important economic and political opportunities for the state:
‘The popular trains resulted from Ciano’s initiative, the outcome -as he frankly admitted- 
of a felicitous convergence of economic calculations and political considerations. The 
discounts on group travel of up to 50 percent were designed to boost mass transit, thereby 
reducing the huge deficit of the state railroads as revenues declined during the depression; 
at the same time they provided the urban unemployed and poor a brief respite from the 
dismal depression atmosphere of the cities (...). Accompanied by well-devised propaganda, 
the ‘popular trains’ quickly became a new national institution, celebrated in popular ditties 
by a lower-class public that previously, had rarely, if ever taken train trips for diversion. 
Between 2 August and 20 September 1931, more than half million travelers took advantage 
of the discounts. 151
Tourists were also able to benefit from further reductions in local
1 C'}
restaurants, hotels and museums. In this way, the popular trains represented a 
major contribution to growth and expansion within the tourist economy of the 
Venetian area as a whole.153
For the authorities in Venice, the potential of the popular trains to provide a 
much-needed boost to the local economy far outweighed the importance of the 
Fascists’ conception of the train as means of promoting awareness of the glories
149 AMV, Affari Generali del Comune di Venezia, quinquennio 1931-34, fascicolo XI/II/18, 
‘Relazione sull’attivita svolta dal Comune nell’anno 1934’.
150 According to De Grazia’s The Culture o f  Consent, p. 184, ‘The experience of the moment 
became fused with the image of the regime, rendered tangible through contact with the awesome 
potency of a new technology, the evocative sites of past patriotic feasts, and the symbol of Italy’s 
future might’.
151 lid, p. 180-83.
152 AMV, Affari Generali del Comune di Venezia, quinquennio 1931-34, fascicolo XI/II/18, 
‘Relazione sull’attivita svolta nell’anno 1934’.
153 Apparently, this kind of travel system was also put into being as the national government wished 
to stimulate the tourist movement from certain foreign countries. In 1934, for instance, popular 
trains from London and Budapest were afforded particular attention (AMV, Determinazioni 
Podestarili, ‘Turismo. Accoglienza e ospitalita ai partecipanti ai treni turistici di scambio’, trim. I,
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and greatness of the Italian nation and its heritage.154 Further evidence to support 
this contention can be found in the correspondence between the Consulta 
Municipale and the national government in the 1930s. On 28 September 1931, the 
Podesta addressed Costanzo Ciano, reporting that Venice, like other Italian cities, 
was deeply grateful to the central government for the institution of the weekend 
trains to the lagoon, and that the entire citizenry felt similar enthusiasm.155 A year 
later, the Prefect Bianchetti, backed by the Podesta and the Federal Secretary of the 
PNF, pressed Ciano to agree to the provision of ‘Easter trains’ to Venice over a ten 
day period at a discount of up to 75%. These trains, it was hoped, would help to 
offset any drop in the numbers of overseas tourists, this being a time when 
Venetians were ‘seriously concerned with the decline of the international tourist 
trade’.156 In 1936, the Consulta even ensured that the theatrical performance of 
Goldoni’s ‘Le Baruffe Chiozzotte’ was arranged so as to be compatible with the 
timetables of the popular trains, thereby maximising the potential audience by 
taking advantage of those tourists coming from Florence and Rome, and helping to
i c 7
guarantee the greatest possible degree of commercial success.
As a contemporary observer noticed, Venice had traditionally favoured the 
development of elite tourism in the lagoon before it was forced to come to terms
158with the economic crisis ushered in with the onset of the Great Depression. Now 
that the recession was deepening, it had become necessary to appeal to sections of 
Italian society across the class spectrum in order to maintain the economic well 
being of the Venetian tourist industry.159 However, it must be mentioned that in 
some cases the promotion of mass tourism in Venice and the ideological aspects of 
the popular trains did provoke certain kinds of resistance from the local mercantile 
interests. In this respect, the instance of the popular trains helps us to understand the 
ambiguous position of the Consulta Municipale and Venetian citizens towards the
1934, n. 2341).
154 ASV, Gabinetto della Prefettura di Venezia, anni 1893-1936, pacco n. 34, busta ‘Smistamento 
treni popolari in arrivo a Venezia’.
155 Ibid, ‘Treni popolari e semi-popolari’.
156 Ibid.
157 Ibid.
158 Giannino Omero Gallo, ‘Goldoni, immortale poeta di Venezia, onorato ed esaltato nelle strade
della sua citta’, Roma, 13 July 1936.
159 Ibid.
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spread of mass tourism in the city.
On 17 February 1932, Teodoro Bolla, President of the Provincial Federation 
of Commerce of Venice wrote to Domenico Giuriati, deputy in Parliament, 
complaining that tourist flows towards Venice had virtually ceased because of the 
mounting economic crisis and several monetary barriers. According to Bolla, it was 
vital to reinstate those ‘popular trains’ which had brought so many benefits to the 
city during the past season. The official was also of the opinion that the quality of 
the popular train system could be dramatically improved through the modernization 
of certain services and facilities. Trains could be labelled ‘semi-popular’ instead of 
‘popular’, by adding second class carriages to the existing third class cars. 
Following from this, it would be logical to provide discounts for second and first 
class hotel accommodation and not merely for rooms in the third class hotels.160 
Bolla saw the initial success of the popular trains as a platform from which to 
expand to the ultimate advantage of Venice’s tourist economy. He recognised that 
in 1931, those trains had favoured working class travellers who had benefited most 
from the various reductions. The same could not be said for those tourists 
belonging to the ‘petty bourgeoisie, more endowed with cultural capital and 
perhaps a greater desire to appreciate the cultural heritage of the Italian nation, but 
who [were] less keen on travelling on third class carriages’. Bolla asked Giuriati to 
form a committee to discuss the matter, including representatives of the Consulta 
Municipale and the Consorzio Alberghi e Pensioni Venezia e Lido, alongside those 
of the travel agencies and the National Railway Society.161
Nevertheless, there were elements within Venetian commercial circles who 
were not entirely satisfied with the results brought by the popular trains, especially 
those businessmen running luxurious hotels and restaurants (a by no means 
insignificant proportion of Venice’s hoteliers).162 At the end of the 1932 summer 
season, Guido Casattini, president of the Consorzio Alberghi e Pensioni Venezia e
160 ASV, Gabinetto della Prefettura di Venezia, anni 1893-1936, pacco n. 34, busta ‘Smistamento 
treni popolari in arrivo a Venezia’.
161 Ibid.
162 According to Fincardi, when the ‘Lictor’ bridge over the lagoon was inaugurated on 25 April 
1933, many Venetians, following the considerable tourist increase of the mid 1920s worried about a 
possible invasion of Venice from masses o f tourists, especially those less economically endowed 
(Fincardi, ‘I fasti della ‘tradizione” , in Isnenghi, Woolf, (eds.), Storia di Venezia, p. 1489).
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Lido, addressed the Prefect of Venice and thanked him for having benefited 
summer tourism to the lagoon through the institution of the popular trains, and 
praising the undoubted contribution made to the reduction of unemployment in the 
Venetian district. Yet, at the same time, he argued that the accompanying discounts 
granted in hotels and restaurants had meant that many businesses could not be said 
to have made any tangible profit, and that the travel and tourist discounts had 
simply served the purpose of keeping them financially above water at a time of
i  f i 'y
crisis. The Podesta, on behalf of the Tourist Office in Venice, wrote to the 
Provincial Federation of Commerce with concerns about the ways in which the 
discount systems had been operating. The Federation had agreed reduced prices for 
the users of the popular trains with some Venetian hotels for the Corpus Domini 
celebrations (from the tourist point of view, the Holy Year, in 1925, had proved a 
great financial success and the Federation wished to repeat the experiment).164 
However, the Tourist Office reported that many travellers who had reached Venice 
by popular train found that they were denied the agreed reductions by several hotels 
and bed-and-breakfasts, leading to a number of complaints. The Podesta added that 
he might in future be forced to cancel the popular trains/accommodation discounts 
formula ‘because of the inability of the local hotel industry to live up to the 
expectations of tourists’.165
Again, in 1938, a certain ambivalence on the part of local tourist interests to 
the emerging mass tourism in Venice could be detected. That year, the Podesta 
reported to the Prefect outlining the previous efforts made by the Venetian 
authorities to establish the popular trains as a means of alleviating the effects of 
economic crisis. However, by 1938, the worst ravages of the depression seemed to 
be over, and with tourist numbers rising once again, some Venetians wished to put 
an end to the experiment of popular trains. According to the Podesta, ‘the hotel 
industry in Venice now wished only to work towards elite tourism’, a commercial 
priority that clearly ran up against the popular trains project which was aimed at
163 ASV, Gabinetto della Prefettura di Venezia, anni 1893-1936, pacco n. 34, busta ‘Treni popolari e 
semi-popolari’.
164 Ibid.
165 Ibid.
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promoting the tourism of the lower classes.166 Little attention was paid to the stated 
aim of the Fascist regime to favour, first and foremost, the development of mass 
tourism for ideological purposes. This group of Venetian hoteliers were more 
interested in appealing to those social classes most suitable to their own businesses, 
leading them towards a clash of interests not simply with the Fascist authorities, but 
also with those in Venice who did indeed favour the growth of mass tourism for 
monetary reasons. For the Fascists, ideological and economic implications were to 
go hand in hand, but for some Italian citizens, their own private commercial 
interests far outweighed the regime’s propagandistic concerns. In this instance, the 
Podesta, bowing to pressure from Rome, was forced to reject the request made by
1 f\ 7the hotel industry to reduce the popular trains service to Venice.
From these events, it is nevertheless clear that the possibility of embracing 
mass tourism in Venice was intrinsically linked to the need to find a feasible 
solution to the economic crisis, regardless of the Regime’s wish ‘to go towards the 
people’. However, once the worst of the crisis was thought to be over, the 
traditional trading class wished to focus once again upon its conventional market -  
exclusive tourism. After all, it was to the elite tourists that Venice had sought to
thappeal since the end of the 19 century, before Fascism had come to power, and the 
local hotel industry saw no reason to discontinue those customs simply because of 
the current ideological infatuations of the central authorities in Rome. Ultimately, 
many considered that the fulfilment of the peculiar economic interests of Venice 
had little in common with the regime’s objective of achieving the ‘fascistization’ of 
society through modem tourism. Tourist strategies adopted in the city would, from 
time to time, need to be different from the ideologically determined tourist 
directives handed down by the state. Many Venetians were of the opinion that 
tourist policy ought to be tailored to fit the practical needs of the local economy and 
its hotel sector rather than Fascist propaganda, consensus-building, or national 
economic strategies.
Viewed in this light, the case of the popular trains provides another striking 
example of the conflict of interests between regional/local identity and national
166 Ibid.
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identity, and of the clash between consolidated tourist traditions and the 
requirements of the new ideological state. It is also a significant indication that a 
self-proclaimed ‘totalitarian’ regime was in fact incapable of living up to the ‘ideal 
type’ totalitarian model. Instead, there existed discernible fractures between the 
central government’s directives and the ways in which they were interpreted and 
implemented by local authorities. Here, perhaps, David Forgacs’ concept of ‘flawed 
totalitarianism’ is useful.168 Ideology and propaganda never totally penetrated the 
essence of cultural tourism in Venice, eventually losing out to the strength of the 
entrenched customs and traditions of a city whose very identity was defined by the 
needs of commerce and the tourist industry in particular.
2.7 Boosting tourism: modern tourist techniques adopted in Venice
The cosmopolitan public that frequented Venice during the May-June and 
August-October tourist seasons was envisaged as an elegant public, refined and 
fond of cultural activities, above all exhibitions. It was for the benefit of such 
visitors, to facilitate their enjoyment of the Twentieth Biennale of International Arts 
and Venice’s other artistic, sporting and social events in the summer 1936, that the 
Biennale administration and the Tourist Office issued special guidebooks including 
reduced travel and cumulative entrance tickets.169
As in mainstream business practice, the habit of setting up ‘joint ventures’ 
between the different services and events became a defining feature of Venetian 
cultural tourism in the 1930s. Travel discounts and entrance reductions represented 
the cornerstone of the new commercial enterprises. With the purchase of a single 
ticket, holidaymakers were entitled to travel to Venice and partake of selected 
events at discounted prices throughout the summer.170
In some cases, commercial ventures were arranged between the historic city 
and the Lido. In 1937, a major business agreement was reached between the
167 Ibid.
168 Forgacs (ed.), ‘Introduction’, in Rethinking Italian Fascism, p. 8.
169 ASAC, Serie Scatole Nere, busta n. 44, ‘Riduzioni ferroviarie 1936’. In July 1936, the travel 
agent ‘Adriatica’ of Budapest ordered as many as thirty o f these booklets for its customers, planning 
to organise a full service of transport, accommodation, leisure and information (Ibid).
170 See for instance, AMV, Determinazioni Podestarili, ‘Turismo. Estate Veneziana’, trim. II, 1933, 
n. 1042.
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Tintoretto Exhibition in Venice, and the Cinema Festival and the International Boat 
Racing at the Lido.171 For the occasion, the Ministry of Communications issued 
travel discounts to Venice at up to 50% of the normal ticket price from 23 June to 
19 September 1937. The period until 31 July benefited the Tintoretto Exhibition 
while the second period, until 19 September, was geared towards the promotion of 
the Biennale Cinema Festival and the International Boat Racing, and included a 
‘seaside reduction’ for accommodation at the Lido, with a minimum stay of six 
days. Tickets were not valid for return if not countersigned by the Tourist Office in 
Venice. Therefore, profits in favour of the different events were calculated 
according to the respective periods of fare reductions.172 Ultimately, what mattered 
to the municipal Tourist Agency was that the various activities and events included 
on the tourist calendar were making a profit.173
On other occasions, mutual strategies were adopted amongst events in 
various Italian cities. A common example was the joint venture between the Venice 
Biennale, the Milan Triennale, the International Book Fair in Florence, and other 
exhibitions in Turin. Writing to the administration of the Biennale, Enrico 
Bemporad, President of the Executive Committee of the International Book Fair in 
Florence, claimed that a public attracted by the prospect of a cumulative discount 
could be enticed into visiting all four exhibitions, and that this cumulative 
enterprise would lead to ‘further profits in the books of the individual events’.174
The project of tourist development in Venice could not have been 
successfully carried out without the effort made by the Venetian municipality and 
its Tourist Agency in the adoption of modem promotional and publicity techniques 
to sustain tourism and attract audiences. In keeping with the regime’s objective of 
‘going towards the people’, Venice set out to appeal to a wider public by improving 
its tourist facilities, and by offering discounts on various tourist services. For 
example, in the 1930s, major advertising campaigns were encouraged both inside 
and outside the Italian borders. The Podesta himself used his position to issue
171 Ibid, ‘Turismo. Vidimazione biglietti ferroviari a riduzione anno 1937’, trim. II, 1937, n. 1865.
172 ASV, Gabinetto della Prefettura di Venezia, anni 1893-1936, pacco n. 34, busta ‘Riduzioni 
ferroviarie pel 1936-Riscossione quote dai viaggiatori’.
173 ASAC, Segreteria/Arti Visive, ‘Corrispondenza 1935’.
174 ASAC, Serie Scatole Nere, busta n. 44, ‘Ferrovie 1928’.
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decrees ordering the local Tourist Agency to advertise major publications both in 
Italy and abroad.175 According to the Consulta Municipale, this form of publicity 
was ‘particularly suitable for attracting an international tourist crowd to the 
Stazione di Cura Soggiorno e Turismo\ 176 Each year, the local council together 
with the Tourist Agency organised a competition for the design of a promotional 
poster publicizing the splendour of Venice and the Lido.177 The event was 
considered important enough to merit a judging panel drawn from the Biennale 
entourage and including acclaimed painters such as Ettore Tito and Italico Brass.178 
The Podesta also encouraged Venetian hotels and hostels to produce lists detailing 
their prices and facilities in order to enable the tourist authorities to provide 
information and reply to specific enquiries from overseas tourist agencies and 
ordinary citizens’.179
From 1930, great energy was devoted to the conception of an ‘illustrated
1 80and cosmopolitan’ Venetian periodical. In 1934, the Tourist Office printed as 
many as 300,000 copies of a local tourist guidebook, published in four languages 
and including all kinds of information about communications, travel,
1 O 1
accommodation, sport and amenities. As for publicity material intended for non- 
Italian audiences, the Podesta urged the tourist authorities to take into account 
‘those countries which showed the greatest interest towards Venetian tourism such 
as Germany, Austria, Hungary, Switzerland, Britain, America, France, Spain,
175 AMV, Determinazioni Podestarili, ‘Turismo. Inserzioni reclamistiche su giomali in Italia e 
all’estero’, trim. I, 1930, n. 157. Regulations concerning major tourist publications in Venice were 
quite strict. For instance, on 10 October 1938, the Prefect warned the Directors o f the reviews Le Tre 
Venezie, Lido-Venezia and Viaggi C.l.T. that the Minculpop (Ministry of Popular Culture) had 
expressed its desire that all the programmes of celebrations of tourist nature were approved by the 
Ente Provinciale per il Turismo before being printed with any relevant comment (ASV, Gabinetto 
della Prefettura di Venezia, anni 1893-1936, pacco n. 4, busta ‘Programmemi di stagioni e 
manifestazioni di carattere turistico’).
176 AMV, Determinazioni Podestarili, ‘Materiale Pubblicitario della Stazione di Cura Soggiorno e 
Turismo’, trim. II, 1930, n. 158.
177 Usually the poster portrayed a Venetian landscape paired with the image o f a bourgeois woman 
wearing luxury clothes and jewels. Few sentences and bold colors publicized the historic city and its 
glamorous beach.
178 AMV, Determinazioni Podestarili, ‘Cartello reclame Venezia-Lido’, trim. I, 1930, n. 327.
179 Ibid, ‘Elenco alberghi e pensioni Venezia-Lido’, trim. II, 1929, n. 1862.
180 Ibid, ‘Contributo 1930 per l’uscita di un periodico veneziano illustrato e poliglotta’, trim. I, 1930, 
n. 159.
181 AMV, Affari Generali del Comune di Venezia, quinquennio 1931-34, fascicolo XI/II/18, 
‘Relazione sull’attivita svolta dal Comune nell’anno 1934’.
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Poland, Romania, Holland, Denmark, Sweden and Norway’.182 The placing of 
various advertisements in the foreign press was regarded as a particularly valuable 
means of overseas publicity.183 Germany was the foreign nation where the greatest 
effort was made (possibly the result of ideological affinities) and in 1934, 
promotional material for Venice was published in more than fifteen German
184newspapers. In order to create a sophisticated publicity network outside Italy to 
deal with tourist promotion and related information services, the local council 
established distinct branches of the Tourist Office, each responsible for different
185foreign countries. Moreover, annual contributions were paid into the Italian 
Chamber of Commerce in Berlin ‘for propaganda186 to spread in Germany in favour 
of the Venetian Stazione di Cura via suitable forms of publicity’.187 Another means 
of achieving tourist publicity was Venetian participation in various national and 
international tourist fairs.188 Tourist exhibitions in the 1930s were ordered by the 
Direttorio Generale of the Ente Nazionale Industrie Turistiche with the aim of
• • • • • 1 &Qgrouping major Italian resorts together within a kind of tourist ‘Stock Exchange’ 
and, according to the Podesta, provided ‘outstanding propaganda for the Venice’s 
various and complex tourist interests’.190
In this way, the commodification191 of culture was complete. The Biennale 
of International Arts was simply part of tourist packages offered for sale by various 
travel agencies. In short, the exhibition and other Venetian cultural events were 
available for purchase as tourist products, with a consequential strengthening of the
182 Ibid
183 AMV, Determinazioni Podestarili, ‘Inserzioni reclamistiche su giomali esteri’, trim. II, 1929, n. 
1731.
184 AMV, Affari Generali del Comune di Venezia, quinquennio 1931-34, fascicolo XI/II/18, 
‘Relazione sull’attivita svolta dal Comune nell’anno 1934’.
185 AMV, Determinazioni Podestarili, ‘Agenzie fiduciarie della Stazione di Cura presso le sedi della 
Cosulich e del Lloyd Triestino’, trim. II, 1929, n. 1732.
186 It is important to note that the use of the word ‘propaganda’ in these municipal records was just 
another term for ‘publicity’ and carried no ideological meaning.
187 AMV, Determinazioni Podestarili, ‘Contributo alia Camera di Commercio Italo-Germanica per 
pubblicita’, trim. II, 1929, n. 1733.
188 Ibid, ‘Turismo. Partecipazione a fiere e a mostre’, trim. II, 1936, n. 1255.
189 Ibid, ‘Turismo. Partecipazione all’Esposizione di Montecassino’, trim. II, 1929, n. 1865.
190 Ibid, ‘Turismo. Partecipazione all’Esposizione Intemazionale di Anversa e Liegi 1930’, trim. I, 
1930, n. 5851.
191 By ‘commodification’ it is meant not just the process of transforming raw materials into the 
finished object but also the practice by which a good is consumed by consumers. When culture is 
bought by cultural consumers it becomes a article of trade, a commodity, too (it is commodified).
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relationship between art and commerce. Tourist practices adopted to sell 
exhibitions, concerts, theatre plays, place the emphasis on the pragmatic side of 
cultural tourism rather than the cultural capital (and ideology) incorporated by these 
events.
2.8 Cultural tourism in the war years
In the late 1930s, the Fascist regime, confronted by the European political 
crisis, embarked upon a more radical programme of propaganda and coercion.192 
Even so, the evidence suggests that only very rarely did the Venetian Consulta 
dwell on the content of local cultural representations to be staged in the city, as long 
as it was accepted that they suited the established tastes of the desired audience. 
Acclaimed authors such as Goldoni and Shakespeare would always draw large
193audiences. That ‘Othello’ by Shakespeare was conceived of as a potentially 
profitable tourist attraction, in spite of the increasingly Anglophobic political 
climate can be seen in the Podesta’s ruling that the municipality, ‘in order to bring 
to Venice the usual number of foreign visitors, without which the citizens’ interest 
would be severely damaged, should coordinate the year’s summer schedule with art 
events to be staged in the Palazzo Ducale, one of these being ‘Othello’ by 
Shakespeare’.194 Perhaps informing the Podesta’s decision was a recollection of the 
enthusiastic critical acclaim with which Max Reinhardt’s earlier production of ‘The 
Merchant of Venice’ had been received.195
In a similar vein, on 21 March 1939, Volpi informed the Biennale 
committee members of his proposal once again to include Shakespeare’s ‘Othello’
192 Stone, The Patron State, p. -16.
193 In 1936, the newspaper II Giornale d ’ltalia declared: ‘Everyone can understand which source of 
beauty, which element of cultural propaganda and tourist attraction could represent the institution of 
a stable venue of goldonian performances periodically arranged, especially when this venue is called 
Venice’ (Zajotti, ‘7/ Ventaglio e'Le Baruffe Chiozzotte di Goldoni in Campo San Zaccaria e a San 
Cosmo della Giudecca’, II Giornale d ’ltalia, 21 June 1936).
194 AMV, Determinazioni Podestarili, ‘Turismo. Eventi dell’estate veneziana 1936’, trim. IV, 1936, 
n. 2365.
195 ASAC, Serie Verbali delle Adunanze del Comitato di Amministrazione dell’Ente Biennale, vol. 
Ill, 28/01/35-30/01/43, session 28 January 1935. As a Jew, Reinhardt's status as a great artistic 
innovator was threatened when Hitler came to power. The Nazis began to expropriate his theatres in 
Germany, and he was subsequently forced to leave the country to emigrate to America in 1934. 
However, in Italy anti-Semitism was not so virulent as to prevent this kind of production and in
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and ‘II Campiello’ by Goldoni, both directed by Renato Simoni, in the forthcoming 
Theatre Festival (Volpi apparently also considered staging Browning’s ‘The Barrett 
Family’ in the court of Palazzo Rezzonico before deciding against it on the grounds 
that ‘the play’s success would be uncertain’ -  a conclusion which had nothing to do 
with any ideological consideration).196 Later that day, Vilfrido Casellati, President 
of the Province of Venice, asked Volpi whether public interest towards the 
Biennale art exhibition had lessened or expanded in recent months. Volpi expressed 
a belief that it had indeed diminished, but professed himself unable to provide a 
precise explanation for the apparent decline. Maraini, addressing Casellati, put 
forward the view that the falling off in interest might be explicable with reference 
to the recent development of the Lido beach resort, the popularity of which meant 
that many tourists did not return to the mainland until the end of the summer
197season. Volpi, however, showed no willingness to consider closing down the fine 
art exhibition. On the contrary, he announced that it was his intention to extend the 
duration of the Biennale in order to give it a higher profile during the tourist season.
In 1940, with the crisis in Europe reaching a seeming denouement with the 
fall of France, Italy followed in Germany’s aggressive footsteps and announced 
itself ready to enter the war. Perhaps surprisingly, however, with the global 
economy fragmenting and suffering as a direct result of the conflict in Europe, it 
appears that Venice continued to produce and promote its all-year round 
celebrations and amusements in an apparently light-hearted atmosphere. An article 
appearing in the New York Herald in the same year illustrated the sense of 
Venetian detachment from the destructive events unfolding in Europe and 
demonstrates the apparent continuity in the strategies of the town’s tourist industry. 
The article is worth quoting at some length:
Venice offers an enchanting programme for the 1940 season, but merely to be in
Venice is in itself enchanting. The artistic programme includes, naturally, the XXII Art
Venice, cosmopolitanism and internationalism were far more important. It was on occasions such as 
this that the city demonstrated an internationalism far beyond mere Italian nationalism or Fascism.
196 Ibid, session 21 March 1939.
197 The Music Festival had traditionally been the least profitable off all the major Biennale events, 
partly because it was the last event of the season (held in September) and many tourists tended to 
leave Venice as soon as the cinema festival at the Lido had been completed.
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Biennale, inaugurated on 1 June with the usual picturesque procession by water to the 
Public Gardens where, in Italian and foreign pavilions until October 1 the art most 
representative o f the world’s modem mediums of expression will be on view. Especially 
interesting is the musical, theatrical and cinema programme. From June 11 to 14, in the 
Piazza San Marco, the ‘Resurrection of Christ’ by Perosi, will be presented. On July 15 to 
31, open-air performances of the Venetian comedian Goldoni are scheduled. From August 
4 to 9, open-air productions of Wolf-Ferrari’s opera ‘Campiello’ and Pick-Mangiafalli’s 
Casanova ballet will be delightful events. The musical programme will be complemented 
by the International Musical Festival of the Biennale from September 1 to 15, at which a 
special feature is a Hungarian company specialising in concerts and ballets at the Fenice 
Theater, itself one of the exquisite gems o f 16th century architecture. The Fourth 
International Cinema Art Congress at the Excelsior Lido from August 10 to 31, with 
premieres and showings of cinematic masterpieces, will mean three absorbing weeks to 
cinema-lovers and film enthusiasts. Although full details are as yet not forthcoming, it is 
said that Paramount is to contribute a colour version o f the ‘Trail of the Lonesome Pine,’ 
starring Sylvia Sydney, among its other offerings.
The characteristic Venetian water festivals are always a charm of Venice. The 
three of special historical significance are the Feast o f the Redentore on the night of July 
18; the festival on the Grand Canal on the night o f August 22, and the Gondoliers Regatta 
on the afternoon September 6. The Redentore has been celebrated annually almost without 
interruption for more than 500 years. On these occasions, the Giudecca Canal is a living 
patchwork of light, fireworks and fun. As a surviving illustration of Italian tradition it’s 
only possible rival is Siena’s Palio. The Grand Canal festival is of more modem origin, but 
nevertheless provides a splendid illumination of palaces, bridges, myriad brilliant barges, 
gondolas and every sort of water craft, together with various choral and other concerts. The 
Regatta is an absorbing festival in which royalty, high society and the people all participate. 
The traditional gilded bissone, gondoliers in bright satin uniforms, precede the racing boats, 
and a member of the royal family presents the prizes, including for the fourth winner a live 
pig. On August 16, the Murano quarter, famous for its glass and lace industries, has a 
Gondoliers’ Regatta of its own which also attracts many Venetian visitors.
Sporting events begin with the eighth International Motorboat race from Pavia to 
Venice on June 14. The International Golf Tournaments are, as usual, scheduled for 
September. From August 31 to September 6, the Tennis tournaments at the courts of the 
Excelsior Hotel courts are held. From September 13 to 15, the VIII Motorboat Concourse is 
held on the lagoons, and from September 14 to 19, golf competitions at the Alberoni links. 
Other special events scheduled for the season are the ‘Light Extravaganza’ at the Lido on 
July 11; the ‘Festival of the Full Moon’ in the Piazza San Marco on August 1; a Fashion 
Show at the Excelsior Lido on July 24 and 25; a Venetian Agricultural Exhibition from
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August 1 to 15; and the usual cultural courses for Italians and foreigners to be held at Ca’
Foscari from September 1 to 30 under the auspices of the Inter University Institute’.198
This article is significant as it shows that despite mounting xenophobia, an 
increasingly autarchic political atmosphere, and a period of deteriorating 
international relations (with consequent negative effects for the Biennale and the 
number of tourists visiting Venice), the city maintained its commitment to the 
cultural and tourist domain. With Venice reliant upon tourism, it is hardly 
surprising that the authorities eschewed an aggressive ideology in favor of the 
preservation of their own traditional economic interests. War and tourism were 
incompatible, and clearly the Venetian ruling class would have preferred the 
maintenance of a healthy tourist trade over and above a Fascist war. Even with the 
outbreak of an economically detrimental conflict, the vital imperative was to 
maintain the summer season to the greatest extent possible. The account cited 
above clearly demonstrates that Venice sought to promote its tourist agenda without 
reference to any warlike climate. On the contrary, the tourist publicity seems to 
have been specifically tailored to distract attention from the war, precisely because 
war was too hard to incorporate into the Venetian culture of cosmopolitanism.
If we compare the 1940 summer calendar with its 1931 predecessor (see 
section 2.1), we find that in 1940 surprisingly little had changed. If anything, the 
programme was expanded and enriched in 1940, revealing an ongoing wartime 
loyalty to the summer season’s tourist events (as the New York Herald stated above, 
the Redentore had been held, almost without interruption every year for five 
centuries).199 The municipality’s intention was clearly to continue promoting
198 ‘Water Festivals, art and sports events fill brilliant Venetian summer calendar’, New York Herald, 
26 May 1940.
199 Bosworth also gives this significant account about Venice in the war years: ‘Even in the summer 
of 1942, Venice’s high society appeal had not entirely been surrended. Inevitably, the XXIII 
Biennale attracted fewer spectators than its predecessors had done but it was still open, and 
commentators assured their readers that the surviving clientele was more select and knowledgeable 
than before the waiLln Piazza San Marco, music could still be heard, although it was now on 
occasion provided by the Hermann Goring Regimental (who played Bach and Liszt). More 
grandiose tourist events had not been cancelled. The ‘Theatre of 4,000’ opened, this time in Campo 
San Polo, under the auspices of Minculpop and with the promise that it offered ‘the chance for all to 
attend performances which hitherto were reserved to a narrow group of privileged beings’. Ordinary 
people, it was said, could then express the ‘enthusiasm of this simple and open souls^ beating at 
every expression of beauty’. Cavalleria Rusticana, Aida and Tosca, ‘the music of our great men, the
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tourism, despite the unfavorable international atmosphere, in the hope that the 
effects of the war would not seriously damage the Venetian economy. In this 
respect, Volpi’s speech to the Biennale Committee in 1941 is highly significant. He 
began with a demand for the revival of the summer season through the launching of 
outdoor film screenings as part of the Cinema Festival before going on to ask the 
Podesta to ensure that the events scheduled by the town council were not timed to 
coincide with any film showings at the cinema exhibition.200 This indicates that 
Volpi’s business-like attitude and pragmatic commercial approach was maintained 
in spite of the wider national development of a Fascist war climate.
2.9 The ambiguous relationship between the Venetian administration and the 
state
In this chapter, it has been argued that the tourist movement was crucial for 
the well-being of the Venetian district, especially in times of prolonged economic 
crises. For this reason, of the two functions of tourism outlined by Mussolini in the 
1930s -  ideological and economic -  the latter was far more important than the 
former in the eyes of the local authorities, and the cultural showcase events staged 
in Venice were primarily understood as a contribution to the local economy. From 
this perspective, it was entirely logical that the Tourist Office should be so heavily 
involved in the organisation and production of cultural events, and that the 
municipality was constantly on the lookout for exciting new ideas to enrich the 
summer tourist calendar. Concerts, exhibitions, plays and local festivals were 
always assessed in terms of their contribution to the tourist trade and their
real, magnificent music of our geniuses’, would lift the hearts of every audience. Art, too, was still 
displayed. In the summer of 1942, Venice acted as host to an exhibition o f popular religious art. 
Volpi and the Duke of Genoa were present at its formal lunch, emphasizing the special inspiration 
which had been given to contemporary religious art by the ‘crusade’ against the Ufl£S$ Conferences 
were still held -one was organized by the critics of religious art for example- while the ‘Friends of 
Japan’ advertised a lecture series. Later in the year, a Croatian Exhibition opened, luring visitors 
with a martial statue owPoglavnik, by Ante Pavelie. So, too, did an exhibition of ‘female activity’ 
which displayed the ‘many tiny skills’ of ‘the perfect housewife’. Regattas were held. There was 
even another cinema festival, the tenth since 1932^ which^Volpi declared would illuminate once 
again ‘how Venice had learned to become a centre of formidable economic interest and power, 
while demonstrating that Italy, despite the heavy burden of its war effort, still had time for^ aifidt .  
Pavolini and Goebbels arrived to prove his point’ (Bosworth, ‘Venice, 1911-45’, pp. 16-17).
200 ASAC, Serie Verbali delle Adunanze del Comitato di Amministrazione dell’Ente Biennale, vol.
Ill, 28/01/35-30/01/43, session 12 May 1941.
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consumer potential in a cosmopolitan tourist market. For this reason, they were 
always more likely to prioritise commercial appeal over ideological factors. Even in 
wartime, Venice attempted to maintain its own traditions of tourism, leisure 
activities and open-air pastimes and to seek to transcend the autarchy and extreme 
nationalism of the Fascist ideologues.
Griffin has argued that Fascism ‘means propaganda on a massive scale, the 
radical overhaul of education and academic life, and the reshaping of cultural life 
both at the level of ‘high art’ and of popular culture and leisure’.201 However, the 
case of Venice reveals that the regime’s efforts to ‘fascistize’ cultural life in the 
region was only partially effective with regard to the attitudes of Venetian elites 
towards the town’s cultural activities. At best, ‘fascistization’ simply overlapped 
with the profitable use of culture in favour of tourism. Ultimately, practical 
economic considerations continued to intrude into what might otherwise have been 
an exclusively ideologically-driven sphere.202
Even when Fascist organs such as the local section of the OND were 
involved in the preparation of cultural activities, regionalism, Venetian identity and 
the promotion of tourism still retained their importance. As for the Venetian elites, 
several local businessmen demonstrated a blatant self-interest and disregard for the 
state’s ideological objective of expanding mass tourism in the city if this was seen 
to run against the grain of their own business interests.
The case of the ‘popular trains’ is a particularly clear point at which the 
potential for clashes between the Fascist state and the Venetian tourist industry was 
exposed and is an example which illustrates the dissonance between local 
understanding of cultural tourism and the priorities of the Fascist regime. In this 
respect, Bosworth’s words are significant:
‘And what, too, of the summer festivals, the Redentore, the regattas, the art, cinema and 
music Biennali and many of the exhibitions? They undoubtedly did contain and express 
some elements of Fascism. But it was not a reliable or consistent Fascism, one which 
transmuted its audiences’ souls and liquidated there the vestiges of liberalism, or 
Catholicism, or localism, or cosmopolitanism, or many another non-Fascist idea. Though it
201 Griffin, ‘Staging the Nation’s Rebirth’, in Berghaus (ed.), Fascism and Theatre, p. 17.
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was hard fully to accept the arguments of historians who aver that all politics is mere 
surface, a shadow-play of the ‘real’ social world, this glimpse o f Venetian history reveals a 
host of long-term structures that challenge the notion of a wholly affirmed Fascist or 
cultural revolution. By this account, in the years from 1911 to 1945, Venice remained in 
most ways itself, more drawn to the sacralization of leisure than to that of Fascist life’.203
The evidence provided above makes a compelling case for the need to 
separate the history of Venice from a monolithic history of Italian Fascism. It is 
clear that the interlinked cultural and economic interests and objectives of Venice 
bred a unique local mentality which, while compatible with many elements of 
Fascism and capable of coexisting with Fascist rule, should not be thought of as a 
simple variant of Fascist ideology or an unquestioning servant of the values and 
ideals of the Fascist regime. The main argumentative thrust of this chapter has been 
to suggest that, in many respects, Fascism was only a passing episode in the secular 
history of Italian and Venetian tourism.
202 Bosworth, ‘Tourist planning in Fascist Italy’, p. 17.
203 Bosworth, ‘Venice, 1911-45’, p. 19.
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3. Giuseppe Volpi and the development of cultural tourism in Venice
This chapter examines the role played by Giuseppe Volpi as the foremost 
example of a Fascist businessman and public figure acting as a mediator between 
the world of national politics and the representatives of Venice’s own aspirations of 
economic revival. Volpi’s rise to prominence under Fascism was connected both to 
the project to bring about the overall transformation of the Veneto area into a 
modem productive district undertaken in the 1920s and 1930s, and to the 
development of cultural tourism as a staple Venetian industry in the historic town 
and the Lido.
Volpi’s entrepreneurial spirit gave rise to the Music Festival in 1930, 
followed by the Film Festival in 1932, the Poetry Conventions of 1932 and 1934, 
and the Theatre Festival in 1934.1 The redefinition of cultural tourism that came 
with the birth of the new Biennale festivals and the establishment of the industrial 
harbour of Porto Marghera, both sprang from Volpi’s willingness to reshape the 
economic destinations of the Venetian area. As the exploitation of cultural tourism 
emerged as the only viable alternative left to the city of Venice, cultural events 
came to acquire an overtly commercial function. As a result, Volpi’s approach to 
both industrial issues and Biennale cultural activities was characterised by 
pragmatism and mercantile awareness. For Volpi, both had to prove their economic 
viability if they were to merit the backing of the Venetian business elites.
The case of the Biennale Music and Theatre festivals demonstrates that 
when cultural showcases did not fulfil their commercial function properly (i.e. they 
were not deemed to be sufficiently profitable), Volpi tended to abandon them, 
regardless of any contribution they might make to the moral benefit for the 
population. In a city that was living upon the profits generated by tourism, all 
related activities were expected to give a fundamental contribution, and were 
treated as businesses that should abide by business rules. As both the creator of 
Porto Marghera and the President of the Ente Autonomo Biennale, Volpi 
established himself as the ‘co-ordinator’ of the Venetian economy in the post-
1 Paolo Rizzi, Enzo di Martino, Storia della Biennale 1895-1982, Milano, Electa, 1982, p. 37.
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World War I period. He also acted as the most effective mediator between local 
priorities and the demands of the state, guaranteeing that, to the greatest possible 
extent, Venice undertook the steps of industrial development with the backing of 
the regime.
In this way, the Venetian landscape of cultural entertainment was the 
product of an ambitious programme of economic reform moulded by the city’s 
traditional tourist interests rather than an ideologically driven creation imposed 
through the directives of the central government.
3.1 Giuseppe Volpi and the cultural industrialization of Venice
•  • 9Giuseppe Volpi, Count of Misurata, was to become one of the most 
celebrated Italians during the inter-war period. Volpi was already well-known as 
the conte venezianissimo, and had built a reputation as a master of finances as he 
gathered together an enormous business empire. By 1921, he held posts in at least 
46 industrial groups such as the electrical giant, Societa Adriatica di Elettricita 
(SADE), the Ciga hotel conglomerate, and the numerous insurance and banking 
corporations including Galileo and Lloyd Adriatico, the Banca Commerciale 
Italiana (a major shareholder in both SADE and the Ciga) and the Credito 
Industriale financial group.4
Through his position in the SADE, Volpi was the primary provider of 
electricity in the Veneto region together with Vittorio Cini and Achille Gaggia (the 
three formed the so-called ‘Venetian group’).5 A steamship company and crucial
2 Volpi had been made count of Misurata, a stronghold conquered during the Libyan War of 1912, in 
December 1920 for his service as a diplomat.
3 Pier Mario Pasinetti, ‘II convegno di poesia a Venezia’, II Ventuno, 7 August 1932.
4 Giovanni Di Stefano, Giannantonio Paladini, Storia di Venezia 1797-1997. Dalla Monarchia alia 
Repubblica, vol. Ill, Venezia, Supernova, 1997, p. 93
5 In 1905, Cini started as a businessman in the field of transports and constructions. In 1925, he held 
posts in several societies: SADE, Credito Industriale, Societa di Navigazione Interna and Societa di 
Navigazione Libera Triestina (transports), Officine Meccaniche Italiane di Reggio Emilia 
(mechanics), Alti Fomi e Acciaierie della Venezia-Giulia (steel indyustry), etc. (Maurizio 
Reberschak, ‘Gli uomini capitali: il ‘gruppo veneziano’ (Volpi, Cini e gli atri)’, in Isnenghi, Woolf, 
(eds.), Storia di Venezia, vol. Ill, p. 1272). Gaggia became part of the Venetian group in 1905 when 
he was appointed General Director at the SADE. In 1931, he held posts in 61 companies 
(mechanics, constructions and transports) and was president of the Ciga from 1925 to 1944 and from 
1948 to 1953 (Ibid, p. 1278). Volpi, Cini and Gaggia were the new elements of the local economic 
life, embodying a second generation of Venetian entrepreneurs after the Papadopoli, Treves de’ 
Bonfili and Breda. (Di Stefano, Paladini, Storia di Venezia, p. 36).
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interests in the luxury hotels under construction on the Lido extended his areas of 
influence, ensuring that both tourist and transport were in place in the portfolio.6 
Moreover, the auspicious encounter in 1900 between Volpi and Giuseppe Toeplitz, 
head of the Banca Commerciale had led to the development of a series of financial 
enterprises in a city which was moving towards the reinvention of itself as a 
commercial and industrial powerhouse.7
At the turn of the century, the Veneto region ranked as the third most 
important industrial district in Italy (after Piedmont and Lombardy), specialising in 
textile production and engineering. Venice’s industrial base rested, to a large extent, 
on foreign investment, and major enterprises and industrial plants bore such names 
as Neville (mechanics), Stucky (Giancarlo was both the founder of Pill a Pilla 
which produced electrical material and administrator at Credito Industriale), 
Junghans (transports), Layet and Rothschild (gas companies). These foreign 
businessmen brought economic innovation to the lagoon, as the region witnessed 
the development of new power stations, ferry boat lines, and other successful
o
commercial activities.
Along with economic expansion, the city authorities began to consider ways 
of circumventing Venice’s geographical limitations, developing the concept of 
‘exiting the island’,9 and building an ‘industrial Venice’ on the mainland, an idea 
increasingly favoured by the Venetian business elite.10 The project of general 
economic restructuring of the district would also foster the implementation of a 
novel urban plan that had been devised in 1902 by Captain Luciano Petit, a 
technician supported above all by Piero Foscari. Foscari, a Venetian notable 
descendant of the Doge Alvise Foscari, member of the town council from 1899 to 
1919 and subscriber of SADE shares, subsequently singled out Volpi as the man 
capable of transforming the plans for Porto Marghera into reality.11 According to
6 Plant, Venice, Fragile City, p. 233.
7 Reberschak, ‘Gli uomini capitali’, in Isnenghi, Woolf, (eds.), Storia di Venezia, p. 1257.
8 Di Stefano, Paladini, Storia di Venezia, p. 33-4.
9 Ibid, p. 22.
10 The solution was faithful to the ancient republican laws of 1292 which had established by decree 
the shift of the glass production to the Murano island in order to contain dangers of fire in Venice 
(Ibid, p. 104).
11 Ibid, p. 24.
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historian Giovanni Fontana, Petit’s plan came to occupy an important place in the 
processes of economic growth and the challenge of productive reorganisation faced 
by the Veneto region in the chemical, steel and mechanical fields after the First 
World War.12
Petit based the new plan for industrial takeoff in Marghera on the idea that
‘rich’ trades and traditional crafts would remain in Venice while ‘poor’ trades
(fertilizers, coal, phosphates), mass production and manufacturing industries would
move to the mainland. This economic ‘Grand Strategy’ entailed the construction of
an industrial harbour, Porto Marghera, at the edge of the lagoon, linked by a bridge
to the tourist port, Piazza San Marco, and the subsequent transfer of the less
wealthy elements of the Venetian population to the industrial suburbs of Mestre, a
strategic decision related to pressing demographic concerns in Venice (there were
1 ^far too many inhabitants in the Venetian islets, about 150,000). The islands of 
Lido, S. Erasmo, Murano and Giudecca were no longer capable of meeting the 
demographic challenges confronting Venice and needed to address the problem of 
overpopulation. It was hoped that improved conditions for both industry and 
housing would help relieve overcrowding and unsanitary conditions in the centro 
storico. According to Foscari and Petit, the project could not only be allied to 
Venice’s land reclamation plans, it would make Venice an industrial centre of 
international standing. The Porto Marghera construction proposal would also entail 
a series of employment-creating public works schemes such as the building of 
railways, canals, power stations, bridges and garages.14
Politically, local debate polarized around the issue of whether 
manufacturing activities should continue to be located in Venice (as was argued by 
the ‘conservatives’) or whether the development of the Porto Marghera ‘Grand 
Strategy’ should be allowed to proceed as the big industrial and financial interests 
desired (as was argued by the ‘modernizers’).15 Amongst the former, were members 
of the Chamber of Commerce and the small commercial elites who feared that
12 Giovanni Luigi Fontana, ‘L’economia’, in Isnenghi, Woolf, (eds.), Storia di Venezia, vol. Ill, p. 
1454.
13 Di Stefano, Paladini, Storia di Venezia, p. 23.
14 Fincardi, ‘I fasti della ‘tradizione” , in Isnenghi, Woolf, (eds.), Storia di Venezia, p. 1489.
15 Fontana, ‘L’economia’, in Isnenghi, Woolf, (eds.), Storia di Venezia, p. 1448.
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building a port outside Venice could cause a steady decline of commercial activities 
in the historic centre. The second faction comprised the local industrial and 
financial groups who saw in Porto Marghera a chance of great economic expansion 
and were given voice by Gino Damerini in La Gazzetta di Venezia}6
Complicating the issue somewhat were those concerned citizens who 
worried about the nature of the transformation of Venice that the project might 
bring, particularly the dangers of upsetting the environmental and economic 
balances in the lagoon. This party counted authorities such as Pompeo Molmenti 
(the liberal conservative town councillor from 1896 and then deputy and senator) 
and later Giovanni Giuriati and Carlo Suppiej (both of the Venetian PNF), among 
its supporters. From the 1920s, Giuriati and Suppiej propounded a dissenting form 
of Fascismo d ’ordine and spoke against the ‘tourist and industrial interests
• *17embodied by Volpi’. Whereas Volpi and Foscari had defended Porto Marghera as 
the ‘saviour’ of the historic town, Giuriati and Suppiej argued that the upcoming 
wave of industrialization would seriously damage Venice’s artistic heritage and the 
environmental balance in the lagoon. Eventually, the Venetian PNF lost out in
1 Rfavour of the local ruling class, now backed by the Fascist government.
In February 1917, Volpi founded the Sindacato di studi per imprese elettro- 
matallurgiche e navali nel porto di Venezia whose membership comprised names 
such as Cini, Gaggia, Stucky, Papadopoli and Breda. Meanwhile, the mayor Filippo 
Grimani,19 and the town council started negotiations with the central government to 
develop Marghera. Thereafter, construction ‘was handled at both regional and 
national levels with panache and speed over a matter of months’ after a formal 
agreement (dubbed a ‘Volpian masterpiece’ because of the complex negotiations 
and agreements involved) had been signed between the state represented by Paolo 
Boselli and Ivanoe Bonomi, the Comune di Venezia headed by Grimani, and the 
Societa Porto Industriale di Venezia led by Volpi.21 Construction finally began in
16 Fincardi, ‘Gli ‘Anni Ruggenti’ dell’antico leone’, p. 455.
17 Ibid.
18 Di Stefano, Paladini, Storia di Venezia, p. 104.
19 Grimani, who had been skeptical about Porto Marghera around 1904, gradually changed his mind 
in favour of the project (Ibid, p. 26).
20 Plant, Venice, Fragile City, p. 276.
21 Di Stefano, Paladini, Storia di Venezia, p. 91
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1919 where upon Piero Foscari issued a pamphlet on the matter and sent it to all 
members of the government. It claimed that the port ‘would remove heavy industry 
from the historic city and, at the same time, further develop the hydroelectric 
production’.22
As suggested above, the mastermind behind the Porto Marghera scheme 
was Volpi himself. He was by no means a disinterested party and, as the head of the 
Societa Adriatica di Elettricita, would be the main provider of the electrical power 
supplies necessary for the fulfilment of the project: In fact, the company played a 
central role in the birth of Porto Marghera, and acted as a major partner in its
23cartel. The construction of an industrial port also represented a strategic economic 
objective for Volpi as it would allow for a significant reduction of production costs 
and the development of his role of supplier of services for harbours, railways, 
tourism, banking and navigation.24
The ‘Venetian group’ of Volpi, Cini,25 Gaggia and other leading 
businessmen began to invest large amounts of capital in the development of the 
project which was established as the new economic hope of the old city, when in 
1922, the first major industrial plants moved out to Marghera.26 In the convention 
of 18 August 1926 (signed by Volpi in his role as Minister of Finance^, favourable 
concessions were granted to the Societa Porto Industriale di Venezia, relieving the 
company of the burden of various fees, taxes and the Imposta di Ricchezza Mobile,
27terreni e fabbricati. The same year, the concept of a Greater Venice brought the 
mainland municipalities within its jurisdiction.28 Nevertheless, no one could ignore 
the economic implications for the historic centre. With the manufacturing industries 
moving out to the mainland, the historic town, deprived of many of its economic
22 Plant, Venice, Fragile City, p. 276.
23 Fontana, ‘L’economia’, in Isnenghi, Woolf, (eds.), Storia di Venezia, p. 14545
24 Sergio Romano, Giuseppe Volpi. Industria e Finanza tra Giolitti e Mussolini, Venezia, Marsilio, 
1997, p. 36.
25 Vittorio Cini’s businesses were usually financed by the Banca Commerciale Italiana where Volpi 
retained major interests (Reberschak, ‘Gli uomini capitali’, in Isnenghi, Woolf, (eds.), Storia di 
Venezia, p. 1272-73).
26 Guido Zucconi (ed.), La Grande Venezia. Una Metropoli Incompiuta tra Otto e Novecento, 
Venezia, Marsilio, 2002, p. 21. Between 1925 and 1939, industrial activities based in Porto 
Marghera overtook the commercial ones located in Venice (Ibid).
27 Fontana, ‘L’economia’, in Isnenghi, Woolf, (eds.), Storia di Venezia, p. 1455.
28 Zucconi (ed.), La Grande Venezia, p. 20.
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staples, was left with only one alternative; to promote its history, art and culture and 
to accept that its economic future lay in the business of tourism.
According to Bosworth, Volpi strongly desired the growth of Porto 
Marghera, ‘that planned industrial development, which, in some eyes, promised to 
save Venice from a terminal decline or a tourist fate worse than death, and, in 
others, would lead to irredeemable pollution’.29 He hoped that before long, the 
region would have become a seat of economic enterprise and a vibrant industrial 
district.30
Margaret Plant argued that ‘with the establishment of Marghera and Greater 
Venice, linked by bridges, the city of Venice appeared, at least to its leaders,
-y 1
vigorous and renewed, an Italian partner in modem Fascism’. In 1928, the 
Podesta Orsi praised Volpi’s efforts towards the reorganisation of the area, 
conveniently forgetting that the Count had earlier been heavily criticised by the
32Fascists of Giuriati:
‘You do not have to fear that the necessities of industrial life might disrupt the artistic 
atmosphere of our city because Venice has finally solved its awkward problems. Today she 
retains, as any other large town, an intense industrial activity which has been transferred 
onto the mainland, at the borders of the lagoon, assuring the salvation of the ancient city. 
The man who has most contributed to the resolution o f the matter is Count Giuseppe Volpi 
di Misurata to whom I bestow my gratitude’.33
Not only did Volpi represent the major capitalist interests of the lagoon 
area, he also embodied the two faces of the Venetian economy: the industrial and 
the tourist. The Societa Adriatica di Elettricita was to Porto Marghera as the 
Compagnia Italiana dei Grandi Alberghi was to the historic town, and both 
businesses, of course, were managed by Volpi.34 Indeed, according to the ‘Grand
29 Bosworth, Italy and the Wider World, p. 87.
30 Reberschak, ‘Gli uomini capitali’, in Isnenghi, Woolf, (eds.), Storia di Venezia, p. 1264.
31 Plant, Venice, Fragile City, p. 285.
32 Romano, Giuseppe Volpi, p. 83.
33 Orsi, ‘Discorso in occasione dell’inaugurazione della XVI Biennale Intemazionale d’Arte’, 
Ateneo Veneto, August 1928.
34 Antonio Sartorello, Fumione e Collocazione degli Istituti Espositivi d ’Arte: Origini e Sviluppo 
della Biennale di Venezia (1895-1968), tesi di laurea 1977, Libera Universita degli Studi di Trento, 
p. 90.
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Strategy’, the Venetian district was to be thought of as divided into two main areas: 
one, Porto Marghera, devoted to the new industries, the other, the historic town, 
which, deprived of its industrial economy would develop its ordained role as an 
international centre of cultural tourism, largely through the reinvigoration of its 
main cultural event, the Biennale of International Arts.35 Any major revival of 
tourism in Venice would naturally benefit Volpi’s hotel companies. Moreover, as 
the Banca Commerciale was connected to the British travel agency, Thomas Cook, 
it was no coincidence that tourism registered high up on Volpi’s list of business 
priorities. Fontana argued that his work for the Biennale Cinema Festival and his 
contributions to the restoration of several Venetian palaces (such as the 
Conservatorio Benedetto Marcello) were all undertaken within this commercial 
grand design.
Volpi, therefore, seized for himself a lead role in the program of ‘cultural 
industrialisation’ that came to occupy a place of such importance in the economic 
strategy of the region in the inter-war period. In a speech delivered at Zurich 
University in January 1939, Volpi emphasized the ‘two Venices’, one ‘ancient, 
historic, immortal, which must forever keep its sacred monuments inviolate to be a 
museum alive with splendour’, and the other as exemplified at Marghera, ‘a busy
38hive of factories harnessing Fascist energy to the benefit of production and trade’.
In other words, the territorial division was conceived of as existing along 
economically and culturally determined class lines: the Venetian island complete 
with the Biennale and its cultural prestige on the one hand; the hinterland with its 
industrial activities and working-class suburbs on the other. As productive activities 
shifted to the mainland, Venice became more and more a ‘cultural habitat’, the site 
of a tourist-fuelled cultural consumerism.39 The idea of the Grande Venezia had 
created a compartmentalised system which effectively separated the urban nucleus 
from the metropolitan entity to which it remained functionally linked.40 In this way, 
it is fair to say that a ‘division of labour’ had imposed itself upon the transformation
35 Di Stefano, Paladini, Storia di Venezia, p. 102.
36 Bosworth, ‘Tourist planning in Fascist Italy’, p. 18.
37 Fontana, ‘L’economia’, in Isnenghi, Woolf, (eds.), Storia di Venezia, p. 1466.
3* Giuseppe Volpi, Venezia antica e moderna, Venezia, 1939, 3 0
T Sartorello, Funzione e Collocazione degli Istituti Espositivi a Arte, p. 88.
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of the area, a phenomenon which surely contributed to the effective exploitation of 
cultural activities in historic Venice.
D esp ite having mnny intcicst5~ouLside V enice , thp rnmtmrtinn nf Pnrtn 
Marghera remained VnlpiIs^-jwrrrrrry—frn-mA^Onrp the industrial port was 
established, Volpi planned to create ‘an intellectual Venice with a tourist future’.42 
For Fincardi, the project was clearly designed to benefit Volpi’s tourist-industrial 
investments in the Venetian district.43 He sought to make real the myth of an ideal 
space of entertainment and cultural events suitable for a new aristocratic-bourgeois 
tourist audience. Volpi’s managerial and business expertise gave him an awareness 
of Venice’s potential as a commercially successful cultural resort and the changes 
that would be required for its transformation. Therefore, the development of 
cultural tourism in the 1930s with the creation of additional Biennale festivals, 
major art events such as the Tintoretto, Titian and Veronese exhibitions, and a 
string of other public celebrations (see chapter 2) came to fit the broader plan for 
the economic restructuring of the Venetian district. The ‘Volpi era’ prioritised the 
foundation of a commercial tourist infrastructure in Venice with the Biennale at its 
centre. Without the Biennale, Venice’s artistic, historic and maritime heritage 
would be seen to be diminished, and the cultural tourism industry would have lost 
much of its raison d'etre.
3.2 The vision of a new industrial Venice
At the beginning of the century, Venice was widely considered to have been 
a non-productive spot of luxury and hedonism.44 In particular, the city’s constructed 
identity corresponded with the image of a decadent resort that lived upon gambling, 
soirees dansantes, masquerades and idle leisure. As Bosworth has suggested:
‘For the tourists who crowded into Piazza San Marco, by contrast, Venice had many 
charms. It was a fabulous place -Dickens comprehended it in a ‘dream’; Ruskin proclaimed 
the Doge’s Palace ‘the central building of the world’; years after, Theophile Gautier could
40 Zucconi (ed.), La Grande Venezia, p. 12.
41 Romano, Giuseppe Volpi, p. 79.
42 Di Stefano, Paladini, Storia di Venezia, p. 112.
43 Fincardi, ‘I fasti della ‘tradizione” , in Isnenghi, Woolf, (eds.), Storia di Venezia, p. 1489.
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still see in his mind’s eye the colour of the peaches which he had bought on the Frezzeria. 
But to the Victorian and fin  de siecle mind, such sensual beauty and pleasure carried a 
strong hint of sin. In the writing of figures as diverse as ‘Baron Corvo’, Maurice Barres or 
Thomas Mann, Venice became the special symbol of decadence, lust, adultery and 
homosexuality, this last still at the time that unnamed sexual perversion which thrilled so 
many northern Europeans with its possibilities’.45
The decadent image attached to the city had been established long before 
the advent of Fascism. As early as 1910, members of the Futurist movement, which 
included Filippo Tommaso Marinetti, had launched some 800,000 leaflets from the 
Clock Tower in St. Mark’s Square, directly upon tourists returning from the Lido. 
Containing embittered rhetoric, the leaflets attacked the aura of decadence that 
Venice had nourished for centuries:46
‘We repudiate Ancient Venice, exhausted and ravaged by centuries of pleasures, 
the Venice that we have loved and possessed in a great nostalgic dream. We repudiate the 
Venice of the foreigners, market of antiquarian fakers, magnet of universal snobbishness 
and stupidity, bed worn out by her procession of lovers, jewelled hip-bath of cosmopolitan 
courtesans, great sewer of traditionalism.
We want to heal this rotting city, magnificent sore of the past. We want to give 
new life and nobility to the Venetian people, fallen from their ancient grandeur, drugged by 
a nauseating cowardice and abused by the habit of dirty little business deals.
We want to prepare the birth of an industrial and military Venice able to dominate 
the Adriatic, that great Italian lake. Let us fill the stinking little canals with the rubble of the 
tottering, infected old palaces. Let us bum the gondolas, rocking chairs for idiots, raise to 
the sky the majestic geometry of metal bridges and factories, abolishing the drooping 
curves of ancient buildings. Let the reign of divine Electric Light come at last, to free 
Venice from her venal hotel-room moonlight’.47
According to Marinetti, Venice was the symbol of ‘pastism’, and it was
44 Bosworth, Italy and the Wider World, pp. 170-71.
45 Ibid, p. 170.
46 Plant, Venice, Fragile City, p. 261-62.
47 As cited in Plant, Venice, Fragile City, p. 262: F.T. Martinetti, U. Boccioni, C. Carra, L. Russolo, 
‘Contro Venezia passatista’, in Maria Drudi Gambillo, Teresa Fiori, Archivi del Futurismo, Roma, 
De Luca, 1957, pp. 19-20. English trans. In Futurismo e Futurismi, Milano, Bompiani, 1986.
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necessary to ‘turn one’s shoulders on the past in order to welcome the future’.48
At the same time, these demands for modernisation revealed a lack of 
knowledge of the work of Piero Foscari, Achille Gaggia and Giuseppe Volpi, 
whose Sade company had at the heart of numerous projects including the 
development of hydroelectricity in the Veneto.49 For Plant, ‘Marinetti’s critique 
might appear highly original and the first substantial attack on passeisme, but filling 
in the canals and the lagoon, boarding over the Grand Canal, providing 
carriageways, developing industry, opening up the Adriatic to Italian concerns and 
re-energising the city in general, had all been mooted and discussed during the two 
previous decades’.50
However, during the First World War such thoughts were discarded. 
Situated close to the front line, the Venetian islets were subject to enemy aerial 
bombardment and, after the rout of Caporetto, had the majority of their civilian 
population evacuated.51 In 1922, with Fascism in firm control of the state, it was 
time for Venice to recreate its image in tune with the Fascist conception of the 
productive Italian nation. Fascism could not tolerate an unhealthy reputation and 
aimed at transforming the city into a diligent and dynamic town seeking to 
substitute a disheveled Venice for a disciplined one. The local ruling class, too, 
expressed its desire for the city to ‘walk on its own, with its own courage, 
forgetting the alleged credit towards the state’.52
In this light, the new industrial suburb of Marghera, not only came to 
represent tangible economic possibilities for the Venetian population, it was also 
key in the construction of the identity of a re-bom, fruitful town, along with the 
local and central governments’ wishes. On one hand, the municipality pursued the 
revitalization of traditional local activities (see chapter 4, part three), on the other, it 
aimed at rescuing Venice’s representation of a tired borough by creating a modem 
industrial reality just off the lagoon. Only in this way could Venice be a true Fascist 
city. Therefore, post-war Venice came to be associated with Porto Marghera, which
48 ‘Una vivace intervista con F. T. Marinetti’, II Giornale del Veneto, 27 April 1926.
49 Plant, Venice, Fragile City, p. 262.
50 Ibid, p. 264.
51 Bosworth, Italy and the Wider World, p. 171.
52 AMV, Verbali delle sedute del Consiglio Comunale di Venezia, session 2 March 1922.
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in turn was linked with the drive towards modernization promoted by Fascism.
The municipality made every possible effort to reinforce the bond between a 
resurrected Venice and Fascism, the political force which had enabled the 
transformation. The regime had marked a watershed between a dark period of pre- 
World War I and the future might of industrial Venice. In so doing, Fascist Venice 
was overshadowing liberal Venice. In 1928, the Podesta Orsi took the opportunity 
of welcoming the press to the XVI Biennale to reveal the city’s positive 
achievements under Fascist rule:
‘You have visited every inch o f the great Padania Plain, characterised by industrial activity, 
and you have come to Venice, generally labelled the city of arts and history; but tomorrow 
you will see the new industrial port in Marghera and have the chance to verify important 
factors. First of all, Venice has finally solved the question of having an intense industrial 
life without jeopardising the safety of the historic centre, by shifting all the equipment 
outside the lagoon. Secondly, Venice, always considered as an inert and sleepy town, 
partakes instead with energy in the magnificent awakening which, under the impulse of 
those men guiding the nation with Roman grandeur, shakes today the whole Italy (...). Tell 
the people that amidst monuments of ancient sensibility there is a population who works in 
an atmosphere fuelled with enthusiasm and faith, with a clear vision o f its destiny. The 
salute I am paying is the one of the old and new Venice’.53
Contemporary journalistic sources suggest that it was vital for the Venetian 
elites to ensure that local plans for industrial takeoff were inscribed within a wider, 
Fascist-inspired, spiritual and material process of renewal. On several other 
occasions, Venice had incorporated the Fascist ‘ethic’ in its effort to obtain central 
government recognition and support for its programme of reconstruction.54 For 
example, Podesta Alvera, in the early 1930s, welcomed the introduction of rigid 
economic controls, with a reaffirmation of the city’s unconditional faith in the 
Fascist Revolution:
53 ‘La giomata dei giomalisti esteri’, La Gazzetta di Venezia, 23 June 1928.
54 See for instance AMV, Alvera, L ’Amministrazione del Comune di Venezia, where the Podesta’ 
labelled the Lictor Bridge over the lagoon as ‘the symbol of Fascist geniality and courage’; AMV, 
Verbali delle sedute della Consulta Municipale di Venezia, session 28 March 1937, where Alvera 
declared that ‘Venice had been for centuries the heir and the best guardian of the spirit of willpower 
handed down by Rome, and [could] be, thanks to Fascism, worth of the present march towards the 
future’.
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‘Venice shall be among the first cities to partake to the economic rebirth that the Duce has 
foreseen. This will be stimulated by the grand works ordered by the Head of the 
government which should necessarily convey new vivifying lymphs to her never ending 
activities (...). We, representing different interests and trades, joined by the same faith that 
is the Fascist faith, tied by the same sentiment of devotion, by the same love for this 
immortal city, we demand of the Fascist officials and the Blackshirts that we join the Duce 
and the Fascist Revolution’.55
Town authorities had often complained about how people visited Venice 
simply for leisure and not for business. Isolated from the mainland, the town was 
cut off from the Veneto’s general commercial traffic. Hence, Mussolini made 
pronouncements in favour of the enlargement of the railway bridge over the lagoon, 
to provide access for road traffic, a project finally completed in the early 1930s. 
Another seriously considered plan was the development of airborne 
communications, so as to make Venice the centre of Italian air traffic.56
Within this framework, the construction of Porto Marghera and the Lictor 
Bridge (the enlarged railway bridge) symbolised progress towards the Fascist 
conception of modem Venice. In those years, Gino Damerini wrote in the Rivista di 
Venezia of how the bridge could accomplish ‘a psychological task: that of 
destroying the myth of a ‘flabby’ Venice which live[d] in memories and luxury 
hotels, an unfair myth now overshadowed by an exemplary productive reality that, 
in number and importance of creations, has no comparison in any other Italian 
city’.57 According to Damerini, this fresh role was acquired thanks to the dynamism 
of the regime and the new Italy. The bridge linking Venice to the continent was a 
sign of the transformation-occurring within ‘the totalitarian organism of the native 
land’.58
In 1932, as the economic recession plumbed new depths across Europe, the
55 AMV, Verbali delle sedute della Consulta Municipale di Venezia, session 11 October 1930.
56 Ibid, session 26 July 1928.
57 Gino Damerini, ‘II Ponte del Littorio. Salvaguardia dell’antica citta e della nuova Venezia’, La 
Rivista di Venezia, April 1933. According to Fincardi the bridge had been ‘blessed by Patriarch La 
Fontaine and inaugurated by Prince Umberto’ at the presence o f several ministers and Venetian 
notables (Fincardi, ‘I fasti della ‘tradizione” , in Isnenghi, Woolf, (eds.), Storia di Venezia, p. 1489).
58 Damerini, ‘II Ponte del Littorio’.
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national daily II Corriere della Sera declared that the best way to enjoy the new 
essence of Venice, created by ten years of uninterrupted Fascist rule, was to admire 
the landscape from the highest point of the city, the Clock Tower in St. Mark’s 
Square. It recited:
‘The splendid spectacle of powerful and active modernity infiltrates deep into the soul of 
the old city. The grandiose complex of works undertaken to link the island to the mainland 
represents better than anything else the spirit of force and decision with which Fascist Italy 
has approached the resolution of Venice’s long-time troubles. Three issues have been 
solved at the same time: 1) the enlargement of the port and its commercial traffic; 2) the 
demographic and housing expansion; 3) the conservation of the traditional aspect of the 
historic centre. The solution of the ancient ‘question o f the bridge’ has been accomplished 
not only from the theoretical point of view but also as a living reality thanks to the Duce’s 
will. Today, fifteen years after the stipulation of the convention between the state, the 
municipality and the Societa del Porto Industriale for the construction of the port itself, it is 
a powerful creation. In 1927, with ‘Fascist decision’, there was the providential fusion of 
Venice and Mestre into a unique commune which profoundly penetrates into the mainland. 
This surely represents a pure act of Fascist will. Porto Marghera has reached its post of 
second port in Italy, according to the weight of goods charged and discharged. Above all, 
the Venice-Padua highway is the completion o f a vast and complex system of 
communications which has, in ten years, multiplied the importance of Venice as a 
centrefold of wide streams o f commercial and tourist traffic. This naturally implies the 
constant care of the entire tourist and hotel equipment that has been fully developed in 
Venice, especially at the Lido, nowadays a model European beach resort. In history and 
real life there are two contrasting aspects of Venice. There is a Venice of poetry and art, the 
one called ‘city of dreams’, and there is a Venice of willpower and work which can fight 
hard to preserve its position in the world, a Venice which has learned a great practical 
lesson. Mussolini’s Italy has finally recalled the Venice of the imperial tradition to real life 
without blurring the enchantment o f the dream city’.59
Foreign reporters, too, were soon highlighting the great changes that had 
taken place in Venice during the period of Fascist rule.60 Occasionally, the local 
press bemoaned the ‘useless’ expenses allowed by the Consulta Municipale in
59 Zorzi, ‘II grandioso impulso del Fascismo a Venezia. Problemi di secoli risolti in due lustri’, II 
Corriere della Sera, 15 October 1932.
60 See for instance, Richard Fletcher, ‘Venezia: dieci anni dopo. Vista da un giomalista inglese’, La 
Gazzetta di Venezia, 17 July 1937.
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order to improve the city’s appearance. Usually, the authorities quickly responded 
by claiming they had done their best to avoid those disbursements while directing 
municipal care to the needy, thereby ensuring that resources were distributed 
equally among local citizens, so as to reinforce the image of a community ‘that 
lived upon honest work’ rather than gambling.61
To conclude, Porto Marghera represented much more than a concentration 
of industrial plants, it stood as a fresh Fascist start after the liberal era had 
witnessed the decline of Venice’s traditional trades. The new Venice therefore 
embodied a ‘true’ Fascist municipality which had been rescued by the regime. In 
this light, the relationship between the city and the central government could be 
founded upon a positive new basis, with Fascism not just a normative authority, but 
also a force for the economic rehabilitation of Venice.
3.3 Volpi and Fascism
ft'yAccording to Bosworth, rather than being a Fascist ‘new man’, ‘Volpi rose 
in the Giolittian era through deals certainly with the Banca Commerciale and 
probably with the royal family. He made a name for himself as a man with good 
contacts in the Balkans and Asia Minor and, in 1912, was therefore selected by 
Giolitti to ease the negotiating processes of the Treaty of Ouchy which ended the 
Libyan War’.63 Indeed, by 1921, he had attained sufficient status for the occasion of 
his departure to assume the governorship of Tripolitania to merit considerable 
public acclaim.64
Nonetheless, the fact that Volpi rose to prominence in the liberal era was no 
impediment to the continuation of a successful career under Fascism. Mussolini on 
various occasions expressed his admiration for Volpi: ‘No Venetian can ignore 
what the name ‘Volpi’ means for Venice’. It stood, the Duce explained, for ‘beauty 
and poetry, as well as will and conquest’. Armed with such high praise, the count 
could indeed portray himself as the new Doge.65 Yet, according to Sergio Romano,
61 AMV, Verbali delle sedute della Consulta Municipale di Venezia, session 18 May 1938.
62 Bosworth, ‘Venice, 1911-45’, p. 11.
63 Ibidem, Italy and the Wider World, p. 87.
64 Ibidem, ‘Venice, 1911-45’, p. 11.
65 Ibid (as cited in), p. 16.
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up to 1920, he was still a ‘Giolittian’ and was attacked by Piero Marsich and the 
first wave of Venetian urban Fascism (Marsich was vehemently opposed to Volpi’s 
domination of the Venetian economy).66
In March 1919, the first Fasci di Combattimento67 were created in Milan, 
Verona, Treviso and Padua, followed by those of Venice, Trieste, Mestre and 
Feltre, and before long, much of the country was troubled by the violence of the 
Fascist squads. The National Fascist Party (PNF) was created by Benito Mussolini 
on 7 November 1921. Venice, like other Italian cities, was experiencing the return 
of ex-soldiers from the front and undergoing the social unrest of the so-called ‘Red 
Biennium’, the leftist popular turmoil of 1919-1921 influenced by the Russian 
Revolution.69
In Venice, it was the ‘urban’ Fascism of Piero Marsich which gradually 
gathered consensus amongst ex-veterans and students. In contrast to the ‘agrarian’ 
Fascism that began to dominate the national movement, Marsich’s Fascism 
remained faithful to ‘anti-bourgeois, anti-clerical, anti-socialist and anti- 
parliamentary values that had hitherto characterised the Milanese FascV. He 
despised both the agrarian Fascists arming against Socialist organisations and 
Volpi’s aspirations for economic hegemony expressed in Venice through his 
control of the SADE.70 Moreover, Marsich believed that Volpi’s involvement in 
negotiating the Treaty of Rapallo between Italy and Yugoslavia (12 November 
1920) which ended the Fiume affair, had betrayed Italian nationalism.71
In order to stop Marsich attacking the SADE, Volpi in the early 1920s
• 72started supporting the Venetian Fascists Giovanni Giuriati and Alberto De 
Stefani,73 later ministers under Mussolini. While Marsich was supported by ex­
soldiers, students and radical groups, Giuseppe Volpi was able to draw upon a
66 Romano, Giuseppe Volpi, pp. 121-22.
67 Political organisations gathering ex-combatants and war veterans.
68 Di Stefano, Paladini, Storia di Venezia, p. 75.
69 Ibid, p. 77.
70 Ibid.
71 Romano, Giuseppe Volpi, p. 122
72 He had been head of the temporary government set up by Gabriele D’Annunzio in Fiume in 1919 
(Di Stefano, Paladini, Storia di Venezia, p. 77).
73 He was bom in Verona and took his laurea in Padua. In 1921, he was elected deputy and took part 
in the March of Rome in 1922 (Ibid, p. 78).
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reservoir of consensus from among the upper-middle classes. By 1922, Volpi’s 
version of Fascismo d ’ordine had asserted its primacy over the ‘anarchic’ form 
associated with Marsich,74 and his ambitious economic plans for the development 
of an industrial harbour on the mainland had been generally well received by the 
local town council.75
In strictly political terms, the first sign of the ‘impending defeat of local 
democratic forces’ had occurred at the administrative elections of October 1920, 
won by the Lista per il rinnovamento cittadino, including Liberals, Fascists, 
Nationalists and Popolari sustained by Patriarch La Fontaine. The new majority 
appointed a municipal council headed by Davide Giordano, a Venetian doctor and a 
Fascist who replaced the liberal-conservative Filippo Grimani.76
The fact that the Fascist radicals were largely excluded from this series of 
appointments indicates the success of their moderate counterparts in seeking to 
consolidate their image as an appropriate and acceptable form of political 
expression for the professional and upper-middle classes. Giordano’s promotion 
opened the way for an alliance between the conservatives and Mussolini.77 In 
October 1922, with the March on Rome, Fascism took control of the government 
and from that moment onwards, the Fascismo d'or dine was at the head of Venice, 
shattering the hopes and expectations of anarchists and democrats (Marsich 
resigned from the PNF in 1922).78
With Fascism in power, Volpi came to embody the classic example of a 
flanker joining the regime rather than embodying its ideology, with the main aim of 
protecting his own interests. According to Romano, ‘The Fascio [was] a municipal 
and national force that Volpi, perhaps cynically, and certainly realistically, had to 
take into account since it represented many interests in the city -  including the
74 Ibid.
75 Christian Bee, Venezia. La Storia, il Mito, Roma, Carocci, 2003, p. 115.
76 Di Stefano, Paladini, Storia di Venezia, p. 79.
77 Plant, Venice, Fragile City, p. 277.
78 Di Stefano, Paladini, Storia di Venezia, p. 80. After becoming a fully-established regime in 1925, 
Fascism issued new laws concerning local administrations: the liberal mayor became the Fascist 
Podesta appointed by the government and aided by a Consulta Municipale (a municipal council 
nominated by the state). The last elected mayor was Davide Giordano (1920-24), followed by Bruno 
Fomaciari, a temporary commissary until 1926, after which the first Podesta, Pietro Orsi, was 
appointed, serving from 1926-29 (Ibid, p. 83).
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urban petty bourgeoisie and part of the working class at the port such as the
dockers, needed by Volpi to realize his project’.79
Volpi formally joined the PNF (National Fascist Party) in 1924 and acted as
Minister of Finance from July 1925 to July 1928. The ‘Battle of the Lira’
(deflationary policies designed to produce lower salaries and increased
productivity) unsurprisingly served the interests of big capital and industry such as
Volpi’s own SADE which, between 1925 and 1928, grew significantly stronger.80
He also achieved other important goals such as a balanced national budget through
severe checks on public and local expenditures and the payment of war debts and 
81international loans. In 1928, Mussolini heard that Volpi had privately made clear 
his opposition to the government’s monetary policy and therefore discharged him.82
Volpi continued to remain loyal to Fascism in public, something that can 
certainly be explained at the local level by his need to acquire additional land 
around Marghera that had been reclaimed by the state. In a letter addressed to 
Giovanni Giuriati, Minister of Public Works, he wrote:
‘In the aftermath of World War I a reconstruction fever was with us and Fascism, with its 
spirit of renewal, was there to help us by creating the necessary conditions for loyalty and 
labour; thereafter positive ideas just arrived (...). The mercantile future for Venice is Porto 
Marghera, it is also the greatest weapon for the defence of those beloved islets’.83
In his speeches, it was made clear the main aim of the ‘Grand Strategy’ was 
to separate industrial production from the historic city, in order to defend its artistic 
heritage. In more practical terms, the development of a commercial port on the one 
hand and a tourist infrastructure on the other, would serve the economic interests of 
both branches of his own business groups. Indeed, according to Romano, Porto
84Marghera constituted the basis for a huge fiscal evasion sanctioned by the state. 
Volpi’s declaration many years later to the Biennale committee meeting of 12 May
79 Romano, Giuseppe Volpi, p. 122.
80 Ibid, p. 157.
81 Ibid, pp. 153-54.
82 Ibid, p. 166.
83 As cited in Di Stefano, Paladini, Soria di Venezia, p. 101.
84 Romano, Giuseppe Volpi, pp. 89-92.
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1941 is significant. He made this point:
‘You know well how my one and only goal was always that of reviving my native town. In 
the period of time between Caporetto and Vittorio Veneto I brought to life the project of 
Porto Marghera. At present, Marghera counts 107 industries, with a capital investment of 
about 4-5,000 million lire; it employs 20,000 workers, and given that for any worker there 
is a family of three, as a consequence Marghera benefits around 60,000 people (.. .)’.85
Such claims strongly suggest that Volpi’s outlook was regional rather than 
national. As Romano put it, Volpi always acted in favour of Venice, ‘for which he 
had shown love and devotion (adorazione filiale), and was able to embody at best 
its ‘provincial cosmopolitanism” .86
By the 1930s, Volpi had established himself as a leading business figure in 
Venice. He was able to assume the credit for the successful creation of Marghera 
and the political influence that came with economic power allowed him access to 
the heart of the Fascist regime, access which he used to promote both the economic 
interests of the town and his own businesses.87 Margaret Plant has remarked:
‘Hosting these cultural events from the centre of his hotel empire at the Lido, Volpi saw 
himself as an entrepreneurial twentieth-century doge heading the cultural renewal of 
Venice, as well as its post-war industrial might. And that might was indeed considerable 
while Marghera prospered in the late 1930s, providing Mussolini’s ever-expanding war 
effort with crucial industrial backing. Volpi’s development of the coking industry, 
Vetrocoke, has been described as the ‘backbone’ o f industrial production in these years’.88
If the well-being of Venice and his own businesses represented his primary 
interest, Volpi knew how to relate national politics to local circumstances. Clearly 
he had found political support for his entrepreneurial aspirations in the Fascist 
regime, regardless of the depths of his ideological commitment. The regime, on the 
other hand, had found a man capable of bringing tourism, international acclaim and
85ASAC, Serie Verbali delle Adunanze del Comitato Amministrazione Ente Biennale, vol. Ill, 
28/01/35-30/01/43, session 12 May 1941.
86 Romano, Giuseppe Volpi, p. 8.
87 Plant, Venice, Fragile City, p. 295.
88 Ibid, p. 305.
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industrial development to Venice (and by extension to the nation). This, in spite of 
the Fascists’ early rhetoric about breaking free from the corrupt liberal ruling elites.
Significantly Romano makes the point that cultural tourism in Venice could 
be successfully expanded only if the city found a privileged niche within Fascism:
‘The city [Venice], with its cultural individuality, granted him [Volpi] a certain degree of 
independence from Rome, whoever was at the head of the state, Mussolini or Giolitti. (...) 
He had understood that the city could be a primary intellectual centre only if the regime 
would grant it autonomy. Venice, capital of the cinema, of the theatre and figurative arts 
could not be just an Italian or Fascist town, it had to be a free area [zona franca]. Therefore, 
a mediating figure with Rome was needed. Volpi, who was, together with Cini and Caggia, 
the most prominent businessman and the boss in Venice, had this role’.89
Vittorio Cini, one of Volpi’s closest collaborators and business partners, 
argued in 1959 that the count was never active in any political party but conceived 
of politics as public service rather than a profession. His aim was merely ‘to serve 
Venice and his country, under any legitimate government, above any political belief 
or prejudice’.90 This may strike some as being unduly reverential but it does make 
the point that Volpi clearly cared about Venice (and his Venetian business 
interests), before and above any ideological commitment to Fascism.
Thus, when Marla Stone argues that Volpi ‘came from a new technocratic 
class rising to prominence under Fascism’, she is missing a rather important point.91 
Volpi’s peculiarity is that he represented the distinction between the original cells 
of urban Fascism and those Venetian elites who shifted from Liberalism to 
Fascism, living alongside it and taking advantage of it, but who could never to be 
said to have been totally in sympathy with the regime, creating ambiguities that 
would last until the end of the war.
Rather than being a ‘true’ Fascist, Volpi was more of a ‘by-stander’, 
dedicated to the Fascist regime rather than the Fascist movement, to employ a De
89 Romano, Giuseppe Volpi, pp. 8-200.
9.° Vittorio Cini, ‘Giuseppe Volpi: l’uomo’, in Associazione degli Industriali nel quarantesimo 
anniversario di Porto Marghera e del Rotary Club di Venezia nel trentacinquesimo anniversario della 
sua fondazione (ed.), Giuseppe Volpi, ricordi e testimonianze, 1959, p. /(^.
91 Stone, The Patron State, p. 38.
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92Felicean distinction. Volpi remained ‘a fiancheggiatore who had nothing to do 
with Fascism, a symbol of continuity with the Giolittian ruling class’.93 His 
industrial background ‘informed his attitude toward culture, which combined two 
conceptions, that of the Renaissance merchant-condottiero and the Victorian 
empire builder’.94 For Bosworth, Volpi was
‘A collector o f innumerable offices, omnipresent in Venice’s social and cultural activities 
and its most evident bearer of political, economic and social power. Volpi had become and 
would remain until 1943, the chief mediator between the structures of Venetian life and the 
‘event’ of Fascism. In so doing he embodied living proof of the gap between Fascist theory 
and Fascism in practice’.95
Volpi was once reported to have announced: ‘It is not my fault if my 
interests happen to meet those of the State’.96 Put in other way, his dream of 
cultural tourism in Venice served, first and foremost, his own commercial and 
industrial advantages. This can be seen in his promotion of the ‘Venetian
Q7 •experience’ of festivals, gondolas and luxurious hotels and in his artful 
combination of Venetian, Italian, and cosmopolitan identities. It is to be seriously 
doubted, therefore, whether he was ever primarily concerned with Fascism’s 
proclaimed program of the ‘nationalization of the masses’.
3.4 The case of the Biennale Music and Theatre festivals as cultural businesses
Volpi had long acted as a major patron of the arts. His power appeared 
unquestionable under Fascism: he had residences in London and Rome, and owned 
the great Palladian villa at Maser.98 However, he had long been concerned with 
shaking off the stereotyped image of the modem Italian businessman who, though 
possessed of entrepreneurial skills and economic savoir-faire, was embarrassingly 
deficient in cultural awareness. According to Romano, by 1921, Volpi was already
92 De Felice, Le Interpretazioni del Fascismo, Bari, Laterza, 1996, p. 167.
93 Reberschak, ‘Gli uomini capitali’, in Isnenghi, Woolf (eds.), Storia di Venezia, p. 1268.
94 Romano, Giuseppe Volpi, p. 8.
95 Bosworth, ‘Venice, 1911-45’, p. 12.
96 As cited in Di Stefano, Paladini, Storia di Venezia, p. 114.
97 Stone, The Patron State, p. 101.
98 Plant, Venice, Fragile City, p. 305
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known as a ‘city-builder’, a ‘discoverer of ancient treasures’, and as a ‘patron of the 
arts and sciences’."  On 9 September 1922, Bazzoni reported Volpi’s purchase of 
the acclaimed work ‘Madre e Bambino’ on behalf of the Societa Porto Industriale 
di Venezia, a painting which was thereafter donated to the International Gallery of 
Modem Art in Venice.100 In 1929, Volpi was chosen by the Patriarch of Venice as 
president of the body responsible for the maintenance of St. Mark’s Basilica, the 
most important town monument and a powerful symbol of Venice.101 He was also 
in touch with the Venetian intellectual entourage centred around Caffe Florian in 
St. Mark’s Square (including Bordiga and Fradeletto who were later to serve as 
secretary-generals of the Biennale, Orsi, a future Podesta, and Tito, Selvatico and 
Ciardi, acclaimed local painters).
It was in 1930, however, that Volpi took the major step towards his 
objective of integrating the economic development of the city with its cultural 
status when the Venice Biennale was made by the state into an autonomous body, 
and Volpi himself was appointed President of the newly independent institution. 
Margaret Plant makes the point that Volpi was regarded, both by the Venetian 
municipality and the Fascist bureaucrats, as the man capable of successfully 
combining the cultural and commercial aspects of the Biennale:
‘Rather than implementing Fascism’s role for the Biennale, Volpi was able to identify the 
Biennale with particular Venetian interests, in line with the cultural pretensions of the 
regime, and assure its viability in a competitive national climate. That the Biennale was a 
prestigious political platform was more than evident during the official visits of Hitler and 
Mussolini in 1934, when Volpi was prominent as host’.102
By the same token, in 1930, the Podesta addressed a letter to the Prefect of 
Venice, claiming that Volpi was the individual most responsible for the ‘Venetian 
awakening in the industrial and maritime fields’.103 Volpi was described as the
99 Romano, Giuseppe Volpi, p. 196.
100 AMV, Atti Presidiali, anni 1817-1947, ‘Esposizione Artistica Intemazionale 1923’.
101 AMV, Determinazioni Podestarili, ‘Opera di ricostruzione della Basilica di San Marco’, trim. I, 
1929, n. 1107.
102 Plant, Venice, Fragile City, p. 295.
103 ASAC, Serie Scatole Nere, busta n. 63, ‘Promemoria 1930’.
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‘father’ of the gigantic ‘generator’ that was the industrial harbour of Marghera, 
focal point of land and maritime communications between the oriental markets and 
the commercial sites of central Europe. He was renowned as the man who had re­
conquered Tripolitania and acted as its governor, and was portrayed as a great 
statesman, businessman, and skilful negotiator in Lausanne, Washington and 
London. Unsurprisingly, given a background of this kind, the Podesta considered 
Volpi to be ‘the best person to lead and promote the development of the Biennale of 
International Arts, the most important artistic enterprise in the world’.104 In 1936, 
Volpi organized conferences of ‘colonial culture’ at the Theatre La Fenice,105 In 
1938, the Count was made President of the Executive Committee of the First 
Convention for the Development of Industrial Autarky,106 and by 1942, he was 
President of the Committee of Supervision of the town museums.107
Volpi’s role as a ‘cultural facilitator’ is illustrated by his declaration at the
inauguration of the Settecento Museum at Ca’ Rezzonico in 1936. According to
him, ‘the essence of the task confronting Venice [was] encapsulated in the
construction of the ‘Littorio’ bridge (the longest in Italy and built in record time)
1 08and the opening of the museum at Ca’ Rezzonico’. This suggests that for a 
businessman like Volpi, the cultivation of cultural tourism and its related 
institutions in Venice was directly proportional to the development of infrastructure 
and economic progress. Only in this way, there could be an actual prosperity for the 
city.
Volpi thus conceived of culture as being at the service of the economic 
development: its exploitation would herald a new era of commercially viable public 
events such as concerts, exhibitions, festivals and other celebrations. These cultural 
showcases represented an array of entertainments and bourgeois amusements 
offering potentially high returns on investments in the travel and tourist industries. 
The productive reorganization of the Venetian district sought by the Venetian
105 AMV, Determinazioni Podestarili, ‘Conferenze di cultura coloniale al teatro La Fenice’, trim. I, 
1936, n. 312.
106 ASV, Gabinetto della Prefettura di Venezia, anni 1893-1936, pacco n. 4, busta ‘Compagnie 
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ruling class led them to expect that the art event would perform -  now more than 
ever -  a clear economic role, thereby rendering their speculation profitable.109
This is a quite different proposition from the interpretations placed upon 
cultural production under Fascism by several cultural historians which put the 
emphasis on culture as having been at the service of the state’s programme of 
ideological indoctrination (for instance Gentile, see chapter 1). Though the 
following example applies to theatre performances, it is quite indicative of those 
historians’ traditional view of the usage of culture made by Italian Fascism and 
European fascism in general:
‘It appears to be a typical trait of fascist regimes that they sought to translate their political 
creeds into a theatrical language that drew heavily on the traditions o f ritual and mysticism. 
Theatre as a symbolic expression of fascist ideology made use of performative conventions 
derived from religious and secular sources. Like all ritual theatre, it had the function of 
offering a healing power, or katharsis, in a moment o f crisis -in  this instance, a perceived 
national crisis- and to communicate a binding belief system to the participants. Theatre, 
because of its immediacy, touches a deeply irrational core that no other form of propaganda 
can reach. It conveys political messages in an overtly non-political form. In addition, it 
provides the participant with an experience o f the self in communion with others, all of 
whom are potential subscribers to the presented belief system. Therefore, fascist theatre 
could fulfil the function of leading the spectator out of the everyday sphere and away from 
the realities of an alienated existence in societies undergoing major structural crises in the 
aftermath of the First World War, in order to bind the community in an emotionally elating 
experience that transcended class divisions, political divergencies, individualism, uprooted 
existence in a modem metropolis, and so on. Mobilising mass audiences and manipulating 
the emotional impact generated by the event for political purposes seems to be a common 
trait of fascist theatre in all countries’.110
If for Fascism, theatre and other artistic languages had the primary function 
of conveying Fascist values to audiences through cultural experiences, for the 
Venetian ruling class their primary function continued to be the enhancement of 
Venice’s ability to attract great numbers of cultural consumers (significantly, no
109 Giuseppe Ghigi, Tolimpiade del Cinema sul bagnasciuga di Volpi’, in La Biennale di Venezia 
(ed.), Venezia 1932. II Cinema diventa Arte, Venezia, Fabbri Editori, 1982, p. 28.
110 Berghaus, ‘Introduction’, in Berghaus (ed.), Fascism and Theatre, pp. 4-5.
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mass theatre productions were staged in Venice, unlike other Italian cities). This 
raised the interesting question of what might happen if and when the two positions 
clashed with each other.
The intersections of cultural politics with tourism can also be exposed 
through an analysis of the Verbali del Comitato di Amministrazione Ente Biennale - 
the minutes of the Biennale administrative board (several members of which also 
sat on the town council) that are held at the Archivio Storico delle Arti 
Contemporanee in Venice. Although the Verbali only started in 1930, when the 
exhibition was turned into an autonomous institution directly dependent on the 
state, they do illustrate the extent to which the Committee’s primary concern was 
commercial exploitation of the Biennale’s cultural prestige.
Within the Biennale enterprise, the case of the Music and Theatre festivals 
provides an excellent example of the connection between national political 
directives and local, commercial priorities. It is not the aim here to dwell upon the 
cultural content of such events, nor to deny claims regarding their cultural value. 
However, this section does seek to establish that their primary role was inescapably 
linked to the idea of the Biennale as a commercial venture. Sources suggest that at 
the beginning of the 1930s the new events were seen as part of a strategy to defy 
the worst economic effects of the Great Depression and to regenerate tourism in the 
lagoon. In particular, they demonstrate the manner in which cultural events were 
geared towards the interests of commerce.
As mentioned above, Volpi, as head of the Ente Autonomo Biennale, 
founded the collateral festivals in the 1930s. In contrast to the art exhibition which 
ran at a loss throughout • the 1930s, these new events initially showed a small 
profit.111 This was particularly true of the Film Festival which was able to attract 
elite European audiences, the result of the combination of its location at the 
exclusive Lido beach resort, its Hollywood atmosphere and the presence of several 
film stars.
The Theatre Festival comprised a series of outdoor productions directed by 
Renato Simoni and Guido Salvini. It also included a production of Shakespeare’s
111 As an example, the First Music Festival registered a profit of 3,075 lire.
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‘The Merchant of Venice’, directed by Max Reinhardt, but the festival was 
primarily devoted to the traditional theatre of Venetian Carlo Goldoni (‘La Bottega 
del Caffe’, ‘Le Baruffe Chiozzotte’), and it was only after World War II that it 
began to incorporate more contemporary dramatic forms.112 The festivals depended 
directly upon the Biennale administration and the town municipality for event 
planning and financing113 (although other institutions such as the Ciga or the 
Consorzio Alberghi di Lido were amongst the patrons114). Close contact with the 
Biennale entourage and supervision from the town council lasted for the entire 
decade, along with mutual promises to ‘keep each other informed on any aspects of 
the festivals’ management!.115
The Music Festival was the first event of international contemporary music 
held in Venice. The first edition took place at the Theatre La Fenice from 7th to 14th 
September 1930 (with one concert held at the Ciga’s Excelsior Theatre). 
Repertoires included symphony and chamber music as well as opera, and the 
executive committee was headed by Adriano Lualdi (see also chapter 2). Amongst 
the musical conductors there were well-known maestri such as Tullio Serafin. The 
event was sanctioned by Fascism with the Committee of Honour including leading 
Fascist figures such as Balbino Giuliano, Minister of National Education, Giuseppe 
Bottai, Minister of Corporations, Costanzo Ciano, Minister of Communications and 
Achille Starace, vice-secretary of the PNF.116
The First Music Festival achieved wide success and the executive
117committee was pleased with financial results. On 3 February 1930, Lualdi 
informed Mussolini that the festival had made a valuable profit, before urging that,
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what he called a ‘fortuitous experiment’ should be repeated in 1932, a decision 
justified by the ‘considerable advantage that this kind of event could bring, not only 
artistically, but also to the Venetian tourist movement’.118 As a result, in 1932, the 
Podesta determined that 35,000 lire would be invested in the Music Festival. Not 
only was this justified with reference to Venice’s ‘ancient music traditions’, but the 
fact that the first festival had proved so popular, contributing to the attraction of a 
considerable number of tourists to Venice, ‘with all the rewards related to it’, was 
also a major consideration.119
Some months later, Bazzoni updated Volpi on the financial position of the 
Theatre and Music festivals: ‘The festivals do show some deficit’ he stated, 
‘nonetheless, its extent is not so important as to alarm us, especially if we think of 
the moral value attached to these celebrations, as well as the material benefit 
brought to the whole town by the increased tourist movement’.120 In 1934, 
reinvigorating the tourist industry was still one of the chief concerns in Venice; in 
its third edition, the Music Biennale had been greeted by its president as a key 
moment of the tourist calendar. On 31 July, Volpi announced to Bazzoni that he 
was most enthusiastic about the festivals. Thereafter he encouraged Bazzoni: ‘You 
must have noticed from the papers that the Biennale festivals have dramatically 
increased the numbers of tourists that month. You should draw the relevant 
information from our Tourist Office and dispatch them to the next committee 
meeting [of the Biennale]. Also, when you can, have a glance at the article ‘The 
development of the tourist movement in Venice and the Lido’, printed in today’s 
Gazzetta di Venezia’ m  According to the article, the Tourist Office reported that 
the number of foreigners visiting the lagoon in the second decade of July had raised 
by 2,019 in town, and 368 in the Lido, compared with the previous years’ figures. 
Volpi believed that this success was due not just to the natural appeal of Venice and
159)
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the Lido, but 4to events such as the first Theatre Festival at the 19th Biennale. No 
doubt the Music and Cinema festivals [would] be of benefit to the forthcoming 
summer season, too’.122
The Biennale administration was convinced that, by allowing an 
enlargement of their programme, the festivals were destined to stimulate more and 
more public interest, bringing correspondingly increased profits.123 Towards the 
end of 1934, the entire municipality was quite satisfied with the results produced by 
the summer cultural festivals and their contribution to tourism. Thereafter, the 
Consulta agreed on an exceptional contribution of 200,000 lire to be settled in 
favour of future events, ‘given the fact that the Ente Biennale, faithful to the agenda 
arranged by a committee including the Podesta of Venice and the Prefect Guido 
Beer, had successfully co-ordinated the Theatre, Cinema and Music festivals, 
bringing the city a considerable number of visitors’.124
However, as early as 1935, after profits had slowly started wearing thin, 
Volpi began to express his dissatisfaction with the Poetry convention, which was 
subsequently abandoned, and there was even uncertainty about the Music Festival 
because of the high expenses that had been incurred the previous year.125 On 4 
April 1936, the Prefect of Venice contacted Volpi seeking information about ‘the 
ways in which the Ente Biennale [had taken] charge of the organisation of the 
festivals, and which solutions [had been] introduced to relieve their deficit’. Shortly 
afterwards, Volpi made it clear that the various events could not take place unless 
the Biennale committee was provided with the necessary funds.126
The appointment of Volpi at the head of the Biennale meant that a skilful 
entrepreneur and negotiator was now in charge of the institution, and was 
consistently prepared to bargain with Mussolini (who was known to be fond of the
127Music Festival) in order to obtain additional state funding. In a letter dated 1
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June 1933, Volpi declared his loyalty to 1 ‘Fascist civilization’: ‘If there is an
event that deserves moral and material support from Rome, it is our Festival of
Music, carrying out its activity in such a Fascist fashion in support of modem art
and acclaimed artists!’.128 In 1936, Volpi wrote to Mussolini again stressing that the
Biennale wished to reaffirm the primacy that the Fascist era represented in the art 
1
domain in Italy.
At the same time, during one Biennale committee meeting, Volpi expressed
his disappointment with the Minister of National Education for having denied
additional funds for the complementary festivals, effectively threatening to abolish
them and to limit the Biennale’s activities (although Volpi did make clear that such
actions would not affect the Film Festival, which the Head of Government himself
had communicated an interest in retaining, as ‘it [was] a fully developed cultural
showcase’).130 Maraini, therefore, assessed the awkward financial position of the
festivals, and argued that in the forthcoming year the Music and the Theatre events
might be cancelled. In this case, the Cinema Festival would be stretched over the
summer season and even expanded and enhanced with the creation of additional
1^1competitions and prizes.
On 22 April 1936, Ludovico Foscari, President of the Ente Provinciale per 
il Turismo di Venezia asked the Ente Autonomo Biennale to forward a list of the 
events ‘of a tourist nature’ that were to be staged during the summer season.132 On 
17 May, Volpi responded, asserting that ‘after a thoughtful evaluation, for several 
reasons, not least because of financial restrictions, the committee [had] come to the 
decision to cancel all the festivals for the upcoming summer, excluding, naturally, 
the Film Festival to which continuity and autonomy ha[d] been granted by a Royal 
Decree’.133 This ‘threat’ to cancel them was vital in prompting the central
1936, Volpi wrote to Mussolini again stressing that the Biennale wished to reaffirm the primacy that 
the Fascist era represented in the art domain in Italy (Ibid).
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government to award an annual contribution.
Afterwards, a decree issued by the Podesta, approved by the Prefect on 28 
August 1936, announced that it was a direct request of the Ministry for the Press 
and Propaganda that the Biennale continue to host the renowned Music and Theatre 
festivals in the future.134 Volpi was asked to gather the local authorities, the 
members of the Cooperazione dello Spettacolo (a body accountable to the Ministry 
for the Press and Propaganda), and other relevant syndical representatives, to 
discuss the calendar of events to be staged. Nicola De Pirro, the official ‘Theatre 
Inspector’, and General Secretary of the Ministry for the Press and Propaganda 
wanted the theatre and music events to be organised primarily for artistic reasons. 
He thus ensured that the Biennale was granted its annual contribution of 200,000 
lire. The Podesta himself, ‘because the town council [had] the moral duty of aiding 
those aforementioned biennial events, which were conceived to benefit the city of
Venice, as well as to attract foreign tourists’, contributed the annual sum of 50,000
* 1lire to be taken from the budget of La Fenice Theatre.
In 1938, Volpi again announced that the Ente Biennale was going to drop 
the Music Festival, the organisation of which was now the responsibility of La 
Fenice Theatre. The institution had been reopened that year under municipality 
supervision and Volpi’s stated aim was to avoid ‘unnecessary repetition in the 
musical events’, although it is more likely -as suggested before- that he
1^7abandoned the festival because of its lack of commercial success.
According to Renzo De Felice and Marla Stone, cultural forms were 
exploited to promote Italy’s and Fascism’s prestige within the national borders and 
overseas,138 and served to' build consensus from the population, especially the 
young generations, ‘within conditions coordinated by the party and the 
government’.139 Nonetheless, there is evidence to suggest that the main reasons for
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hosting cultural festivals in the lagoon and the Venice Biennale of International 
Arts, had less to do with the indoctrination of young Fascists than the generation of 
additional revenues and the production of benefits for local commercial interests in 
Venice and the Lido, all as part of the broader project commenced in the 1930s for 
the general economic rejuvenation of the area.140 In the light of this, the continued 
staging of the Music and Theatre festivals after 1934 fits perfectly with the 
entrepreneurial attitude proper of Volpi. When Biennale activities proved to be 
profitable, their president, Volpi, remained pleased to invest in them. On the other 
hand, were they to be financially unsuccessful, he would have little hesitation in 
bringing them to a halt, whatever the concern of the Fascist authorities for moral 
improvement of the Venetian population. For Volpi, the ‘nationalisation of the 
masses’, worthy a project as it might be, had little to do with business.
Cultural events in Venice were regarded as part of the responsibility of 
‘tourist attraction’.141 Therefore, any interpretation of the festivals as simply part of 
a national programme for the mobilisation of the masses or the need to spread 
Fascist ideology would appear to be in need of serious reconsideration. For the 
local authorities, it was quite natural to preserve their economic well-being before 
acting to promote the spiritual education of the Italian nation at large. Instead, the 
approach of art historian Giuliana Tomasella, labelling Volpi’s project as the 
‘tourist re-launch of Venice’, provides a far more convincing starting point for 
understanding the cultural politics of Venice in the 1930s.142
It might thus be argued that the real targets of the Ente Autonomo Biennale 
and the Venetian town council were far from the propagandist^ aim of forging 
ideological consensus, and modernizing Italian society and the nation through 
culture. At best, it can be said that, shaping a new national consciousness
Fascism’, Journal o f  Modern Italian Studies, vol. 4, n. 2, summer 1999, p. 188.
140 Maraini, in the Rivista di Venezia, declared: ‘This last event [the Music festival] of our glorious 
art institution [the Biennale] has revealed the enormous material and moral benefit brought into 
being by the enlightened enterprises o f Count Volpi and his close collaborators, enterprises that 
make Venice, which the Duce has put at the top of the national art hierarchies, into an exclusive 
arena for intellectual activities and a centre o f irresistible attraction of the most prestigious streams 
of international tourism’ (Maraini, ‘II Festival Musicale Veneziano’, La Rivista di Venezia, 
September 1932).
141 ‘La VII Festa Intemazionale della Musica a Venezia’, La Gazzetta dell’Emilia, 26 September 
1942.
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represented a secondary consideration. For Volpi and his Biennale entourage, the 
life of the festivals was strictly linked to finding a definitive resolution of the 
town’s financial crisis, regardless of how deeply the Minister for the Press and 
Propaganda desired them to be regularly staged.143 In Volpi’s mind the Theatre and 
Music festivals were nothing more than commercial products which deserved 
proper marketing strategies and financial assessment. Such attitude clashed with the 
primary aims of the regime, revealing the existence of a conflict between local and 
national expectations. The pragmatic Venetian outlook contained the potential for 
contrasts with Fascist programmes and the need, expressed by the regime in the 
1930s, to consider the musical and dramatic institutions in relation to their 
ideological purpose.
For the Gazzetta del Mezzogiorno, Fascism had contributed to the musical 
education of the people through the policies of the Minister of Popular Culture, the 
activities of the Dopolavoro, and the propaganda of the Gruppi Universitari 
Fascisti as well as the syndical organisations. It had created the Sabato teatrale, the 
theatre for the masses and factory concerts. ‘Fascist Italy’, claimed the newspaper, 
‘offers the most favourable conditions for the rebirth of music traditions’.144 II 
Gazzettino di Venezia focused on the educational function of outdoor theatre 
productions which had achieved remarkable popularity amongst the popolo and 
worked directly upon his consciousness.145 According to the PNF representative, 
Guido Mancini, the Music Festival would be best thought of in terms of its 
educational function, in keeping with the traditional attitudes towards artistic events 
of the Fascist regime.146 According to II Regime Fascista, outdoor theatre presented 
‘a peculiar challenge, essentially a Fascist task in the art field which should go 
‘towards the people” .147 The Fascist editorial had reported that Venetian musical 
events were arranged to spread (as far as possible) knowledge of music among the
142 Tomasella, Biennali di Guerra, p. 15.
143 ASAC, Serie Verbali delle Adunanze del Comitato di Amministrazione dell’Ente Biennale, vol. 
Ill, 28/01/35-30/01/43, session 16 March 1936.
144 Ibid.
145 ‘II teatro all’aperto’, II Gazzettino di Venezia, 31 August 1937.
146 Ibid.
147 Gallo, ‘II Ventaglio e II Campiello nel quadro stupendo di Venezia’, II Regime Fascista, 12 July 
1939.
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wider public and, in particular, among those customarily less likely to attend 
concerts. It was therefore thought important to ‘develop the musical sentiment 
gradually and carefully’.148
Such radical declarations suggest that there existed a desire on the part of 
the regime to ‘educate’ Italians through cultural activities. However, the editorial 
also noted how the venues chosen for the performances in Venice, the so-called 
campi, were not large enough to host the popolo.149 In fact, the campi were the ideal 
size for a limited number of viewers, likely to be an elite audience.150 Again, local 
policies could be quite distinct from national requirements.
In the specific case of Venice, cultural politics aimed at wider strata of 
population demonstrated the ambiguous position of Volpi and the Biennale 
entourage, caught between the need to increase profits and ‘educating the masses’. 
For them, broadening the class appeal of the Biennale would only occur if it could 
reasonably be expected to bring beneficial financial gains.
For example, in 1934, Volpi stressed the fact that the Biennale had recently 
enlarged its field of action so that the town council needed not provide any more 
cultural events for the upcoming summer season, for the festivals were meant to be 
‘for the masses’ in the first place. ‘It is our wish that the Theatre, Music, and 
Cinema productions host some performances at popular prices’ Volpi added.151 
Some months later, La Rivista di Venezia, produced by the town council, declared 
that ‘with its fourth edition and the performance of Verdi’s Messa da Requiem in
1 S9St. Mark’s Square, the Third Music Festival intended to target the masses’. 
Therefore, it is odd that despite these declarations Volpi refused to subsidise a 
popular music concert to be held in the Biennale premises during the 40 anni della
148 ‘Propaganda musicale’, II Regime Fascista, 20 October 1932.
149 Ibid.
150 According to Doug Thompson, ‘when Mussolini declared that the theatre in Fascist Italy must 
become a teatro per ventimila (theatre for twenty-thousand), he was insisting on the refocusing of 
dramatic art so that it could engage (and instruct) the masses and no longer be the prerogative of a 
small intellectiual elite’ (Doug Thompson, State Control in Fascist Italy: Culture and Conformity 
1925-1943, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1991, p. 121).
151 ASAC, Serie Verbali delle Adunanze del Comitato di Amministrazione dell’Ente Biennale, vol. 
II, 01/02/32-06/07/34, session 26 February 1934.
152 Zajotti, ‘II III Festival Musicale della Biennale’, La Rivista di Venezia, August 1934.
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Biennale Exhibition in 1935, because he was apparently short of funds.153
In this regard, on 1 June 1935, Michele Pascolato, president of the 
provincial section of the Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro, had specifically asked 
Volpi to allow the Societa Orchestrale —Mandolinistica Chitarristica- Lux to play 
within the Biennale’s gardens. This would enable the music society to acquire the 
necessary training and 'financial aid’ to meet the travel expenses of an upcoming 
concert tour to Vienna 'with propagandists aims’, the following year.154 On a 
similar occasion, Bazzoni forwarded to Volpi the schedule of a set of classical 
music concerts to be staged at the Biennale Italian pavilion in the summer of 1935. 
In both cases, Volpi insisted that he could not assist such initiatives, mostly because 
previous experiments with the town band had failed to live up to expectations, 
attracting disappointing audiences.155
In 1936, when the political situation demanded the forging of a stronger 
national consensus, the Ministry for the Press and Propaganda demonstrated its 
determination to see the creation of a popular lyric season financed by the town 
councils of the main Italian communes. Apparently, this was meant to be politica 
nazionale (a national policy).156 Problems emerged when the plan was seen to clash 
with Volpi’s own intentions. Aware of Volpi’s disillusionment with the Music
157Festival as ‘the most expensive and the least profitable of all the festivals’ and 
his indifference towards active mass participation in the event, the Minister for 
Press and Propaganda made the decision to shift the burden of organizing popular
158concerts in Venice on to agencies independent of the Ente Autonomo Biennale.
Eventually, the Ministry officials and local authorities reached a 
compromise choosing the' Centro Lirico Italiano to undertake the mission instead of 
the Music Festival. A decree from the Podesta subsequently granted 10,000 lire to
153 ASAC, Serie Scatole Nere, busta n. 44, ‘Manifestazioni 1935’.
154 Ibid.
155 Bazzoni to Volpi, 15 April 1935, ASAC, Serie Segreteria/Arti Visive, ‘Corrispondenza 1935’.
156 AMV, Determinazioni Podestarili, ‘Stagione lirica popolare-sovvenzione’, trim. II, 1936, n. 
1040.
157 ASAC, Serie Verbali delle Adunanze del Comitato di Amministrazione dell’Ente Biennale, vol. 
Ill, 28/01/35-30/01/43, session 8 February 1936.
158 AMV, Determinazioni Podestarili, ‘Stagione lirica popolare-sovvenzione’, trim. II, 1936, n. 
1040.
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the Milanese institution to fulfil this ‘educational’ task.159 A similar entrepreneurial 
outlook prevailed when, at the committee meeting of 14 April 1937, Volpi had 
suggested avoiding staging outdoor music concerts in St. Mark’s Square during 
September because of ‘the possibility of bad weather preventing profits from 
covering basic expenses ’.160
Once again, Volpi’s determination to maximise profits had little to do with 
mobilising the largest audiences, revealing the existence of a reservoir of resistance 
to the implementation of national policies in Venice. Popular culture was not 
always the right answer to the city’s economic needs. In the second half of the 
1930s, the Mussolinian politics of ‘going towards the people’,161 along with the 
poor economic performances of the festivals, had started to prove disappointing to a 
Biennale entourage eager to concentrate upon profitable, cultural activities 
attracting elite audiences. The Biennale administration was opting for a marketing 
strategy appealing to selected cultural consumers, rather than galvanizing all the 
masses.
3.5 The Venice Biennale festivals and cultural competition
The fact that cultural production and the entertainment industry were 
regulated by the state, and that the Biennale had been officially put on top of a 
hierarchy of art exhibitions was no guarantee of the emergence of an organic 
national system of cultural showcases headed by the Venetian festivals. Instead, the 
following section will reveal the existence of many competing realities at the local 
level, struggling to attract the largest audiences. Volpi remained protective of 
Venice’s ‘entertainment’ potential, and had become increasingly concerned about 
the competition from other Italian towns offering rival cultural festivals. According 
to a survey conducted by Maraini, there were more than 500 exhibitions in Italy in 
1935.162 In Volpi’s opinion, overproduction in the field of figurative arts
159 Ibid.
160 ASAC, ‘Serie Verbali delle Adunanze del Comitato di Amministrazione dell’Ente Biennale’, vol. 
Ill, 28/01/35-30/01/43, session 17 January 1938.
161 Nicolodi, ‘Su alcuni aspetti dei Festivals’, p. 142.
162 ASAC, ‘Serie Verbali delle Adunanze del Comitato di Amministrazione dell’Ente Biennale’, vol. 
Ill, 28/01/35-30/01/43, session 16 March 1936.
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‘undoubtedly [contributed to] a diminishing public response affecting even the most
* 163important events’. For this reason, the government resolution giving pre­
eminence to the Ente Autonomo Biennale, for its representatives, had more to do 
with the assertion of Venetian primacy over similar enterprises, than with the 
simple coordination of national cultural politics. Additionally, Volpi’s role as the 
main figure in the top-ranking cultural festival earned him the right to be ‘heard by 
the Head of Government over so vital an argument’.164
As an example, in 1936, the Podesta Mario Alvera announced his intention 
to make representations to Rome about the proposed film festival at Villa Olmo, in 
the vicinity of Como, ‘very near indeed to its Venetian counterpart’.165 Alvera 
feared that the festival at Villa Olmo ‘might be detrimental to Venice’,166 and 
resorted to pressurizing the Prefect and the Minister for the Press and Propaganda 
in order to establish for Venice exclusive rights to this kind of event. Local 
authorities claimed that the Venice Film Festival had become ‘a magnificent 
artistic, tourist and economic enterprise’ and that the city should claim as hers any 
showcase of similar nature. Alvera also recalled that Venice only possessed two 
paramount events, the Biennale of International Arts and the Cinema Festival, and 
that the Ministry retained every year two million lire from the balance of the
167Municipal Casino to finance the development of the Italian film industry. In 
Alvera’s words, Venice had been bearing a ‘remarkable burden’ in order to be able 
to support a project ‘which she must consider as hers because she had devised it in 
the first place’.168 Furthermore, it was claimed that the city should be granted the 
right to prevent any similar enterprises from invading her domain: ‘Under no 
circumstance shall the Biennale be dispossessed of her festivals in favour of other 
events whose only aim is that of copying the Venetian ones. Other cities should 
find different entertainments appropriate to their environment’, Alvera
163 Ibid.
164 Ibid.
165 Ibid.
166 ASV, Gabinetto della Prefettura di Venezia, anni 1893-1936, Pacco n. 15, busta ‘Mostra 
Cinematografica Villa Olmo-Como’.
167 Ibid.
168 ASAC, Serie Verbali delle Adunanze del Comitato di Amministrazione dell’Ente Biennale, vol. 
Ill, 28/01/35-30/01/43 , session 16 March 1936.
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proclaimed.169
On 26 December, the Podesta of Como addressed the Podesta of Venice 
reassuring him that the film festival at Villa Olmo only screened scientific 
documentaries, and not ‘commercial productions’.170 He insisted that the only 
public who attended the festival were those people who periodically paid a visit to 
the lake in Como, ‘a category of tourists who [were] certainly not drawn away from
171Venice’. He also maintained that it was vital to Como to treat its tourists to some 
sort of entertainment in order to avoid the decline of the hotel industry in the 
area.172 Subsequently, Manlio Binna, speaking on behalf of Luigi Freddi, Director 
General of Cinematography, reassured Alvera that the official, in the name of his 
regard towards the Venice Film Festival, would deal with any forthcoming
1 7”}attraction in the field.
On another occasion, Alvera raised the alarm over the news that St. Moritz, 
a ski resort in the Swiss Alps, would be hosting a film festival during the winter 
season. According to him, even though the Como event had not affected Venice 
severely, it had represented the starting point for other similar ventures, including 
foreign versions.174 In 1941, when the Venice Film Festival was a well established 
feature upon the international cultural landscape, Volpi claimed that it had been a 
‘purely Venetian creation not based on an ephemeral success’ and that other 
analogous endeavours experimented in foreign countries were ‘doomed to 
failure’.175
The issue of competition between Venice and other Italian historic cities 
over the ‘cultural packages’ offered to their visitors also affected the Music 
Festival. Up to 1932, the festival had limited its field of action to chamber music, in 
order not to clash with the May Musicale Fiorentino which had traditionally put on 
seasons of opera in Florence. Nonetheless, on 25 April 1932, executives at the May
169 Ibid.
170 ASV, Gabinetto della Prefettura di Venezia, anni 1893-1936, Pacco 15, busta ‘Mostra 
Cinematografica Villa Olmo-Como’.
171 Ibid.
172 Ibid.
173 Ibid.
174 ASAC, Serie Verbali delle Adunanze del Comitato di Amministrazione dell’Ente Biennale, vol. 
Ill, 28/01/35-30/01/43, session 17 January 1938.
175 Ibid, session 17 December 1941.
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Musicale Fiorentino accused the Biennale administration of having invaded its 
territory and to have appropriated its own ancient traditions.176 Maraini firmly 
responded that their festival had been authorized by the Head of Government and 
that there was no possibility of clash between the two institutions as the Venetian 
event habitually featured ‘chamber music of an international character’ while its 
Florentine counterpart had traditionally focused upon opera.177 In other words, the 
Biennale entourage claimed not to have intention of competing directly with 
Florence. In 1934, La Rivista di Venezia reported, Florentine authorities opted for 
an odd-yearly basis activity which ‘ceased any possibility of competition between 
the two institutions’. This allowed the Venetian festival, which was held only in 
even years, ‘to fully embrace every sort of musical expression and widen its
• 178 • •horizons’. Mussolini expressed his opinion on the matter, declaring:
‘I think that once the Venetian and Florentine manifestations have settled down in order not 
to disturb each other, there is no valid reason why the Venice Festival should be limited in 
its means and artistic programmes. You can, from now on, utilise the great orchestra and 
chorus as well, according to your necessities’.179
According to Harvey Sachs, the two cosmopolitan towns of Florence and 
Venice had chosen to be competitors rather than allies in a common battle against 
cultural provincialism.180 Belonging to the same corporate system of syndical 
exhibitions did not prevent antagonism, indicating that under Fascism cultural 
production was not unified, revealing fractures and contradictions. Also, 
membership of the same nation, under the same regime, did not entail that the 
Venetian ruling class would start thinking on a national level. The well-being of 
Venice was more important than Fascism’s desire to stage exhibits designed to 
promote the regime’s magnificence, an example once again, of the local perspective 
winning out over the national.
176 La Biennale di Venezia (ed.), Venezia 32, 82, p. 31.
177 Ibid.
178 Zajotti, ‘II III Festival Musicale della Biennale’.
179 ASAC, Emeroteca, III Festival Intemazionale di Musica, 8-16 September 1934, Programma 
Ufficiale.
180 Harvey Sachs, Musica e Regime. Compositori, Cantanti, Direttori d  ’Orchestra e la Politica
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With similar considerations in mind, the Podesta habitually refused requests 
from foreign town councils to host concerts played by the Venetian town band ‘as
those requests [were] made during the summer season, when the band must play in
181Venice’. Such policies could clearly be said to run counter to the expressed 
desire of the regime of forging extended cultural inside and outside the national 
boundaries in order to bear witness to the greatness of the Italian nation and is 
cultural heritage.182
3.6 Conclusions
For Roland Sarti,
‘While the Fascists dispersed their energies in the pursuit of multiple and often conflicting 
goals, the industrialists concentrated on retaining maximum independence in the 
management of their enterprises and trade associations ( ...)  The industrialists looked upon 
political activity in a purely instrumental way. Politics was a means of keeping the 
government on the path of economic and social orthodoxy’.183
By the same token, Volpi remained a businessman who used the regime to 
serve his own interests, in a bid to restrain Fascist state interference in private 
enterprise especially in the first years of the regime. Later, he was able to combine 
Fascist ideology with the image of a reborn, commercially successful Venice. For 
Volpi, praising Fascist ‘modernization’ and linking it to local achievements 
justified the commercialisation of culture for the sake of regional economic 
rejuvenation.
Volpi’s aim,- was first of all, to satisfy the town’s need to expand the 
summer tourist season. It is crucial to understand that he planned to do this in 
tandem with central government, taking advantage of the regime’s desire to boost 
mass tourism as a means of fostering national consciousness. As a businessman
Culturale Fascista, Milano, II Saggiatore, 1987, p. 119.
181 AMV, Verbali delle sedute della Consulta Municipale di Venezia, session 24 March 1937.
182 As an example, the Biennale was charged with the task of arranging art exhibits in the main 
European cities, which were supposedly an extension of the network created by the syndical system 
in Italy.
183 Roland Sarti, Fascism and the Industrial Leadership in Italy, 1919-1940, Berkeley and Los 
Angeles, University of California Press, 1971, pp. 1-2.
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with major interests and investments in the Venetian area, Volpi deliberately bound 
his project of industrial and tourist development of Venice up with the broader 
Fascist political objective of winning mass consent. The growth of popular tourism 
in the lagoon could sit easily with the regime’s aspiration to mobilise the Italian 
population through the mass perception of Fascist modernity (for example with the 
use of modem means of transport, such as the train, the symbolic ‘image of party 
discipline and state power’184), through mass holidaying (and its accompanying 
inculcation of Italian awareness), or through cultural events (of which the Biennale 
provides the most obvious example). For this reason, it was essential that the 
municipality demonstrated its loyalty to the regime and its accomplishments, and 
that local actions could be incorporated within the wider picture of Fascist policies.
This chapter has also exposed the existence of clashes in the formation of 
cultural policies, between the central government and the Venetian ruling class, 
revealing that there were many cracks in the Italian totalitarian system, and that 
local exigencies in the cultural field might not take into consideration the Fascist 
desire of nationalising the masses. The economic function attached to the Biennale 
festivals meant that Volpi attempted to ‘merchandise’ them only when they were 
profitable, regardless of their inherent cultural value.
Porto Marghera was not just the product of local investments and capitals, 
but through Volpi it embodied ‘a complex web of financial and industrial interests,
185opening up to national and international markets’. The connivance of Fascism 
was therefore vital, and Volpi stood out as the most suitable mediator between local 
and national administrations. His appointment as Minister of Finances fitted within 
a context of alliances between Fascism, directed towards the transformation of the 
state, and big capital, which allowed the full development of Marghera.
The Venetian port continued to represent the ‘gateway to the Orient’ in the 
Adriatic, now combined with a major industrial area. These possibilities were 
grasped by the great financial and trade interests in Italy who saw in Marghera a 
fortuitous convergence of industrial settlements, fiscal exemptions, energy at low-
184 Foster, ‘Foreword’, in Schnapp, Staging Fascism, p. XVII.
185 Reberschak, ‘Gli uomini capitali’, in Isnenghi, Woolf, (eds.), Storia di Venezia, p. 1264.
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1 86cost and reduction of production and transport expenses. Indeed, as Bosworth has 
concluded:
‘The political history o f the city [Venice] from 1911 to 1943 might best be summed up as
the story o f the irresistible rise of Giuseppe Volpi, Count of Misurata, not so much a Fascist
true believer as a political chameleon, a man with a good head for business and an anxious
187willingness to take on more and more positions of responsibility and status’.
186 Ibid.
187 Bosworth, ‘Venice, 1911-45’, p. 18.
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4. The Venice Biennale of International Arts in the 1930s
Much of the literature on the Venice Biennale produced in the past twenty 
years has focused upon the extent to which the institution succeeded in preserving 
its independence from an increasingly intrusive state bearing an all-pervasive 
ideology. For example, the work edited by the Ente Autonomo Biennale in 1982 
investigated precisely this complex relationship between the Biennale, the 
authorities in Rome, and the various ideological concessions that the central 
government made to the institution.1 Attention is drawn to a series of episodes 
characterized by Venetian demands for autonomy and self-determination from a 
reluctant Fascist bureaucracy presented as a powerful and highly interventionist 
force. For the Biennale, 1930 symbolized a watershed. Before this date, the 
institution was still a local body steeped in regionalism and dependent upon the 
Venetian municipality; afterwards, it was transformed into the site of a series of 
struggles between core and periphery (between the Ente Biennale and the regime). 
Financial stability and national recognition were obtained at the cost of the loss of a 
sense of ‘Venetianness’ at the Ente. In other words, the state provided regular 
financial contributions towards the Biennale which, in turn, became an organism 
under Fascist control.3 According to the source mentioned above, it was within this 
framework that Volpi and the Biennale circle operated to preserve the identity of 
the exhibition caught between local and national realities.4
Other sources have focused on the aesthetic role of the institution within the 
wider art world. They have considered the Venice Biennale as a contested terrain, 
the site of struggles for pre-eminence between classical art forms (traditionally 
dominant at the exhibition since its inauguration in 1895) and avant-garde art 
(which made a major impression in the 1920s, particularly during Vittorio Pica’s 
period as secretary general).5 In this way, the Biennale functioned as a symbol and 
a force for Italian ‘modernisation’, serving to redefine national and international
1 Scotto Lavina, ‘1927, 1936’, in La Biennale di Venezia (ed.), Venezia 32, 82, pp. 19-31.
2 Ibid, p. 63.
3 Ibid, p. 20.
4 Ibid, p. 21.
5 See for instance, Rizzi, di Martino, Storia della Biennale, p. 32; Romolo Bazzoni, 60 Anni della
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taste in the Fascist period, especially through the introduction of the ‘Novecento’ 
movement6 at the 1928 Biennale.
Finally, there are those historians who have anticipated the connection 
between cultural events and the entertainment industry, identifying the Biennale 
festivals as facilitators for the local economy. The Volpian era was regarded as an 
attempt to breathe a new life into the Biennale system (upon which the economic 
well being of the Volpi-dominated hotel industry depended).7 However, few 
scholars have systematically analysed the enterprise as a full part of a sophisticated 
plan for the ‘cultural industrialization’ of Venice, or the economic strategies 
adopted by the institution to enable it to survive in a notoriously volatile and 
competitive international art market.
This chapter addresses these questions in detail, investigating the 
relationship between the Venice Biennale of International Arts as a truly 
commercial body and the forces shaping the national and international art markets. 
What at first glance have appeared to be ideologically driven aspects of the 
Biennale (such as the need to host various styles and art schools) can be 
convincingly explained by predominantly economic and commercial imperatives. 
There is thus a common line with previous chapters and the argument that tourism 
and pragmatism were of more importance than Fascist rhetoric. For the Biennale 
entourage, the first priority was to confront Venice’s deepening economic crisis and 
to tailor the Exhibition of International Arts accordingly. If this meant elevating 
commercial factors over ideological principles then so be it.
The chapter has been divided into three parts: the first one focuses on the 
Biennale of International Arts as an institution deeply embedded within the 
economic structures and interests of the city, its commercial function largely 
established and institutionalised before Fascism had come to power. Crucial 
changes in the administrative structure are also taken into consideration: with the 
official assertion of Fascist state control over the Ente Autonomo Biennale in 1930,
Biennale di Venezia, Venezia, Lombroso Editore, 1962, p. 119.
6 According to Stone, ‘Novecento’ artists such as Mario Sironi, Carlo Carra and Felice Casorati, 
‘tended to work in blocky, solid forms, [and] shared an interest in the architecturalism and its formal 
values. They depended on common themes and images, such as women, landscapes, still lifes, and 
mythological scenes’ (Stone, The Patron State, p. 47).
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the exhibition obtained recognition from the government, financial stability and 
pre-eminence over similar initiatives in other cities. The second part deals with the 
Biennale as a cultural institution fostering and facilitating the growth of a private 
art market by acting as a mediator between patrons and artists. Through the 
implementation of reforms aimed at enhancing the commercial appeal of the 
exhibition, the Biennale, before being a Fascist institution, had come to rank 
alongside other leading private art galleries. The third section analyses the 
establishment of the decorative arts pavilion within the Venice Biennale, 
considering the ways in which it was created to resolve the crisis afflicting 
traditional Venetian crafts, and expanding the range of cultural products on offer by 
presenting potential customers with more ‘democratised’ art forms, more suitable 
for the developing private market.
7 See for instance, Rizzi, di Martino, Storia della Biennale, p. 37.
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Part One: The structures
4.1 The Biennale as a commercial institution cloaked in culture: from 
Liberalism to Fascism
Recently, Marla Stone has analysed the transformation of the Venice 
Biennale under Fascism. According to Stone, exhibitions have played a central role 
in Western national self-representation since the mid nineteenth century:
‘With the expansion of the public sphere that accompanied the Industrial Revolution and 
the emergence of the Liberal state, many Western societies used exhibitions to represent 
political, social and economic ideologies. In the wake of the highly successful British 
Crystal Palace-exposition of 1851, governments from monarchies to parliamentary 
democracies to dictatorships devoted increasing amounts of money and attention to national 
and international industrial and art shows. From the American celebration of westward 
expansion to the British glorifications of industry and empire, exhibitions introduced many 
people to the dominant narratives o f their respective societies’.8
Italy’s Fascist regime organised an increasing number of exhibitions during 
its period in office, especially regional events after 1926.9 Stone has argued that 
Fascist exhibitions were mainly ideological, noting that they ‘played a central role 
in its [Fascism’s] aestheticized politics’ and that they were ‘designed to represent 
and define the cultural sphere’.10 Before the Fascist era, the Biennale hosted a 
limited number of genres, styles and artists. After 1922, it was restructured to 
welcome ‘the new professional and white-collar middle classes’.11 The regime
sought and ‘pursued the legitimacy and continuity it found in elite culture and the
12cultural consensus possible in a successful mobilisation of mass culture’. Stone 
considers the event as a major if not the central element in the regime’s aesthetic 
self-representation and for its drive towards an ideologically motivated consensus. 
In response, however, it might be claimed that this was only partially the case. That 
commercial factors exerted a greater degree of influence upon Venetian cultural 
tourism than ideological considerations has already been emphasized, and in this
8 Stone, The Patron State, p. 17.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Stone, ‘Challenging cultural categories’, p. 184.
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chapter, it will be argued that the Biennale of International Arts should be regarded 
in a similar light.
The last years of the nineteenth century represented a period of economic 
expansion in Europe. Unprecedented levels of newly acquired wealth and economic 
power allowed the bourgeoisie, with its new-found status, to invest more and more 
time in leisure activities. In Venice, leisure had always meant tourism, and in 
particular cultural tourism. In this sense, culture had been employed to serve 
tourism and commerce, and the Biennale of International Arts had come to stand at 
the point of intersection between the three. It retained, therefore, not only a 
paramount cultural role, but also a vital commercial function.
In 1933, the journal II Lavoro Fascista, an official party organ, claimed that 
the Venice Biennale was the means through which ‘Fascism [had] established itself 
in the city of the Doges’.13 As a cultural event of international standing, it was 
natural that the Fascist regime would seek to impose its influence upon it. However, 
local priorities led the Venetian authorities in a rather different direction. The 
hypothesis to be developed here is that the Biennale was founded as a tourist- 
cultural enterprise, promoted by powerful elites interested in the 
internationalization of Venice as a commercial centre. This contention is supported 
by the fact that in the 1930s, the Biennale administration, following the remarkable 
industrial expansion of Porto Marghera and the subsequent concentration of tourist 
activities in the historic town, added new events (the Music, Theatre and Cinema 
festivals) to complement the elite forms of cultural tourism prevalent in the first 
decades of the 20th century.14 The exploitation of the Biennale to benefit local 
commercial interest. demonstrates not only how the city and its events were 
increasingly being commercialized and commodified, but also how its status as a 
major tourist destination was evolving. In other words, the Biennale developed 
according to a set of economic priorities which Venetian trading elites regarded as 
defining the role and function of the institution.
12 Ibid, p. 185.
13 ‘II genio, la tecnica e la produzione italiana nelle imponenti manifestazioni delle grandi mostre\ II 
Lavoro Fascista, 5 October 1933.
14 The Biennale executive committee was in charge of both the artistic and administrative 
management in the figure of the secretary general and the administrative director.
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For Lawrence Alloway, ‘exhibitions are propaganda, not only for our 
transformed sense of scale, but for specific projects, mercantile in the case of the 
Great Exhibition, tourist in the case of the Venice Biennale’.15 The point being 
driven home here is that, for the Biennale, the reinvigoration of the tourist industry 
was far more relevant than any promotion of Fascist themes and values. This 
conception led to the decision to include the work of foreign artists at the Biennale, 
a decision intended to widen the exhibition’s appeal to visitors from overseas.16
Evidently, the Biennale, held since the last years of the nineteenth century, 
pre-dated the establishment of the Fascist regime. Inaugurated in 1895, it was 
conceived as a response to Venice’s economic decline by fin de si^cle elites who 
hoped it would bring new sources of revenue and international acclaim to the city.17 
A prestigious exhibition, if carefully timed to coincide with the summer tourist 
season, might well provide the resolution of Venice’s economic problems. Antonio 
Fradeletto, the first Secretary General of the Biennale, once declared:
‘Venetian citizens were asked to form a committee with the task of proposing the main 
points of a statute which was to rule the future exhibitions. This had the double aim of 
regulating the display of works of art and the creation of an artistic market in which the city 
of Venice might find some economic re lie f .18
The committee had to be composed of residents known for their ‘love of the 
arts and long-time business skills, as well as artists resident in the city of Venice. 
Moreover, it was also to suggest the means to achieve the best results in the artistic 
as well as the economic domain’.19 It is significant that several members of the 
local business class were indeed to be found on the committee, including Giancarlo 
Stucky (see chapter 3), M. Guggenheim, successful creator of artistic furniture and 
Niccolo Papadopoli, a wealthy, noble Venetian entrepreneur (both Stucky and 
Papadopoli would later become involved in Volpi’s project for the construction of
15 Lawrence Alloway, The Venice Biennale 1895-196. From Salon to Goldfish Bowl, London, Faber 
& Faber, 1968, p. 38.
16 Ibid.
17 Sartorello, Funzione e Collocazione degli Istituti Espositivi d ’Arte, p. 93.
18 Bazzoni, 60 Anni della Biennale di Venezia, p. 126.
19 Ibid.
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the industrial port in Venice).
Under the Fascist regime, the connections between local capitalist elites and 
Venetian cultural circles became more evident as the related projects of fostering 
tourism and promoting the cultural industrialization of the city were both pursued.20 
In 1930, when a Royal Decree transformed the Biennale into an autonomous 
institution under direct control of the regime,21 Antonio Maraini, retaining the 
position of secretary general, declared that the institution ought to become a 
business in order to adapt itself to the ‘modem Fascist world’. It could no longer 
rely on amateurish or random improvisation, but needed to institute coordinated 
economic policies and financial planning. In short, it would require the same 
rational administration of resources as any other successful industrial or 
commercial enterprise.22 The official charter, under article 5, established that the 
Biennale should organize outdoor theatre plays during the summer season and 
concentratevthe concerts and ballets of the Music Festival in September and October 
in order to prolong the tourist season.23 Article 12 stated that the executive 
committee, alongside other government, party and Biennale personnel, should 
include the Undersecretary for Tourism (Direzione Generate per il Turismo) and 
the Undersecretary for Commerce {Direzione Generale per il Commercio), an 
undersecretariat at the Ministry of Corporations. Significantly, the subcommittee 
charged with the task of coordinating the Film, Music and Theatre festivals was to 
include among its members the President of the Ente Provinciale del Turismo 
(Provincial Agency for Tourism) who did not sit on the committee that oversaw the 
arts exhibition.24
In other words, the Venetian authorities saw the Biennale as providing an 
aesthetic-cultural patina to what should properly be regarded as a predominantly
20 Maraini expressed his hopes that the fact that Volpi was no longer Minister o f Finances would not 
interfere with further steps to be undertaken by the Biennale, one being the decree of recognition of 
autonomy o f the institution (ASAC, Serie Scatole Nere, busta n. 44, ‘Pubblicita’ 1930’).
21 As cited in La Biennale di Venezia (ed.), La Biennale di Venezia, pp. X-XIV: Regio Decreto 
Legge 13 January 1930, La Gazzetta Ufficiale del Regno d ’Italia, n. 33, 12 February 1930.
22 Maraini, ‘II nuovo assetto della Biennale Veneziana’, Rassegna dell’Istruzione artistica, February 
1930.
23 As cited in La Biennale di Venezia (ed.), La Biennale di Venezia, p. XIV: Regio Decreto Legge 
21 July 1938-XVI ‘Nuovo Ordinamento dell’Esposizione biennale intemazionale d’arte di Venezia’, 
La Gazzetta Ufficiale del Regno d ’ltalia, n. 229, 6 October 1938.
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commercial phenomenon serving the Venetian hotel and tourist industries. As has 
been noted before, the revitalization of the tourist sector in the post-war period of 
economic depression had become a major objective of the Venetian municipality. 
As a direct result of the war and the decline of the tourist industry, the Biennale in 
the 1920s was no longer drawing the number of visitors to which it had become 
accustomed. 431,000 visitors had attended in 1912, but this figure had declined 
precipitously to just 172,000 in 1928.25 The institution was short of funds to finance 
various prizes and there were few official purchases made by national public 
bodies: in the 1920s works of art were acquired only by the Gallery of Modem Art 
(<Galleria d ’Arte Moderna) on behalf of the Venice municipality. The following 
figures give an idea of the difficulties that afflicted the exhibition in those years:26
Biennales__________Sales figures*______ Visitors___________ Purchases
1920 -XII 2,628,747 240,510 682
1922 -XIII 1,251,456 380,544 575
1924 -XIV 2,548,901 319,853 885
1926 -XV 2,427,836 201,025 367
1928 -XVI 1,434,747 172,841 350
1930 -XVII 1,407,892 193,003 462
* Sales figures are expressed in lire
Some influential Venetians thought that the solution should come from the 
state. In 1928, Antonio Maraini replaced Vittorio Pica as the Secretary General of 
the Biennale. Soon afterwards, a Royal Decree confirmed the permanent character 
of the exhibition, allowing it to benefit from customs exemptions and train fare 
reductions. All other Italian exhibitions were subject to annual authorization by the
24 Ibid.
25 La Biennale di Venezia (ed.), La Biennale di Venezia, p. III.
26 Ibid.
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Head of Government and the relevant ministers.27 The Podesta of Venice, Pietro 
Orsi, was exultant after the official recognition of the Biennale,28 although his 
delight might well have been tempered had he known he was soon to be replaced 
by Ettore Zorzi, appointed by the central government.29 Indeed, this decision was in 
some respects a surprising one as Orsi had seemed willing to place the Biennale at 
the service of the Fascist regime.30
In 1930, a Royal Decree authorised a series of public works such as the 
‘Littorio’ bridge, the huge car park located in Piazzale Roma, and the Nicelli 
airport. Piazzale Roma was soon afterwards linked with St. Mark’s Square and the 
cultural heart of Venice,31 ready to appeal to a more expansive tourist clientele. 
Even Stone, initially arguing that the Biennale represented ‘an instance of Fascist 
dominance obtained through ideological and cultural means’,32 recognises the 
strength of the commercial forces operating upon the event:
‘The addition of an array of evening activities was tied to the expanded tourist packaging of 
the Biennale. After 1932, on any given evening, visitors could partake of a variety of 
attractions, including folkloric festivals and regattas on the Venetian canals. The diversified 
Biennale stressed the consumption of the ‘Venetian experience’, in the form of a surfeit of 
Venetian imagery and references, from the Goldoni productions of the theatre festival to 
the gondolas and masks of the promotional literature. O f course, these images were in 
symbiosis with the inexpensive and readily available souvenirs carrying the same ones. (...) 
Visitors could make extended trips, partake o f a range of activities, select, choose and 
consume plays, music, film and the fine arts. Each of these attractions mobilized the 
consumptive possibilities of culture and of Venice itself by being situated in various parts 
o f the city and requiring that the spectator move through the city to attend them. The 1934
27 As cited in La Biennale di Venezia (ed.), La Biennale di Venezia, p. VIII: Regio Decreto Legge 24 
December 1928 ‘Autorizzazione in via permanente della Esposizione intemazionale d’arte di 
Venezia e della Esposizione quadriennale nazionale d’arte’ di Roma, La Gazzetta Ufficiale del 
Regno d ’ltalia, n. 19, 23 January 1929.
28 AMV, Orsi, Brevissima Sommaria Relazione, Venezia, 1929.
29 Bazzoni, 60 Anni della Biennale di Venezia, p. 123.
30 Back in 1927, Orsi had declared: ‘The Venetian Esposizione constitutes an event of such 
importance that I must attach to the request of authorization o f the XVI Biennale some brief 
explanations o f the way in which we intend to push to the maximum every practical activity and we 
plan to frame the Venice Biennale within the grandiose project of national renovation cherished by 
Fascism’ (Orsi, ‘La relazione al Duce per il riconoscimento dell’Esposizione di Venezia’, La 
Gazzetta di Venezia, 26 November 1927).
31 AMV, Orsi, Brevissima Sommaria Relazione, p. 108.
32 Stone, The Patron State, p. 15.
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Biennale brochure underlined the limitless attractions o f the event: the brochure was 
divided into seven promotional sections -film, fine arts, decorative arts, music, theatre, 
traditional feasts and sport competitions- and exceptional railway reductions’.'
This provides an illustration of the extent to which the ‘commodification’ of 
the Biennale had been achieved in the 1930s, transforming the event into a series of 
commercial transactions within an international cultural market. It was also decided 
that the Giardini Castello, the traditional location of the exhibition, was to be 
included among those sites served by Rio Nuovo, a quicker waterway that flowed 
from Piazzale Roma to the core of Venice, and from which the Biennale itself was 
to benefit directly. Soon afterwards, the old bank beside the gardens was 
extensively redesigned and embellished, becoming known, in true Fascist style, as 
the Riva dell ’Impero (Imperial Bank).34
Relief for the financial and organizational problems of the Biennale came in 
1930, the year that Mussolini decided ‘to bring the arts under the umbrella of the 
Fascist revolution’.35 Thereafter another Royal Decree unilaterally transformed the 
exhibition into the ‘Autonomous Agency of the Venice Biennale’ {Ente Autonomo 
La Biennale di Venezia)?6 The new administrative committee was appointed by the 
Head of the State, drawing from the advice of the Minister of National Education, 
the Minister of Corporations and the Minister of the Interior. However, it included
> 37some familiar figures such as Maraini, Ettore Ciardi, and the Podesta Zorzi.
The establishment of the Biennale as a state agency was perceived by some 
to be a betrayal of the Venetian municipality but the potential controversy was 
reduced as a result of the appointment of a Venetian as President of the Biennale. In 
recognition of the ‘Venetianness’ of the institution it was decided that a well-known 
Venetian figure be appointed as president, providing Volpi with the opportunity to
3 8assume the mantle of the ‘saviour’ of the institution. Fascist authorities
33 Ibidem, ‘Challenging cultural categories’, pp. 101-05.
34 Distefano, Paladini, Storia di Venezia, p. 108.
35 Stone, The Patron State, p. 33
36 As cited in La Biennale di Venezia (ed.), La Biennale di Venezia, pp. X-XIV: Regio Decreto 
Legge 13 January 1930, La Gazzetta Ufficiale del Regno d ’ltalia, n. 33, 12 February 1930.
37 Ibid.
38 Sergio Bettini, ‘Un futuro per la Biennale’, La Rivista Veneta, n. 10, May 1969.
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strategically stressed both the national and local nature of the Biennale, and it was 
quickly decided that the exhibition should continue to be inaugurated on St. Mark’s
39day. Volpi reassured Venetians about the new arrangements in the periodical Le
Tre Venezie (a monthly review edited under the auspices of the Fascist Provincial
Federation of Venice40): ‘The legislation does not affect our actions and aims, it is
Venice in her incomparable artistic tradition which hails and judges. It is Venice
which consecrates artists to posterity’.41 
TV)^ P y
.\11 uf iwliiirti again suggests that, despite outward appearances, the events of 
1930 brought with them a marked divergence from the stated aims of the central 
government. For the Biennale administrative board, commercial pragmatism 
determined priorities: though Fascism was given the right to intervene in questions 
concerning the institution, Volpi had been granted official sponsorship for his plan 
to develop the Biennale as the centrepiece of a campaign to boost tourism and 
support the local hotel industry. Moreover, the regime had conceded the Venice 
Biennale a pre-eminent status in comparison with other Italian cultural events, 
something that would enable the Venetians to undermine potential competition 
from similar enterprises elsewhere in Italy (see chapter 3).42 In this respect, 
Maraini’s words, reported in the local newspaper La Gazzetta di Venezia, are 
significant. ‘Referring to the Biennale’, he stated, ‘we do not mean just an Italian 
art exhibition placed on top of other national artistic events by the Fascist regime, 
but also an exhibition that is first of all Venetian and international, a meeting point 
of the world’s art’.43
Once the regime had tackled the issue of reform at the Biennale, it found 
itself drawn into questions of state funding, and negotiations over this issue 
initiated heated debates between the central government, the provincial 
administration and the, Venetian municipality. In order to put an end to these 
disputes, the Ministry of Education declared that the state would participate
39 AMV, Affari Generali del Comune di Venezia, quinquennio 1921-1925, fascicolo VII/13/7, 
‘Inviti alia inaugurazione della XIV Esposizione Intemazionale d’Arte’.
40 Volpi, ‘La XVII Biennale’, Le Tre Venezie, April 1930.
41 Ibid.
42 Maraini, ‘La nuova Esposizione Intemazionale d ’Arte’, La Gazzetta di Venezia, 14 September 
1930.
43 Ibid.
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annually with grants amounting to 200,000 lire, while the local administration 
provided 150,000 lire and the province of Venice 50,000 lire.44 It is striking to see 
that by the end of the 1930s, with Europe sliding towards war, contributions to the 
Biennale from the Minculpop (Ministry of Popular Culture) were ascribed to the 
section ‘Costs for propaganda’, an administrative device which later allowed 
Maraini to ask the Minister of Finance for additional state funds for the 1941 
Theatre Festival, precisely because of the plays to be staged, ‘II Conte di 
Carmagnola’ which was ‘of striking Venetian character’, and Goethe’s ‘Faust’ 
which could be characterised as ‘overtly anti-English’.45
Ultimately, the newly acquired official status of the institution was geared 
towards the purpose of solving its financial problems. By 1934, Maraini was in the 
position to declare: ‘The Biennale of International Arts has appealed to people from 
all countries giving a significant boost to local tourism and doubling the level of 
guests since the last event’. Attendance was now satisfactory, reaching 250,000 
visitors in 1932 and continuing to rise to 450,000 in 1934.46 For the local council, 
the most important thing was that, despite the new levels of state intervention and 
the subsequent loss of administrative freedoms, the Venice Biennale had at last 
achieved financial stability. Though this meant a higher degree of control from the 
regime, the Biennale circle was only too happy to receive additional funds to revive 
the institution and consequently Venetian tourism.
4.2 Searching for approval from Fascism47
The minutes of the Biennale administrative board suggest that local and 
national identities could coexist without difficulty in Venice, while indicating that 
the Venetian municipality sought constant recognition from the Fascist regime for
44 Stone, The Patron State, p. 40.
45 ACS, Ministero per la Cultura Popolare, busta n. 209, ‘Sovvenzioni 1931-1943’, 7 November 
1942.
46 ACS, Telegram, Maraini and Volpi to Mussolini, 17 October 1934, Presidenza del Consiglio dei 
Ministri (1934-36), busta 3462, prot. 14.1.283, sottofascicolo 5.
47 Even though this chapter mainly focuses upon the Biennale of figurative arts, this section takes 
into consideration the subsidiary festivals (this applies to section 4.3, too).
48 On 23 January, Maraini again contacted Mussolini to let him know that ‘the collateral festivals 
would greatly contribute to the level of tourism the city o f Venice, in accordance to the desire of the 
Head o f the Government’ (Scotto Lavina, ‘1927, 1936’, in La Biennale di Venezia (ed.), Venezia 32,
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its projects. On the other hand, they also reveal the manipulation of national Fascist 
policies by the commercial interests of the city. It is easy to see why formal 
sanction from Fascism was essential, as only this could provide the financial 
stability and organisational freedom needed to stage the events effectively.
At the first meeting of the newly constituted Ente Autonomo Biennale 
committee on 27 February 1930, Volpi made it clear that a compromise had to be 
found between the traditions of <'venezianita\ modem financial planning and the 
regime’s political requirements.49 In so doing, the Venetian ruling class aimed at 
linking local identity and Fascist ideology to the common object of economic 
resurgence. Political rhetoric could be supported if it assisted in facilitating a 
blossoming of commerce in the area. On 23 and 24 October 1932, the Biennale 
circle held a Fascist Convention of Arts with the aim of bringing exhibitions of fine 
arts, music, theatre, cinema, architecture, poetry and decorative arts under one roof. 
What is remarkable is that the official programme, signed by Volpi, Maraini and 
Suppiej,50 specified under article 4 that the convention was meant to be a tribute 
that the Biennale organisation was paying to the ‘vast work of reconstruction 
operated by Fascism and the Regime in order to reaffirm the grandeur of Italian 
art’.51 By the same token, some months later, Volpi insisted before the committee 
members that the 18th Biennale had fulfilled broader goals than the previous ones, 
because, for the first time, it came to include other cultural forms beside the art 
exhibition; moreover it had increased the number of foreign pavilions built in the 
island of Sant’Elena. Such tremendous success, both financial and artistic, 
according to Volpi, was testimony to ‘the cultural blossoming that Italy had
52witnessed in ten years of Fascist government’.
At a meeting of 3 October 1933, attention focused upon the newer festivals. 
Maraini explained that the events had been launched on an experimental basis for
82, p. 44).
49 ASAC, Serie Verbali delle Adunanze del Comitato di Amministrazione delPEnte Biennale, vol. I, 
27/02/30-07/12/31, session 27 February 1930.
50 Federal Secretary of the PNF in Venice (see also chapter 3).
51 Scotto Lavina, ‘1927, 1936’, in La Biennale di Venezia (ed.), Venezia 32, 82, p. 52.
52 ASAC, Serie Verbali delle Adunanze del Comitato di Amministrazione dell’Ente Biennale, vol. I, 
001/02/32-06/07/34, session 15 November 1932.
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the first time the previous season, following Mussolini’s directions.53 He was now 
concerned about possible ways of sustaining them. Volpi shifted the attention of the 
committee towards local interests, pointing out that the festivals ‘should benefit the 
Biennale exhibition by 20% and the Venetian community by 80%’. Thereafter, he 
asked the Podesta whether the municipality would consider funding the exhibition 
in relation to a ‘guaranteed economic return allocated to the city’.54 On another 
occasion, Volpi argued that the Biennale cinema festival was a very popular and 
profitable event, although* the Theatre and Music festivals were rather less 
commercially appealing. He continued by claiming that together with artistic merit, 
another very important goal was being achieved, that of making Venice a more 
attractive destination which ultimately favoured the Biennale as a whole and the 
city itself with ‘more and more cosmopolitan travellers and upper-class visitors 
being attracted’.55
According to Fiamma Nicolodi, on the eve of the inauguration of the First
Music Festival in 1930, Adriano Lualdi declared that the festival programmes
‘despite being of international character [were] first and foremost an Italian and
Fascist institution’56 (a reference to the fact that the music performed and
composers honoured were predominantly Italian and therefore necessarily Fascist).
Nonetheless, the Music Festival, as a commercial enterprise alongside the other
Biennale events, was primarily a Venetian creation, compatible with the local
strategy of developing tourism and cultural entrepreneurship. It remained
essentially concerned with increasing Venetian wealth and economic expansion. In
this sense, despite many declarations of loyalty to Fascism, the relationship
w-er*,
between the city of Venice, the Biennale institution and the tourist industries in 
an important sense independent of Fascist influence.
53 On 13 January 1932, Maraini wrote to Mussolini, stating: ‘In conformity to the will of Your 
Excellence that the Biennale contribute as much as possible to the awakening of Venetian economic 
life, I have put together a programme of collateral events designed to direct each month public 
interest and the flux of the widest Italian and international tourism towards Venice. (...) Now, to 
definitely launch the above mentioned programme, and to push it to the maximum, an assessment 
from Your Excellence would be precious’ (Scotto Lavina, ‘1927, 1936’, in La Biennale di Venezia 
(ed.), Venezia 32, 82, p. 44).
54 ASAC, Serie Verbali delle Adunanze del Comitato di Amministrazione dell’Ente Biennale, vol. I, 
01/02/32-06/07/34, session 3 October 1933.
55 Ibid, session 6 July 1934.
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Maraini, in a report presented to a committee meeting of January 1935, 
explained the reciprocal nature of the bond existing between Venice, tourism and 
the function of the Biennale of International Arts. He argued:
‘This year the beauty o f Venice has attracted a larger audience than ever. (...) The city of 
remarkable palaces comes alive as the spring season arrives, bringing a bustling crowd, 
which crosses bridges, wanders through alleys and explores the canals (...). In this way they 
enjoy Venice’s true spirit. That is why we can agree that the last summer season was a truly 
‘Venetian’ one. (...) It is through its highest artistic achievements that the Biennale draws 
its international acclaim and prestige. If it is from Venice that the exhibition draws its 
ability to set the highest standards, it is also through these noble arts that the Biennale pays 
tribute back to Venice. For this reason, the tourist success is not the result, as in many other 
instances, of meaningless propaganda or exploitation of past glories, but the outcome of 
substantial values that tend to renew and improve themselves over time. This is the 
explanation of last season’s success, which witnessed so many young people and cultured 
gentlemen visiting Venice from overseas; such broad consensus must encourage the 
Biennale in its bid to make Venice an unrivalled art centre’.57
In the committee meeting of 12 May 1941, Volpi welcomed all the artistic 
proposals outlined by the secretary general for the following summer season, ‘not 
just for their benefit to tourism, but also because they provide continuity to the 
Biennale’s activities’. Professor Comelio Di Marzio, President of the Confederation 
of Professionals and Artists of Venice, agreed with Volpi, emphasizing the 
dependence of Venice’s continuing well-being upon the Biennale institution: ‘The 
Biennale’s function goes beyond the mere artistic domain, it has a dovere civico
58[‘civic duty’] of revitalizing Venice’.
Historically, the Biennale had the primary function of supporting Venice, 
which bore in turn the task of ‘nourishing’ the exhibition. Here, the Esposizione 
Intemazionale d ’Arte established a field of action that was larger than the mere 
cultural domain: it retained a ‘civic function’ which meant the provision of an 
economic contribution to the city of Venice. As industrial activities were moved to
56 Nicolodi, ‘Su alcuni aspetti dei Festivals’, p. 142.
57 ASAC, Serie Verbali delle Adunanze del Comitato di Amministrazione dell’Ente Biennale, vol. 
Ill, 28/01/35-30/01/43, session 28 January 1935.
58 Ibid, session 12 May 1941.
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Marghera, the Biennale inherited the role of building up cultural tourism. The 
frequent communications with Rome had the purpose of ensuring that the 
aspirations of the Venetian elites fell into line with the central government’s 
policies. It was essential that the specific project of economic revival in Venice be 
made compatible with the national program of constructing a totalitarian state. 
Venice, it was thought, could better fulfil her aspirations of commercial 
development and cultural industrialization when allied to, rather than in conflict 
with, the Fascist regime.
4.3 The neutrality of the Music Festival’s repertoires
The programmes designed for the various Biennale Music festivals during 
the 1930s were indicative of precisely this tension between national cultural 
policies and local tourist interests. Ultimately, according to Fiamma Nicolodi, 
fe^cleticism4 combined with an openness towards all the musical trends operating 
in Italy, was the rule.59 Musical programmes ‘stayed away from the demagogic 
input of going toward the people’,60 and could not really be said to have been 
agents for the nationalisation of the masses. An example of this is the programme
t h  *hof the Third International Festival of Music covering 8 to 16 September 1934:
Saturday 8th 
Sunday 9th 
Tuesday 11th. 
Wednesday 12 
Friday 14th 
Saturday 15th
th
Symphonic concert of inauguration. Theatre La 
Fenice;
Symphonic concert of Nordic Music directed by I. 
Debrowen. Theatre La Fenice;
Symphonic concert of Orchestra directors. Theatre La 
Fenice;
‘The Mass’ by Giuseppe Verdi with Beniamino Gigli. 
Musical director Tullio Serafin. In St. Mark’s Square; 
First presentation of the Viennese Opera ‘Cosi Fan 
Tutte’ by Mozart. Theatre La Fenice;
Theatre of Chamber Music at the Theatre Goldoni;
Nicolodi, ‘Su alcuni aspetti dei Festivals’, p. 167.
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Sunday 16th Symphonic concert of the Viennese Philarmonic
Orchestra at the ‘Salon de la Ragione’ in Padua, 
directed by Clemens Krauss. Second representation 
of the Viennese Opera ‘Die Frau onhe Schatten’ by 
Richard Strauss. Theatre La Fenice.
No one would realistically claim that these performances represented a 
particularly Fascist or even Italian aesthetic. On the contrary, they were more 
international than national, in flavour, featuring the great names of European music 
such as Verdi, Mozart and Strauss. Bosworth too has argued:
‘No doubt the Italians were italianissimi as composers, but their music and its lyrics 
frequently invoked liberty, or individuality, or decadence, in ways that were not 
straightforwardly reconcilable with Fascism, and always suggested that Italian-ness had a 
history separate from the current regime. If Fascism had not, as it were, completely 
changed the music, so too its festivals were merely grafted onto a programme which had 
developed, before 1922, a rhythm of its own, a rhythm which would continue beyond 
1945’ 61
According to the Biennale executive committee, the festival should not be 
the representative of any single, particular artistic trend but should include ‘all the
fF)musical voices worthy of being heard’. It thus comes as no surprise to discover 
that in 1936, a well-known newspaper criticised the programme of the Third Music 
Festival for having been drawn from the most ‘ordinary and commercial symphonic 
repertoire’, and that the character of the performances had clearly revealed 
‘superfluous popular and tourist intentions’.63 For Harvey Sachs, the regime was 
able to use the Music Festival to show its ‘openness’. Because Venice was a centre
60 Ibid. p. 142.
61 Bosworth, ‘Venice, 1911-45’, p. 18.
62 Renato Mariani, ‘Sintesi e bilancio del festival musicale veneziano’, L ’Ambrosiano, 15 September 
1936.
63 Ibid. By the same token, even an outstanding journal such as the Venetian Ateneo Veneto perfectly 
caught the pragmatic spirit of the Biennale, this time o f the Theatre Festival by declaring: ‘There is 
no doubt that the events announced by the Biennale for next July will constitute new, grandiose 
affirmations for Renato Simoni and Guido Salvini, and a powerful tourist attraction for the Venetian 
summer’. (Teo Gianniotti, ‘La Biennale e il teatro’, Ateneo Veneto, June 1937).
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of international tourism, the state was eager to offer a more cosmopolitan and less 
autarchic image of itself.64 Yet, this reveals that, if the festival wished to be a 
commercial product appealing to a wider public, it could not afford to prioritise 
explicitly Fascist themes. On the contrary, it had to favour internationalism, 
cosmopolitanism and the kind of carefree subjects that leisure-seeking tourists 
would most respond to.
4.4 Resting upon the tourist industry: the Biennale and mass tourism
The adoption of modem tourist techniques was vital even for a globally 
renowned event such as the Biennale of International Arts. Despite the economic 
depression of the 1930s, Venice continued to operate as an elegant and 
cosmopolitan resort. Beginning in 1930, Maraini and Volpi attempted to widen the 
Biennale’s audience by using travel discounts and advertising techniques 
traditionally associated with the commercial tourist industry.65 In view of this, 
Maraini expanded and modernised the Biennale press office with the regular 
publication of information, schedules, prizes and discounts, in the local, national 
and international press.66 By 1934, Biennale news and advertisements ran in sixty- 
two national newspapers and fifteen European and American dailies. Discussion 
about tourist numbers, the arrangement of various discounts, and tourist planning in
• 67general were a constant feature of the committee meetings.
64 Sachs, Musica e Regime, p. 116.
65 Volpi paid particular attention to press relations, a key aspect of any campaign to successfully 
commercialize the Biennale. Journalists and arts critics, whether Italian or foreign, had been granted 
special facilities by 1928 (ASAC, Serie Scatole Nere, busta n. 57, ‘Pubblicita 1930’). In order to 
boost the Biennale’s reputation, that same year, Arturo Lancellotti, one of Giuseppe Bottai’s 
collaborators, had pleaded with Maraini to grant an invitation to the Marquis de Felice, ‘no ordinary 
reporter’ in Lancellotti’s words, ‘but the founder of the newspaper Corriere d ’Italia’ (Ibid, busta n. 
48, ‘Pubblicita 1928’). That year, the Biennale administration confirmed a welcoming programme 
for the foreign press to be launched in 1930. Among the various events, the programme was to 
include a meeting with the Prefect, a visit to the Biennale followed by lunch offered by the Ciga and 
the Hotel Excelsior at the Lido, and finally excursions to the glass industries o f Murano and the 
commercial port (Ibid). It is clear that in incorporating commercial venues as well as sites of cultural 
interest, Volpi’s intention was to stress the economic vitality o f Venice, not just its cultural prestige.
66 ASAC, Serie Scatole Nere, busta n. 57, ‘Pubblicita 1930’. According to a businessman such as 
Giuseppe Volpi, propaganda made on behalf o f the Biennale could not be anything but 
‘materialistic’, in the service of the commercial function of the exhibition, and helping to boost the 
profits made by the festivals. (ASAC, Serie Materiale da Riordinare, ‘Ufficio Stampa- 
Amministrazione 1936’).
67 ASAC, Serie Verbali delle Adunanze del Comitato di Amministrazione dell’Ente Biennale, vol.
132
In 1939, the Podesta reported that the executive board of the Ente 
Provinciale per il Turismo had expressed its desire that the Venice Biennale, 
because of its role in ‘carrying out an artistic activity which [was] vitally linked to 
the tourist business,’ should make every effort to remain in close communication 
with the Tourist Office authorities. According to the Ente, the Biennale usually 
communicated its schedules to the Tourist Office in July, too late to be of much use 
in overseas or even national publicity campaigns. Maraini, writing to the Podesta, 
defended the position of the Biennale, asserting that the Tourist Office were 
exaggerating the problem, and pointing out that the institution had been represented 
by an official at the .meeting undertaken by the Ente Provinciale per il Turismo in 
order to define entertainment programmes for the Venetian summer season.68 
Nevertheless, it was subsequently agreed that the Biennale programmes should 
reach foreign tourist agencies by February at the latest.69
The Biennale administration under Maraini made travel discounts the 
foundation of its tourist enticement programme.70 From the study of the minutes of 
the Biennale committee meetings, it is clear that the finances of the institution 
greatly benefited from the special fare reductions granted by the central 
government. On 26 February 1934, one of the committee members announced that 
a train discount of 70% had led to a corresponding increase in sales of both rail 
tickets and Biennale membership cards. The latter enjoyed a wide channel of 
distribution: they were made available in municipal offices, travel agents, 
bookshops, music shops, stationers, and haberdasher’s shops.71 The Podesta himself 
added that it was necessary to exploit travel discounts to the maximum, forcing 
visitors to purchase an entrance ticket to the exhibition by making it compulsory 
that they punch their travel tickets within the gates of the Biennale. The success of 
the event was measured in practical terms by the amount of entrance tickets and
72railcards sold to the public.
Ill, 28/01/35-30/01/43, session 28 January 1935.
68 Ibid.
69 ASAC, Serie Scatole Nere, busta n. 68, ‘Pubblicita-1939’.
70 Stone, The Patron State, p. 121.
71 ‘XV Esposizione. Gli abbonamenti’, II Gazzettino di Venezia, 18 April 1926.
72 ASAC, Serie Verbali delle Adunanze del Comitato di Amministrazione dell’Ente Biennale, vol. 
Ill, 28/01/35-30/01/43, session 28 January 1935. See also Stone, The Patron State, p. 121.
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The Archivio Storico delle Arti Contemporanee holds detailed records of 
guidelines for fare reductions and advertising strategies: 15,000 posters offering 
discounts were displayed on the Italian train carriages circulating on the main 
routes. Fare reduction adverts were also placed in telephone directories.73 In 1928, 
details of the fare discounts associated with the Biennale were as follows: from 12 
May to 17 July, between 28 July and 6 September and from 22 September to 25 
October, a 30% discount on the normal train ticket price was available, while from 
2 to 11 May, 18 to 27 July, 7 to 21 September and 26 October to 4 November, 50% 
discounts on train tickets could be obtained.74
Clearly the plan was designed as part of a strategy to develop specific 
periods as high points of the summer season. Eventually, it would include a list of 
strategic positions (squares and streets of main Italian cities) where the agencies in 
charge of tourist promotion concentrated the distribution of their advertising 
material.75 On 13 March 1930, the Ministry of Finance granted customs exemptions 
for those works of art that were to be displayed at the Biennale, and on 9 May, it 
acknowledged that the same works could be transported back without incurring the 
normal charge.76
Marla Stone has argued that ‘Fascist cultural bureaucrats employed several 
strategies for widening a previously limited cultural institution, broadening content 
and actively cultivating the attendance of new social groups’.77 Nevertheless, it is 
fair to say that most tourist practices were adopted before Fascism came to power 
and had little or nothing to do with ‘fascistizing’ audiences (for example, the habit 
of granting fare reductions and facilities dated back to the nineteenth century). In 
fact, the Exhibition o f International Arts had, since its inception, developed ‘the 
aim of promoting and favouring the participation of the public as well as assuring to 
the enterprise a remarkable profit’, and to this end it had consistently lobbied for 
and obtained special 50% discounts on return tickets to Venice from the National 
Railway Administration, discounts which came complete with a exhibition
73 ASAC, Serie Scatole Nere, busta n. 48, ‘Pubblicita 1928’. See also Stone, The Patron State, p. 
1 2 1 .
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid, busta n. 57, ‘Pubblicita 1930’.
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membership card valid for the entire season. According to the Biennale executive 
board, these tickets were an innovation of the Exhibition of International Arts and 
the regime itself adopted the practice.78
By the same token, the first beneficiaries of travel discounts were 
commercial rather than cultural interests. In 1933, the review Commercio Veneto 
declared that the Exhibition of International Arts and its subsidiary festivals had 
attracted to Venice a sizeable public both from Italy and overseas, a success 
facilitated by the implementation of various fare reductions which had brought 
‘great advantage to commerce in general and hotel industry in particular’.79 It was 
believed that many tourists were still content to take advantage of discounted train 
tickets without any intention of entering the exhibition itself.80 Even when travellers 
were drawn inside the salons in order to validate their tickets, it was arguable that 
any emphasis on ‘moral education’ was a secondary consideration to ‘commercial 
gains’.81
Yet, more doubt can be cast on the assertion that the adoption of mass 
tourism practices at the Biennale was part of a coordinated programme to target a 
wider class spectrum for propagandistic and ideological purposes. The aim here is 
to demonstrate that Venetian Fascists were more interested in the economic 
possibilities offered by increased attendance than the incorporation of new social 
groups within the development of an identifiably Fascist national culture. This point 
is reinforced by the fact that the longevity of the Biennale and other major cultural
77 Stone, The Patron State, p. 97.
78 A decree o f 16 December 1923 granted railways facilities and customs exemptions in favour of 
fairs and exhibitions (ACS, Regio Decreto Legge n. 2740, 16 December 1923, ‘Norme per la 
concessione di facilitazioni ferroviarie e doganali a favore di fiere ed esposizioni’, Ministero della 
Cultura Popolare, busta n. 1547, ‘Sovvenzioni 1931-1943’, prot. 14/1/1067). On 14 September 
1927, the Ministry o f Finance had authorized train discounts of 30% from 1 to 27 October 1927 to 
visit the ‘Exhibition of Home Furniture’ organized by the Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro in the 
French and German pavilions at the Biennale’s Giardini Castello (ASAC, Serie Scatole Nere, busta 
n. 48, ‘Pubblicita 1928’). Had the Biennale happened in 1927, instead of 1928, I would interpret the 
home furniture event as a pretext under which the regime attracted lower classes to the art exhibition 
as well. It was probably the case that the OND was temporarily using the Biennale’s site; yet this 
surely had the result to familiarize the working class with the Biennale’s environment.
79 ‘Venezia. II programmema della XIX Biennale’, Commercio Veneto, 22 October 1933.
80 Claude Roger-Marx, ‘L ’art francais a la Biennale de Venise’, LeJour, 25 August 1934.
81 Gianniotti, ‘Ultimo giomo all’esposizione. Bilancio consuntivo di tre mesi di vita’, 11 Gazzettino 
di Venezia, 20 September 1942.
82 Stone, The Patron State, pp. 98-9.
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events set up in Venice directly depended upon the length of the period in which 
the fare reductions subsidised by the central government in order to broaden 
attendance remained valid.83 In 1926, for example, the reduced tickets were 
suspended due to an earlier decree of 6 April 1925 which forbade the involvement 
of the National Railway Administration in schemes of payment by travellers of 
subsidies to the organisational committees of conventions, exhibitions and 
celebrations. According to the Biennale administration, the temporary lack of such 
a vital concession had serious effects on the profits of the XV edition, even 
jeopardising the future of the event.84
In that sense, the travel reductions granted by the central government were 
not just facilities for tourists; they represented the cornerstone, the very existence of 
the Venetian cultural summer programme.85 At times, they could be source of 
competition between the Biennale and other cultural events. On 13 February 1935, 
this led the local administration to criticise the state: the Podesta Mario Alvera 
complained to the Prefect that the decision made by the government to cut back fare 
discounts granted to travellers would have a dramatic effect upon the financial plan 
devised for the Titian Exhibition.86 According to Alvera, the economic position of 
the Titian Exhibition had already been altered when the president of the Biennale 
had personally met the relevant minister in order to grant to the Quarant’anni 
d ’arte veneta Exhibition at the Biennale Gardens an option of two months of travel 
discounts. It later proved possible to reach an agreement between the two executive 
committees over shares of fare reductions. Because the Titian Exhibition was 
‘responsible for enhancing tourist numbers’,87 the Podesta asked the Prefect to deal 
on his behalf with the central authority in order to keep fare reductions discounted 
by 50% for at least six more months, so as to avoid further financial damage to the
83 ASAC, Serie Segreteria/Arti Visive, ‘Bollettino 1934-37’.
84 ASAC, Serie Scatole Nere, busta n. 57, ‘Promemoria’.
85 ASAC, Serie Verbali delle Adunanze del Comitato di Amministrazione dell’Ente Biennale, vol. 
Ill, 28/01/35-30/01/43, session 28 January 1935. It is quite significant that for the Settecento 
Exhibition of 1929, profits obtained through discounted rail tickets made up 1/3 of the entire 
business. (ASAC, Serie Segreteria/Arti Visive, ‘Mostra del Settecento Veneziano’).
86 ASV, Gabinetto della Prefettura di Venezia, anni 1893-1936, pacco n. 34, busta ‘Riduzioni 
ferroviarie pel 1936-Riscossione quote dai viaggiatori’.
87 Ibid.
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local administration.88
Nevertheless, during the Biennale meeting of 31 July 1935, Volpi informed 
the committee that despite all attempts to boost the Exhibition Quarant'anni d'arte 
Veneta, it had proved a financial failure. According to Volpi, this was explained by 
three main factors: the low degree of interest shown by the public due to poor 
publicity before the event; the temporary lack of authorization of rail discounts 
from the government; and the simultaneous opening of the Titian Exhibition. Most 
seriously, Volpi argued, the town council had planned the Titian event without 
taking the possibility of competition with other Biennale celebrations into 
consideration.89
The Podesta then announced, for the benefit of the Minister of 
Communications, that ‘the treatment meted out to Venice, considered the most 
important resort in Italy [was] pitifully only equal to that granted to minor resorts, 
and that vanishing travel discounts for tourists meant that Venice would be in a 
position of inferiority compared to other Italian cities’.90 Clearly the Podesta 
criticized the state for not assisting Venice in the right way: once again we are 
confronted with competing local interests rather than an organic national system 
where all communities worked together with common aims. On a general level, 
these examples provide an illustration of the degree of involvement of tourist 
techniques in the success or failure of Biennale cultural events in Venice. Their 
commercial success was, quite simply, too important to be left to chance.
According to Giuliana Tomasella, the Biennale of International Arts in the 
1930s recorded profits only in the edition of 1934 (a profit of 2,800,000 lire against 
an expense of 2,300.,000 lire). In 1938, expenses had overtaken takings by one 
million lire, a remarkable sum indeed in those years. For Tomasella, the deficit 
sprang both from the decrease in the number of visitors (in 1938 they were at only 
half the 1934 levels), and from the impossibility of reaching an appropriate 
agreement with the Italian Railway Society.91 Tomasella insists that most profits at
88 Ibid.
89 ASAC, Serie Verbali delle Adunanze del Comitato di Amministrazione dell’Ente Biennale, vol. 
Ill, 28/01/35-30/01/43, session 31 July 1935.
90 Ibid.
91 Tomasella, Biennali di Guerra, p. 7.
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the Biennale were produced from fare reductions and the impact of the so-called 
‘bollini ferroviari’ (rail tickets to be punched at the Biennale gates) which had been 
a consistent feature of the exhibition until 1935, when, suddenly, a Royal Decree of 
21 February arbitrarily decided that fare reductions would not last more than four 
months and would be re-established at 50% 92 Moreover, Alvera complained that 
benefits originating from special travel reductions were affected by a curtailment of 
profits of 55% devolved as contributions to various national institutions. According 
to Alvera, discounts had been granted to all kinds of minor events, and other 
concessions for tourist groups and families had overlapped with those of the 
Biennale in such a way as to undermine the benefits received in Venice.93 To 
understand the impact the decree had on the profits generated by travel reductions, 
it need only be noted that in 1934, they stood at 925,050 lire while in 1936, they 
had fallen dramatically to just 107,900 lire.94
In 1936, Volpi wrote to Dino Alfieri, Undersecretary of State for the Press 
and Propaganda informing him that the Biennale administration had decided to start 
the Music and Theatre festivals in 1930 ‘because travel discounts then granted by 
the national government would allow them to obtain remarkable profits from the 
sum produced from the purchase of return tickets’.95 According to Volpi, it was 
thanks to this income and further contributions from the municipality that the 
festivals achieved importance, both in terms of ‘artistic as well as tourist’ success.96 
He also complained that since it had been decided that these profits were to be 
shared with the Provincial Tourist Agency, the decision to dispossess the Biennale 
of further sums in favour of the institutions of the regime would mean that the 
traditional benefits from the travel discounts would be reduced to virtual 
insignificance, and the Biennale would thus be deprived of one of its main 
economic sources. The lack of benefits deriving from train discounts were to have 
such lasting consequences, contributing to Volpi eventually threatening to abandon 
the festivals in the second half of the 1930s (see chapter 3). Moreover, for the same
92 Ibid, p. 8.
93 ASAC, Serie Verbali delle Adunanze del Comitato di Amministrazione dell’Ente Biennale, vol. 
Ill, 28/01/35-30/01/43, session 5 February 1936.
94 Tomasella, Biennali di Guerra, p. 8.
95 ASAC, Serie Scatole Nere, busta n. 44, ‘Riduzioni ferroviarie 1936’.
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reason, Volpi remained adamant that there was no possibility of the Biennale 
administration paying its yearly contribution to the Ente Provinciale per il 
Turismo?1
Once again, it is revealed that travel, tourism and commerce represented the 
cornerstone for the life of the Biennale enterprise up to the point where their very 
existence was determined by their commercial potential. For this reason, it is 
difficult to conclude that the promotion of mass tourism at the Venice Biennale was 
driven primarily by ideological considerations. The new forms of publicity and the 
use of the festivals as tourist commodities point at an evident process of 
commercialisation of cultural contents. Fare reductions and other travel schemes 
were the direct product of the economic function fulfilled by the Biennale in order 
to revive tourism in the lagoon rather than representing an aspect of Fascist 
propaganda.
96 Ibid.
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Part Two: The enterprise
4.5 The Biennale within the international art market
In the 1930s, the function assigned to the Venice Biennale of generating 
additional revenue and boosting tourism was dramatically reinforced. Both the 
Biennale administration and the local council demanded that the institution perform 
a practical-commercial function alongside its aesthetic-cultural role. Thus, in 1932, 
Maraini declared in La Rivista di Venezia: ‘There will come a day that people point 
at the institution as a centre regulating all the arts, where ideal and cultural 
possibilities join commercial interests’.98 Volpi himself, from his usual 
entrepreneurial perspective, had at the beginning of the 1930s expressed the need to 
make the Biennale ‘more appealing to the audience’,99 meaning that the latter 
should be encouraged to engage with the exhibition as consumers. It was certainly 
the case that in the 1930s, the Biennale administration hoped to take maximum 
advantage of the international art market. In a period of heavy economic recession, 
the sale of works of art displayed at the Biennale had become vital to the very 
existence of the institution (which retained 10-15% of the price of any works 
sold).100
In 1928, Maraini declared that sales constituted the life blood of the 
Biennale101 and that they had always been more conspicuously important than in 
any other local exhibition. Nonetheless, it was recognised that the body suffered 
from its decidedly antiquated ways of dealing with potential customers. Maraini 
also believed that an obstacle to the improvement of sales revenue was a gap of two
years between one exhibition and the other, in which the administration could
102easily lose contact with collectors who might otherwise become regular buyers.
To avoid this, it was suggested that Biennale executives consider the possibility of 
inviting representatives from the private sector to oversee sales right from the 
preparatory phases of the exhibition. A private body could boost profits by 
establishing close relationships with public institutions, municipal galleries, banks,
97 Ibid.
98 Maraini, ‘La XVIII Esposizione Intemazionale d ’Arte’, La Rivista di Venezia, April 1932.
99 ASAC, Serie Materiale da Riordinare, ‘Ufficio Stampa-Amministrazione 1936’.
100 ASAC, Serie Registri Vendite, 1930.
101 Scotto Lavina, ‘1927, 1936’, in La Biennale di Venezia (ed.), Venezia 32, 82, p. 42.
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companies and art collectors. In effect, the Biennale authorities were moving 
towards the acknowledgment of the importance of the private art market, and 
recognising that it was necessary to cooperate with the private domain in order to
1OTpenetrate it.
In 1932, Volpi again stressed the need to appoint to the sales office an 
expert accountable to the administration personnel.104 Alvera claimed that it was 
vital to boost sales, but did warn the other members about moving from the 
complete lack of a ‘mercantile spirit’ that had hitherto characterized the Biennale to 
the opposite extreme. Volpi proposed to initiate a one year experiment: to exclude 
the percentage deriving from purchases made by officials and public bodies from 
the share earned by the sales officer. Maraini backed the idea as a means of 
improving private purchases against the public ones which had traditionally formed 
the majority of the transactions at the Biennale.105
In 1941, Maraini announced that the Milanese art expert, Ettore Gian 
Ferrari, had been appointed as the Head of the Biennale Sales Office. He owned a 
private gallery connected to ‘excellent customers and art amateurs’, and was known 
to have close contacts with many artists. According to Volpi, Gian Ferrari’s salary 
could even be covered by the additional profits generated as a result of his 
appointment.106 Tomasella thus notes that Gian Ferrari was appointed in order that 
the Biennale might take advantage of his contacts in the art world, and improve the
i  f\n  t #
exhibitions own disappointing sales record. The decision to hire Ferrari was part 
of a strategy which ultimately aimed at dragging the Biennale, kicking and 
screaming if need be, into the international art market, in order to make its
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid. At the committee meeting of 19 September 1930, Maraini had expressed his concern about 
falling sales caused by the general depression, and had suggested that a ‘radical reform’ of the sales 
office at the Biennale would be necessary in order to dramatically boost purchases. Maraini was of 
the opinion that a trained sales expert was needed; he believed that the contact between clerk and 
customer ought to be strong and continuous, and a constant connection could only be carried out by 
a real ‘vendeur’ who could maintain a business relationship with buyers. According to Volpi, a 
‘production agent’ {agente produttore) would be required (ASAC, Serie Verbali delle Adunanze del 
Comitato di Amministrazione dell’Ente Biennale, vol. I, 27/02/1930-07/12/1931, session 5 
September 1930).
104 ASAC, Serie Verbali delle Adunanze del Comitato di Amministrazione dell’Ente Biennale, vol. 
II, 01/01/1932-06/07/1934, session 25 January 1932.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid, vol. Ill, 28/01/1935-30/01/1943, session 12 May 1943.
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contemporary art exhibitions less dependent on state support which up to that point 
had sustained it.108 Once again, it needs to be stressed that conveying a political 
message to the Italian population through artistic representation was not as 
important as the commercialisation of culture and the profit-generating potential of 
the works on display.
During various committee meetings, Volpi had himself complained about 
the difficulty of finding private buyers for the works of art displayed at the 
Biennale, and the perception that purchases were being made almost exclusively by 
public agencies. The quadro da cavalletto, the common painting, he argued, had 
had its day, and it was therefore necessary to find alternative ways to attract the art 
lover, such as the decoration of panels as done in Japan, decorative prints, 
engravings for panels, etc.109 The committee’s intention was to organize future 
exhibitions in such ways as to cater for the tastes of the private art market. If the 
orthodox painting was demode, then Volpi would prioritise new genres with greater 
commercial potential.110 The Biennale authorities thus came to the conclusion that 
their primary task was the revitalization of the private market, since official 
purchases from Fascist bureaucrats and public administrations were generally 
‘satisfactory’.111
Once the Biennale was turned into a state body, the Fascist regime had 
started to finance it officially. However, another way for the government to inject 
funding was through state purchases of the works of art at the various exhibitions. 
According to Marla Stone,
‘From 1930 until its collapse in 1943, the Fascist dictatorship consistently allocated funds 
for the purchase of paintings, drawings, and sculpture from the international, national, and 
regional exhibitions under its sponsorship. The organs of the party and the government
107 Tomasella, Biennali di Guerra, p. 103.
108 Ibid, p. 104.
109 ASAC, Serie Verbali delle Adunanze del Comitato di Amministrazione dell’Ente Biennale, vol. 
Ill, 28/01/35-30/01/43, session 10 May 1935.
110 Clearly nobody took into account that in 1925 the Fascist journal Le Arti Plastiche (which read 
Periodico della Corporazione Nazionale delle Arti Plastiche) had warned that an artwork being the 
product o f ‘personal taste’ or ‘commercial intentions’ could not be an expression or record of the 
moral heritage o f a nation, thus it should have been readily eliminated. (Gino Severini, ‘Biennali 
Venezianq' , Le Arti Plastiche, 1 June 1925).
111 Stone, The Patron State, p. 71.
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made acquisitions at every Venice Biennale between 1930 and 1942 and widespread 
official buying was supplemented by significant purchasing by Fascist officials. Beginning 
in 1930, government and party purchases at the Venice Biennale remained fairly steady 
ranging between 25 and 32 percent o f total sales and increased to 37 percent in the early 
1940s. As an example, at the first Venice Biennale with major Fascist government and 
party presence, in 1930, overall sales amounted to 1,407,892 lire for 462 works of painting, 
sculpture and drawing. Government offices, local agencies, and party organizations 
together made purchases to the value o f 291,700 lire. The largest official buyer, the 
Ministry o f National Education, spent 130,000 lire on 35 paintings and sculpture destined 
for the Galleria d ’arte modema in Rome. The government was also represented by the 
Roman municipal administration, the Ministry o f Corporations, and the Undersecretariat 
for the Fine Arts. The National Fascist Party, and some of its affiliated organizations, such 
as the National Fascist Confederation of Professionals and Artists, bought 54,000 lire worth 
of art’.112
Apparently, in doing so, the regime intended to assist the private market 
which had been in a state of financial crisis since the end of the war.113 
Nonetheless, alongside the growing level of state involvement, the private market 
was also starting to establish itself at the Biennale. In this light, the observation 
made by Volpi at a committee meeting in 1935 is significant. Noticing that sales 
figures in 1934 had failed to climb higher than at previous exhibitions, due to the 
economic crisis, he revealed that there existed a huge difference between official 
sale prices of works of art and final agreed prices which highlighted the importance 
of the bargaining process. Volpi also pointed to the changing nature of the 
acquisitions and the disappearance of the ‘wealthy buyer’.114 Instead, the trend at 
the Biennale was for an increasing number of purchases of less expensive works. 
What is striking is that Volpi underlined the desire of less affluent consumers to 
possess a work of art (interesting in itself from the social point of view but less 
desirable when it came to the diminution of the huge private fortunes of the richest 
collectors and patrons from the exhibition).115 The Biennale authorities thus
112 Ibid, p. 72.
113 Ibid, p. 71.
114 ASAC, Serie Verbali delle Adunanze del Comitato di Amministrazione dell’Ente Biennale, vol. 
Ill, 28/01/35-30/01/43, session 28 January 1935.
115 Ibid.
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detected a double-edged set of developments. On the one hand, there was the 
decline of ‘enlightened patronage’ and on the other ‘the simultaneous rise of the 
artwork of mass consumption’.116
What Volpi had grasped was one of the most important social processes of 
the first decades of the century -the democratisation of consumption, the expansion 
of the audience keen to buy art, and the resulting commercialisation and 
standardisation of cultural products to cater for this new market. This progression is 
also demonstrated through the statistical analysis of the Biennale sale registers 
(registri vendite) between 1926 and 1942 summarised in the table below:117
P u b lic  bodies* P r iv a te  buyers** O ver, sales
1926 833,381 1,594,005 2,427,386
1928 / / /
1930 575,525 581,293 1,156,818
1932 703,495 267,750 971,245
1934 / / 866,181
1936 / / 912,500
1938 695,081 298,766 993,847
1940 / / /
1942 / 1,502,179 3,700,000+
*: this category indicates expenditure of public bodies in lire 
**: this category indicates expenditure of private buyers in lire
If one examines the sales figures for 1926, the ‘private buyers’ category
represented 70 individuals.118 They spent altogether 1,594,005 lire while the rest of 
the buyers (public bodies) reached 833,381 lire.119 We can thus conclude that, as 
early as 1926, a private art market had indeed developed, and that it was already 
larger than the market for public purchases. In February 1927, La Gazzetta di
116 Scotto Lavina, ‘1927, 1936’, in La Biennale di Venezia (ed.), Venezia 32, 82, p. 58.
117 ASAC, Serie Registri Vendite, 1926-42.
118 From this figure are left out: public administrations, Fascist bureaucrats and institutions, galleries 
and museums, companies, societies and associations, banks, clubs, dignitaries and foreign 
ambassadors and other various collective bodies which form altogether the ‘public buyers’. The 
same distinction is operated by the Biennale Sales Registers (see for example sales registers of 
1936).
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Venezia announced:
‘The remarkable amount of money flowing to the Biennale testifies to the importance that 
Venice has reached within the international art market and the necessity, from the economic 
point of view, to defend its position (...)• This signifies that the Venice Biennale is nowadays a 
national and international organism based on sound roots thanks to the perfect organisation of 
the artistic and administrative direction o f the enterprise’.120
In 1928, the private market comprised 87 individuals. Unfortunately, sales 
figures for the XVI Biennale and an overall evaluation for that year are not 
available. Nonetheless, Maraini wrote to the Prefect of Venice bemoaning the fact 
that the ‘true art lover’ was missing from the XVI edition, leaving room for a kind 
of buyer less keen on spending the same amounts. Moreover, the number of works
by very young artists on display produced the contraction of a market which had
121hitherto tended to favour more established artists. This could well explain why, 
in the following editions, the Biennale deliberately courted the ‘big names’ of the 
art world. In 1928, Maraini had acknowledged some criticism of the catalogue, with 
the exhibition accused of being too avant-garde and neglecting more traditional 
forms of art. It contained two different sections of the same importance: one was 
devoted to the ‘Novecento’ movement, one to the art of the ‘Ottocento’, with 
famous painters and internationally recognised maestri. In particular, the 
‘Ottocento’ artists had received an invitation permitting them to display at the 
Biennale whatever they liked, in the belief that the popularity of the traditional 
Ottocento style meant that almost all works would find buyers relatively easily.122 
Maraini also informed foreign representatives of the ‘huge financial success’ of the 
XVI Biennale, and noted that many of the purchases were made within foreign
123pavilions by Italian galleries and private buyers.
In 1930, the private art market had dramatically shrunk to a figure of 
581,293 lire, significantly lower than that of 1926. Nonetheless, the number of
119 ASAC, Serie Registri Vendite, 1926.
120 La Gazzetta di Venezia, 18 February 1927.
121 ASAC, Serie Scatole Nere, busta n. 44, ‘Pubblicita 1928’.
122 Ibid.
123 Ibid.
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private buyers at the XVII Biennale had reached around 107 individuals reinforcing 
Volpi’s conclusions about the changing nature of the art market. The overall figure 
for the public sector remained roughly the same at around 575,525 lire.124 In 1932, 
the onset of the global depression hit the art market, and purchases only reached 
around 267,750 lire. There were still over 100 buyers, but they were not prepared to 
spend anything like as much as in previous years. A totally inverted trend is 
revealed if one examines the figures for the public market where purchases stood at 
703,495 lire that year.125 Recession hindered arts consumption after 1933. Yet, the 
government continued to buy art and this encouraged more spending. Government 
and party purchases increased at the 1932 Biennale.126
The changing climate certainly contributed to the decision in the 1930s to 
open the doors of the Biennale to the decorative arts, amongst the crafts most 
closely associated with the Venetian tradition (see section 4.10). Decorative objects 
were less expensive and therefore more appealing to the wider, less wealthy public 
identified by the administration. Moreover, the ‘artists’ producing this 
‘merchandise’ were often merely specialised national or foreign handicraft
127companies producing unique or limited edition pieces. This reinforces the thesis 
that the Venice Biennale in the 1930s came to heavily emphasise its commercial 
outlook.
The pavilion of decorative arts was successful in boosting sales which 
totalled 866,181 lire in 1934.128 In 1936, sales were up to 912,500 lire for 511 
works of art, although unfortunately figures for private and public purchases are not 
available. Nonetheless, we do know that out of 511 pieces, 229 were paintings, 53 
were sculptures, 145 .were drawings and engravings, and 84 were decorative 
objects.129 This meant that despite the ongoing economic depression, the private art 
market still focused upon the ‘real’ work of art, the traditional painting, rather than 
modem glassware and decorative objects. Again in 1938, public purchases, with 
about 695,081 lire worth of sales, came to sustain those from private buyers which
124 ASAC, Serie Registri Vendite, 1930.
125 Ibid, 1932.
126 Stone, The Patron State, p. 73.
127 ASAC, Serie Scatole Nere, busta n. 63, ‘Elenco ditte da invitare per la mostra del vetro’.
128 ASAC, Serie Registri Vendite, 1934.
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were up to 298,766 lire.130 If we compare private purchases in 1934 and 1938, it is 
clear that the private art market was maintaining itself at a consistent level, 
somewhat surprising given the economic conditions and the deteriorating 
international political climate.
Despite Maraini’s complaints that sales had not been satisfactory, it is 
striking that he did not blame the economic situation or the unwillingness of the art 
market so much as logistical problems (he argued that the public was neglecting the 
exhibition because the central government had not granted its usual travel 
discounts).131 Overall sales had still totalled around 993,847 lire, and the Biennale 
administration revealed that they could have reached 1,132,630 lire if only 
transactions had remained in line with the original selling prices.132 Again, this 
indicates that, in a time of crisis, artists were ready to come to terms with buyers in 
order to sell their works. Moreover, the share that the Biennale retained as a 
percentage on sales went up to 15%, a sign, either that the art market was further 
developing, or that the Biennale was increasingly looking to the economic return it 
could draw from sales as the solution to the financial situation of the institution.
In 1940, 403 artworks were sold for a little more than one million lire. What 
is striking is that just 24% of purchases were made by a very small number of 
private buyers. The rest was shared among various state bodies such as the 
Ministers of National Education, of Popular Culture, of Communications, of 
Agriculture, of Foreign Affairs, the municipalities of Venice, Naples, Genoa and
133Florence, civic museums, Fascist confederations and provincial administrations.
The Biennale of 1942 was the last to be held before the end of the war. As 
we analyse figures of transactions, it is clear that purchases from Fascist institutions 
had dramatically fallen, while the private art market had showed a correspondingly 
impressive rise. Overall sales marked a peak of more than 3,700,000 lire for about 
800 works of art (an increase of 100%), and the private sector had spent an
129 Ibid, 1936.
130 Ibid, 1938.
131 ASAC, Serie Verbali delle Adunanze del Comitato di Amministrazione dell’Ente Biennale, vol. 
Ill, 28/01/35-30/01/43, session 24 March 1938.
132 ASAC, Serie Registri Vendite, 1938.
133 Tomasella, Biennali di Guerra, p. 80.
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astonishing 1,502,179 lire.134 These statistics further reinforces the thesis of a 
development of a private art market separate from Fascist influence and state 
patronage. The respectable review Domus declared that results of this kind were 
unprecedented, surpassing even those in the boom year of 1920 when sales had 
reached an enormous two and a half million lire. Most remarkable was that 90 per 
cent of buyers were from the private sector, spontaneously choosing and acquiring 
for their own sake, not to support artists or to make patronage but to possess works 
of art they desired (notwithstanding the wartime situation).135 Buyers included 
famous collectors such as Falck, Della Ragione, Jucker, Astaldi, Stramezzi, 
Marinotti, plus, naturally, Volpi and Cini. The impressive results were certainly due 
to the appointment of gallery owner Gian Ferrari at the Biennale sales office.136
Despite the war, private buyers continued to pump money into the art 
market at the Biennale. Maraini declared that success of the exhibition was 
complete in 1942, and praise came from the press as well as the art critics, but the 
unprecedented level of sales could be interpreted as indicative of recognition 
granted by the public.137 Again Maraini bemoaned the lack of travel discounts, but 
he was pleased to see that the audience participating at the Biennale did include 
‘refined, cultured buyers, real art lovers’.138 In the face of the economic situation, 
claimed the official, the share earned by the Biennale had been highly satisfactory, 
and he could conclude that sales were ‘the cornerstone of the success of the 1942 
edition’. For the central government, keeping the exhibition alive during wartime 
served political purposes, while for the Biennale entourage, what mattered was the
139economic return granted by sales.
4.6 Competitions with Fascist themes
The fact that the Exhibition of International Arts aimed at serving a tourist 
project rather than an exclusively aesthetic one does not mean that the institution
134 ASAC, Serie Registri Vendite, 1942.
135 Maraini, ‘Nota sulla XXIII Biennale’, Domus, October 1942.
136 Tomasella, Biennali di Guerra, p. 104.
137 ASAC, Serie Verbali delle Adunanze del Comitato di Amministrazione dell’Ente Biennale, vol. 
Ill, 28/01/35-30/01/43, session 30 January 1943.
138 Ibid, session 24 March 1938.
139 Ibid.
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was free from ideological content or that it was not subject to Fascist influence and 
policies. As pointed out before, for the regime, cultural events and naturally the 
Biennale were indeed considered as agents of mass mobilisation. In 1930, the state 
decided to take its programme of nationalization even further. Following the 
recognition of the Ente Autonomo Biennale, the Administrative Committee 
introduced official competitions with Fascist themes, open to all Italian artists who 
were members of the Fascist syndicates, alongside the regular schedule. These were 
to establish themselves as a mainstay of the exhibition’s cultural landscape and 
were credited, if only by the most doctrinaire officials, as finally bringing about the 
creation of a specifically Fascist aesthetic. La Gazzetta di Venezia wrote that the 
competitions had been instituted in order to bring back real art, which had been 
hitherto ‘disoriented by abstraction, away from the subjects of real life’.140 Maraini 
wished to ‘reinstate consensus, a tie of agreement, an exchange of sentiments and 
ideas between the domain of arts and the people’.141 According to the Rivista di 
Venezia, Maraini had inaugurated those competitions in order to make the Biennale 
the necessary mediator between the Fascist Revolution and artists, ‘who need[ed] to 
live and operate within their time’.142 In reality, after the system of selection had 
changed, prizes had been established to give a chance to those young artists who 
had not been officially invited.143
Sponsors included the Minister of National Education, the PNF, the 
Venetian municipality, various Confederations, private associations and citizens. 
The awards ceremony took place in the Palazzo dell’Esposizione, beginning in 
September 1930, and the works of art were displayed within the Central Pavilion.144 
The jury of the competitions included Volpi, Giuseppe Bottai (Minister of the 
Corporations), Giacomo Di Giacomo (President of the National Confederation of 
the Fascist Syndicates of Professionists and Artists), Cipriano Efisio Oppo 
(Secretary General of the Syndicates of Fine Arts), Roberto Forges Davanzati 
(President of the Society of Authors and Editors), Carlo Basile (representing the
140 La Gazzetta di Venezia, ‘Riduzioni ferroviarie per la XVII Biennale’, 13 April 1930.
141 Maraini, ‘Finalita Sociali dei Premi alia XVII Biennale’, Politica Sociale, August 1930.
142 Zorzi, ‘Le vicende dei premi alia Biennale dal 1895 al 1930’, La Rivista di Venezia, 1930.
143 ASAC, Serie Verbali delle Adunanze del Comitato di Amministrazione dell’Ente Biennale, vol. 
I, 27/02/30-07/12/31, session 7 December 1931.
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PNF), Margherita Sarfatti, Ugo Ojetti and, naturally, Antonio Maraini himself.14' 
According to the report written by the committee, the variety and generosity of the 
prizes offered by the sponsors were unprecedented in Europe. There were 250 
participants for nineteen prizes worth 331,000 lire.146 Because of this, on the 
committee meeting of 5 September 1930, Volpi suggested that the Biennale 
administration retained a share of 10 percent upon the amount of the prizes. Maraini 
was rather less keen, explaining that prizes were instituted only upon completion of 
the official purchases from which the Biennale itself profited.147
According to Stone, Fascist competitions at the Biennale proved a failure. 
The majority of the works presented were deficient in either style or technique, and 
many of the allotted prizes were in fact never awarded.148 Others were assigned 
more because of the effort rather than the talent of the artists. Instead, competitions 
for the Goldsmiths’ Hall suffered from a problem of having too many competitors 
and participants. The press generally agreed that competitions were unsuccessful,
149above all because of the lack of enthusiasm shown by the entrants themselves.
The cultural bureaucrat Arturo Lancellotti, in an article revealingly titled 
‘The failure of the prize competitions’, wrote: ‘It was painful to think that such a 
paramount national event would not find an artist able to tackle it with the 
appropriate degree of passion and intensity (...). These competitions gave birth to so 
many pictorial horrors.(...) Paintings were frightening for their sheer scale. (...) Not 
even Maraini, with his resources, could make the miracle happen (...). We must 
agree upon their failure’.150
In 1932, under the pretext of celebrating the tenth anniversary of the March 
on Rome, Maraini promoted the usual competitions which once again disappointed 
juries who noted the lack of enthusiasm shown by artists.151 It is sufficient to 
observe that in many cases, the competitions, as in 1930, had to resort to awards
144 Belvedere, 15 June 1929.
145 Stone, The Patron State, p. 276.
146 Ibid, p. 79.
147 ASAC, Serie Verbali delle Adunanze del Comitato di Amministrazione dell’Ente Biennale, vol. 
I, 27/02/30-07/12/31, session 5 September 1930.
148 Stone, The Patron State, p. 83.
149 Arturo Lancellotti, ‘La XVII Biennale Veneziana’, La Rivista di Venezia, October 1930.
150 Ibid.
151 Stone, The Patron State, p. 82.
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being made to the least bad entrant. A similar trend was maintained throughout 
the 1930s -low levels of participation and less interest. Similar experiments 
introduced at the ‘Premio Cremona’ in 1939 by more doctrinaire officials such as 
Roberto Farinacci also attracted very few suitable applicants.152 According to 
Stone, artists refused to take part in those specific events because they could rely on 
alternative rewards from the state, such as direct purchases or benefits from the 
syndical system.153
The Fascist regime started to act as patron at the Biennale at the beginning 
of the 1930s, exactly when the fostering of the burgeoning private market became a 
priority.154 We have already seen how Volpi’s strategy of targeting a wider 
audience of cultural consumers culminated with the tremendous success of the 
Venetian summer tourist seasons and increasing attendance levels at the Biennale’s 
events. This had the positive effect of expanding the private art sector, and those 
artists who could not break into the market of expensive paintings could turn 
instead to the decorative arts, more affordable to a middle-class public. The paradox 
is that Fascism, in promoting mass attendance, actually created the conditions 
which allowed artists to enter the private market, and to rely on economic sources 
other than those granted by the state. By widening consumer base, the regime 
actually produced the failure of the prize competitions (at least in terms of their role 
in constructing consent). The Biennale, by accepting cultural compromise and 
diversification in fact served to prevent the development of a defined Fascist 
aesthetic.
Artists at the Biennale were sometimes willing to accept Fascist patronage 
when this did not require an overt political commitment. It seems that they were 
willing to contribute to Fascist art (i.e. work sponsored by Fascist institutions or 
patrons), but were deeply reluctant to produce a "fascistized’ art (i.e. work openly 
depicting Fascist themes and images). The latter was generally perceived to be an 
unacceptable compromise of artistic integrity, and artists preferred to renounce the
152 Ibid, p. 186.
153 Ibid, p. 85.
154 Ibid, p. 71.
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prizes on offer in order to preserve their creative freedoms.153 It is interesting to 
note that a similar judgement was reached by Lancellotti who observed: ‘Despite 
the monetary appeal of the prizes, the majority of the artists have followed their 
own path, painting and sculpting whatever they had in mind; instead, a small part, 
pushed by economic constraints, have come to terms with their conscience and 
have attempted to try their luck with the prizes, with poor results’.156 At the same 
time, Maraini prophetically complained that artists were more and more detached 
from the national problems, ‘paying attention to technical and theoretical questions 
comprehensible only by specialists’,157 or ‘using a language for elitist circles 
characterized by an arrogant exclusivism’.158
On a broader level, it is fair to say that, as well as state patronage, artists 
could now draw upon the developing private market which constituted an 
‘impersonal’ patron which did not require any political commitment.159 According 
to the general theory of Pierre Bourdieu, confronted with a private audience, artists 
had more chance to produce an art for art’s sake, and tended to become more and 
more autonomous from the requirements of an official patron (in this case the 
Fascist state) and the academic system. The ‘constant growth of a public of 
potential consumers’ guaranteed the producers of works of art a minimum level of 
‘economic independence’. As a result, cultural producers were thus ‘increasingly in 
a position to liberate their products from external constraints, whether the moral 
censure and aesthetic programmes of a proselytizing church or the academic 
controls and directives of political power, inclined to regard art as an instrument of 
propaganda’.160 This process ran parallel ‘with the constitution of a socially 
distinguishable category of professional artists who [were] less prone to recognize
155 There was the case o f artists who ventured negotiation. For instance, on 6 June 1935, the 
Direzione Generale degli Italiani alFEstero, a section o f the Minister of Foreign Affairs complained 
with Domenico Varagnolo and the Biennale which had acted as mediator in a transaction. The 
Direzione had commissioned a bust of the Duce to be placed at the Italian embassy in Bruxelles. 
Sculptor Ruffini had claimed 2,000 lire for his work, while for an eventual second copy, the 
Direzione complained, he would ask for an extra 500 lire, and so forth for any additional sculpture 
(ASAC, Serie Segreteria/Arti Visive, ‘Risposte di artisti 1935’).
156 Lancellotti, ‘La XVII Biennale Veneziana’.
157 Maraini, ‘ Final ita Sociali’.
158 Ibidem, ‘Biennale di conciliazione’, Le Tre Venezie, April 1930.
159 Bourdieu has analysed the field of cultural production at a general level. It is my aim here to 
apply the analysis to the case of the Biennale of International Arts.
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rules other than the specifically intellectual or artistic traditions handed down by 
their predecessors’. The more autonomous cultural producers became, the more 
they tended to condemn privilege, worldly acclaim and even the institutionalised 
forms of cultural authority (the absence of any academic status or position might 
even be considered a virtue).161
By 1943, both Maraini and Volpi had accepted that the ‘Fascist Revolution’ 
had had its day. Even so, the main reasons for that year’s decision to cancel the 
‘Fascist’ competitions were of an economic nature. Besides producing 
disappointing artistic results, they had incurred significant administrative expenses 
upon the Biennale authorities and, as Volpi pointed out, young artists had the 
chance to make themselves known through the competitions at the numerous 
syndical exhibitions arranged every year.162
This section has demonstrated that the forging of a definite Fascist aesthetic 
was not possible at the Biennales of the 1930s. The progressive development of a 
private art market worked to thwart any advancement towards the fascistization of 
the cultural exhibits on display at the competitions, as emerging artists had the 
chance to sell their works to the wider public rather than to Fascist institutions. 
This, combined with the burden of growing administrative costs, persuaded the 
Biennale organisers to abandon the goal of a Fascistized art in favour of cultural 
diversification.
4.7 ‘Aesthetic pluralism’ as a marketing strategy
Purchases in the 1930s were made by a range of Fascist organisations and 
groups including the. Fascist Confederation of Agricultural Syndicates and the
1 A3National Fascist Confederation of Professionals and Artists. Stone has argued 
that in these cases ‘aesthetic pluralism’164 remained the defining feature of state
160 Pierre Bourdieu, The Field o f  Cultural Production, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1993, p. 112-13.
161 Ibid, p. 116.
162 ASAC, Serie Verbali delle Adunanze del Comitato di Amministrazione dell’Ente Biennale, vol. 
Ill, 28/01/35-30/01/43, session 30 January 1943.
163 ASAC, Serie Registri Vendite, 1930-38.
164 Aesthetic pluralism is considered by Stone as the practice endorsed by the state of supporting 
different art trends with no particular exclusion, as long as they were not overtly anti-Fascist (Stone, 
The Patron State, pp. 65-70).
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patronage, a factor which necessarily tended to promote a far greater degree of 
‘liberalism’ in the art field than was the case in Nazi Germany.165 Government and 
party, playing an active role in the art market, purchased works without conforming 
to any narrowly defined aesthetic doctrine. Admittedly, state purchases between 
1930 and 1935 did markedly favour Italian artists, particularly those associated with 
the ‘Novecento’ movement, but the work of Futurists, members of the Italian 
‘return to order’, Tuscan naturalists, Strapaese artists166 and abstract painters were 
by no means ‘off limits’ to state buyers.167
Stone, looking at the example of the 1934 Biennale, insists that ‘the works 
bought failed to show bias towards a particular aesthetic school’.168 The 
‘Novecento’ movement and the Futurists were both represented on party and 
government acquisition lists (and Stone draws attention to works by Achille Funi, 
Felice Carena, Tato, and Enrico Prampolini in particular). She does not detect any 
major distinction between party and government acquisitions policies, noting that 
‘all the prominent schools from the Futurists through the Metaphysicals found 
government and party purchasers’.169 In addition, purchases of overtly political 
works were not common in what Stone terms the ‘middle years of Fascist 
patronage’ and, as a result, she is able to conclude that, in buying significant 
quantities of exhibited art drawn from a wide range of schools and movements, the
170regime was demonstrating its commitment to an aesthetically pluralist culture.
For Stone, ‘aesthetic pluralism’ was a constant policy of the Fascist state 
when buying art at the Biennale. However, it might well be argued that the practice 
of choosing a range of styles and genres was not imposed on the institution by the 
state as Stone holds171-but was instead the product of the institution’s own ‘liberal’ 
cultural politics. This entailed a carefully considered decision on the part of the 
Biennale administrative board to invite different schools in order to cater for the 
varying tastes of a broad range of potential buyers. As was noted earlier in this
165 Stone, The Patron State, p. 77.
166 Pictorial style with references to ruralism and rustic values.
167 Stone, The Patron State, p. 73.
168 Ibid, p. 75.
169 Ibid.
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chapter, Volpi and Maraini’s chief concern was to stimulate the private market. 
Several artworks had been acquired by the different ministries, the PNF and Fascist 
bureaucrats, and the Venetian municipality mainly from 1930 onwards. Therefore, 
the biggest contribution to the Biennale before 1930 had come from the private art 
market, a niche that could be further exploited. For this reason, it was vital that the 
Biennale did not discriminate against any particular style for fear of restricting the 
market. During the committee meeting of 28 January 1935, Volpi reminded the 
audience that the ‘credo’ of the Biennale had remained unchanged since its 
foundation in 1895; it accepted ‘any inspiration or technique but refused any form 
of vulgarity’. The Biennale, argued Volpi (somewhat cynically), stayed faithful to 
its principles regardless of any change of persons or norms.172
By studying the sales registers between 1926 and 1942, it is possible to 
establish that there existed a group of private buyers who had shown constant 
interest in specific genres throughout the late 1920s and early 1930s. In this light, it 
had become relatively easy for Maraini and the Biennale executives to predict the 
audience’s tastes and prepare future exhibitions accordingly. What Marla Stone 
labels ‘aesthetic pluralism’ might therefore be said to have been part of the 
Biennale’s own ‘marketing strategy’ rather than any real desire to conform to a 
specific Fascist policy in the cultural domain.
The Biennale sales records can help to identify those patrons who had 
consistently purchased art at the exhibition in the 1920s and 1930s.173 One notable
172 ASAC, Serie Verbali delle Adunanze del Comitato di Amministrazione dell’Ente Biennale, vol. 
Ill, 28/01/35-30/01/43, session 28 January 1935.
173 The table below draws from the Biennale sales registers and summarizes some of the purchases 
at the Biennale between 1926 and 1942:
P. Stramezzi 
A. Zamorani 
E. Zorzi 
C. Giussani 
I. Montesi 
S. Stravopolous 
G. Baradel 
V. Cini 
A Gaggia 
A. Orvieto 
P. Ingegnoli 
G. Errera
1926 1928 1930 1932 1934 1936 1938 1940 1942
*  *  *  *
* * * * *
'  *  *  *  *  *
*  *  *  *
*  *  *  *
*  *  *
*  *  *  *  
* * * * * * *  
* * * * * * *
*  *  *  *
*  *  *
* * * * * *
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trend was that of how the majority of the buyers mentioned favoured decorative 
rather than figurative arts. It was probably this that prompted the opening of a 
specialized pavilion in 1934, more than any perception of a need to enlarge the 
range of traditional cultural offerings at the Biennale.
Again, aesthetic diversification served the purpose of satisfying the tastes of 
those loyal patrons who were regularly buying at every edition of the showcase. 
These initial conclusions are supported if one looks at the growing desire of the 
Biennale administration to establish control over what was exhibited at the various 
pavilions. In the 1930s, the decision to select particular works of art for the 
Biennale, rather than offering general invitations to artists, resulted from an 
awareness of the need to monitor the content of the pavilion displays, and to
P. Ghislanzoni * * *
T. De Marinis * * *
P. di Valmarana * * *
E. Amonn * * *
Z. Ronocoroni * * * *
G. B. del Vo * * *
P.G. Kennedy * * *
G. Venini * * *
*: indicates purchases o f the same kind o f art made by the patrons at the different editions of the 
Biennale
As shown above, Paolo Stramezzi was fond o f oil paintings, and regularly bought works by 
Louis Buisseret at the Biennale editions o f 1936, 1938, 1940 and 1942. Engineer Arrigo Zamorani 
shared his passion for art between oil paintings and fine glassware: he intervened as a buyer at every 
Biennale between 1934 and 1942. Venetian Count Elio Zorzi exclusively purchased glassware at 
every edition between 1928 and 1938, except for 1934. A love of fine glassware also influenced the 
purchasing o f Camillo Giussani in 1926, 1930, 1934 and 1940. Ilario Montesi, too, had a penchant 
for decorative arts, buying crystal and glassware in 1928, 1930, 1934 and 1940. The name of Greek 
patron S. Stravopolous was marked in the sales registers of 1932, 1934, 1938 and 1942, while Giulio 
Baradel revealed his fondness o f decorative arts at the editions o f 1932, 1934, 1936 and 1940. 
Venetian entrepreneurs Achille Gaggia and Vittorio Cini acted as generous patrons at every 
Biennale in the 1930s and early 1940s, possibly explained by their business partnership with 
president Volpi. Adolfo Orvieto purchased art in 1926, 1928, 1932 and 1934, while Paolo Ingegnoli 
was active in 1928, 1930 and 1932. G. Errera and his spouse regularly purchased at every Biennale 
between 1928 and 1938. Pqolo Ghislanzoni expressed his own preference for decorative arts, 
especially plates and pots, at the editions of 1930, 1936 and 1940. Tamaro De Marinis specialised in 
the buying o f watercolours at the Biennale o f 1928, 1934 and 1938. As for Countess Pia di 
Valmarana, she concentrated on purchasing textiles in 1932, 1934 and 1936. Eric Amonn bought oil 
paintings in 1932, 1936 and 1942, while Zaira Roncoroni focused on litographies in 1932, 1936, 
1938 and 1940. G.B. Del Vo acted as patron in 1926, 1928 and 1930, P.G. Kennedy in 1928, 1930 
and 1932, and glassware producer G. Venini in, 1928, 1934 and 1940 (ASAC, Serie Registri 
Vendite, 1926-42). According to Tomasella, Ghgdneer Sante Astaldi, famous art collector, had 
developed his own taste, acquiring at the Biennale ‘omogeneous nucleous of artworks’. In 1943, he 
had revealed the usual distinctive choices by purchasing ‘Nudo di giovane donna’ from Cantatore, 
‘Fiori’ from Tomea, ‘Adolescente’ from Gentilini, and ‘Sogno di Zeno’ from Birolli. (Tomasella, 
Biennali di Guerra, p. 104).
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guarantee a greater level of diversity in the presentation of the material.174
The importance of avoiding discrimination against any school or style had 
been established as a cornerstone of the Biennale’s cultural politics. On 5 May 
1930, Volpi explained how his preoccupations were concerned above all with the 
desire to ensure that the exhibition of fine arts be successful among the public. For 
this reason, he believed the executive committee could not remain detached from 
the Biennale’s sales policy. Volpi also demonstrated his intention to maintain a 
liaison with the Patriarch in order to avoid any possibility that Catholics might be 
forbidden from visiting the exhibition.175 On 3 October 1933, the Podesta 
questioned Maraini oyer the nature of the forthcoming Biennale, and he responded 
that the exhibition wished to host Those balanced and mature art manifestations 
rather than experimental works’.176 Certainly, Maraini intended to welcome more 
commercial art trends that could attract a wider range of buyers, broadening the 
exhibition’s appeal beyond artistic elites and the avant-garde. As pointed out 
before, this approach did not emerge in the 1930s, but it was reinforced during that 
decade with Volpi at the head of the Biennale, determined to meet precise
• 1 7 7economic requirements and commercial priorities.
To conclude, the fact that aesthetic diversification was allowed at the 
Biennales, not only exposes the limits of the supposedly totalitarian state when 
managing culture, it also reveals that cultural policies were not invariably imposed 
from above but could spring from below (if we consider the Biennale as a body 
steeped in regionalism and local traditions), from the internal mercantile ‘ethics’ of 
cultural enterprises. Major strategies and events within the life of the cosmopolitan
174 Maraini, ‘Nota sulla XXIII Biennale’.
175 ASAC, Serie Verbali delle Adunanze del Comitato di Amministrazione dell’Ente Biennale, vol. 
I, 27/02/30-07/12/31, session 5 May 1930.
176 Ibid, session 3 October 1933.
177 After all, as early as 1928, the Biennale executive committee had made clear that foreign artists 
invited to the exhibition were those ‘most representative of modem art in every country’. Artists 
such as Picasso, Van Dongen, Matisse, Dobson and Faijta -Maraini insisted- could surely fall in that 
category. According to the Biennale administration, the XVI edition o f the exhibition was arranged 
to praise ‘the best living artists’ (ASAC, Serie Scatole Nere, busta n. 44, ‘Pubblicita 1928’). On 13 
May 1928, the review II Giornale dell’Arte, declared about the XVI Biennale that a good exhibition 
should have been like ‘a beautiful banquet where all the tastes and flavours were represented’. The 
Biennale should have not backed just one trend, also as a way to avoid monotony and repetition 
(Raoul Viviani, ‘L ’inaugurazione della XVI Biennale di Venezia’, II Giornale dell’Arte, 13 May 
1928).
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art exhibition were determined by the simple imperative of ‘making money’, and 
aesthetic choices were influenced by commercial factors far more than the 
construction of a Fascist art.
4.8 Ideas for reforms at the Biennale
It is striking to observe that, despite the statement of Mayor Giordano back 
in 1922, who commented that the Biennale of International Arts ‘ [was] not intended 
to be a market’ and that, therefore, it had opted not to bring in ‘commercial works 
of art’,178 in reality, .boosting sales, especially those of Venetian artists, counted 
more than anything else. As early as 1920, the secretary general Pica, had been put 
under the surveillance of a Consiglio Direttivo appointed by Giordano to keep in 
check his penchant for avant-garde art. According to Elio Zorzi, Giordano, in doing 
so, had been pressurized by the traditional Venetian artistic milieus who feared they 
could not compete with modernism and might loose business.179
In order to stimulate sales, Maraini, in 1928, had even begun to send letters 
to the Podestas of Bologna, Naples, Palermo, and Rome urging them to buy
1 ROartworks on behalf of their town galleries. This drive was also responsible for 
changing the system of invitations operating up to 1930, when Maraini proposed a 
radical reform of selecting procedures. Prior to that date, artists invited to exhibit 
were free to display whatever works they wished, thereafter, Maraini and Volpi 
decided to issue single invitations to a specific work of art rather than to the artist 
himself.181 According to Maraini, there were artists to whom you could assign a 
space to exhibit ‘with blind eyes’, and others who needed to have their works of art
178 AMV, Affari Generali del Comune di Venezia, quinquiennio 1921-25, fascicolo XI/7/XX, 
‘Esposizione Biennale Intemazionale d’Arte’.
179 Scotto Lavina, ‘1927, 1936’, in La Biennale di Venezia (ed.), La Biennale di Venezia, p. 37. In 
1925, the journal L ’Eco del Piave had declared that the Biennale had become ‘a wealthy fair of 
mediocrity’ (Frank Zasso, ‘I creatori della Biennale Veneziana contro il suo snaturamento’, L ’Eco 
del Piave, 3 May 1925), and the Gazzetta di Venezia reported that the journal Le Arti Plastiche, ‘a 
well informed review’, had written about the ‘increasing commercial spirit of the Venice Biennale’ 
{La Gazzetta di Venezia, 5 December 1925).
180 ASAC, Serie Scatole Nere, busta n. 44, ‘Pubblicita 1928’.
181 ASAC, Serie Verbali delle Adunanze del Comitato di Amministrazione dell’Ente Biennale, vol. 
Ill, 28/01/35-30/01/43, session 18 April 1935.
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revised before being presented.182 One year later, Maraini had proposed to divide 
invitations into two different categories: one to be issued to the artist, and one to be 
directed to the work of art. The first group included those individuals who, 
undoubtedly deserved a place at the Biennale; the second included ‘those who still 
struggle[d] for recognition’.183 In 1928, Maraini and other committee members 
wrote to Volpi that ‘only a proper system of invitations [could] allow the Biennale 
to represent all the trends of modem art, especially the most notorious’.184 Soon 
afterwards, Maraini and Volpi announced that future Biennales would be based 
upon invitations to a select group of major artists organised in key individual 
exhibitions. In other wotds, they intended to limit the number of invitations to 
artists of established fame while specific artworks could be selected to represent the 
work of less well-known participants.18^
Admission by invitation represented, according to Maraini, a way to create 
exhibitions which could ‘communicate with the public and that the public 
understood’, and this was one of many innovations which had to be introduced ‘to 
make a useful contribution to the Biennale, the city of Venice and to the arts in
1 o /
general’. Eventually, in 1932, Maraini, during a committee meeting, reminded 
his audience that occasionally the Biennale administration reserved the right to 
modify its charter, in which case artists might only be entitled to exhibit if they had 
been formally invited, a policy that served to distinguish the Venice Biennale from 
the Roman Quadriennale. Such a system, Maraini argued, would also mean 
significant savings of money and work, as much of the job of examining the works 
of art would be avoided.187 Additionally, under article 10 of the charter, it was 
decided that no invitation could be issued to those applicants that had not 
participated in the Biennale at least once before.188 This was done to avoid 
unwanted approaches from lesser known artists, and could also be used to ensure
182 Ibid, session 25 May 1935.
183 ASAC, Verbale delle Adunanze del Comitato di Amministrazione dell’Esposizione Biennale 
Intemazionale d’Arte, sedute 10-11-12 May 1927
184 ASAC, Serie Scatole Nere, busta n. 44, ‘Pubblicita 1928’.
185 ASAC, Serie Verbali delle Adunanze del Comitato di Amministrazione dell’Ente Biennale, vol. 
I, 27/02/30-07/12/31, session 25 October 1930.
186 Ibid, vol. II, 01/01/32-06/07/34, session 15 November 1932.
187 Ibid, vol. I, 27/02/30-07/12/31, session 27 February 1930.
188 Ibid.
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that artists who had been unsuccessful in the past could be excluded .189
Biennale administrators justified their decisions with reference to the need 
to constantly rethink and reform internal rules about invitations, juries, 
competitions and prizes, so as to stay in touch with the most recent trends and 
tastes.190 In reality, the most important priority was to limit the exhibition to 
‘acknowledged’ works, most likely to generate sales.191 Maraini declared in 1932 
that the change was in response to the desire to associate Venice with ‘an artistic 
elite drawn from the highest levels of the most beautiful aesthetic periods’.192 As 
early as 1927, Nino Barbantini had suggested limiting the number of invitations to 
foreign participants who lived in Italy, and especially Venice. The previous year, 
Barbantini had observed that the only foreign artist invited to the exhibition outside 
his pavilion was Mariano Fortuny, and he was ‘practically considered as a 
Venetian’.193 Not surprisingly, art critic Lionello Venturi had declared in the 
Milanese review Belvedere that the Venice Biennale had always been ‘a 
comfortable cushion for the great masters of the Lagoon’, meaning that the 
institution preferred to host safe, unchallenging commercial art rather than avant- 
garde trends.194 As a result of such conservatism, more radical artists had never 
been called to the Biennale195 (in spite of Margherita Sarfatti’s demand that ‘the 
invitation granted to the artist should only be related to the talent of the latter’).196
The idea of organising major retrospectives exhibiting the works of
189 As mentioned before, the Biennale in the 1930s was feeding a growing conservatism in the art 
field. In 1932, II Giornale d ’ltalia declared: T here are no revelations at the XVIII Biennale! Every 
personal exhibition bears the ‘declaration of paternity’: names like Carra, Carena, Martini, Dazzi, 
Kisling. As at important meals, one suddenly knows the brand of the wine and food. Portraits, 
landscapes and still lives without effort of research (...). It is not with the approval o f few groups 
that one pushes forward an institution which proves very expensive, and needs to enlarge its 
entourage beyond the restricted areas of the initiated and the snobs. Those who were excluded by 
this system are convinced that the system should serve art and not the opposite’. (Carlo Tridenti, 
‘Gli artisti Italiani e stranieri alia Biennale di Venezia che sara solennemente inaugurata domani dal 
Re e dalla Regina’, II Giornale d ’ltalia, 28 April 1932).
190 Maraini, ‘Nota sulla XXIII Biennale’.
191 Tomasella has noticed that the majority of artists represented at the Biennale had always been the 
Venetian ones, as to favour the local art market (Tomasella, Biennali di Guerra, p. 31).
192 ‘Alla Biennale di Venezia. Mostre individuali e collettive’, II Regime Fascista, 3 May 1932.
193 Lionello Venturi, ‘Venezia XVII’, Belvedere, anno II, n. 5-6, May-June 1930.
194 Ibid.
195 Gino Pancheri, ‘La XXII Biennale Intemazionale di Venezia. Gli artisti stranieri in Brennero’, II 
Piccolo, 2 June 1940.
196 ASAC, Serie Scatole Nere, busta n. 44, ‘Pubblicita 1928’.
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internationally renowned artists was bom of the same spirit of commercial 
enterprise. During one Biennale committee meeting, Maraini had expressed a 
preference for setting up a retrospective including the ‘most significant works of art 
of the Ottocento’ at the XVI edition.197 Volpi, convinced that such events should be 
at the heart of the Biennale, supported Maraini, and suggested a retrospective of the 
work of Pablo Picasso which, alongside exhibitions of Italian artists, would form 
the ‘pillars of the Biennale’.198
On the various Biennale committee meetings, Maraini usually stressed the 
need for a stricter selection process executed at the level of the numerous syndical 
exhibitions,199 allowing the Biennale to host only ‘the most significant 
participants’.200 According to the secretary general, the Biennale should be a fomm 
reserved ‘only for outstanding names’.201 Its chief purpose was not to ‘discover 
those talents who could be identified at the regional exhibitions, but to recognize 
them as important artists, thereby serving to enhance their reputations’.202 A similar 
policy was applied to the Biennale’s foreign exhibitors.
In 1935, the secretary general went further, proposing that only selected 
capiscuola (masters) be invited to the Biennale, which provided an opportunity to 
devote entire halls to commercially attractive exhibitions. In his most ambitious 
project, he planned to have just 50 artists invited at the Biennale, with selected 
painters, sculptors, drawers and engravers holding personal exhibitions. Works by 
non-invited artists would be strictly limited to pieces identified at the syndical 
exhibitions.204 Alvera complained that the Biennale risked turning itself into a 
‘closed circuit’.205 Volpi, however, was of the opinion that this policy would allow
197 Ibid.
198 ASAC, Serie Verbali delle Adunanze del Comitato di Amministrazione dell’Ente Biennale, vol. 
I, 27/02/30-07/12/31, session 21 January 1931.
199 These exhibitions were co-ordinated by the Fascist Syndicate o f Fine Arts, set up in 1926, and 
represented the first step o f the selection process towards access at the Biennale o f International 
Arts.
200 ASAC, Serie Verbali delle Adunanze del Comitato di Amministrazione dell’Ente Biennale, vol. 
Ill, 28/01/35-30/01/43, session 30 January 1943.
201 Scotto Lavina, ‘1927, 1936’, in La Biennale di Venezia (ed.), Venezia 32, 82, p. 42.
202 ASAC, Serie Verbali delle Adunanze del Comitato di Amministrazione dell’Ente Biennale, vol. 
Ill, 28/01/35-30/01/43, session 17 December 1940.
203 Ibid, session 18 April 1935.
204 Ibid, session 14 April 1937.
205 Ibid.
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audiences to come into close contact with ‘mature artists’ with ‘wisdom’, judged 
not by age but by quality.206 According to Volpi, the Biennale would be well 
advised to apply the same system to decorative arts and foreign pavilions. It was 
essential to assign single halls to a few chosen participants representative of their 
nations ‘in such a fashion that only the creme de la creme of art or the outstanding 
living maestri be displayed at the Biennale’.207 For Tomasella, this was a way to 
avoid crowding the exhibition with art work of inferior quality.208 It might also be 
concluded, however, that it was a strategic move determined predominantly by 
commercial forces.
In 1936, the central hall ‘Italia’ held personal exhibits of Carena, Ferrazzi, 
Severini, Carra and a retrospective of Chessa. In a time of economic depression and 
political sanctions, it had become vital to charm as broad an audience as possible 
with ‘sure-fire’ attractions.209
In the 1930s, Maraini also became increasingly concerned with finding a
910way to stimulate purchases in the foreign sections. He believed that sales were 
stagnating because of the temporary crisis of the private art market and the 
appearance of new events similar to the Biennale elsewhere in Italy, a phenomenon 
that might eventually damage the Venetian institution by dissipating public 
attention.211 Volpi made clear his desire to reaffirm the international standing of the
exhibition by suggesting that foreign pavilions devote space to a retrospective ‘of
212very important artists and another two halls to well known living maestrf. 
Maraini agreed, arguing that this would enhance the levels of foreign participation, 
and preclude the display of works of minor importance. It was vital to concentrate, 
in every salon, on works of art considered ‘highly significant’, so as to ensure that
213the most prestigious and interesting aspects of foreign culture were on display. 
The choice of international artists, argued Maraini, should be negotiated by Volpi
208 Tomasella, Biennali di Guerra, p. 54.
209 ASAC, Serie Verbali delle Adunanze del Comitato di Amministrazione dell’Ente Biennale, vol. 
Ill, 28/01/35-30/01/43, session 21 March 1939.
210 Ibid, vol. II, 01/01/32-06/07/34, session 15 November 1932.
211 Ibid, vol. Ill, 28/01/35-30/01/43, session 16 March 1936.
212 Ibid, vol. I, 27/02/30-07/12/31, session 8 June 1931.
213 Ibid, session 27 February 1930.
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and officials representing foreign nations. Margherita Sarfatti complained that when 
foreign officials were involved, they tended to choose the least impressive 
international works.214
In 1940, the newspaper II Piccolo di Trieste observed of the Biennale:
‘If anyone expects a revelation o f new trends or artists at this exhibition they will be 
disappointed. Considering the given hierarchy of expositions, it is unlikely that such 
revelations emerge within superior events such as the Biennale. It is easier to find them at 
the Littohali or similar cultural institutions’.215
Indeed, at the heart of the exhibition were collections by acclaimed Italian 
artists such as Carra, Funi, Carena, Oppo, Severini and Tosi. There were also 
successful Venetian painters such as Varagnolo, Da Venezia, and Dalla Zorza.216 
The same system was still in use in 1943, which Volpi considered proof of its
217success. It was no surprise, therefore, that Maraini noted a trend of young artists 
tending to exhibit at the Biennale via the decorative arts, as this was now the easiest 
way of breaking through.218 The figurative arts had become something of a ‘closed 
shop’, reserved for the established elite.
Ml iif in liii 1i illustrates the extent to which the Biennale in the 1930s 
learned to reinvent and rearrange its regulations and policies in order to move with 
the times. Feasible reform projects had to take into account a growing private art 
market, and the Biennale needed to appeal to the potential buyer by offering the 
appropriate product. Organisers thus fostered a strongly commercial outlook which, 
in practice, meant that the more conventional, ‘populist’ art forms were afforded a 
prominent position. If less well known artists had the opportunity to access the 
Esposizione Biennale through minor syndical exhibitions, the core of the Biennales
214 Ibid. In the case of the United States, it is significant that the pavilion belonged to a private art 
gallery, the New York Grand Central Art Gallery. Unsurprisingly, this institution would naturally 
exhibit the works that it owned itself, not necessarily the works most representative of United States 
art, fitting in the overall commercial outlook promoted by the Biennale (Ibid, vol. Ill, 28/01/35- 
30/01/43, session 28 January 1935).
215 Silvio Benco, ‘Primo sguardo alia Biennale’, II Piccolo di Trieste, 25 May 1940.
216 Tomasella, Biennali di Guerra, p. 40.
217 ASAC, Verbali delle Adunanze del Comitato di Amministrazione dell’Ente Biennale, vol. Ill, 
28/01/35-30/01/43, session 18 April 1935.
218 Ibid, session 25 May 1935.
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in the 1930s was unsurprisingly reserved for the established arts, favoured by the 
wealthier patrons.219 Buyers with more modest means could instead focus on 
decorative arts, deliberately made available to broaden the range of cultural 
products on offer. Ultimately, what it was important was that the Biennale 
entourage was always prepared to modify its rules to be able to meet the changing 
tastes of the art market. As mass tourism was fast developing in the lagoon, aided 
by the application of more sophisticated tourist techniques, so the Biennale was 
able to broaden its commercial appeal, at the same time increasing the numbers of 
visitors within its gates, and fulfilling its economic function and civic 
responsibilities.
4.9 The Biennale as mediator between art production and art consumption
Another way to stimulate sales at the Biennale was to encourage buyers and 
sellers towards certain genres and styles in order to make them more compatible. In 
so doing, the Biennale came, for all practical purposes, to acquire the function of a 
mediator in the 1930s art market. Intervening at the level of art production could 
provide the Biennale administrative board with a guarantee that the kind of art 
exhibited would be the most attractive to prospective buyers. After 1930, the 
secretary general had the responsibility for the following aspects of the Biennale 
exhibition:
1) the arrangement of one hall representing one of the great living maestri of 
the Ottocento or Novecento;
2) the arrangement of another hall with one mainstream painter, considered the 
most representative of his age;
3) the arrangement of a miscellaneous hall with works of art of different 
artists.220
Clearly, holding exhibitions of the work of acknowledged talents was
219 See also Rizzi, di Marino, Storia della Biennale, p. 37.
220 ASAC, Verbali delle Adunanze del Comitato di Amministrazione dell’Ente Biennale, vol. I, 
27/02/30-07/12/31, session 4 June 1930.
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central in the task of enhancing the Biennale’s appeal to the broadest possible 
audience (at least among the wealthier classes). The task of choosing which works 
to invite to the Biennale largely fell upon Maraini who was responsible for 
travelling from one artist’s studio to another with the role of selecting works of art 
to meet the commercial criteria of the organisers.221 After his visits to the studios, 
Maraini, with the aid of two committee members, Marcello Piacentini and Beppe 
Ciardi, compiled a list of works which was subject to approval by Cipriano Efisio 
Oppo, Secretary General of the Fascist Syndicate of Fine Arts.222 Records reveal 
that in several cases it was artists themselves who urged Maraini to pay a visit to 
their studios.223
A study of the correspondence between the Biennale, patrons and artists 
clearly illustrate how the mediatory role of the Biennale played a vital part within 
the transaction process. It should be remembered, of course, that the institution had 
an interest in these processes, retaining as it did some 10-15% of the final selling 
price. Bazzoni was in charge of writing to the artists suggesting which works of art 
could be sold to particular customers. He also recommended the final price (always 
lower than the original selling price), providing the artists with contact numbers, 
addresses and useful advice. On the other side, he made efforts to win over the 
potential patron towards a specific genre, style or school. His task was clearly one 
of seeking to influence the market and encourage purchases by matching potential 
buyers with particular products.224 It was no doubt with this kind of activity in mind 
that Maraini declared that ‘Venice should become, from the artistic point of view, a 
directive centre, a facilitator of communications between artists and connoisseurs, 
collectors and merchants ... not only an art market but also a great centre of
225education and moral improvement’.
The Biennale’s mediating role was reinforced by the fact that Domenico 
Varagnolo, Sales Director, contacted various artists in 1935 in order to leam the
221 Ibid, session 5 May 1930.
222 Ibid, session 21 January 1931.
223 ASAC, Serie Scatole Nere, busta n. 44, ‘Pubblicita 1928’.
224 ASAC, Serie Segreteria/Arti Visive-Amministrazione, ‘Risposte di Artisti 1936-37’.
225 Maraini, ‘La fimzione intemazionale delle Biennali veneziane’, La Rivista di Venezia, April 
1932.
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present locations of their works within foreign art galleries.226 This reflected a 
determination to monitor the process of selection of works of art at the Biennale, 
after the system of invitations had been radically changed at the beginning of the 
1930s (see previous section). Detailed sales registers helped to keep track of who 
was buying what. Varagnolo also conducted a survey of Italian art collections 
possessed by private galleries and patrons in order to provide an overview of the 
private art market and the tastes of private collectors.227 It is possible to see this as 
another attempt to improve the Biennale’s ability to predict future trends and 
fashions.
The Archivio Storico delle Arti Contemporanee holds a number of 
significant records relating to correspondence between various artists and the 
administrative board which provide a clear picture of the willingness of the 
Biennale to connect buyers to sellers. For example, on 30 October 1930, Varagnolo 
wrote to Michele Cascella expressing his disappointment that the Biennale sales 
office had not been able to sell any of the artist’s works at their original asking 
prices. Nonetheless, he had identified a company which had offered 400 lire for one 
of Cascella’s paintings. Significantly, he concluded the letter with this 
recommendation: ‘If you are content with this small amount the deal is struck and 
we suggest you accept it’.228 Some months later, Varagnolo contacted art collector 
Marco Bamabo informing him that the painter Seibezzi was ‘happy’ to accept his 
offer of 1,500 lire for the painting ‘Riva delle Zattere’ which had been tagged at an 
original price of 5,000 lire. On the other hand, sculptor Eugenio Bellotto was not 
satisfied with the offer of 2,000 lire for the bronze ‘Testa di boscaiuolo’ (originally 
priced at 4,000 lire). Varagnolo, in his role of commercial mediator, advised 
Bamabo to offer to Bellotto 3,000 lire or at least 2,500 lire, perhaps adding 500 or
2291,000 lire for the purchase of another of his works.
On the same day, Varagnolo addressed Dr. Amistani informing him that the 
French painter Prinet and Italian painter De Bemardi had followed the earlier
226 ASAC, Serie Segreteria Arti Visive/Amministrazione, ‘Risposte di Artisti 1936-37’.
227 Ibid.
228 ASAC, Serie Copialettere, Domenico Varagnolo, letter to Michele Cascella, vol. 210, 1930, n. 
16.
229 Ibid, Varagnolo, letter to Marco Bamabo, vol. 210, 1930, n. 20.
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advice of the Biennale administration, and had accepted the offers of 4,000 lire and
1.000 lire respectively for their paintings ‘La Reprimenda’ and ‘Tintoria’. Not all 
the people concerned were so accommodating, and the painter Italico Brass 
provided an example of an artist insisting stubbornly upon a minimum price. In the 
case of Brass and the drawing in question (which had been produced using a special 
technique and for which he demanded a minimum payment of 450 lire), Varagnolo
urged Amistani to meet the artist’s price for what he described as a ‘very special,
• • 210  very interesting piece’.
On another occasion, an identical letter was sent to two different companies
at the same time, the Unione Esercizi Elettrici in Milan and the Alti Forni e
Acciaierie in Temi. Briefly, Varagnolo informed their managers that at the XVII
Biennale there were to be exhibited some acqueforti by Emilio Mazzoni Zarini
representing ‘important and interesting’ power stations at Furlo and Castellano.
According to Varagnolo, those acqueforti had been amongst the prize winners at a
competition organised by Volpi’s SADE at which they had been greatly acclaimed
by the audience. The official urged the two companies to purchase some or the
entire range ‘not only for propaganda reasons, but also in order to encourage the art
of the acquaforte which [was] the noblest means of illustrating the different
industrial activities’.231 It is particularly interesting in this case to note Varagnolo’s
efforts to combine economic factors, artistic merit and ideological and educational
purposes in his ‘sales pitch’.
On 10 November 1930, the Biennale executives contacted Gino Tenti,
Director General of Fine Arts at the Ministry of National Education, urging him to
spend an additional 17,000 lire at the Biennale on behalf of the Galleria Nazionale.
The officer recommended the painting ‘Giona’, by Heifer, which was priced at
6.000 lire and ‘Giuliotti’, by Romanelli, at the price of 10,000 lire. He also made 
clear that he had insisted that both painters reduce their original asking price.232 The 
next day, a letter was addressed to Professor Giulio Pari in which Varagnolo 
suggested that he take advantage of ‘good opportunities to buy valuable works of
230 Ibid, Varagnolo, letter to Dr. Amistani, vol. 210, 1930, n. 23.
231 Ibid, Varagnolo, letter to the Unione Esercizi Elettrici, Milan and Alti Forni e Acciaierie, Temi, 
vol. 210, 1930, n. 40.
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art at special conditions’. Knowing that Pari had already expressed an interest in 
paintings by Milesi, Beraldini and Brugnoli, and was ready to purchase them had 
they been less expensive, Varagnolo, revelling in the role of mediator, revealed that 
the sales office ‘would be able to lower prices to figures that would be very 
convenient for the buyer’. He also urged Pari to formulate a minimum offer, being 
confident that this would then be accepted by the vendor.233 In a similar fashion, in 
1940, the officer, concerned at a drop in sales at the Biennale, asked Bazzoni to 
write letters to private collectors in order to exhort them to make purchases at the 
XXII edition. With true commercial spirit, Bazzoni outlined various lists of 
possible acquirers which Varagnolo then checked and corrected in order to avoid 
making ‘buchi nell’acqua’ (mistakes). Varagnolo, was understandably keen to 
concentrate attention on proprietors and entrepreneurs ‘with large means’ rather 
than ‘big names with no money’.234
A number of factors allowed Bazzoni and Varagnolo to perform their 
mediating roles between buyers and sellers. They were able to draw upon a good 
knowledge of the general art field and also the particular market conditions relevant 
to the Biennale. They had acquired all the necessary means through records stored 
at the Archivio Storico, and it was simply a matter of keeping artists and art lovers 
linked together. In this sense, much of their correspondence focused upon the 
organisational aspects of transactions such as price details and bargaining 
opportunities, leaving out lengthy consideration of the content of particular 
artworks and their aesthetic merit or ideological value. Again, this says much about 
the nature of the Biennale as a genuine business enterprise as well as a cultural 
institution.
At the end of the 1920s and through the 1930s, the Ministry for the Press 
and Propaganda .had charged the Biennale board with the responsibility for 
arranging overseas art events.235 The Biennale was officially considered as an
• 236‘auxiliary organisation’ in the management of foreign exhibitions, and had
232 Ibid, Varagnolo, letter to Gino Tenti, vol. 210, 1930, n. 59.
233 Ibid, Varagnolo, letter to Giulio Pari, vol. 210, 1930, n. 67.
234 Tomasella, Biennali di Guerra, p. 73.
235 ACS, Atti della Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, 1932, busta n. 3462, prot. 14/1/283.
236 ASAC, Serie Segreteria/Arti Visive, ‘Unita 02: Mostra Settecento’.
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therefore formed a special permanent committee of fifteen persons to oversee
237them. Those showcases mainly involved those artists regularly exhibiting at the 
Venice Biennale who could subsequently present their works outside the Italian 
circuit. Artworks were transported around the different European capitals,238 
providing an effective means of entry into overseas markets.239 Usually, Maraini 
tried to avoid taking artworks overseas if they had not already been displayed at the 
Biennale.240
If for Fascism, setting up cultural showcases outside the Italian borders had 
nationalist and ideological value in its own right, for the Biennale entourage, it 
embodied an additional means of developing the overseas market. Arguably, 
therefore, the most important concern was the opportunity to extend the scope and 
period of the Venetian cultural events programme. The Biennale exhibitions abroad 
had been described as ‘the most suitable organisation for the integration of the 
ministerial services of propaganda’.241 In reality, however, they constituted more 
evidence of the mediatory role acquired by Venice within the international art 
markets and the commercial outlook retained by the Ente Autonomo Biennale.
237 ASAC, Serie Scatole Nere, busta n. 44, ‘Mostre Biennali all’estero 1927’.
238 ASAC, Serie Segreteria/Arti Visive, ‘Corrispondenza 1935’.
239 In 1930, the Milanese journal Giovedi revealed how the greatest and most powerful art markets 
were the foreign ones. Even the French market had been lately overtaken by Amsterdam, London, 
Koln, Berlin, Lipzeig and Wien. According to the newspaper, a lot of Italian artworks were 
commercialised within those markets. Amsterdam, London and Koln were particularly closely 
associated with the most authoritative American art dealers, providing a commercial channel for 
European art to the United States. Around 50 per cent o f the Italian art of any era was found in the 
luxurious and large catalogues edited by those foreign companies on the occasion o f their three or 
four annual sales (Armando Giacconi, ‘Cronache di belle arti. Gli acquisti e le vendite’, Giovedi, 10 
July 1930).
240 Tomasella, Biennali di Guerra, p. 85.
241 ASAC, Serie Scatole Nere, busta n. 44, ‘Mostre Biennale all’estero 1933’.
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Part Three: The decorative arts
In the mid-1930s, the pavilion of decorative arts was opened within the 
Venice Biennale, a further development in a series of initiatives that included the 
Settecento Exhibition and the Goldsmith’s Salon of 1930. Its history parallels that 
of the fine arts exhibition inasmuch as it retained the ‘civic function’ of supporting 
the local economy. In the first place, it aimed at relieving the shortcomings of 
Venetian commerce by promoting traditional Venetian handicrafts through specific 
salons. Exhibition culture was once again being employed not only to boost tourism 
in the lagoon by offering another spectacle, but also to contribute directly to the 
rehabilitation of the local economy by publicising and celebrating local 
craftsmanship and manufacturing skills. The project was essentially characterised 
by a Venetian flavour which was far more striking than any nationalist or Fascist 
functions that the exhibition may have served, in that it honoured local traditions 
and products more than it expressed the ideological agenda of either Italian 
nationalism or the Fascist regime.
The decorative arts pavilion can also be seen as a reaction to the Biennale 
authorities recognition of the need to include, alongside the fine art exhibits, 
cultural products within the more modest price range of the average visitor. The 
new exhibition thus responded to the expansion and fragmentation of the private art 
market with the inclusion of numerous, less wealthy buyers, a process already 
analysed in section 4.5. As was the case with all of the new cultural showcases 
staged in Venice, the initiative enjoyed widespread publicity and benefited from the 
provision of discounted train fares to encourage the highest possible number of 
tourists to visit the new exhibition. In this sense, the decorative arts pavilion was 
simply a further and perhaps more obvious stage in the processes of the 
commodification of culture occurring at the Biennale.
4.10 The state of Venetian handicrafts in the 1920s
After World War I, tourism and traditional Venetian crafts242 were
242 They included glassware, mosaics, pearls, furniture, artistic masks, textiles and leather, 
embroidery, shawls, wrought iron, paintings on velvet, ceramics, lacquers, works on copper and 
other metals, gold smelting and pottery (ASAC, Serie Scatole Nere, busta n. 63, ‘Consiglio
170
undergoing a major crisis. Small-scale handicrafts suffered under the pressures of 
recession and mounting competition from large-scale, low-cost mass producers.243 
According to the contemporary press, the crisis was rooted in the erosion of 
conventional distinctions between ‘art’ and ‘industry’ that resulted in the bottega 
(artisan workshop) being overtaken by the factory, where there was little place for 
the artist’s individual creativity.244 The industrial system naturally overpowered the 
small workshop, which had long been Venice’s primary economic unit.
According to the Consiglio Provinciale dell’Economia Corporativa -a body 
overseeing economic expansion and representing Fascist corporatist politics in the 
province- Venetian artistic lacework suited for a more refined market had lost many 
wealthy buyers among the connoisseurs who had traditionally favoured the 
products of Venice and Burano245 above those of competitors.246 The production of 
enamel for mosaics had been diminishing due to the lack of orders, while the 
wrought iron industry’s recession had commenced in 1927 when both the domestic 
and export markets contracted dramatically.247 Levels of Venetian glassware 
production had also declined due to the reduction in tourist numbers, while foreign 
competition simply exacerbated existing difficulties, especially for small 
businesses. Foreign exports to North-America, which had hitherto represented one 
of the best markets, were also in decline, although this was compensated for to 
some extent by the acquisition of an increasing market share in Germany and
248British imperial territories in Africa and the Indian sub-continent. By late 1924, 
however, Italy, like other European countries, was facing a combination of inflation 
and foreign competition.249
With a newly established regime devoted to making Italy one of Europe’s 
leading markets, the Venetian ruling elite committed itself to the rebirth of local 
activities and the revival of the city’s heavily run-down economy. To achieve this,
Provinciale dell’Economia di Venezia. Adunanza Plenaria, 12 December 1930’).
243 Ibid.
244 Gino Calibano, ‘Creazione artistica e ‘meccanismo” , II Giornale di Sicilia, 17 July 1929.
245 Burano is part o f the Comune di Venezia and specialises in artistic lacework.
246 AMV, Consiglio ed Ufficio Provinciale dell’Economia Corporativa di Venezia, L ’attivita 
economica della Provincia di Venezia nell’anno 1931, Venezia, 1933.
247 Ibid.
248 Ibid.
249 De Grazia, The Culture o f  Consent, p. 11.
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regional crafts needed to develop greater resonance, both in Italy and abroad. One 
of the strategies adopted by the Venetian administration to extend the recognition of 
traditional local products throughout Europe was to arrange (or revive) specialised 
pavilions and exhibitions culminating in the spectacular Mostra del Settecento 
Veneto of 1929 (celebrating Venice’s economic apex of the 18th century), and the 
opening of the Biennale decorative arts pavilion in 1934.
The Venetian municipality had first established its own exhibitions of local 
labour in the opening years of the century, called Esposizioni Permanenti d ’Arti ed 
Industrie Veneziane dell ’Opera Bevilacqua La Masa,250 held in Palazzo Pesaro. In 
the mid-1920s, these events were appropriated by Fascism to serve an ideological 
agenda. Organised with the consent of the Syndicate of Fine Arts by an executive 
committee drawn from the Istituto Veneto per le Piccole Industrie e il Lavoro 
(Venetian Institute for the Small Industries and Employment -a regional body to 
boost economic relations) and the Fascist Federation of Craftsmen, the showcase 
was financed by local institutions, ‘without exceeding the annual sum of 10,000
• ilire’. For the Consiglio Provinciale, it was vital to stimulate local handicraft 
production as well as artistic and technical enhancement, and targets were set to 
encourage efficiency and promote an annual display of selected handicraft products 
chosen by the Duchess Bevilacqua La Masa. Interestingly, the municipality 
staged the 1929 event at the Lido, within a pavilion lent, not surprisingly, by the
7STCiga, an arrangement anticipating the tourist plan adopted in the 1930s. The 1931 
edition, once again held at the Lido, was purposely organised ‘during the bathing 
season’254 and in 1937, the Podesta ordered the exhibition be put under the heading 
‘tourism’.255
250 La Masa was the Duchess who had donated the premises.
251 ASAC, Serie Scatole Nere, busta n. 63, ‘Consiglio Provinciale dell’Economia di Venezia. 
Adunanza Plenaria, 12 December 1930’.
252 Ibid.
253 AMV, Determinazioni Podestarili, ‘XX Mostra dell’Opera Bevilacqua La Masa’, trim. II, 1929, 
n. 1889.
254 Ibid, ‘XXII Mostra dell’Opera Bevilacqua La Masa. Acquisto opere d’arte’, trim. II, 1931, n. 
1857. In 1935 the Ciga could not loan its premises at the Lido. Thus, the exhibition of the Opera 
Bevilacqua La Masa was held at the Biennale Gardens, within the Belgium pavilion (Ibid, ‘XXVI 
Mostra dell’Opera Bevilacqua La Masa. VI del Sindacato Belle Arti’, trim. Ill, 1935, n. 1555).
255 Ibid, ‘Turismo. XXVII Mostra dell’Opera Bevilacqua La Masa. VII del Sindacato Belle Arti’, 
trim. Ill, 1936, n. 1017.
172
During wartime too, the typical Venetian products of lace, embroidery and 
glassware did not lose their primary function of attracting tourists. For example, in 
1941, the Podesta explained that in order to boost tourism in Venice, particularly 
important given the loss of trade suffered as a result of the war, the Comune had 
arranged an exhibition of woman’s fashion called ‘II Tessile e l’Abbigliamento 
Autarchico’, in addition to the usual summer season celebrations.256 To 
complement the event, the organisers arranged tiny exhibitions of goods and 
accessories linked to Venetian fashion surrounding the main exhibition. According 
to the Podesta, the initiative’s principal aim was to highlight the national textile 
industry’s great effort, within the autarchic framework dictated by the regime. 
However, he also claimed that the exhibition would add fresh vibrancy to the 
Venetian summer season with consequent advantages for those involved in the 
local tourist sector and dependent industries.257
Moreover, it was followed by a convention of the main delegates of 
syndical and corporative bodies of Italy and Germany to discuss problems of 
production, taste and distribution in the textile and clothing domain.258 Even the 
syndical exhibitions of handicraft represented a source of tourism for the Venetians. 
While Fascism had taken advantage of these old fairs to serve its own propaganda 
needs, Venice had used the Fascist ideological drive to advance its own plans for 
the revival of local markets, the growth of tourism, and the expansion of the Lido.
4.11 The Settecento Exhibition
The celebration of Venetian traditional crafts reached its apex in 1929, when 
the Settecento Exhibition of 18th-century art products was set up within Venice’s 
Biennale gardens. The idea for the exhibition apparently originated with the Prince 
of Piedmont. Initially awarded to Rome, pressure from Volpi, Giovanni Giuriati
256 Ibid, ‘Turismo. II tessile e l’abbigliamento autarchico a Venezia’, trim. II, 1941, n. 1190.
257 According to the Corriere della Sera, the character acquired by the event was essentially of 
commercial nature (Zorzi, ‘Alta moda e tessuti autarchici tra le manifestazioni delfarte Veneziana’, 
II Corriere della Sera, 14 January 1941). As usual, the event was financed by the Venetian Tourist 
Agency, with the executive committee consisting of the Director of the Ente Nazionale della Moda, 
plus representatives from the Unione Industriali, the Istituto Veneto per il Lavoro, the Tourist 
Office, craftsmen’s and goldsmiths’ organisations (AMV, Determinazioni Podestarili, ‘Turismo. II 
tessile e l’abbigliamento autarchico a Venezia’, trim. II, 1941, n. 1190).
258 Zorzi, ‘Alta moda’.
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and Podesta Orsi led to the event being brought to Venice.259
According to the town council, the exhibition was intended to ‘adequately 
reaffirm the grandeur and originality of Italian art in the XVIII century’, and 
contained drawings, paintings, sculptures, antiques, furniture, books, engravings, 
plus typical Venetian products such as glassware, lacework and embroidery.260 By 
its sheer scale, the Venetian authorities made it clear that the Settecento Exhibition 
was to be the cornerstone of the project to rejuvenate traditional handicrafts.261 This 
time, it was not only about generally increasing tourist numbers as in the case of 
other well-known cultural events staged in Venice, it was about raising the profile 
of those products at the heart of the Venetian economy.
It is relatively easy to demonstrate that the initiative was conceived to 
benefit local producers.262 On 25 July 1929, Renzo Bertozzi, the provincial 
secretary of the Autonomous Fascist Federation of Italian Craftsmen, contacted the 
general secretariat of the event to complain that one Venetian company specialising 
in the reproduction of Settecento antique furniture was enjoying publicity within the 
exhibition catalogues. According to the Federation, this amounted to unfairly 
favouring just one business to the disadvantage of other, equally worthy local 
manufacturers. Instead, Bertozzi suggested that the secretariat add a list of all the 
craft workshops of Settecento items located in Venice to the catalogue, in order to
7 ATbenefit a much wider range of local businesses. Moreover, the name of the 
Istituto Veneto per il Lavoro had to appear in the official catalogue.264 This joint
259 ‘Un’esposizione del Settecento Italiano indetta a Venezia per Testate’, La Gazzetta di Venezia, 1 
May 1929.
260 The 18th century represented the golden age for the production of Venetian traditional crafts.
261 ASAC, Serie Segreteria/Arti Visive, unita 01, ‘Mostra ‘700 e XVII Biennale 1929-30’. This is 
also demonstrated by the type o f institutions involved in promoting the exhibition, which were 
devoted to the economy rather than to the arts. These included the Fascist General Confederation of 
Italian Industry, the National Confederation o f the Fascist Syndicates o f Commerce, the Fascist 
General Confederation o f Agriculture, the National Institute for Small Industries, the Autonomous 
Fascist F ederation o f the Italian Craftsmen and the National Confederation o f the Fascist Syndicates 
of Terrestrial Transports and Internal Navigation (Ibid.) It is interesting to notice that the kind of 
buyers who intervened at the event represented an anticipation of the market for decorative arts 
created at the 1930s Biennales. Figures like Alfredo Campione, Vittorio Cini, Paolo Ingegnoli, Ilario 
Montesi, Mario Queriolo, Achille Gaggia and Enrico Coen Cagli purchasing artworks at the 
Settecento Exhibition of 1929 were the same ones later acting as patrons at the Biennale pavilions of 
decorative arts (Ibid).
262 ASAC, Serie Scatole Nere, busta n. 63, ‘Mostra del Settecento’.
263 Ibid.
264 Ibid, ‘Istituto Veneto per il Lavoro e le Piccole Industrie’.
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celebration of art and industry completed the commercialisation of the event: artists 
were entrepreneurs and the pavilion itself resembled a shopping arcade as much as 
an artistic salon.
Speaking about the exhibition, Podesta Orsi said: ‘I consider this a good 
initiative from the historic, artistic and above all economic point of view, an idea 
that will benefit tourism for a number of years. This aims at fulfilling an 
outstanding programme: I hope it will constitute an exceptional event, drawing the 
attention of the entire world, so as to make Venice the source of the Settecento, of 
all the Settecento, in all the countries, in all its manifestations. The programme 
should be of international interest, even though great importance will be given to 
the Italian section (...).265 According to Orsi, the exhibition was also dedicated to 
the representation and glorification of ‘the highest manifestation of Italianness’.266
Yet, beyond the surface of rhetoric, the exhibition, upon which a significant 
proportion of the year’s tourist income was thought to be reliant - like many of the 
cultural events staged in Venice at the time - was a product of local identity and not 
just because it was commemorating Venice’s past economic splendour. With many 
art lovers expected to be attracted to the lagoon, it was supported by a series of 
concerts, theatre plays and trips to the Venetian palaces and Ville Venete.
The event was organised in 1929 in order to bridge the gap between the 
1928 and 1930 Biennales and, as argued in chapter 2, the aim was to provide a 
constant level of tourist flows into Venice by arranging at least one outstanding 
exhibition around which others could be developed. This is also mirrored by what 
Podesta Orsi declared:
‘The XVI Exhibition of International Arts of 1928, as well as constituting an artistic and
265 ASAC, Serie Arti Visive/Segreteria Generale, unita 02, ‘Mostra ‘700’.
266 Ibid, unita 01, ‘Mostra ‘700 e XVII Biennale 1929-30’.
267 Ibid. Events strictly tied to the Settecento Exhibition were also established. O f particular note in 
August 1929, was space given by the Federazione Nazionale Fascista dell’Abbigliamento for 
displays of Italian Fashion at the Excelsior Ciga Hotel at the Lido, which included celebrations of 
lace work, shawls, Damask and Brocade, with the Croce Ross a Italiana also organising a costume 
ball at the hotel.267 As with other cultural showcases, the initiative was financed by the Stazione di 
Cura, Soggiorno e Turismo in Venice, (AMV, Determinazioni Podestarili, ‘Mostra del ‘700 
Italiano’, trim. IV, 1929, n. 2925) with the artistic arrangement left to Nino Barbantini and the 
administrative management to Romolo Bazzoni (Ibid, ‘Pagamento compenso ai preposti alia 
direzione e organizzazione della Mostra del Settecento Italiano’, trim. IV, 1929, n. 3168).
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cultural manifestation worthy of the glorious local traditions and past retrospectives, has 
positively increased the movement o f visitors towards Venice, as revealed by Biennale 
statistics. The gap year between Biennales could be profitably devoted to the preparation of 
another art manifestation. The event would contribute to increase tourism towards the 
lagoon, when considering the fact that the Stazione di Cura, Soggiorno e Turismo has been 
created this year with a separate budget from that of the municipality’.268
Whether or not the Settecento Exhibition retained ‘a purely artistic character 
free of every commercial and speculative aim’, as Orsi thought, Venice would gain 
‘several general advantages’ from it, and for this reason, the initiative deserved the 
town council’s complete attention. As the cultural enterprise par excellence of 
1929, it became part of a joint venture with the International Boat Racing270 at the 
Lido that was established with the aim of exploiting the benefits of transport 
concessions. Combined tickets were issued for the two events, with discounted 
transport available for most of the tourist season. For the benefit of tourism, 
therefore, it was hoped to establish a spiritual link between art and sport.271
As for cultural showcases already analysed, the same modes of promotion 
of the event were employed. A massive publicity programme was organised, 
together with a request for travel discounts made to the central government, which 
was awarded by the Minister of Communications, Costanzo Ciano, with train fare 
reductions of 50%, starting from 15th June.272 As noted earlier, such discounts were 
crucial to the success of an art showcase as they encouraged more tourists into the 
city. Travelcards issued for the occasion, in fact, made up 1/3 of the Settecento 
Exhibition’s profits,273 with the executive committee earning 10 lire upon single rail 
tickets issued within the Veneto region, and 5 lire upon those issued outside of it.274 
Fare concessions were, allegedly only granted following direct intervention from 
Volpi and Giovanni Giuriati,275 after Ciano had refused to extend them for the
268 AMV, Determinazioni Podestarili, ‘Mostra del ‘700 Italiano’, trim. II, 1929, n. 1086.
269 ASA C, Serie Scatole Nere, busta n. 50, ‘Mostra del Settecento 1929’.
270 Not surprisingly, president of the event was Giuseppe Volpi.
271 ASAC, Serie Scatole Nere, busta n. 50, ‘Concorso Motonautico Intemazionale’.
272 ASAC, Serie Segreteria/Arti Visive, unita 02, ‘Mostra ‘700’.
273 Ibid.
274 ASAC, Serie Scatole Nere, busta n. 50, ‘Bollettino commerciale delle Ferrovie dello Stato’.
275 Ibid, ‘Pubblicita 1929’.
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flfltUSf' duration of the exhibition ‘because too many reductions ha[d] been conceded 
for similar manifestations’.276
To promote awareness of the event’s international significance, special train 
discounts of 70% were granted to the Italian and foreign press and art critics.277 For 
holidaymakers, the local Tourist Office arranged a publicity stand welcoming ‘the 
Italian and cosmopolitan public’ while, upon their arrival in Venice, an official 
provided visitors with comprehensive information about the celebrations.278
With regard to mass participation, Silvio Versino, Inspector of the 
Provincial Section of the Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro, expressed the desire that 
workers be able to partake in the ‘moral and material elevation’ of such ‘a pure 
emanation of Fascism’ that he believed had been fostered by the exhibition 279 The 
Central Direction of the OND also promised to engage in a sustained publicity 
campaign across the Italian provinces to promote the initiative.280 Other reductions 
were given to societies of workers, veterans’ associations and Dopolavoro 
members, including discounted educational trips to the islands of Burano and 
Murano, the traditional home of lacework and glassware production.281 However, 
while special attention was paid to providing ‘popular trains’ to the exhibition as ‘a 
means of attracting a large number of visitors’ and therefore favouring tourism, 
spiritual matters such as the ‘elevation of the masses’ were not really contemplated
9 89by the organisers.
It is thus somewhat ironic that on 18 September 1929, following widespread 
critical acclaim, the Podesta justified his request for further travel reductions by 
reaffirming the non-profit-making character of the event, despite his expressed
277 Ibid, ‘Mostra del Settecento 1929’.
278 AMV, Determinazioni Podestarili, ‘Turismo. Banco di informazioni turistiche in Piazza San 
Marco sotto i portici del Palazzo Ducale dal lato del molo’, trim. Ill, 1936, n. 1730.
279 ASAC, Serie Scatole Nere, busta n. 50, ‘Ribassi per dopolavoristi alia Mostra del Settecento’.
280 Ibid.
281 ASAC, Serie Segreteria/Arti Visive, unita 02, ‘Mostra ‘700’.
282 AMV, Determinazioni Podestarili, ‘Turismo. Banco di informazioni turistiche in Piazza San 
Marco sotto i portici del Palazzo Ducale dal lato del molo’, trim. Ill, 1936, n. 1730. The Istituto 
Veneto per il Lavoro went further in its efforts to lure even more art lovers to the exhibition, by 
organising cultural courses about the Settecento that were aimed at workers and craftsmen in the 
trades involved. Taking place within the Biennale pavilions, the courses would constitute ‘a great 
means o f attraction o f the audience’ in addition to the advertising posters that hung outside the 
Biennale gardens. Combined tickets for the courses and the exhibition were also made available
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desire for economic return:
‘The Settecento Exhibition, which has now been open for about two months, has obtained 
and continues to obtain a great success among the public and critics. The number of visitors 
increases each day and art lovers have pleaded that such an interesting event be granted an 
extension. Therefore, the organisers have reached the unanimous decision to postpone the 
closure to 31st October. To do so, it is vital that this Ministry allow an extension of fare 
reductions previously granted until 10th October. This extension would be justified by the 
fact that the enterprise had to renounce to ticket rights from 1st to 15th September in favour 
of the Committee o f the International Boat Racing. You know well that the goals are 
absolutely and exclusively cultural, in spite o f various costs and sacrifices, and that an 
extension of twenty days could bring remarkable economic advantage to the city of 
Venice’.283
From this statement, it is evident that there was constant communication 
with central government to reassure it of the spiritual purpose of such exhibitions. 
Yet, it is also clear, once more, that for the Venetian ruling class, cultural tourism in 
its various manifestations was strongly linked to immediate economic benefits and 
the vitality of Venice. In fact, the connection was so strong that the ‘exclusively 
cultural’ was nonchalantly associated with ‘remarkable economic advantage’. Thus, 
any demand that led to a different goal (i.e. nationalisation, fascistization, etc.) 
remained very much a secondary aim. The Settecento Exhibition retained the 
character of a catalyst event for 1929, of the likes of the Titian, Tintoretto and 
Veronese exhibitions organised in the 1930s in order to bridge the gap between 
.Biennales. Yet, it also served the purpose of enhancing Venetian typical products in 
a joint celebration of cultural tourism and local economy.
4.12 Initiatives in favour of art and industry
Since the Settecento experiment had proved successful, the Consiglio 
Provinciale dell ’Economia Corporativa soon envisaged the arrangement of similar 
showcases in the future, along with a series of initiatives designed to uplift the 
historic Venetian product. On 12 December 1930, the Consiglio gathered to discuss
(ASAC, Serie Scatole Nere, busta n. 50, ‘Corsi coltura ‘700’).
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a variety of activities for the promotion of artistic-industrial manufacture in the 
area. The board began by reaffirming the central importance of the artistic output of 
medium and small factories for the district, and Venice in particular.284 Glassware, 
mosaics, pearls, furniture, artistic textiles and leather, shawls, wrought iron, 
paintings on velvet, works on copper and other metals, gold smelting and pottery 
constituted subtle manifestations of Venetian artistic traditions that fuelled 
commercial activity for the local and international markets. Nonetheless, a 
comparison of previous production and trade figures reveals how the quantity, 
quality and value of manufactured products had been diminishing.285 Members of 
the Consiglio Provinciale were of the opinion that this negative trend was the result 
of the better industrial and commercial structures of rival Italian regions in addition 
to increased foreign competition caused by the more effective production of similar 
goods overseas.
According to the Consiglio Provinciale, these issues were essential for the 
future well-being of the Veneto region. While agriculture had become intensive, 
and large-scale manufacturing had experienced rapid modernisation, once
287flourishing medium and small-scale industries were in decline. Principally, this 
was related to the lack of knowledge of suitable markets for the distribution of 
Venetian goods, plus the poor organisation in the exchange relationship between
' J O O
markets and the persistent crises of production. Energies currently employed in
these fields needed to be revitalised and multiplied, in order to increase production
potential in the interest of both the local and national economies. The Venetian
Abe*
authorities also sought to encourage such reforms by organising £& own
• • • * 289initiatives.
For the Consiglio, more than just a centre of artistic production, Venice was 
also an outstanding tourist magnet, attracting numerous visitors with its singular
283 ASAC, Serie Scatole Nere, busta n. 50, ‘Mostra ‘700’.
284 Ibid, busta n. 63, ‘Consiglio Provinciale dell’Economia di Venezia. Adunanza plenaria del 12 
dicembre 1930’.
285 Ibid.
286 Ibid.
287 Ibid.
288 Ibid.
289 AMV, Verbali delle sedute della Consulta Municipale di Venezia, session 4 June 1931.
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historical grandeur and artistic heritage. From spring to autumn, statistics 
established an annual movement of between 350,000 and 550,000 travellers.290 For 
decades, the town council had created and sustained the Exhibition of International 
Arts, which constituted not only a conspicuous international art market, but also ‘a 
spiritual centre within the domain of figurative arts’.291 It had also inspired other 
enterprises, such as the Settecento Exhibition of 1929, which had registered 
excellent results: while the Biennales had hitherto received 6,000,000 people, the 
Settecento Exhibition could claim 350,000 visitors.292
For all of the reasons mentioned above, the President of the Consiglio 
Provinciale dell’Economia Corporativa, in collaboration with the Istituto Veneto 
per le Piccole Industrie e per il Lavoro, the National Autonomous Fascist 
Federation of Italian Craftsmen and the Provincial Secretariat, the National Institute 
of Handicraft and Small Industries, the National Federation of Syndicates of 
Glassware Industry, the Provincial Union of Fascist Syndicates of Industry and 
other local institutions, promoted the following initiatives:293
the creation of industrial and decorative pavilions within the biennial
Exhibition of International Arts;
the participation of local handicraft industries to the Exhibitions of the
Opera Bevilacqua La Masa at Ca’ Pesaro;
the institution of sample exhibitions for brokers.294
These projects, whether concerned directly with tourism or traditional 
crafts, serve to reinforce the thesis that the Venetian ruling class exploited the 
exhibition culture with the primary aim of reinvigorating the local economy. As the 
Consiglio Provinciale stated, the industrial and decorative pavilions within the
290 ASAC, Serie Scatole Nere, busta n. 63, ‘Consiglio Provinciale dell’Economia di Venezia. 
Adunanza Plenaria, 12 December 1930’.
291 AMV, Verbali delle sedute della Consulta Municipale di Venezia, session 4 June 1931.
292 Ibid.
293 Giovanni Giuriati, Secretary o f the Venetian section o f PNF granted his patronage to the 
initiatives (Ibid).
294 ASAC, Serie Scatole Nere, busta n. 63, ‘Consiglio Provinciale dell’Economia di Venezia. 
Adunanza Plenaria, 12 December 1930’.
180
Exhibition of International Arts should have been filled with the permission of the 
Ente Autonomo Biennale which wanted to place Italian decorative production in 
contact with the international public, in order to ease the distribution of products, 
promote better understanding and encourage the improvement and perfection of
295goods. Those salons had to be conceived as international exhibitions of selected 
items produced by craftsmen and artists of every nationality, but mainly Italian,296 
and every rank of contemporary decorative and industrial art. The goal was to 
represent the exact evolution of taste and the conditions of production within a 
determined branch of the industrial arts, without excluding retrospective exhibitions 
that were of particular interest to the public, manufacturers and artists.297
The opening of one or more decorative arts pavilions should coincide with 
that of the Exhibition of International Arts itself. By 1932, an exhibition of artistic 
glassware, lacework and embroidery (from 1st May to 15th August) and another of 
textiles and enamels (from 25th to 31st August) were also arranged.298 Permanent 
and semi-permanent exhibitions of sample items suitable for export were located in 
the Istituto Veneto per il Lavoro and included glassware, mosaics, enamels, 
wrought iron, traditional artistic textiles, lacework, embroidery, furniture, leather, 
ceramics, lacquers and precious stones.299 Industrial art products for display were 
limited and carefully selected by each production workshop.300 To obtain the best 
results, appropriate publicity needed to be made by the Chambers of Commerce, the 
municipal Tourist Office, various tourist agencies and the Ciga. All the 
organisational costs (including rents, insurance and publicity) were to be met by the
295 Ibid.
296 To beat off competition rather than boosting nationalism.
297ASAC, Serie Scatole Nere, busta n. 63, ‘Consiglio Provinciale delTEconomia di Venezia. 
Adunanza Plenaria, 12 December 1930’.
298 ASAC, Serie Verbali delle Adunanze del Comitato di Amministrazione dell’Ente Biennale, vol.
I, 27/02/30-07/12/31, session 3 March 1930. Those sections were to be financed by the Consiglio 
Provinciale dell’Economia Corporativa, the Istituto Veneto per le Picccole Industrie e per il 
Lavoro, the General Fascist Confederation of Industry, the Autonomous Fascist Federation of
Handicraft Communities, the National Institute for Handicraft and Small Industries, and the National 
Federation o f the Fascist Syndicates of Glassware (Ibid). The Biennale board contributed to the 
costs of the premises, their furnishing and the management of the sales office, while the Istituto 
Veneto per il Lavoro assumed any remaining organisational responsibilities. A special board of 
artists and experts was also established, which included the Biennale secretary, the administrative 
director and an executive committee responsible for setting up the pavilions o f decorative arts (Ibid).
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Istituto Veneto per il Lavoro, which also oversaw the administrative management 
and technical control of production.301
Most notable was the enthusiasm of the Fascist Consiglio Provinciale 
dell ’Economia Corporativa for further cultural exploitation. Records show how the 
Settecento Exhibition and the Biennale pavilion of decorative arts were created with 
the explicit task of favouring Venetian industries302 rather than national education, 
while culture was also used to stimulate a commercial resurgence in a restricted 
area. Aided by official Fascist institutions, the Venetian administration was giving 
way to a ‘narrow’ project with the regional perspective taking precedent over the 
national. Between the end of the 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s, the 
municipality felt compelled to merge art and commerce into a unique combination, 
capable of initiating the revitalisation of traditional activities. For the Venetian 
business elites, exhibition culture was not so much about the inculcation of Fascist 
ideology among the workers, but the enhancement of the traditional local economy. 
Above all, it is essential to recognise that the promotion of regional products was 
commercial rather than ideological.
301 Ibid. The Institute also struck deals with the Sezione Autonoma di Credito per VArtigianato e le 
Piccole Industrie to ease the concession of credit during the production phase. All the handicraft 
companies that wished to participate in the sample exhibitions had to apply to the Istituto Veneto 
per il Lavoro, and provide a description of products with photos and prices. Having considered 
these, the executive committee made its decision based upon the ‘commercial’ potential of the 
presented item (ASAC, Serie Scatole Nere, busta n. 63, ‘Consiglio Provinciale dell’Economia di 
Venezia. Adunanza Plenaria, 12 December 1930’).
302 As the crisis o f local industries deepened in 1931, the town council in tandem with the Biennale 
administrative board set out to finance a forthcoming convention of glassware entrepreneurs and 
technicians, to formulate a strategy to revitalise the field. To guarantee the event’s success, Venetian 
representatives thought.of arranging a type o f joint venture with their English counterparts (Ibid, 
‘Note sul progettato convegno di industriali e tecnologi del vetro italiani ed inglesi’). In a detailed 
report from November 1931, Bazzoni revealed how the English director of the Institute for 
Glassware Research in Sheffield and representative of the Society of Glass Technology, Professor 
Turner, was the most acclaimed glassware technician. Turner made clear in his speeches that the 
glassware industry would gain an outstanding position only through strict co-operation amongst 
industrialised countries, with one possibility to further the advancement of the field, being the 
organisation o f specialist conventions to enable the exchange o f the latest technical knowledge 
(Ibid). For this reason, an International Artistic Congress took place in Venice in 1932, where the 
National Fascist Federation of Glassware Industry asked Professor Turner to resolve the increasingly 
worrying recession o f typical Venetian products. The Federation arranged a glassware exhibition 
within the 1932 Biennale which involved the main Venetian glassware producers such as ‘Perle e 
Conterie’, ‘Cristalleria di Murano’, ‘Vetri e Cristalli’ etc. (Ibid). Maraini was highly supportive of 
the various initiatives devoted to the development of the local industrial forces, and hoped to 
pressurise Professor Turner into including a section in the convention that was dedicated to the 
artistic glass o f the Burano island. Moreover, the meeting was supposed to have had a sympathetic 
bias towards the spirit o f the Biennale, to enhance the initiative (Ibid).
182
4.13 The Biennale pavilion of decorative arts
As mentioned above, the Biennale decorative arts salon was opened in 
1934. However, as an exhibition within the Biennale domain this was not an 
entirely new experiment. Every Exhibition of International Arts from 1903 onwards 
had contained a limited number of very important figurative artworks and 
decorative objects,303 especially within foreign pavilions.304
In 1930, in collaboration with Monza’s similar Triennale,305 the Biennale 
executives arranged a special section of decorative objects called Goldsmith’s 
International Salon, within the Exhibition of International Arts.306 Managed by the 
Engineer Beppe Rava, President of the Istituto Veneto per il Lavoro e le Piccole 
Industrie in Venice and vice-President of the Consiglio Provinciale dell'Economia 
Corporativa, the initiative, designed to support local products, was a complete 
success both in terms of public response and sales.307 Several gold and jewel 
producers participated, which included the Scuola d ’Arte Industriale Selvatico in
 ^no
Padua and the Societa Italiana Argenterie e Posaterie di Alessandria.
In 1932, the Biennale administrative board aimed to welcome additional 
decorative disciplines to the XVIII exhibition, for which a special, brand new 
pavilion was to be completed by 1934. Arranged within the Biennale’s main 
exhibition, the section contained limited, carefully chosen items that displayed the 
best examples of various Italian decorative disciplines, alongside selected foreign 
products. Maraini wrote in the preface of the XVIII Biennale catalogue that the 
scheme represented a remarkable effort to ensure the ‘well being of the Venetian art 
and craft industries’.309 The Biennale management board wanted the exhibition to 
focus on those fields in which local craftsmen excelled, such as glassware and
303 They included porcelains, ceramics, glassware, embroidery, tapestry, antique furniture, books and 
ornaments (Ibid, ‘Padiglione arti decorative’).
304 Ibid.
305 Esposizione Triennale Internazionale delle Arti Decorative Industrial i Moderne e 
dell ’Architettura Moderna.
306 ASAC, Serie Scatole Nere, busta n. 63, ‘Padiglione arti decorative’.
307 Ojetti, ‘La Mostra dell’Orafo alia XVII Biennale’, La Rivista di Venezia, 1930.
308 Ugo Nebbia, ‘Gli orafi alia XVII Biennale Veneziana’, La Rivista di Venezia, 1930.
309 ‘La XVIII Biennale di Venezia inaugurata alia presenza dei sovrani’, II Corriere Padano, 29 
April 1932.
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embroidery, as this would be advantageous for Venetian products over those of 
foreign industries. As the organisers insisted: ‘Competition would surely work as 
stimulus for future improvement’.310 However, only a very few foreign producers 
were invited, no doubt precisely to avoid that very competition.311
The press followed suit, Elio Zorzi reaffirming the value of traditional craft, 
in the prestigious Rivista di Venezia:
‘One should not believe in the standardised art. An object is not beautiful if made with ten 
thousands other copies. It is not true that a social art can exist at a low cost and that this art 
can outstrip the most exclusive and luxurious one. The rarity of the object, the technique 
applied and the materials selected are an essential part of its beauty and desirability. 
Widespread distribution follow a successful form or trend but its development is not 
something symbolising genuine art’.3,2
Yet, within art circles, there was still a degree of confusion as to whether 
decorative arts should be considered real artworks or industrial products. The 
Biennale entourage maintained that decorative objects were true art forms 
excluding any ‘industrial concept’,313 and that ‘mercantilism should be left out’,314 
while art connoisseur Ugo Nebbia declared the objects displayed at the XVIII
315Exhibition of International Arts to be of an ‘eminently industrial character’. By 
reaffirming the artistic nature of the exhibition, Biennale officials were trying to 
play down accusations of vulgar commercialism, and give artistic credibility to the
316event. In reality, industrial giants such as Lalique, Baccarat and Tiffany were all 
participants at the XVIII Biennale, although they naturally claimed their products 
were authentic handicraft masterpieces, produced in a very limited numbers and 
therefore of genuine artistic merit. The evidence nevertheless suggests that ‘pure’ 
art was being increasingly overshadowed by the consumer commodity, with many
310 Ibid.
311 ASAC, Serie Scatole Nere, busta n. 63, ‘XVIII Biennale 1932’.
312 Zorzi, ‘Uno sguardo d’assieme alia XIX Biennale’, Rivista delle Arti, May 1934.
313 ASAC, Serie Scatole Nere, busta n. 63, ‘XVIII Biennale 1932’.
314 ASAC, Verbali delle Adunanze del Comitato di Amministrazione dell’Ente Biennale, vol. II, 
01/01/32-06/07/34, session 7 December 1931.
315 Nebbia, ‘Gli orafi alia XVII Biennale Veneziana’.
316ASAC, Serie Scatole Nere, busta n. 63, ‘Elenco ditte da invitare per la mostra del vetro’ .
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participating companies using the Biennale name for private advertisement.317
The Goldsmith’s Salon of 1930 and the XVIII Biennale pioneered the way 
for the establishment of future decorative arts sections. Having proved a success, 
the Biennale executive committee began to seriously consider devoting an entire 
pavilion to traditional, local crafts.318 At the Biennale committee meeting of 7 
January 1932, Rava discussed the need to build a proper base to host selected 
decorative arts. According to Rava, this mirrored the interest of several Venetian 
institutions, such as the Consiglio Provinciale dell ’Economia Corporativa, the Ente 
Nazionale per I ’Artigianato e le Piccole Industrie, the National Confederation of 
Industry and the municipality itself.
Volpi, speaking as a businessman, was of the opinion that the exhibition 
should take place annually and not every two years, with the pavilion being 
subsidised by those institutions directly interested in the event.319 What is most 
notable is that the Biennale management, and Volpi above all, considered these 
exhibitions of decorative arts to be specifically designed for the benefit of the 
representatives of Venetian workshops and industries. This was reflected in the 
decorative arts pavilion being named Venezia, revealing the ‘branding’ strategy 
employed to exclude unwanted competition from the Milan Triennale.320
317 ‘I visitatori della Biennale’, La Gazzetta di Venezia, 12 May 1934.
318 ‘La XVIII Biennale Veneziana inaugurata alia presenza dei sovrani’, II Corriere Padano, 29 
April 1932. As early as 1929, Venetian notable Lionello Venturi had suggested that the Biennale 
host those works of art widely appealing to the tastes of the masses such as decorative products in 
separate sales pavilions as a marketing strategy (Venturi, Pretesti di Critica, Venezia, 1929).
319 ASAC, Verbali delle Adunanze del Comitato di Amministrazione dell’Ente Biennale, vol. II, 
01/01/32-06/07/34, session 7 January 1932. In fact, active contributions would come from industrial 
and commercial institutions, rather than artistic ones, such as the Istituto Veneto per il Lavoro, the 
Consiglio Provinciale dell’Economia Corporativa, the General Fascist Confederation o f the Italian 
Industry and the Autonomous Fascist Federation of Italian Craftsmen (ASAC, Serie Materiale da 
Riordinare, ‘Ufficio Stampa-Amministrazione 1936’).
320 ASAC, Verbali delle Adunanze del Comitato di Amministrazione dell’Ente Biennale, vol. II, 
01/01/32-06/07/34, session 7 December 1931. The administrative board at the Milan Triennale had 
become increasingly alarmed about the forthcoming inauguration of a Biennale pavilion of 
decorative arts. At the start, the Milanese entourage was convinced that the exhibition would be of 
very limited proportions, and that the news of a whole salon o f decorative objects was just an 
amplification o f the press. It was fundamental for the Milan Triennale that the Venetian event did 
not invade its territory, especially in a period in which ‘producers d[id] not score well’ (Scotto 
Lavina, ‘1927, 1936’, in La Biennale di Venezia (ed.), Venezia 32, 82, p. 47). Nonetheless, 
competition would spring very soon between the two institutions (ASAC, Serie Scatole Nere, busta 
n. 63, ‘Esposizione Triennale Intemazionale delle Arti Decorative). Maraini was o f the opinion that 
the lack o f a definite seat for the exhibition would give a valid pretext to the organisers o f the Milan 
Triennale to impede any further edition o f the Biennale Exhibition o f Decorative Arts, and therefore
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Additionally, in order to ensure that different crafts and handiworks all benefited, a 
rota prioritising different trades at every exhibition was developed.321
The Biennale Exhibition of Decorative Arts was finally inaugurated in 
1934. Marla Stone describes how:
‘Glassware, textiles, lacework, gold smelting, enamel work, and brass work all became 
central to the Biennales o f 1934 to 1942. In 1934, seventy-three decorative art exhibitors 
presented 422 objects. Modem glass designs by famous Venetian producers such as Venini 
and Saviati shared the Venezia pavilion with traditional lacework.322
Needless to say, the executive committee, which included the Biennale 
leadership figures of Volpi, Maraini and Bazzoni,323 promptly declared that the new 
event would support ‘the novel spirit of collaboration between artists and its 
institutions, as created by Fascism according to the Duce’s will’.324 For Margaret 
Plant the desire for formal recognition from central government was obviously 
essential, yet, the primary target remained the enhancement of the economy:
‘From its inception in the nineteenth-century, the history of the international exhibition, 
artistic or industrial, had as a fundamental aim the promotion of national goods in the 
applied and fine arts. Whatever the distaste for aspects of Fascism, not least the symbiosis 
o f art and war in Futurism, the official sanction of the Biennale ensured its survival and
325expansion, particularly in a time o f economic depression .
By 1942, it seemed that the decorative arts salon had successfully 
accomplished this t^sk, and the Gazzetta di Messina reported that the Biennale 
pavilions had successfully revived some traditional artistic schools, such as 
embroidery, ceramics, glassware, and carved wood, which had otherwise been in
works on the new pavilion were accelerated (ASAC, Serie Verbali delle Adunanze del Comitato di 
Amministrazione dell’Ente Biennale, vol. II, 01/01/32-06/07/34, session 7 January 1932).
321 Ibid, vol. Ill, 28/01/35-30/01/43, session 28 January 1935.
322 Stone, The Patron State, p. 111.
323 ASAC, Serie Scatole Nere, busta n. 63, ‘Mostra del vetro, merletto e ricamo, mosaico, ferro 
battuto’.
324 ASAC, Maraini, ‘Introduzione’, Catalogo della XX Esposizione Biennale Internazionale d ’Arte.
325 Plant, Venice, Fragile City, p. 296.
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serious danger of being outstripped by modem production methods.326 Plant also 
makes the specific claim that in the 1920s and 1930s the Biennales stimulated ‘the 
progressive modernisation and creativity of the Murano glass industry’ .327
However, the creation of a decorative arts pavilion was not solely intended 
to relieve economic depression, it also responded to a precise strategy to generate, 
within the Biennale, an alternative art market, aimed at a less wealthy public. As 
mentioned above, Volpi had quickly detected the economic trend that had led to the 
broadening of the market, and the creation of a consumer base including numerous 
middle class patrons. Less affluent buyers were seemingly drawn towards 
decorative objects that were both more affordable and accessible than the fine arts. 
The pavilion had been opened to attract precisely this kind of consumer, at a time 
when the private art market was acquiring more social and economic importance.
Registers for the 1934 Biennale reveal sales reaching 866,181 lire, of which 
private buyers accounted for 271,560 lire 328 and public buyers for 594,621 lire. The 
private art market contained about 150 individuals that spent around 1,810 lire 
each.329 The introduction of decorative arts at the Biennale proved successful in 
expanding the number of buyers interested in less expensive art. In fact, out of 561 
works sold, 197 were decorative objects mainly made of glass, crystal or textiles, 
with prices much lower than those to be found in the fine art pavilions. According 
to Stone, the new middle classes had been deterred from buying art by the cost, in 
addition to cultural and practical barriers. Paintings and sculptures at the Biennale 
had been too expensive for the non-collector or the non-elite consumer. In 1932 and 
1934, painting prices ranged from 1,000 to 5,000 lire, while glassware and other 
decorative art pieces cost between 100 and 300 lire. After 1932, a visitor could
' * T 3 0attend the Biennale and purchase a Venetian glass vase for 125 lire."
When, in the mid-1930s, the Biennale administrative board established that 
the exhibition of figurative arts would only host a few invited participants in order 
to dedicate the room to well-known, talented artists (see section 4.8), the same
326 Lucio Mangiarotti, ‘Maturita artistica del popolo italiano’, La Gazzetta di Messina, 27 June 1942.
327 Plant, Venice, Fragile City, p. 299.
328 The figure is slightly higher than 1932 but we must remember we are dealing with recession 
years.
329 ASAC, Serie Registri Vendite, 1934.
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marketing policy was adopted for the pavilion of decorative arts, in tune with the 
need to expand the commercial appeal of the institution. Few, capable decorative 
artists would have shared the salon to offer the best range of local production with 
the greatest commercial potential.331 In this way, a Volpi-style, business rationality 
imposed itself at the Biennale: the wealthiest art lovers could focus on the limited 
products of the more prestigious and appealing ‘big names’ in the fine arts section, 
while the middle-classes could opt for less-expensive, decorative items. Rational 
thinking and marketing strategies facilitated the democratisation of art 
consumption, as middle-class buyers could now consider themselves genuine 
patrons of the arts. To conclude, the exhibitions of decorative arts organised in 
Venice in the 1920s and 1930s benefited Venetian economy in two ways. On the 
one hand, they helped to further the expansion of local productive capacity, while 
on the other, by offering more affordable items, they succeeded in widening the 
range of social classes who regularly bought art.
4.14 Conclusions
The argument of this chapter developed from the starting observation that 
the Biennale was established in order to help relieve Venice’s economic problems 
long before Fascism had come to power. Even though the Biennale was assigned 
the role of co-ordinator of other national exhibitions and ideological ‘facilitator’ by 
the regime, the institution continued to retain its primary purpose of promoting 
tourism and the city of Venice during the years of Fascist government.
The fact that the exhibition, after 1922, was repackaged and extended to 
attract a wider audience was not understood by its organisers solely as a way of 
nationalising the masses, but also as a means of expanding the commercial appeal 
of the Biennale beyond the borders of elite cultural consumerism. This also exposed 
a trend in tune with the progressive growth of the art market, and the development 
of the practices of cultural tourism through the cultivation of modem tourist 
techniques.
330 Stone, The Patron State, pp. 111-12.
331 ASAC, Verbali delle Adunanze del Comitato di Amministrazione Ente Biennale, vol. Ill, 
28/01/35-30/01/43, session 14 April 1937.
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From this perspective, if for Fascism, the 1930 decree recognizing the 
Esposizione served to put the institution under the control of the central authorities, 
for the Biennale administration, it represented the only viable solution to a series of 
financial problems for which the search for approval from the state was just another 
means of securing financial aid, binding up local aspirations with the power of the 
Fascist state.
This chapter has claimed that the Venice Biennale of International Arts, 
because of its inherent economic function, was a commercial institution cloaked in 
culture. The repertoires of the music festivals were cosmopolitan and largely 
appealing to the wider public rather than purely Fascist or even nationalist 
repertoires. Similarly, the Biennale promoted aesthetic diversification, not as a 
result of a Fascist policy in the artistic domain, but as an inherent desire of 
rendering the exhibition palatable to as broad an audience as possible. Stone’s 
‘aesthetic pluralism’ was more of a marketing strategy than a cultural or ideological 
practice.
Reforms and innovations implemented throughout the 1930s served the 
purpose of turning the Biennale into a truly commercial enterprise, capable of 
adjusting its artistic output in order to achieve the highest possible level of sales. 
This also prompted the exhibition to acquire the role of mediator within the art 
market, which had more to do with the need to match buyers and sellers rather than 
the embodiment of the role of ‘cultural facilitator’. Decorative arts were introduced 
essentially to reinforce the Biennale’s ‘civic function’ of supporting the Venetian 
economy, to widen its range of cultural offerings and to target less wealthy patrons. 
The Biennale was geared towards commercial values and the expansion of the 
private art market, a fact that in itself serves to explain the failure to develop a 
defined Fascist aesthetic and the failure of the Fascist competitions. Since artists 
had the chance to sell their works to private patrons, the necessary space was 
created for them to operate away from the constrictions and limitations of Fascist 
themes, ideology, and political control.
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5. Serving Tourist Purposes: the Lido Beach Resort and the Biennale Film
Festival
The history of the Lido1 and the Cinema Festival provides another striking 
example of the progressive commodification and exploitation of cultural tourism in 
the Venetian lagoon during the 1930s. From an impoverished and declining area 
destined for the poorer classes in the nineteenth century, the Lido was transformed 
with the implementation of a novel urban plan aimed at rejuvenating the site 
through the promotion of elite tourism. To this end, popular diversions were 
confined to a distant part of the island, while upper class leisure facilities were 
established at the heart of the Lido resort. The prospect of new reforms of this kind 
fitted perfectly with Volpi’s concept of La Grande Venezia2 and was understood as 
part of a programme of urban planning where the beach resort would form the 
glamorous attachment to the historic town. In this light, Venice and the Lido would 
be centres for the exploitation of culture and tourism, while industrial activities 
were concentrated at Porto Marghera. Within two decades of the end of World War 
I, the Lido had been transformed into a cosmopolitan beach resort, eventually 
emerging as an elegant tourist destination of international standing, which, to a 
large extent escaped increased national autarky and state regulation, reaching a 
balance between Fascist ideology and cosmopolitanism.
This chapter seeks to show how the establishment of the Cinema Festival in 
1932 made a major contribution to the revitalization of the Lido, after it found itself 
in dire economic straits as a result of the First World War. In its early years, the 
festival stood out as a purely local business, a product of the hotel industry’s 
ambitions represented by Volpi and the Ciga, and exemplified by the construction 
of the Cinema Palace in 1937. In that period, the event was clearly regarded as a 
means of boosting tourism in the Venetian area, more than an agent of cultural 
change: it was designed to prolong the tourist season rather than developing the
1 The Lido di Venezia is an islet part of the Comune di Venezia.
2 According to journalist Giuseppe Ghigi, when founding the Cinema Palace, Volpi primarily took 
into consideration the Lido’s interests and the project of La Grande Venezia (Ghigi, ‘Eccellenze, 
signore e signori...’, in La Biennale di Venezia (ed.), Venezia 1932, p. XV).
3 Zucconi (ed.), La Grande Venezia, p. 175.
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new cinematic art form. This interpretation is strengthened by the fact that a clear 
Fascist policy towards cinema was slow to emerge, and Fascist authorities took no 
real interest in the festival until the intervention of the Ministry for the Press and 
Propaganda in 1936.
In an increasingly close relationship with Venice, the Lido was soon 
celebrating a golden age with the launch of theatres, amusement parks, golf 
courses, aquariums, swimming pools and other leisure facilities. In particular, the 
establishment of a municipal casino as a permanent feature upon the Venetian 
cultural landscape highlights how the gaming industry was put at the service of 
cultural tourism, welfare and society in such a way as to overcome any difficulties 
stemming from the moral ambiguities of gambling. This reinforces the thesis that 
tourism, entertainment and culture were inextricably bound up within the 
programme of economic revitalization.
5.1 The birth of the Lido as modern holidaying resort: from tourism of the 
poor to elite tourism
This section explores the shift of the Lido’s economic priorities in the 
1920s, from providing leisure activities for the poorer classes to welcoming a 
tourism of the social elites which redefined the island as an exclusive, cosmopolitan 
beach resort, and fulfilled plans of development of cultural tourism as seen in the 
project of La Grande Venezia (see chapter 3).
It was only around the mid-nineteenth century that urbanisation on a 
significant scale began to manifest itself in the Lido area, a process that would 
continue to accelerate towards the turn of the century. In tourist terms, the island 
developed a distinctive dual identity: on the one hand, it was an international beach 
resort; on the other, a holiday suburb for the people of Venice.4 The opening of the 
first bathing establishment in 1833 marked the birth of the modem Lido and the 
father can be said to have been Giovanni Busetto, nicknamed ‘Fisola’. At the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, Busetto had begun to acquire different estates 
at the Lido, forming an extensive property from what was then the Ospedale al
4 Ibid.
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Mare (the marine hospital), to the north, as far as the Excelsior Hotel.5 According 
to Plant, ‘still sparsely populated and under military restrictions, the island became 
part of the Comune di Venezia in 1883, when the bathing industry was being 
established (...). In 1899, Ettore Sorger, one of the main developers of the area, 
succeeded in effecting the transfer of military lands to the Commune’.6
From that point onwards, the Lido underwent a series of public works which 
greatly accelerated the process of urbanisation, and helped to define the elitist 
character of the island.7 Luxury holiday facilities were administered by a ‘leading 
consortium’, combining local entrepreneurs and municipal government. The 1905 
construction of an electrical supply line from the lagoon to the beach and the new 
aqueduct further ‘increased the potential of the area’.8 The Societa dei Bagni and 
then the Compagnia Italiana dei Grandi Alberghi (Ciga) succeeded Busetto as 
proprietors of the area, continuing the same development policies as their 
predecessor.9
It was the Ciga, established in March 1906, or more accurately, the efforts 
one of its directors, Nicolo Spada, a sort of modem Fisola, that firmly imprinted a 
particular image of exclusivity upon the new Lido. Thanks to the new sea front 
developments and the elegant hotels, complete with private beach facilities and 
parks, the island emerged from the provincialism which had hitherto characterised 
it.10 Indeed, the pace of development of the Lido was remarkable in the early 
twentieth century.11 According to Margaret Plant, Spada and Sorger combined to 
oversee the establishment of the Hotel Excelsior, with Sorger also instrumental in 
the project to extend the promenade, the Lungo Mare, as far as the new hotel. The 
stunning and luxurious Excelsior, devised by Giovanni Sardi, ‘was opened on 20
July 1908, watched by a crowd reported to be thirty-thousand strong, and it was to
12remain at the centre of Venetian social life until the Second World War’. For
5 Giorgio Triani, ‘1932, 1’age d’or di una spiaggia da cinema’, in La Biennale di Venezia (ed.), 
Venezia 1932, p. 44.
6 Plant, Venice, Fragile City, p. 257.
7 Zucconi (ed.), La Grande Venezia, p. 177.
8 Plant, Venice, Fragile City, p. 257.
9 Zucconi (ed.), La Grande Venezia, p. 183.
10 Ibid.
11 Plant, Venice, Fragile City, p. 234.
12 Ibid, pp. 257-8.
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journalist Giorgio Triani it embodied the best example of the highest degree of 
comfort and elegance, nature and glamour, health and sport within a single seaside 
resort.13
At the beginning of the century, the island was already well on in its way to 
becoming the maritime leisure capital of Italy. In the first place, for Triani, a new 
‘maritime order’ was established at the Lido, at the centre of which was the new 
fashion for sunbathing. Hitherto, the sun had been considered to be the enemy of 
the fashionable white complexion and seaside activities were more frequently 
undertaken as part of a period of convalescence or medical prescription.14
Furthermore, these natural elements tended to be viewed as remedies for 
diseases associated with the poorer classes. For sufferers from rickets, scrofula, 
tuberculosis and other respiratory maladies, clinics and hospices were located 
within the seafront hospitals and the convalescent resorts.15 As a result, Venetian 
hospitals had come to assume an important place amongst the medical institutions 
of Europe for their role in the physical and moral recovery of the needy.16 This 
phenomenon helped to define a ‘tourism of the poor’, and the Marine Hospital, 
built in 1868, actually constituted something of an obstacle to the construction of 
the glamorous Lido image. Consequently, the exclusion of the sick and the poor 
came to be seen as a prerequisite to the development of the more prestigious forms 
of tourism which the local authorities sought to promote. Accordingly, the future of 
seaside hospitals began to come under threat from the new establishments such as
17‘Des Bains’ and the ‘Excelsior’ which were dependent on an elite clientele. A 
type of exclusive international tourism was about to replace the traditional leisure 
activities of the lower classes: as the Marine Hospital represented an obstruction to 
this, the hotel industry set out to eliminate the problem.
In 1908, after the inauguration of the Excelsior Palace,18 the Ciga proposed
13 Triani, ‘1932, Page d’or’, in La Biennale di Venezia (ed.), Venezia 1932, p. 43.
14 Ibid, p. 45.
15 Ibid, p. 49. Medical practitioners were of course aware that the vitamin deficiencies that caused 
ailments such as rickets could be treated through exposure to the sun, and the Venetian Lido was 
thus a perfectly suited site for recuperation (Ibid).
16 Zucconi (ed.), La Grande Venezia, p. 178.
17 Triani, ‘1932, Page d’or’, in La Biennale di Venezia (ed.), Venezia 1932, p. 49.
18 The typical hotel clientele included barons, princesses and elegant dames (Ghigi, ‘L’olimpiade del 
Cinema’, in La Biennale di Venezia (ed.), Venezia 1932, p. 21).
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to relocate the Maritime Hospital, which stood right beside an ex-fortress named 
‘Forte delle Quattro Fontane’, opposite the site of the hotel. A decision had been 
taken to facilitate the unfettered growth of elite tourism at the Lido, whilst 
relegating the institutions associated with the ‘tourism of the poor’ to the rear of the 
island, in an area named S. Nicolo. An assembly of patrons at the hospital 
authorized the president of the board of directors, Pietro Calzavara, to take the 
Ciga’s relocation project into consideration, and a legal-technical committee was 
appointed to study the viability of the scheme. Calzavara later outlined the details 
of the plan to the board. Overall expenses amounted to 525,000 lire of which 
300,000 lire were to be provided, together with the costs of the new location for the 
Hospital, by the Ciga.19 In the event, the outbreak of war in 1914 delayed the 
implementation of the scheme and in 1919, the Marine Hospital and the Bagno 
Popolare were still to be found in their original sites. After the war, the number of 
the wounded grew higher, and the sick and disabled were far more visible at the 
Lido. This provided new impetus to the project, and the decision was finally taken
to build a new hospital. On 6 October 1921, the foundation stone was laid, and the
20new building was inaugurated the following year.
While the ‘tourism of the poor’ was confined to S. Nicolo, elite tourism 
gradually opened up to newly emerging social classes. According to Triani, the 
1920s signified a profound shift in the socio-cultural character of the holiday-going 
and leisure-oriented public. No longer were seaside holidays the exclusive preserve 
of the aristocratic families who dictated taste and fashion. Now, the upper 
bourgeoisie, intellectuals and artists were increasingly important consumers of
leisure activities, and for these groups, the sun and sea represented amusement
' 21 rather than a medicinal remedy or health treatment.
Despite the fact that many of the improved facilities and new amenities 
were geared towards the attraction of a tourist trade drawn from the European 
elites, the local authorities also began to offer benefits and sea cures for the average
19 Rizzi (ed.), ‘The first post-war period’, Lido di oggi, Lido di allora, anno I, n. 1, August 1987, p. 
48.
20 Triani, ‘1932, l’age d ’or’, in La Biennale di Venezia (ed.), Venezia 1932, p. 49.
21 Ibid.
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family,22 indicating that the municipality was in favour of cultivating forms of 
tourism open to a wider range of social classes.23 In 1932, for example, the Podesta 
ordered the construction of another popular bathing establishment at San Nicolo di 
Lido. Part of the estate included in this project was to be the location of a pavilion 
to be used as a hostel for war orphans.24 At the end of 1933, the Comune granted 
additional land on the shore to the Marine Hospital in San Nicolo in order to 
complete the newly constructed popular bathing establishment and to improve 
amenities.25 In subsequent years, it created first aid sites along the beach, built new 
cabins and improved transport connections within the island.26 Prices at the 
communal bathing establishment included quotas in favour of the marine colonies 
for veterans and the seriously wounded.27 Moreover, the town council regularly 
issued grants for the poor in need of sea cures at the Lido.28 It made sure that boat 
fares to the island were accessible to the lower middle class family, and also 
established a subsidised transport service to the Lido for the sick and disabled.29 
According to the Podesta, it was necessary ‘to promote initiatives in the 
demographic sector, following the directives laid down by the Duce’. Children in 
particular were to benefit from fare reductions. ‘After all’, said Count Paolo 
Foscari, ‘fares cannot be increased but they can be reduced, we must follow the
22 It has to be noted, however, that those facilities catering for the lower classes were sharply divided 
from those offered to the bourgeoisie.
23 AMV, Verbali delle sedute della Consulta Municipale di Venezia, session 14 November 1928. 
Not surprisingly, the debate upon whether to make the Lido an exclusive beach resort had been alive 
since the end of the 1920s. For example, in 1928, during one of the town council meetings, 
councillor Toffano spoke out about the problems o f the Lido. He believed that foreigners were going 
less often to the Lido because of serious competition from other seaside resorts. According to 
Toffano, the resort was in a very fortunate location, so close to Venice, it was important therefore to 
transform it into one o f the most beautiful beaches in Europe. To achieve the target, it was vital that 
the population o f Venice left the Lido to wealthy foreigners. ‘At the Lido’, insisted Toffano, ‘one 
should not see any homeless people hanging around, at least the central area should be reserved to 
the rich tourist while the rest o f the population should be confined to San Nicolo (the new site of the 
Marine Hospital) and Alberoni’. Councillors Musatti and Brass, however, were in disagreement 
about the possibility o f turning the Lido into an exclusive holidaying spot, believing that locals had 
the same right to enjoy the beach and sea cures as anyone else (Ibid).
24 AMV, Determinazioni Podestarili, ‘Costruzione di un nuovo bagno popolare a San Nicolo di 
Lido’, trim. I, 1933, n. 278.
25 AMV, Verbali delle sedute della Consulta Municipale di Venezia, session 27 January 1933.
26 AMV, Determinazioni Podestarili, ‘Lido. Sistemazione posti di pronto soccorso nelle zone 
balneari comunali’, trim. I, 1936, n. 898.
27 Ibid, ‘Turismo. Sovraprezzo capanne balneari comunali a favore delle colonie alpine e marine 
combattenti e mutilati’, trim. I, 1933, n. 679.
28 Ibid, ‘Sussidi ai poveri bisognosi di cure elio-marine’, trim. I, 1931, n. 2568.
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Duce’s will o f ‘going towards the people’, towards numerous families’.30
The Fascio di Lido together with the Unione dei Commercianti also proved 
willing to contribute to the development of the island’s tourist potential. They 
therefore decided to provide additional funds to the tune of 1,500 lire for the 
improvement of facilities intended ‘to make the Lido an important tourist centre’.31 
In 1939, despite the approaching war, vice-Podesta Rocca argued that because of 
‘the constant tourist growth’ which the Lido had undergone in recent decades, it 
was necessary to acquire additional coastal space to enlarge the popular bathing 
establishment, and meet the expectations of the numerous families holidaying at the 
Lido. An agreement was subsequently signed with the military authorities, which 
had been using part of the coastline coveted by the municipality.32
This section has exposed the emerging tensions between popular tourism 
and elite tourism, and between the hotel industry (keen to cater for the latter) and 
the needs of the lower classes. These frictions were reflected in divisions within the 
local municipality, with some members far keener than others to see the 
development of mass tourism alongside elite tourism in the Lido. The final result 
was the appearance in the Lido of a patchwork of geographically distinct areas 
serving different economic functions.
5.2 Building an elite resort: the Venice Cinema Festival and the tourist 
industry
According to Maurizio Rebershak, there was a shift in the prestige of the 
Lido in 1920 on to a national scale, and soon afterwards, in 1923, to a sphere of 
international prominence.33 In the second half of the 1920s, the island reached the 
pinnacle of its international fame as a site of elite tourism, and had come to be 
considered as synonymous with modernisation and progress in the Veneto region.34 
According to Margaret Plant, ‘the Lido was instantly successful as an extension of
29 Ibid, ‘Servizio trasporto accidentati al Lido di Venezia’, trim. II, 1939, n. 1873.
30 AMV, Verbali delle sedute della Consulta Municipale di Venezia, session 21 December 1938.
31 AMV, Determinazioni Podestarili, ‘Attrezzatura turistica di Lido. Stomo di fondi’, trim. Ill, 1938, 
n. 1859.
32 AMV, Verbali delle sedute della Consulta Municipale di Venezia, session 20 December 1939.
33 Reberschak, ‘Gli uomini capitali’, in Isnenghi, Woolf, (eds.), Storia di Venezia, p. 1258.
34 Zucconi (ed.), La Grande Venezia, p. 183.
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the busy social season played out in the palaces along the Grand Canal’.35
The municipality worked hard to ensure that the Lido could meet the most 
demanding standards of elite tourism. ‘A full-blown advertising campaign 
accompanied the modem invention of the Lido, lauding its unique provision of the 
most modem facilities combined with a historical city across the water’.36 
Numerous reports about the tourist season at the Lido were included in famous 
Italian magazines and reviews, ensuring that the seaside spot became associated in 
the public mind with the names of dignitaries and aristocrats. At the same time, 
however, such coverage suggested that the resort was largely the preserve of the 
wealthy elite.37
During the post-war period the popularity of the Lido expanded 
dramatically. It was said that
‘Everybody seemed in a fever to parade himself, to spend money, to enjoy himself...at the 
Excelsior Palace Hotel one could not count the number o f princes, dukes, counts, marquises 
and barons; but there were a lot o f ‘commentatori’ or simple ‘signori’: they were the 
nouveaux riches who were often surrounded by beautiful women’.38
The international prestige achieved by the Lido, which lasted until 1935, the 
year of the League of Nations sanctions for the invasion of Ethiopia, was the result
39of increasingly close attention being paid to the facilities of the resort. In the 
1920s, Lido residents witnessed the construction of numerous hotels, mansions and 
small villas which were often built in the most recent and fashionable architectural 
styles. The intention to allow the island to compete with international resorts for a 
cosmopolitan clientele was self-evident, and this objective was pursued through the 
creation of numerous new facilities and attractions, from landscaped gardens and 
sporting facilities to the enhancement of the popular bathing establishments.40
The aim was also to endow the Lido with an array of maritime facilities not
35 Plant, Venice, Fragile City, p. 269.
36 Ibid, p. 258.
37 Rizzi (ed.), ‘The first post-war period’, p. 45.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid, p. 46.
40 Ibid, p. 47.
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found elsewhere: in particular, beach houses and shelters reserved for customers of 
the Ciga were real islands of comfort. The quality of service was deliberately 
luxurious so as to attract the highest class and wealthiest of customers.41 In 1926, 
the ‘Chez-Vous’ at the Excelsior Palace, one of the most elegant dance halls in the 
world, was inaugurated and, at the same time, the new tennis courts upon which the 
new International Tennis Tournament was played were opened.42 It was during 
these years that attempts to imitate the Venetian beach resort in other parts of Italy 
were made, the most obvious examples being Viareggio or Forte dei Marmi.43
Again, public and private investments made throughout the 1920s were part 
of a unique strategic design: the Volpian project of La Grande Venezia.44 The Lido 
was becoming the glamorous tourist complement to historic Venice, with the 
maritime aspect being the real appeal of the holiday, providing the perfect 
combination of sunbathing, nature, sports and the artistic, cultural and historical 
attractions. This combination of nature and culture was to be placed at the heart of 
the promotional campaigns45 to popularise Venice and the Lido amongst a national
41 Triani, ‘1932, l’age d’or’, in La Biennale di Venezia (ed.), Venezia 1932, p. 51. We only have to 
think that the company managed a number o f activities in the island amongst which we find the 
bathing establishment named Grande Stabilimento Bagni, seaside shelters at the hotel Des Bains and 
Quattro Fontane, the hotel Excelsior, the hotel Palazzo del Mare, the hotel Alberoni, villas, parks, 
tennis and golf courts, a bar at the Nicelli airport, parkings, stores, dormitories, factory buildings, 
apartments, kiosks, garages, greenhouses, laundries, and tramcars. The Ciga managed hotels at the 
Lido, in Venice, Rome, Naples, Milan, Stresa, and Florence (Camera di Commercio, Industria e 
Artigianato di Venezia, Registro Ditte, I Fascicolo, n. 4905, ‘Compagnia Italiana dei Grandi 
Alberghi’).
42 Triani, ‘1932, Page d’or’, in La Biennale di Venezia (ed.), Venezia 1932, p. 53.
43 Rizzi (ed.), ‘The first post-war period’, p. 48.
44 Triani, ‘1932, l’age d’or’, in La Biennale di Venezia (ed.), Venezia 1932, p. 49.
45 For example, on 16 July 1932, Alfredo Campione, manager at the Ciga, informed the Prefect of 
Venice that in those days, the Istituto Nazionale LUCE, following directives issued from the central 
government, was producing a film on the life o f the Lido; a movie which constituted, according to 
Campione, a ‘terrific means o f propaganda for the seaside resort’ (ASV, Gabinetto della Prefettura 
di Venezia, anni 1893-1936, pacco n. 44, busta ‘Stazioni balneari e invemali. Disposizioni di 
massima. Tutela della moralita’). Therefore, the Podesta ordered the town council to contribute to 
the costs of a promotional movie featuring Venice and the Lido that was to be filmed towards the 
end o f June 1934 and publicised in the review LUCE. This contribution would be taken from those 
funds earmarked for the development o f tourism. Because a film of this type was usually very 
expensive, the Ciga offered to cover half o f the costs. O f the various scenes, only those believed to 
have ‘propagandists’ potential (intended as publicity potential) were chosen (AMV, Determinazioni 
Podestarili, ‘Turismo. Contributo all’Istituto Nazionale LUCE per la ripresa e programmazione di un 
film propaganda su Lido e Venezia’, trim. Ill, 1934, n. 1448). Later, the G.U.F. o f Venice contacted 
the Prefect informing him that the Direzione Generale per il Turismo had instituted a competition 
for local films promoting tourism to be screened in America and Germany as commercial 
propaganda for Venice and the Lido. The G.U.F. also requested a contribution from the Province of
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and international public.46
However, Venice and the Lido suffered badly from the prolonged 
depression, and previous chapters have already examined a number of the ways in 
which the town authorities attempted to stimulate a Venetian economic recovery 
through the promotion of tourism, thereby mitigating the worst effects of the global 
slump. Statistics provided by the Chamber of Commerce reveal that the tourist 
boom in the Lido had peaked during the mid-1920s, and that by the end of the 
decade numbers were in decline:47
1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931
Tourist 47,183 55,365 62,444 52,731 49,240 46,380 45,999 42,668 32,556
Arrivals
Total 171,611 195,236 203,009 172,338 115,048 146,692 136,737 128,304 99,766
Population
By 1931 arrivals at the Lido were almost half the number they had been in 
1925.48 In a meeting in 1928, the Consulta Municipale concluded that any
Venice to allow the city to participate in ‘such a useful competition’ (ASV, Gabinetto della 
Prefettura di Venezia, anni 1893-1936, pacco n. 4, busta ‘Pellicole cinematografiche di produzione 
nazionale. Programmazione’).
46 Zucconi (ed.), La Grande Venezia, p. 180.
47 Camera di Commercio, Industria e Artigianato di Venezia, Registro Ditte, I Fascicolo, n. 4905, 
‘Compagnia Italiana dei Grandi Alberghi’.
48 Examination of the performance of the Ciga in the interwar period, indicates that soon after the 
First World War the economic situation at the Lido improved greatly and the mid-1920s represented 
the peak o f the Ciga’s fortunes, while profits suddenly declined towards the 1930s:
1925_______1926_______1927_______ 1928______ 1929_______1930______1931________1932
9,520,000 8,700,000 4,348,560 6,530,000 6,260,000 6,000,000 11,309 62,348 *
*: figures are expressed in lire
In 1925, the company’s revenues had reached an enormous 9,520,000 lire (Camera di Commercio, 
Industria e Artigianato di Venezia, Registro Ditte, I Fascicolo, n. 4905, ‘Compagnia Italiana dei 
Grandi Alberghi. Bilancio 1925’). Such success in the tourist field was partly explained by the
recent construction o f the Palazzo dell’Esposizione di C a ’ Pesaro at the Lido. The Ca’ Pesaro
exhibition traditionally hosted those artists that had been previously rejected by the Biennale and 
because o f its role as a cultural-tourist attraction we can consider it an antecedent of the Cinema 
Festival. It is not coincidence that the relevant pavilion was financed by the Ciga which considered 
the C a ’Pesaro institution as ‘a business which [could] greatly enhance the commercial profile of the 
Lido’ (Ibid, ‘Verbale di Assemblea, 8 April 1926’). In 1926, the Lido had established itself as a 
world-renowned seaside resort, to the extent that the summer season at the moment now represented 
the most important period of business for the Ciga. However, profits began to fall (perhaps due to 
the impact o f the revaluation of the lira) until on the eve of the global economic meltdown, when the 
Ciga’s administrative board claimed that both economic growth and tourist numbers were in decline,
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economically sensible policy had to be directed towards reviving the tourist 
industry in the Lido.49 In fact, and as a direct result of the kind of thinking 
described above, while Venice was going through a period of deep depression, the 
development and subsequent transformation of the district actually accelerated 
during those years.50 The economic crisis which took hold in the early 1930s might 
even be said to have had a beneficial effect upon the tourist facilities of the Lido, in 
the sense that it forced modernisation and reform upon the hotel industry in order to 
maximise the resort’s appeal. In this, the local authorities were assisted by the fact 
that the Lido had for some time been regarded as an area providing outstanding 
business and investment opportunities.51
The Banca Commerciale Italiana, unsurprisingly given the influence of 
Volpi, contributed financially to many of the speculative business projects 
conducted, and the Ciga itself was heavily involved in several enterprises.52 The 
hotel industry and the Ciga in particular wished above all to promote an elite 
tourism, not only in traditional terms but also drawing upon the newly fashionable 
leisure and sporting activities.53 The company was also closely involved in 
supporting the First International Festival of the Cinema at the Excelsior Hotel, 
perhaps the high point of the process of the cultural industrialization of the Lido in 
the inter-war period.54
and the corporation had been forced to lower prices at its hotels. In 1930, the Ciga’s balance was 6 
million lire (Ibid, ‘Bilancio 1930’), while in 1931 the situation had dramatically worsened with 
profits falling to just 11,309 lire (Ibid, ‘Bilancio 1931 ’). The tourist industry was now in a parlous 
state, and statistics reveal that numbers visiting the Lido had fallen by 23% and resident tourists by 
21% compared to 1930- In particular, the number of American tourists had diminished by 40% from 
1930 levels. Overall, incomes from tourism fell by about 40%, a potentially disastrous contraction 
(Ibid, ‘Verbale di Assemblea, 31 March 1932’).
49 AMV, Verbali delle sedute della Consulta Municipale di Venezia, session 14 November 1928.
50 Triani, ‘1932, Page d ’or’, in La Biennale di Venezia (ed.), Venezia 1932, p. 27. As an example, 
the bridge across the lagoon which was built precisely to improve the connection between the island 
and the mainland was inaugurated on 25 March 1933 (Plant, Venice, Fragile City, p. 283). This 
embodied a project designed to enhance the ‘character’ o f the Lido into an entertainment island for 
the ‘bel mondo’ with Venice, a city of culture, art and history at its heart (Triani, ‘1932, Page d’or’, 
in La Biennale di Venezia (ed.), Venezia 1932, p. 27).
51 Zucconi (ed.), La Grande Venezia, p. 180.
52 Ibid, p. 183.
53 Ibid, p. 185.
54 Triani, ‘1932, Page d ’or’, in La Biennale di Venezia (ed.), Venezia 1932, p. 56. As early as 1914 
the Ciga had played a key role in launching a competition for the construction of forty luxury 
cottages located between the Hotel Des Bains and the Excelsior Palace, and between the 1920s and 
1930s, the company had emerged as the single biggest force for the promotion o f urbanisation at the
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In the 1930s, a series of public works of urban regeneration were 
undertaken in the Lido, a development that helped to redefine not just the image of 
the Venetian resort, but also the essential character of the modem seaside 
destination. Gino Damerini, during a meeting of the town council, drove home the 
point that if the Lido was to survive in a competitive international tourist market, 
significant restructuring and renovation was required in order to ensure that the 
resort came up to international standards. Up to that point, he argued, the 
municipality had tended to neglect these needs.55 However, Damerini wras perhaps 
being somewhat unfair on the efforts of the local authorities. As early as 1928, the 
local administration had completed a major program of road building and 
maintenance across the entirety of the island, from the area of S. Nicolo and Ca’ 
Bianca on one hand, towards the Alberoni on the other.56 In 1934, the new popular 
bathing establishment built one year before, was enlarged and improved so as to
c n
cater for all the tourists coming to the Lido for their vacations, while the facilities 
and capacity of the Nicelli airport were expanded with the constmction of another 
passenger terminal.58
Meanwhile, the development of the resort’s transport infrastmcture 
continued apace, with the Ciga taking control of the bus service running throughout 
the island after 1925,59 and a connection was established with the other islets of the 
lagoon in the 1930s. In 1937, after the Venetian boat fleet had been restored, a 
nightly boat service was arranged between the Lido and Venice.60 By 1939, the 
town council had also started an additional service between the Lido, Murano and 
the Giudecca island.61
At the beginning of the 1930s, the Lido became the focus of a series of 
summer entertainments called ‘Estate Veneziana’ which included events such as the
Lido (Zucconi (ed.), La Grande Venezia, p. 185).
55 AMV, Verbali delle sedute della Consulta Municipale di Venezia, session 14 November 1928.
56 Vittorio Moraffi, ‘Lavori stradali al Lido dal 1928 ad oggi’, La Rivista di Venezia, January 1930.
57 AMV, Determinazioni Podestarili, ‘Turismo. Ampliamento del Bagno Popolare al Lido’, trim. I, 
1934, n. 207.
58 Ibid, ‘Aeroporto Lido. Costruzione di una stazione passeggeri’, trim. II, 1934, n. 1162.
59 Ibid, ‘Defmizione pendenze con la Ciga per contributi autocorriera Lido-Alberoni’, trim. II, 1923, 
n. 1557.
60 AMV, Verbali delle sedute della Consulta Municipale di Venezia, session 24 June 1937.
61 Ibid, session 18 October 1939.
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International Congress of Navigation presided over by Giovanni Giuriati, as well as 
the International Boat Racing, tennis and golf tournaments. For these and other 
cultural and sporting events, the Minister of Communications ordered rail fare 
reductions of 30% and 50% upon return tickets.62 For the Podesta, these 
celebrations contributed to the development of the tourist movement towards the 
Stazione di Cura, Soggiorno e Turismo (Tourist Office),63 and he set out to increase 
funds to finance summer entertainments.64 At the same time, the Ciga had begun a 
major advertising campaign on behalf of the tourist industry in the Lido within the 
main Italian reviews and magazines, in order to popularise the beach resort among a 
wider national and international public.65 The Ciga also sponsored the participation 
of the Lido in the most prestigious tourist fairs in Italy, the General Exhibition in 
Nice and the Milan Fair.66
In 1932, with hotel managers bemoaning the decline of tourism in the
67Lido, Volpi and Maraini sought more ways in which new forms of leisure activity
62 AMV, Determinazioni Podestarili, ‘Estate Veneziana 1931. Spese per pubblicita e 
organizzazione’, trim. II, 1931, n. 1067.
63 Ibid, ‘Turismo. Spesa per festeggiamenti al Lido’, trim. II, 1933, n. 985.
64 Ibid, ‘Turismo. Maggiore spesa per festeggiamenti al Lido’, trim. Ill, 1932, n. 1810.
65 Ibid, ‘Turismo. Propaganda sui giomali Italiani durante la stagione balneare estiva’, trim. Ill,
1934, n. 1411.
66 Ibid, ‘Turismo. Partecipazione all’Esposizione Generate di Nizza e alia Fiera di Milano’, trim. I,
1935, n. 224.
67 Documents held at the Chamber o f Commerce in Venice reinforce the thesis that the Cinema 
Festival at the Lido was the product of tourist development and economic interests. As the Lido 
prospered in the first twenty years o f the century so did the Ciga, which, under the influence of 
Giuseppe Volpi expanded from a local enterprise to a corporation of national significance 
(Reberschak, ‘Gli uomini capitali’, in Isnenghi, Woolf, (eds.), Storia di Venezia, p. 1278). Indeed, it 
is fair to say that the well-being of the Ciga rested upon economic growth of the seaside resort. In 
1932, recession had hit the Lido hard, and the Ciga’s profits stood at just 62,348 lire (Camera di 
Commercio, Industria e Artigianato di Venezia, Registro Ditte, I Fascicolo, n. 4905, ‘Compagnia 
Italiana dei Grandi Alberghi. Bilancio 1932’). The world crisis had taken its toll and incomes 
stagnated while the tourist numbers fell by another 20%, primarily because of the continuing 
collapse in the trade from North America. The administrative board bemoaned the international 
political situation and the tendency o f many nations to raise significant tariff barriers against foreign 
competition. Italy, by way of contrast, in its tourist policies at least, had pursued a relatively liberal 
outlook, without any major limitations or restrictions towards travellers who wished to go abroad, 
thereby, it was hoped, providing a good example to other countries. Managers also drew attention to 
the Italian tourists returning to Venice, believing this development to be indicative of an important 
new internal tourist trend, and ‘the attraction that Fascism exert[ed] over Italians’ (Ibid, ‘Verbale di 
Assemblea, 22 March 1933’). In 1933, the financial position o f the Ciga had radically improved, 
partly as a result o f the attention that the new Film Festival was drawing to the Lido. The primary 
function o f the new festival as a means to rehabilitate the declining tourist economy was apparently 
bearing fruit, and in 1933 the Ciga’s profits had risen to three million lire (Ibid, ‘Bilancio 1933’). In 
1934, profits fell slightly to 2,549,257 lire (Ibid, ‘Bilancio 1934’). Despite the economic crisis, it
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could be exploited to the benefit of mass tourism. That year, Volpi declared: ‘We 
could make an attempt with the cinema, this entertainment is flourishing right now 
and it is interesting to consider whether it would be able to attract the same 
numbers that currently attend football matches. The presence of these visitors could 
revitalize the Lido and the hotels. They represent a cost for us, and are used only by 
the exclusive type of tourist; they could be active also during months like August 
and September (...). The cinema has a future, even if its founder, Lumiere, declared 
that it could never be commercial’.68
Thereafter, Volpi, with his major interests within the Ciga,69 acted as a 
consistent advocate for a new Biennale Exhibition of International 
Cinematographic Art at the company’s Palace Hotel Excelsior. Volpi had been told 
that at the Lido there were no cinema halls to host the festival but he concluded that 
the garden of the ‘luminous fountains’ at the Excelsior would be suitable. The 
cinema exhibition was thus inaugurated at the beginning of August 1932, with the 
immediate result that the hotels enjoyed a substantial increase in business.70 From 
the beginning, therefore, this event reversed the decline of tourism in the Lido, and
was significant that for the Ciga the tourist season had been highly successful, due to the new 
initiatives organized by the Biennale entourage. The Cinema Festival had made a major contribution 
to the revitalization of the tourist season at the Lido and to the benefit of the financial position of the 
Ciga (Ibid, ‘Verbale di Assemblea, 7 April 1937’). In 1935, profits fell again to 2,103,500 lire (Ibid, 
‘Bilancio 1935’). However, they were still much higher than those of 1932, when the Cinema 
Festival had started, meaning that the overall picture was not as worrying as a number of years 
earlier (Ibid, ‘Verbale di Assemblea, 14 April 1936’).
68 Rizzi (ed.), ‘II Lido e la Mostra del Cinema’, Lido di oggi, anno XII, n. 12, August 1999, p. 147.
69 Giuseppe Volpi was not only the president o f the Ente Biennale after 1930, but also the chief 
executive at the Ciga from 1917 and president from 1922 (Camera di Commercio, Industria e 
Artigianato di Venecia, Registro Ditte, I Fascicolo, n. 4905, ‘Compagnia Italiana dei Grandi 
Alberghi. Movimento Personale anni 1930-45’). In 1926, when Volpi took up his official 
appointment with the government in Rome, the Ciga administrative board announced: ‘On July of 
last year, Senator Count Volpi di Misurata, appointed Minister of Finances, resigned from the post 
of administrative manager in our company. We regret the loss o f Giuseppe Volpi’s experience at the 
Ciga, nonetheless, this is made up for to some extent by the great achievements and progress made 
during his tenure o f the post. Let us not forget the deals established with foreign countries which 
have brought great advantages to our industry and the tourist movement in general’ (Ibid, ‘Verbale 
di Assemblea, 8 April 1926’). Three of the administrative managers at the Ciga, Alfredo Campione 
Vittorio Cini and Antonio Revedin were also members of the town council in the 1920s and 1930s. 
Usually, their interventions during meetings aimed at defending the interests o f the Venetian tourist 
industries. It was Revedin, for example, who insisted upon the lowering o f the Tassa di Soggiomo 
duty imposed upon the customers o f Venetian hotels in order to relieve the crisis that had hit the 
industry in the post-war period (AMV, Verbali delle sedute della Consulta Municipale di Venezia, 
session 14 November 1928).
70 ASAC, Serie Verbali delle Adunanze del Comitato di Amministrazione dell’Ente Biennale, vol. 
Ill, 28/01/35-30/01/43, session 30 January 1943.
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contributed to the attraction of large numbers of visitors to the resort, proving to be 
so successful that it was quickly established as an annual event. Volpi specifically 
argued for continuing to stage it at the Lido because of his concern that the Lido 
was ‘tired’71 and in need of fresh initiatives. The launch of the Film Festival 
represented a significant step to promote the island as an internationally renowned 
beach resort. According to Volpi, the Lido had been chosen as the seat of the 
festival instead of Venice, ‘as cinema [was] made, or should be made, of sun and
72youth’. Locating the event within the most luxurious hotel at the Lido further 
clarified the Biennale’s developing identity as a site of consumption, tourism and 
leisure. Margaret Plant, arguing very much along these lines, has observed that
‘Although Antonio Maraini claimed to have invented the idea of the Cinema Biennale, so 
too did Volpi, whose control of industry, culture, tourism and the press was awesome. The 
new venture was propitiously timed at the point when the ‘talkies’ were a novelty and the 
new star system was building. Cleverly scheduled for the height of summer, it was located 
not in old Venice or the Giardini, but in Volpi’s territory on the Lido, at the Excelsior 
Hotel, which provided an outdoor screening area, grand accommodation and the showcase 
o f the beach at the same time. The Lido was an international meeting place for film stars in 
these glamour years, and has continued to be so’.73
The idea of putting together an international festival of films of ‘high artistic 
quality’ in the language of their country of origin and free from the interference of 
the censor was already well established by the 1930s.74 The Venetian Film Festival
71 As cited in Francesco Bolzoni, ‘Correva l’anno decim o...’, in La Biennale di Venezia (ed.), 
Venezia 1932, p. 111.
72 As cited in Ghigi, ‘L’olimpiade del cinema’, in La Biennale di Venezia (ed.), Venezia 1932, p. 22: 
Dario Sabatello, ‘La grande rassegna intemazionale’, II Tevere, 9 August 1932.
73 Plant, Venice, Fragile City, p. 301. In fact, the Ciga hotels had constituted the glamorous side of 
the Biennale since the early 1920s. A 1928 article outlined how representatives of the foreign press, 
after a visit to the Esposizione, had been invited to relax at the Lido’s beaches, enjoying the facilities 
offered at the Hotel Des Bains. At night, dinner was served at the Excelsior Palace where reporters 
were greeted by Volpi, Maraini, Bazzoni, Varagnolo and Alfredo Campione, manager at the Ciga. In 
a speech at the dinner, Campione stressed the many ambitious works being undertaken at the Lido in 
order to further improve the leisure facilities provided by the Ciga on the island. Subsequently, 
guests were taken to drink and dance in the enchanted atmosphere o f the exclusive ‘Chez-Vous’ 
club. Naturally, the evening’s expenses were provided by the Ciga, and the whole enterprise was, of 
course, intended to win the support of the influential press to its side (‘La giomata dei giomalisti 
esteri’, La Gazzetta di Venezia, 23 June 1928).
74 Ghigi, ‘L’olimpiade del Cinema’, in La Biennale di Venezia (ed.), Venezia 1932, p. 27.
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was not the first in history, as has sometimes been claimed. For example, in Rimini, 
right next to the bathing establishment, a summer cinema festival showing a 
number of famous films was held in 1905. In Venice itself, in 1910, around 28 
cinema halls were already functioning, and at the Lido, the Excelsior Palace Hotel 
operated its own cinema.75 Starting in 1923, the Milan Fair promoted a 
cinematographic competition, in 1929 a film festival was held in Padua, and in 
1932, an international film festival was announced in Prague.76 It should also be 
remembered that, in May of the same year, a similar festival was planned for 
Florence. What was new in Venice was the publicity, glamour and extravaganza 
brought to the event by the film stars and the international press in attendance. In 
the words of the Prefect Carlo Catalano, the Cinema Festival was a ‘magnificently 
realized combination of artistic, tourist and economic interests’,77 representing a 
viable alternative to the soirees dansantes and the masque ball parties taking place 
at the Lido.78
Historian of cinema Gian Piero Brunetta has also commented on Volpi’s 
intention of re-launching the beach resort, and makes the point that the first thing to 
benefit from the Mostra d ’Arte Cinematografica was the tourist season at the
7 0  •Lido. According to Margaret Plant
‘From the first films festival, the event was cleverly packaged for prospective tourists and 
poster campaigns promoted reductions in air and train travel to the fourteen evenings of 
screening at the Excelsior. Posters announced the full bill of attractions framed by an image 
o f a giant reel of films unravelling in front o f the columns with the lion o f St. Mark looking 
out over a silhouette o f Palladio’s Redentore, with a crescent moon in the sky. Historic 
Venice was thus imaginatively connected with the vibrant new Lido, which in turn had its 
modem style enhanced by association with the cultural prestige o f the old town’.80
75 Gian Piero Brunetta, ‘La citta del cinema’, in Isnenghi, Woolf, (eds.), Storia di Venezia, vol. Ill, p. 
2190; Triani, ‘1932, l’age d ’or’, in La Biennale di Venezia (ed.), Venezia 1932, p. 55.
76 Ghigi, ‘L’olimpiade del Cinema’, in La Biennale di Venezia (ed.), Venezia 1932, p. 27.
77 ASV, Gabinetto della Prefettura di Venezia, anni 1893-1936, pacco n. 15, busta ‘Mostra 
Cinematografica di Villa Olmo-Como’.
78 Volpi, in a letter addressed to the Podesta announced: ‘The cinema exhibition is undoubtedly the 
initiative that more than anything else deserves to be supported, as it carries out its activity at the 
Lido, where the municipality concentrates all its reforms for improved tourist development’ (ASAC, 
Serie Cinema, ‘IV Esposizione d’ Arte cinematografica. Costruzione del Palazzo Cinema’).
79 Brunetta, ‘La citta del cinema’, in Isnenghi, Woolf, (eds.), Storia di Venezia, p. 2199.
80 Plant, Venice, Fragile City, p. 301. It does not look like posters were aimed at a particular section
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‘We make cinema for the popolo, for the masses’, claimed Pavolini, 
Minister for the Press and Propaganda, at one point.81 Yet, despite the fact that 
cinema was now viewed by Fascist bureaucrats as another way to forge a national 
community, as far as Venice was concerned, cinema was intended to serve the 
tourist industry rather than achieve the status of art or serve as Fascist propaganda 
(we must remember that the committee overseeing the Cinema Festival always 
included the Director General of Tourism within the Ministry for the Press and 
Propaganda.82).83
That the Cinema Festival was created with the purpose of attracting wealthy 
visitors is self-evident, and the chief interests of the Ciga continued to be vested in
• 84elite tourism. The image to be offered to the public was that of an event which 
mixed glamour with art and creativity; the intention was to link popular culture, 
aesthetics and tourism to facilitate the economic rebirth of the island.85 Thus, the 
first target of the festival was not the development of the cinematographic art form, 
but the attraction of an exclusive type of tourism to the island, a chic and cultured 
public, amongst the most glamorous in Europe. The establishment of the Biennale
of society, though.
81 Brunetta, Cinema Italiano tra le due Guerre. Fascismo e Politica Cinematografica, Milano, 
Mursia Editore, 1975, p. 81.
82 Scotto Lavina, ‘1927, 1936’, in La Biennale di Venezia (ed.), Venezia 32, 82, p. 58. Marla Stone 
argues that also ‘the spectacle surrounding the designation o f prizes at the film festival for 
production, direction and performance tied the event to shopping and commerce. The numerous 
categories o f prizes, including an audience referendum with monetary awards for the winners 
underlined the commercial rather than intellectual aspects o f artistic production’. (Stone, The Patron 
State, p. 103).
83 On 13 August 1935, Francesco Marchiori, Secretary o f the Federazione Triveneta fra  decorati 
della ‘Stella al merito del lavoro’ wrote a letter to Count Volpi. The oganisation had the ‘patriotic’ 
task o f grouping all the holders of war decorations within a single veterans organisation attached to 
the Regime, ‘under the symbol of the Lictor’, and to constitute an assistance fund in their favour. 
Marchiori asked Volpi to set up an extraordinary gala night event within the framework of the film 
festival to publicize the project. Volpi responded that, for economic reasons, the Biennale 
administrative committee had decided not to endorse this or any other similar initiatives, whether 
they were o f a public or private nature. In 1941, in a similar fashion, Comelio Di Marzio, President 
of the Confederation o f Professionals and Artists suggested that the problem of the distribution of 
free tickets for the Cinema Festival could be solved by the introduction o f a system of special 
screenings for the press in the morning to ensure that everybody else was paying at the entrance in 
the evening, in order to guarantee certain incomes. (ASAC, Serie Verbali delle Adunanze del 
Comitato di Amministrazione dell’Ente Biennale, vol. Ill, 28/01/35-30/01/43, session 12 maggio 
1941).
84 Rizzi, di Martino, Storia della Biennale, p. 37.
85 Brunetta, ‘La citta del cinema’, in Isnenghi, Woolf (ed.), Storia di Venezia, p. 2200.
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Cinema Festival constituted a defining point in the creation of a strategic 
programme of celebrations in which the major cultural events were timed to 
coincide with the height of the summer tourist season. Prior to the inauguration of 
the Cinema Festival, the Austrian aristocracy, a mainstay of the elite tourist 
clientele in Venice, tended to go to the Lido in mid-July, the hottest and least 
comfortable time of the year back in Austria.86
It might be argued, therefore, that the Cinema Festival served as a means of 
prolonging the peak tourist season in the summer months.87 For Margaret Plant, 
‘life turned around the ‘season’ and the Biennales, the visitors —musicians and 
actors, both local and international- Stravinsky, Malipiero, Max Reinhardt’.88 On a 
broader level, Stone is correct to argue that the Film, Theatre and Music festivals 
gave the Biennale a multifaceted character, offering a new set of itineraries and new 
ways of consuming culture. Stone notes that
‘After 1932, visitors could make extended trips, partake of a range of activities, select, 
choose, and consume plays, music, film, and the fine arts. Each of these attractions 
mobilized consumerist possibilities o f culture and o f Venice itself by their being situated in 
different parts of the city, thereby demanding that the spectator move through the city to 
attend them. The 1934 Biennale brochure underlined the limitless attractions of the event. 
The brochure was divided into seven promotional sections, including film, fine arts, 
decorative arts, music, theatre, ‘traditional feasts and sports competitions,’ and ‘exceptional 
railway reductions’.89
For Stone, the Biennale could now be thought of in terms similar to 
shopping. The art exhibition’s pavilions resembled glamorous department stores 
and ‘the act of moving among a variety of attractions located throughout the city 
deepened Venice’s transformation into an extended arcade or theme park’. The
86 Scotto Lavina, ‘1927, 1936’, in La Biennale di Venezia (ed.), Venezia 32, 82, p. 58.
87 In 1942, Volpi was o f the opinion that the reception of the event had not been excessively 
enthusiastic. This had happened, he believed, because screenings had been poorly timetabled in 
relation to the height o f the summer season and that as a result, the exhibition had only been 
financially rescued by the intervention of the Minister o f Popular Culture. (ASAC, Serie Verbali 
delle Adunanze del Comitato di Amministrazione dell’ Ente Biennale, vol. Ill, 28/01/35-30/01/43, 
session 22 June 1942).
88 Plant, Venice, Fragile City, p. 302.
89 Stone, The Patron State, p. 110.
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broadening of the consumer base and the increasing number of those participating 
in leisure activities lent new emphasis to the quantity of new attractions, shifting the 
focus away from the artistic quality of the cultural exhibits at the Biennale.90
In 1941, despite Italy being at war, Volpi argued that amongst the Biennale 
events, the Film Festival was ‘the most interesting’ since it was consistently able to 
attract foreign participants and visitors. According to Volpi, in Germany cinema 
halls were earning one thousand million marks per year, while in Italy, the 
predicted takings of the cinema industry in 1942 were still only one thousand 
million lire.91 It is striking that the success of the event was to be measured by the 
levels of audience attendance rather than artistic merit.92 Volpi was convinced that, 
in spite of the war, it was of absolute importance not to terminate a successful event 
such as the Cinema Festival and risk losing ‘the advantages achieved in previous 
years with the movement of art lovers and especially tourists’.93 At a meeting of 30 
January 1943, the emphasis of the Biennale entourage on the tourist importance of 
the festival was unchanged. It was clearly established as the most internationally 
renowned and glamorous of the arts events in Venice. Moreover, because it was 
staged in a short period which coincided with the tourist season, the festival served 
the ‘highly valuable function of drawing additional tourists to Venice and bringing 
great economic benefits to the city’.94 At the same meeting, Maraini explained to 
the members, the convenience, for economic reasons, of bringing forward the 
opening of the festival, in order to make it coincide with the very start of the
95summer season.
The connection between the municipality, the Biennale and the Ciga was 
embodied in the person of Giuseppe Volpi. In the 1930s, he accelerated the process 
of transformation of the city: the bridge over the lagoon was inaugurated, and the 
initiatives to turn the Lido into a centre of holiday entertainment were implemented 
with panache. The relaunching of the Lido as a glamorous resort can once again be
90 Ibid.
91 ASAC, Serie Verbali delle Adunanze del Comitato di Amministrazione dell’Ente Biennale, vol. 
Ill, 28/01/35-30/01/43, session 17 June 1941.
92 Ibid, session 22 June 1942.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid, session 30 January 1943.
95 Ibid.
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seen as indicative of the municipality’s desire to subdivide the Venetian area into 
zones of distinct economic development, a process inherent in the plan to realize 
the conception of Greater Venice?6
5.3 The Fascist intervention
In 1932, ‘the Biennale inaugurated the International Film Festival, screening 
forty films from nine nations and attracting 25,000 spectators. It showed two films 
per night for twenty nights, with the projections taking place on the seaside terrace 
of the Excelsior Hotel’.97 The order of the films shown was scheduled according to 
nationality, providing a similar organisational concept to that employed in many of 
the fine arts pavilions. The official charter claimed that ‘the enterprise ha[d], as one 
of its goals, the aim of recognising and rewarding those cinematographic works 
which tend[ed] towards authentic art expressions, without prejudice of nationality
98or genre’. From the start, the festival was characterised by variety and 
entertainment, presenting films in a range of languages and styles.99
According to Stone ‘the Venice Film Festival soon acquired a popular 
following, with attendance figures consistently high throughout the 1930s. In 1935, 
38,500 people attended; in 1936 there were 50,000 spectators and the 1937 festival
96 Ghigi, ‘L’olimpiade del Cinema’, in La Biennale di Venezia (ed.), Venezia 1932, p. 27.
97 Stone, The Patron State, p. 101.
98 As cited in Ghigi, ‘L’olimpiade del Cinema’, in La Biennale di Venezia (ed.), Venezia 1932, p. 
29.
99 At the Festival’s 1932 debut, Italy presented ‘Gli Uomini che Mascalzoni...’ by Mario Camerini. 
French showings included ‘A’ nous la liberte’ by Rene Claire, ‘Au nom de la loi’ by Maurice 
Tourneur, ‘David Golder’ by Julien Duvivier, ‘Hotel des Etudiants’ by Viktor Tourjansky, ‘Azais’ 
by Rene Hervil. German movies comprised Leni Riefenstahl’s ‘Das Blaue Licht’, Leontine Sagan’s 
‘Madchen in Uniform’, Erik Charell’s ‘Der Kongress tanzt’ and Anatole Litvak’s ‘Das Lied Einer 
Nacht’. Great Britain presented ‘The Faithful Heart’ by Viktor Faville while Poland participated 
with ‘Bialy Slad’ by Adam Krzeptowski. The Soviet Union’s movies included ‘Putevka v Zizn’ by 
Nikolaj Ekk and ‘Tichij Don’ by Olga Preobrazenskaja and Ivan Pravov. Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
however, it was American productions that dominated the inaugural event. ‘Doctor Jekyll and Mr. 
Hyde’ by Rouben Mamoulian, ‘The Champ’ by King Vidor, ‘Frankenstein’ by James Whale, ‘The 
Crowd Roars’ by Howard Hawks, ‘Bring ‘em back alive’ by Clayde E. Elliott, ‘The Sin of Madelon 
Claudet’ by Edgar Selwyn, ‘Forbidden’ by Frank Capra, ‘Grand Hotel’ by Edmund Goulding, ‘The 
Devil to Pay’ by George Fitzmaurice, ‘Strange Interlude’ by Robert Z. Leonard and ‘The Man I 
Killed/Broken Lullaby’ by Ernst Lubitsch, were all major draws at the Festival (Gianni Rondolino, 
‘Alla prima esposizione in mostra lo ‘stato’ del cinema’, in La Biennale di Venezia (ed.), Venezia 
1932, pp. 79-80) According to art critic Lorenzo Pellizzari, during the Fascist era, the Cinema 
Biennale was characterised by a general aversion to risk and experimentation and the dominant 
genres tended to be drawn from the commercial mainstream, maximising the festival’s popular 
appeal and commercial potential (Lorenzo Pellizzari, ‘Dalla terrazzo un solo grido: all ’arte!
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was visited by 36,000 viewers’.100 Yet, the pricing of a festival ticket, 5 lire, twice 
the price of a normal cinema ticket meant that the festival was aimed at an elite 
audience rather than the working class.101
Yet, for Doug Thompson, ‘the cinema, unlike the theatre or radio, was used 
to relatively little political effect by the regime, considering its vast potential. Here 
was a ready-made form of mass entertainment which, for the most part, served the 
regime in the negative sense of directing people’s minds away from the often harsh 
realities of their own lives into an escapist world of make-believe or entertainment 
for its own sake’.102 By the same token, the national government initially paid little 
or no attention to the Film Festival which was considered a totally Venetian 
concern bom of commercial imperatives and organized under local auspices. For 
Stone, ‘the total politicisation of the film festival came slowly’.103 Mussolini 
himself failed to appreciate the possibilities of cinema, expressing the opinion that 
‘the theatre was much more efficacious as an instrument of popular education’.104 It 
was also the case that at the first festival in 1932, just one Italian film, the Cines 
Company’s ‘Gli Uomini che Mascalzoni...’, was presented.105
Luciano De Feo, head of the Istituto Internazionale di Cinematografia 
Educativa, recalling the first editions of the Biennale Cinema underlined the 
‘freedom of choice’ that was possible at the time.106 After all, the festival’s official 
charter stated that the position of the Film Festival within the exhibition depended
• • 107 •upon the ‘exclusion of influences of an overtly political character’. This could 
naturally place restrictions on artistic freedoms but it could also have the effect of 
excluding any films with overtly Fascist themes. The festival’s atmosphere was 
instead characterised by the carefree spirit of menefreghismo, with Gerarchi and
all’arte!’, in La Biennale di Venezia (ed.), Venezia 1932, pp. 59-60).
100 Stone, The Patron State, p. 108.
101 Ibid, p. 105.
102 Thompson, State Control in Fascist Italy, p. 121.
103 Stone, The Patron State, p. 108. From 1934, the best Italian movies were prized with a Coppa 
Mussolini (La Biennale di Venezia (ed.), Venezia 32, 82, p. 70).
104 Thompson, ‘Organisation, fascistization and management o f theatre’, in Berghaus (ed.), Fascism 
and Theatre, p. 97.
105 Pellizzari, ‘Dalla terrazza un solo grido’, in La Biennale di Venezia (ed.), Venezia 1932, p. 63.
106 As cited in Ghigi, T’olimpiade del Cinema’, in La Biennale di Venezia (ed.), Venezia 1932, p. 
34: De Feo, ‘Ricordando le due prime edizioni’, L ’Eco del Cinema e dello Spettacolo', n. 78-79, 15 
and 31 August 1954.
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ceremonial uniforms conspicuous by their absence.108 The hasty organisation of the 
exhibition betrayed a somewhat marginal and semi-official initial status. Two 
weeks before the opening of the festival, the programme for the event was still 
unknown, and Maraini had to pressure De Feo to announce it as soon as possible. 
De Feo was actually forced to postpone the inauguration from the 1st to the 6th 
August, but on the 2nd August the calendar of events was still incomplete, and on 
the 4th Bazzoni informed Volpi that the programme was once again in need of 
modification.109 Even an insider like Elio Zorzi admitted that the preparation of the 
Cinema Festival was effectively an act of improvisation on the part of the Biennale 
entourage and the Istitutoper la Cinematografia Educativa.no
In 1932, despite formal requests from the Biennale administration and much
to the disappointment of the organisers, Mussolini had refused membership of the
festival’s honorary committee.111 Maraini himself had tried hard to convince him
through various telegrams and notes, a fact which provides another example of the
way in which the Biennale entourage sought formal recognition from the central
112government for the cultural events staged in Venice. Such acknowledgment not 
only granted legitimacy to the festivals concerned but also contributed to their 
financial security.
Significantly, however, the state did not provide funds for the Cinema 
Festival which was financed instead by the Biennale with the assistance of a loan 
from the Ciga worth 25,000 lire.113 The relatively little attention paid towards the 
exhibition by the Fascist authorities was also reflected in the composition of its 
executive committee which included only one political member, the Secretary
107As cited in Brunetta, ‘La citta del cinema’, in Isnenghi, Woolf, (eds.), Storia di Venezia, p. 2200.
108 Ghigi, Tolimpiade del Cinema’, in La Biennale di Venezia (ed.), Venezia 1932, pp. 34-5.
109 The problems went beyond the film programme itself. At the end o f July, the Theatre La Fenice 
refused to lend chairs for the festival because o f a forthcoming concert featuring the tenor, Schipa. 
Bazzoni had to appeal to various other cinemas in Venice and to the Provincial Dopolavoro to find 
extra ones (ASV, Gabinetto della Prefettura di Venezia, anni 1893-1936, pacco n. 4, busta ‘Mostra 
Cinematografica’).
110 Zorzi, ‘La Terza Mostra Mondiale della Cinematografia a Venezia’.
111 ASV, Gabinetto della Prefettura di Venezia, anni 1893-1936, pacco n. 4, busta ‘Mostra 
Cinematografica’.
112 Ibid.
113 Financial intervention from the state came afterwards.
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General of the National Fascist Federation of Spectacle, Nicola De Pirro.114 
Consequently, it tended to be the Biennale administrative board that pressed for 
more contacts with the government. In 1932, with the creation of a vacancy on the 
executive committee, Volpi, representing the interests of the Film Festival, 
persuaded Mussolini to appoint a member of the Council of Ministers, and 
suggested the Prefect of Venice Guido Beer. In the same manner, the Biennale 
invited cultural and political institutions to offer prizes and awards at the end of the 
exhibition.115
In the first days of July 1932, Volpi informed Giovanni Bettori of the 
Associazione Nazionale Fascista delle Industrie e dello Spettacolo (National 
Fascist Association of the Industries of Spectacle), that the Biennale wished to 
provide funding to those production companies which had presented the best films. 
The same invitations were directed to the president of S.I.A.E. (Italian Society of 
Authors and Editors), to the National Fascist Federation of Spectacle and the 
Podesta of Venice. Yet, the first Cinema Festival was concluded without any prizes 
being awarded.116 The objectives of the organisers can be understood if one 
considers a letter sent by the Biennale to the Minister of Corporations in 1932 
which argued that the Minister should ‘not stand aloof from the great competition
117but demonstrate his consent to the award of a trophy’. Through the institution of 
prizes offered by Fascist bodies, the Biennale hoped to involve a larger sector of the 
regime in the development of the new festival. The aim of the letter was also to
give a permanent character to the Cinema Festival, which explains why Maraini
• • 118 had been keen to stress the importance of the event imposing itself successfully.
Stone argues that the regime in the very beginning did not really take into 
consideration the Biennale Cinema Festival:
‘In 1934, in an effort to coordinate and stimulate national production (as well as to extract 
as much publicity as possible), the Film Festival became annual. In recognition of the
114 Francesco Bono, ‘Cronaca di una mostra senza orbace, censure e coppe di regime’, in La 
Biennale di Venezia (ed.), Venezia 1932, p. 104.
115 Ibid, p. 105.
116 Ibid.
117 Ibid.
118 Ibid.
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growing importance o f film to Fascism’s propaganda efforts, an Undersecretariat for 
Cinematography was opened in the Ministry of Popular Culture. Thus, the inauguration of 
the film festival anticipated by just over a year the regime’s first active intervention in film 
production and its establishment of the permanent undersecretariat to regulate both the 
private and state production and distribution of feature films. The Biennale mounted the 
festival with the aid of the L’Unione cinematografica educativa (Istituto Luce), the film 
studio established by the Fascist government in 1924 and, after 1934, administered by the 
Undersecretariat for Cinematography. The Biennale staff coordinated the technical aspects 
o f the show, while, after 1936, the Ministry o f Popular Culture organized and promoted the 
festival’.119
In 1935, Elio Zorzi was in the position to declare that a state law formally 
recognizing the festival would be greatly appreciated.120 It seems that, ‘for the 
majority of the 1930s, Venice was a portofranco for the international
1 9 1cinematographic culture’. Yet, according to Thompson, ‘there are very real signs 
that by the end of the 1930s just such a shift in awareness by the government was 
beginning to take place. From 1935 on the cinematographic industry was gradually 
passing more and more under Fascist control so far as its organisation was 
concerned’.122
Stone continues:
‘As the 1930s progressed, the content o f the film festival mirrored larger alterations in the 
regime’s attitude toward culture. After 1935, Fascism’s foregrounding o f the rhetoric of 
empire as a way of conveying messages about the nation and race was reflected in the 
prizes awarded: in this period the Biennale introduced a prize for ‘Best Colonial Film’ and 
films o f borhbastic propaganda began to receive the bulk of the prizes. (...) As part of its 
growing control over the creation and dissemination o f films, the Ministry o f Popular 
Culture under Dino Alfieri expanded the ministry’s role in the festival. A law of February 
13, 1936, severed the film festival from the Biennale and decreed it an ente autonomo -  an 
equivalent and autonomous legal status to the Biennale. As would happen to the Biennale 
itself within a year, the film festival was now run by committees o f appointed party and 
government officials. The head of the Department o f Cinema of the Ministry of Popular
119 Stone, The Patron State, p. 107-8.
120 Zorzi, ‘Bilancio consuntivo della Terza Mostra d ’Arte Cinematografica’.
121 Brunetta, ‘La citta del cinema’, in Isnenghi, Woolf, (eds.), Storia di Venezia, p. 2200.
122 Thompson, State Control in Fascist Italy, p. 123.
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Culture, the president of the LUCE, and the president of the Fascist National Federation of 
Entertainment Industries held government appointed posts at the film festival’.123
In Venice, things changed radically in the second half of the 1930s, with the 
development of a dramatically different atmosphere after 1937, when the Fascist 
regime finally revealed its own interest in the festival. The increasingly unstable 
and aggressive international climate of the late 1930s and Italy’s alliance with Nazi 
Germany forced the regime to strengthen its hold over the instruments and media of 
mass persuasion. Cinema, and therefore the Venice Film Festival, had come to be 
viewed as an effective way to convey political messages to the nation -not so much 
through feature films as through the newsreels that were shown alongside them and 
over which the regime could exert full editorial control.124
On 10 August 1937, at the inauguration of the exhibition, Dino Alfieri 
declared:
‘It is important to underline the value that the exhibition had acquired with merit through its 
annual progressive development. To have included within the cultural domain o f the 
Venetian summer season such an important international attraction constitutes a major 
achievement on the part of Senator Volpi to which the Minister pays tribute (...). This is 
why the Fascist government -through the organs created for the occasion -has undertaken 
and undertakes a constant action in order to obtain that the renowned Italian 
cinematography be expression o f the new civilization which bears the name of Benito 
Mussolini’.125
By 1938, ‘political exigencies came to overshadow aesthetic or audience- 
attracting concerns’, and the relative degree of freedom enjoyed by the juries 
suddenly disappeared. After 1937, Nazi Germany was repeatedly awarded the prize
for ‘Best Foreign Film’, and in 1940, the festival transformed itself into the
126Manifestazione cinematografica italo-germanica (Italian-German Film Festival).
123 Stone, The Patron State, pp. 109-10.
124 Nowell-Smith, ‘The Italian cinema under Fascism’, in Forgacs (ed.), Rethinking Italian Fascism, 
p. 149.
125 ASV, Gabinetto della Prefettura di Venezia, anni 1893-1936, pacco n. 4, busta ‘Mostra 
Cinematografica’.
126 Stone, The Patron State, pp. 109-10.
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Nonetheless, on a broader level, according to Philip Cannistraro, the regime 
never adopted a clear cultural policy towards cinema during the Ventennio}21 
Fascism was slow to appreciate the power of cinema as a medium of political 
propaganda despite its wide-ranging popularity as a form of entertainment amongst 
ordinary Italians.128 Similarly, Nowell-Smith insists upon the absence of distinct 
cultural directives in the Fascist period:129 ‘even with the centralization of industrial 
control there was still no artistic policy for the cinema formulated by the regime 
emanating from on high and transmitted via functionaries and cadres’.130 At least in 
the very beginning, Fascism did not feel the need to impose any ‘propagandists 
requirement over cinema’.131 When it did intervene in the field of cinematographic 
art it did so either through administrative censorship, or the Institute LUCE.132
Falasca-Zamponi claims that ‘Mussolini did not adopt particular measures 
with regard to cinema until late in the 1930s, although his regime acquired laws and 
regulations on it established by the liberal government, which first had to face the 
reality and implications of this new cultural medium’.133 For Brunetta, Fascism 
inherited all the censorship laws from the Giolittian era, and reinforced them 
through a Royal Decree of 24 September 1924. There followed, in the 1930s, an 
increase in the extent of government intrusion into all the mass media but especially 
cinema, which was placed under several new forms of control.134
A law of 18 June 1931 formalised state intervention to promote the national 
cinematographic industry. This was followed by the decree of 1933, which imposed 
upon all Italian cinemas the responsibility of screening at least one Italian film for 
every three foreign ones. ‘The State’, wrote Luigi Freddi, ‘has the right and the
127 Cannistraro, ‘II cinema italiano sotto il fascismo’, Storia Contemporanea, 1972, 3.
128 Falasca-Zamponi, Fascist Spectacle, p. 143.
129 Nowell-Smith, ‘The Italian cinema under Fascism’, in Forgacs (ed.), Rethinking Italian Fascism, 
p. 159.
130 Ibid, p. 149.
131 Brunetta, ‘La citta del cinema’, in Isnenghi, Woolf, (eds.), Storia di Venezia, p. 2201.
132 Ibidem, Cinema Italiano tra le due Guerre, p. 29. The creation of the Istituto Luce constituted the 
only early involvement of the regime providing a mass popular vision o f Fascism and its 
achievements in Italy and overseas through its newsreels and documentaries (Thompson, State 
Control in Fascist Italy, p. 122).
133 Falasca-Zamponi, Fascist Spectacle, p. 142.
134 Brunetta, Cinema Italiano tra le due Guerre, p. 29-32. It is significant that in 1930 the national 
production counted five movies, while, in 1942, it counted around one hundred and fifty. From 1936 
to 1940 there was an increase o f 50% in cinema attendance rates. It had taken around twelve years to
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duty to intervene in those areas concerning [cinema’s] ethical function and 
[commercial] well-being’.135 However, it was in 1934 that the most remarkable 
aspects of Fascist cultural politics were implemented. In this respect, the shift to the 
Ministry for the Press and Propaganda of the management of all cinematographic 
activities through the creation of a regulatory body called Direzione Generale per 
la Cinematografia, headed by Freddi, was of great significance. Additionally, the 
Centro Sperimentale per la Cinematografia was founded as an institute of both 
theoretical and practical research, providing full cinematographic, aesthetic and 
technical education to young directors, screenwriters, managers and technicians.136 
For the representatives of the first Congresso Nazionale Cinematografico, cinema 
now constituted ‘a vigorous means of national propaganda’.137
It is not the intention here to dwell upon the content of the films shown at 
the Biennale Film Festival as a means of measuring the extent of state influence. 
However, limited awareness of the history of Italian cinema has done little to dispel 
a number of misleading perceptions and assumptions. For Nowell-Smith,
‘Italian film has been depicted as a cinema of propaganda and ideologically motivated 
escapism -the propaganda being mainly in newsreels and documentaries, the escapism 
mainly in entertainment features. Recent research has cast serious doubt on the validity of 
this propaganda/escapism model even in the case o f Nazi Germany, and all the more 
strongly for Italy. (...) To the extent that the model is accurate, it is applicable also to 
cinema in the liberal democracies of the period. The focus of Italian films in the 1930s was 
predominantly domestic, set against a background of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois
concerns. There was no sense of a mobilized society and the lives represented on screen
were refreshingly normal’.138
It seems safe to argue that no distinctively Fascist ideology in a political 
sense emerged in the majority of Italian films in the period which implied, at most, 
passive support of the regime rather than the performance of an active role on its
establish those structures for the regulation o f Italian cinema control (Ibid, p. 41-2).
135 As cited in Cannistraro, T1 cinema italiano sotto il fascismo’, p. 430.
136 Brunetta, Cinema Italiano tra le Due Guerre, p. 43.
137 Ibid, p. 26.
138 Nowell-Smith, ‘The Italian cinema under Fascism’, in Forgacs (ed.), Rethinking Italian Fascism, 
pp. 142-3, 150.
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behalf. For Thompson, ‘Italian films remained largely what the cinema-going 
public seemed to prefer, namely the light, socially inconsequential forerunners of 
‘sitcoms’. So long as film makers avoided social criticism or alternative models of 
society to the Fascist absolute, they had more or less a free hand’.139
To conclude, the regime geared its attention towards the Cinema Festival in 
the second half of the 1930s, when Mussolini had expressed his wish ‘to go towards 
the people’, the international political situation was deteriorating, and there was 
therefore a need to forge a stronger totalitarian state through mass culture. Because 
cinema embodied one of the most effective means of propaganda, and the Venice 
Film Festival had acquired great popularity through which it could bestow 
credibility to Fascism on an international level, the regime wished to increase its 
control over it.
5.4 The construction of the Cinema Palace
Since the inauguration of the first Cinema Festival in 1932, the lack of a 
suitable venue for the event had proved a real problem for the Biennale 
administration. In 1936, by which time the festival had successfully established 
itself, the town council recognized that there was a need to build an indoor cinema 
pavilion in order to minimise the danger that the Biennale lose control of the event 
which had been hitherto held at the outdoor theatre of the Excelsior Palace.140
Volpi and Maraini took up different positions on the issue. Maraini, together 
with Luciano De Feo, was of the opinion that a brand new cinema pavilion should 
be constructed in S. Elena, within the Biennale Gardens, lending a geographic 
continuity to the Biennale events. The planned theatre pavilion would be capable of 
hosting 2,000 people, extending its potential audience beyond the social elites and 
enabling the participation of a wider audience drawn from all social classes (the 
Excelsior Palace could hold only 1,000 people per night of which 50% were meant 
to be Venetians).141 Maraini also wished to free the event from the control of 
strictly local interests such as the hotel industry.
139 Thompson, State Control in Fascist Italy, p. 123.
140 AMV, Verbali delle sedute della Consulta Municipale di Venezia, session 30 June 1936.
141 Ghigi, Tolim piade del Cinema’, in La Biennale di Venezia (ed.), Venezia 1932, p. 30.
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In contrast, Volpi, with his large economic stakes within the Ciga, was keen 
to keep the Film Festival at the outdoor theatre of the Hotel Excelsior. He argued 
that the audience would not like the idea of leaving the Lido beach in full summer 
to attend the festival in Venice. Moreover, he was not convinced that the Biennale 
Gardens in S. Elena were adequately provided for in terms of the necessary 
transport facilities, and they represented a far less appealing venue than the 
Excelsior which was a tourist attraction in its own right, and was capable of 
drawing numerous visitors to the Lido. Keeping the Film Festival at the Lido meant 
that it would remain part of the summer celebrations, part of the tourist industry, 
and of economic importance to the major hotels on the island.
Here, another clash between the representatives of the national interests 
(Maraini and De Feo) and the representatives of the local hotel industry (Volpi) is 
evident. While Maraini and De Feo wished to reach the highest number of cultural 
consumers through the Cinema Festival, and tie the event to the Biennale as a 
Fascist institution, Volpi aimed at satisfying an elite clientele, in tune with the most 
recent urban planning, where different sections of the Lido were dedicated to 
different kinds of economic activity within a broadly-based tourist industry.
Eventually, the municipality decided that a brand new pavilion should be 
built at the Lido, as part of the growing complex of leisure facilities beside the 
Municipal Casino. This was far closer to Volpi’s position, and by choosing the 
beach resort rather than the Biennale Gardens, the character of the Cinema Festival 
was more clearly defined as serving tourist rather than cultural interests. The initial 
hope for a building capable of housing 2,000 people was modified mainly for 
economic reasons. Estimated costs for the original project stood at 5 million lire, 
and another, less expensive plan was adopted. The new scheme envisaged the 
construction of a single projection hall, worth around 2.3 million lire, with a 
capacity of about 1,000 people, approximately the same as the existing outdoor 
facilities at the Excelsior Palace.142
On 7 June 1937, Volpi wrote to Achille Gaggia, one of the leading figures 
in the Ciga, about the proposed location of the cinema palace. Now that the
142 ASAC, Serie Cinema,‘Lavori 1937. Costruzione del Palazzo Cinema’.
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company and the Biennale would come closer, both Volpi and Gaggia agreed that 
the relationship between them needed to be carefully regulated. In particular, 
according to Volpi, the Biennale should cede land recently acquired from the state 
to the Ciga without charge. In return, the Ciga would build the cinema palace at its 
own expense, since the construction costs were beyond the financial capabilities of 
the Biennale administration.143 The cinema palace would then be committed to the 
Biennale’s activities during the film festival in August, while over the rest of the 
year, the Ciga could use the new facility for its own profit. ‘After all’, argued 
Volpi, ‘this initiative of the cinema that the Ciga is supporting is to benefit tourist 
interests in Venice, first of all’. Volpi also discussed the possibility of requesting a 
loan from the Banca del Lavoro which provided a branch specifically dedicated for 
cinema businesses and film production.144
Initially, the prospective sum of 5 million lire required by the Biennale 
administration for the construction of the cinema pavilion was to be subsidised as 
follows: 1) one million given by the Ciga as compensation for an equivalent 
amount paid to the company by the town council for the annual rent of the premises 
temporarily housing the casa da gioco at the Hotel Excelsior; 2) another million 
given as a gratuity by the Ciga; 3) three million lire given by the financial institutes 
(Istituti di Credito) with provisional funding. Furthermore, the Minister of Popular 
Culture had also decided to contribute to the costs of the cinema palace with
200,000 lire taken from the amount of 2 million lire that the Ministry expected to 
receive annually from the incomes of the casino, for a period of 14 years starting 
from 1 January 1938.
Under the terms of these proposals, the Venice Comune would become the 
sole owner of the cinema pavilion.145 This scheme changed dramatically when the 
Ciga offered to subsidize the cinema palace in its entirety. Volpi, after getting in 
touch with the Minister of Finance and the Director General of Tourism, discovered 
that the company could obtain excellent terms from the Credito Alberghiero if it
143 Ibid, ‘Lavori 1937’, dal n. 1 al n. 15, n. 1.
144 Ibid.
145 Ibid. As the pavilion was to become a property of the Venetian municipality, the latter was forced 
to pay annually a contribution o f 100,000 lire to the Biennale administration taken from the profits 
o f the Stazione di Cura, Soggiorno e Turismo (AMV, Determinazioni Podestarili, ‘Mutuo per il
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agreed to finance the whole enterprise. Volpi wrote to Achille Gaggia that, in his 
opinion, the Ciga could not hope for better conditions, as, in this way, the building 
would belong to the company as part of the Excelsior Palace, together with the 
terrace, the casino, the tennis courts and the swimming pool.146
These developments underlined the importance of the commercial stakes of 
the Ciga in the Cinema Festival. For public consumption, however, the company’s 
main emphasis was placed upon the moral value of the enterprise and the artistic 
interests of the citizens. According to the official convention, the Biennale 
administration was to communicate to the Ciga, three months in advance, the date 
of the inauguration of the cinema exhibition. By the same token, the Biennale was 
to pay the Ciga 15% of the gross income originating from the sale of the entrance 
tickets, and all the advertisements to be hung on the walls of the cinema palace 
were to be an exclusive right of the Ciga.147 It is also significant that all the 
electrical installation works at the cinema palace were to be undertaken by Volpi’s
14.8SADE company, for which the latter was to charge 14,316 lire. The newly built 
cinema palace was directly linked to the Ciga’s Excelsior Hotel, and engineers and 
other experts were provided by the company which managed all the contracts, the 
choice of the furniture and fabrics, and the settlement of bills.149
The role of the Biennale administrative board demonstrates the existence of 
a strong link with the Ciga, and the company specifically requested that the 
Biennale keep all correspondence with the various suppliers and the authorities. 
According to the Biennale executives, the Ciga, having undertaken the task of 
building the new cinema palace, reserved the right to deliberate and decide upon 
expenses. On the other hand, the former insisted that the board had always acted 
with the maximum respect for and deference to the decisions of the Ciga.150 In the 
same period, Volpi, in writing to Bazzoni, noted how the company, contributing for 
the main part to the creation of the cinema palace was ‘almost giving a present to
finanziamento del Palazzo del Cinema a Lido’, trim. Ill, 1938, n. 2204).
146 ASAC, Serie Cinema, ‘Lavori 1937’, dal n. 1 al n. 15, n. 2.
147 Ibid.
148 Ibid.
149 Ibid, ‘IV Esposizione d’Arte cinematografica. Costruzione del Palazzo Cinema’.
150 Ibid.
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the Biennale’,151 when, in fact, this ‘present’ was justified by the undoubted 
economic benefits that would accrue to the Ciga. That the company was so heavily 
involved in the project meant that the Film Festival would soon acquire an even 
stronger commercial identity than before, at the expense of its reputation as a 
predominantly cultural event. The Ciga would also retain a high degree of control 
over the production of the festival, while the continuing association with the 
Biennale would act as a kind of cultural veneer. Ultimately, the Ciga’s involvement 
and interests in the erection of the cinema palace can only be properly understood 
as a commercial venture dictated by economic interests.
The Podesta sanctioned the construction of the pavilion, underlining the 
need for supervision by the Minister of Popular Culture, of the ‘great international 
tourist and artistic resonance of the event organized by the Biennale and the 
immense benefit to the city of Venice’.152 That the cinema palace was there to serve 
tourist purposes is quite clear.153 Not only did the pavilion host the Film Festival 
after mid-August, but it would also be used during the entire summer to hold 
cultural events and amusements of various kinds. On these grounds, the Podesta
t h  fUordered the palace be opened from 15 June to 15 August in order to host twice- 
daily theatrical performances specially staged for the citizens of the Lido, ‘with the 
goal of livening up the life at the Lido and the summer season’. The management of 
the events was entrusted to the Theatre Malibran, and was to be controlled from the 
artistic point of view by the Secretariat of the festival. Should the new venture 
prove to be unsuccessful, the Podesta established that half of the loss be covered by 
the municipality and the other half by the casino.154
By the same token, it is significant that the Biennale administration in 1937
151 Ibid, ‘Lavori 1937. Costruzione del Palazzo Cinema’.
152 AMV, Determinazioni Podestarili, ‘Mutuo per il finanziamento del Palazzo del Cinema al Lido’, 
trim. Ill, 1938, n. 2204. Additionally, the Podesta noticed how the realization of the pavilion would 
enhance the value o f the municipal estates (Ibid).
153 On 4 June 1937, Volpi wrote to the Podesta Alvera: ‘Undoubtedly, this complex of buildings [the 
Cinema Palace] o f the new urban plan devised for the Lido retains an industrial character because it 
serves the purpose o f developing the cinematographic industry, and a cultural one at the same time 
because it tends to improve the tastes o f the audience for what is great in the international artistic 
production. I must add that the Film Festival does not have a speculative character but only aims at 
the tourist development o f the city o f Venice’ (ASAC, Serie Cinema, ‘IV Esposizione d’Arte 
cinematografica. Costruzione del Palazzo Cinema’).
154 AMV, Determinazioni Podestarili, ‘Rappresentazioni cinematografiche diume e serali al Palazzo
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was concerned, mainly for commercial reasons, with the delays afflicting the 
construction of the cinema palace. It was vital that the pavilion was completed for 
the beginning of the festival in August, as the 1937 summer season was particularly 
rainy and thus poor from the financial perspective of the tourist industry.155 To miss 
the beginning of the cinema exhibition in mid-August would have meant holding 
just a quarter of the screenings, with negative implications for the entire holidaying 
season at the Lido.156 Ciga takings of the late 1930s increased as a result of the 
construction of the Cinema Palace.157
Once again, economic matters had won over the imperative of ‘going 
towards the people’, and thus over ideological concerns. This is further proof of the 
ambiguous nature of cultural ev ents organized in Venice. They may well have 
incorporated Fascist ideology, yet the first target to be met was always the direct 
benefit of the local economy, with any contribution to Fascist ideological projects 
being very much a secondary consideration.
5.5 Moral ambiguity and the institution of the Municipal Casino
The establishment of a casino at the Lido and the codes of morality issued to 
regulate life at the beach resort in the 1930s (see following section) reveal the 
existence of a clash between Fascist ethics and the city’s need to further its identity 
as a site of leisure, bourgeois entertainment and summer carelessness of 
cosmopolitan flavour. The casino was blessed by the central government from the 
very beginning, indicating that the economic/tourist function of the institution and 
the prospect of additional revenues were far more important than any Fascist 
ideology of ‘productivism’ and ‘honest work’. As for behavioural codes on the 
seaside, records show that autarchy and nationalism should come to terms with 
local exigencies of healthy international relations and cosmopolitanism.
del Cinema al Lido’, trim. Ill, 1941, n. 1905.
155 Ibid.
156 ASAC, Serie Cinema, ‘Lavori 1937’, dal n. 1 al n. 15, n. 2.
157 In 1936, Ciga profits increased to 2,895,568 lire (Camera di Commercio, Industria e Artigianato 
di Venezia, Registro Ditte, I Fascicolo, n. 4905, ‘Compagnia Italiana dei Grandi Alberghi. Bilancio 
1936’). Despite the unfavourable international circumstances, in 1937, helped by the Tintoretto 
Exhibition, takings rose even more substantially to 4,245,446 lire (Ibid, ‘Bilancio 1937’). In 1938, 
they reached 5,773,465 lire (Ibid, ‘Bilancio 1938’).
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It has already been demonstrated that, in the 1930s, the town authorities 
hoped that the opening of a municipal casino at the Lido would contribute to the 
revitalization of the Venetian economy.158 In particular, the Comune di Venezia 
planned to inject new life into the tourist industries of Venice and the Lido as part 
of the Volpian politics of the Greater Venice.159 According to Bosworth, in 1931, 
Fulvio Suvich, president of the ENIT, had claimed that ‘Italian hotels needed easier 
access to credit and the state should also be more eager to sponsor those spettacoli 
which could attract foreigners, though it should avoid replicating such morally 
doubtful French diversions as gambling’.160 Despite Suvich’s warnings, in the 
1930s, gambling was indeed at the heart of the new Venetian tourist economy.161 In 
1936, La Gazzetta di Venezia reported how tourism in Venice was on the brink of a 
new crisis because of the decline in the number of holidaymakers in the lagoon.162 
For this reason, the Podesta addressed the Minister for the Interior, ‘stressing the 
vulnerable economic situation in Venice’, and portraying the question of the casino 
as a straightforward revenue issue.163 As he saw it, the heavy reliance of Venice 
upon tourism meant that a casa da gioco represented the best available new path to 
economic security.
However, a heated debate had emerged within the town council around the 
possible establishment of the casa da gioco as early as 1924. In those years, Davide
158 Sergio Barizza, II Casino Municipale di Venezia. Una Storia degli Anni Trent a, Venezia, 
Arsenale, 1988, p. 12 (Barizza is currently in charge o f the Archivio Municipale di Venezia). In 
1930, a Luna Park was constructed at the Lido with the aim of creating an entertaining place for all 
the tourists visiting the island. Again, the idea of building a Luna Park came from Nicolo Spada, 
founder o f the Ciga (Rizzi (ed.), ‘La costruzione del Luna Park’, Lido di oggi, anno III, n. 3, August 
1988, p. 110). It included a hall for concerts, a coffee bar, a theatre, gardens and an outdoor cinema 
hall to which the Ciga had contributed (AMV, Verbali delle sedute della Consulta Municipale di 
Venezia, session 21 September 1931).
159 Barizza, II Casino Municipale di Venezia, p. 12.
160 As cited in Bosworth, ‘Tourist planning in Fascist Italy’, p. 15.
161 According to Margaret Plant ‘the new Casino was advertised as ‘open all year round’ in an 
endeavour to attract its clients beyond summer; but summer was the season for the Lido; and it was 
in its heyday in the 1930s. New sporting facilities had been developed in 1929: there was a golf 
course at Alberoni designed by a Scottish expert, Cruikshank, and tennis courts at the Excelsior. Day 
and night life were perpetual spectacles, with not only guests, royalty, aristocracy and, increasingly, 
the new stars of film, but also Les Girls, who performed their acrobatics on the sand, and the night 
club Chez Vous’ (Plant, Venice, Fragile City, p. 303). Eventually, the town administration came to 
rely heavily upon the profits of the casino to balance its municipal budget (Barizza, II Casino 
Municipale di Venezia, p. 10).
162 Gino Bertini, ‘Autunno dorato a Venezia’, La Gazzetta di Venezia, 19 October 1936.
163 Plant, Venice, Fragile City, p. 302.
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Giordano persisted in his refusal to consider the launch of a casino either in Venice 
or at the Lido, regardless of the deepening post-war recession.164 Along with 
Giordano, several members of the town council believed that a casino might 
constitute a force for the moral corruption of the population, and they thought that 
the Lido could attract foreigners without the aid of amusements of that kind. Later 
the vice-Podesta Brass, claimed that many felt a sense of unease in thinking that 
the destiny of the Venetian population’s well-being depended upon incomes ‘of 
such nature’.165 Even if it was recognised that the casino was a necessary financial 
asset, a part of the town authorities would have preferred to find alternative sources 
of income. Vittorio Fantucci, for instance, was among those arguing that Venice
should live upon the proceeds of ‘honest work’ rather than the profits of
• 166gambling. On the other hand, Brass believed that the casino constituted a 
necessary financial measure to improve welfare, education, art and culture.167
Not surprisingly, Giordano and later Brass, Fantucci and other town council 
members were also against the widespread process of tourist development that took 
place at the Lido in the 1930s, and which could put the natural lagoon environment 
in danger. A totally different case was set out by councillors Alfredo Campione and 
Beppe Rava of the Ciga, who firmly backed the construction of additional tourist
1 ASattractions and infrastructure at the Lido.
Nonetheless, in 1936, Fantucci remarked that the government could not 
devolve any more contributions to Venice, and had no other choice but to institute 
the casa da gioco in order to help the city. The contentious nature of the issue was 
one of the reasons why it was eventually decided that the casino should be located 
in the Lido and not in Venice itself, and why Venetians were banned from 
gambling (a ban that was never strictly enforced though).169 It is significant that a 
Fascist regime was prepared to allow Venice to rely upon the proceeds of gambling 
and not ‘honest work’. However, the government permitted the creation of the
164 AMV, Davide Giordano, Relazione sulla amministrazione straordinaria del Comune di Venezia 
4 aprile 1923-July 1924, Venezia, 1924.
165 AMV, Verbali delle sedute della Consulta Municipale di Venezia, session 14 November 1928.
166 Ibid.
167 Ibid, session 6 July 1938.
168 Ibid, session 30 June 1936.
169 Ibid.
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casino in order to solve the apparent crisis of tourism in the city.170 It was far more 
important that Venice should start relying upon her own revenue generating 
potential, and a licensed and regulated casino could well provide the additional 
finances and tourist appeal so sought after by the town authorities.
Significantly, the charter for the management of the casa da gioco also 
established that the Ministry for the Press and Propaganda should benefit from the 
annual revenues earned by gambling, and in its first year of existence, the casino 
paid 469,526 lire to the Ministry.171 Casino administrators were also required to 
contribute to the tourist authorities, and were thus instructed to pay 300,000 lire per 
annum to the Ente Provinciale per il Turismo.172 According to the town council, 
incomes retained by the Ministry at the end of the 1930s were ‘piuttosto larghi’ 
(quite conspicuous),173 and on 23 May 1936, the Podesta Alvera expressed his 
concern to Minister Buffarini about this matter. Alvera was convinced that the 
participation of the state should be cut back and its share of the profits reduced to a 
more modest level. The Ministry instead was to become a ‘controller’ of the funds 
destined for tourism, sports and culture which involved both the Venice Comune 
and the management of the casino.174 In view of these new incomes, Fascism might 
well overlook the Tow morality’ of the casino and the Church’s protestations, and 
accept it as a body that could finance cultural and welfare activities in Venice.
Eventually, in 1936, the Venetian commune was granted by the state the 
same rights for tourist development as San Remo. With the Royal Decree 16/07/36 
n. 1404,175 it was decided that Venice could host a casino with various related 
attractions, under the control of the Provincial Committee for Tourism presided 
over by Count Ludovico Foscari.176 The national government desired that the
170 Ibid, session 15 October 1938.
171 AMV, Determinazioni Podestarili, ‘Quota di compartecipazione del Ministero per la Stampa e la 
Propaganda ai proventi del casino’ municipale’, trim. Ill, 1936, n. 2412.
172 Ibid, ‘Variazioni al bilancio preventivo del comune per l’esercizio 1941’, trim. II, 1941, n. 936.
173 AMV, Verbali delle sedute della Consulta Municipale di Venezia, session 27 October 1938.
174 Barizza, II Casino Municipale di Venezia, p. 23. In order to obtain better conditions, the 
municipality set out to outline a kind o f cahier des doleances which exposed the economic problems 
afflicting the city (according to the report, embroidery and glassware production were both 
experiencing difficulties, Porto Marghera was not meeting expectations, and Venice was the only 
large Comune in Italy to reveal a balance of payments deficit) (Ibid).
175 Barizza, II Casino Municipale di Venezia, p. 9.
176 Bertini, ‘Autunno dorato a Venezia’. According to Barizza, the move embodied the ‘apex’ of the
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institution open for business as soon as was practicable in order to increase levels of 
tourism in Venice, and thus relieve the difficult economic situation. After all, as the 
Podesta had declared to Minister Buffarini on 1 February 1936, Venice not only 
represented an invaluable means of ‘projecting Italy’ to overseas visitors but was 
also the foremost national tourist attraction.177 A provisional casa da gioco was 
therefore set up at once by the Ciga within the premises of the Hotel Excelsior178 
for which the municipality paid 100,000 lire on a monthly basis (in the first year the 
rent had been established at a symbolic 1 lira per month).179 In the meantime, the 
Venice Comune had guaranteed the construction of permanent venues for the new 
casino, a summer one at the Lido and a winter one in Venice (despite initial 
scepticism surrounding the location of gambling in the city). For the winter 
location, ‘the Commune had acquired a number of distinctive buildings that were 
considered as possible venues: the list is interesting in its own right, including the 
Grand Hotel Gritti, the Palazzo Labia (celebrated for its frescoes by Tiepolo), the 
Palazzo Grassi (acquired from Giancarlo Stucky) and the Palazzo Giustinian’.180
According to the official convention, the licensees were asked by the 
municipality to run the casino ‘in a luxurious manner’, hosting daily entertainment 
shows and small concerts, and the programme of events was to be worked out 
together with members of the municipality. This furthers the thesis that the area 
around the Grandi Alberghi was destined to elite tourism. Also, licensees were 
required to contribute to the production of tourist propaganda for Venice and the
Lido.181 Personnel working at the casino had to be of Italian nationality and
182members of the Fascist Syndicates of the city of Venice. The Ciga also resolved 
itself to grant money earned from gambling to the construction of a new pavilion 
for the Biennale Cinema where profits deemed ‘immoral’ were channelled into an
politics o f the Greater Venice pursued by Volpi (Barizza, II Casino Municipale di Venezia, p. 9).
177 AMV, Verbali delle sedute della Consulta Municipale di Venezia, session 5 maggio 1936.
178 Ibid.
179 AMV, Determinazioni Podestarili, ‘Accelerazione lavori per ultimazione casino municipale’, 
trim. IV, 1937, n. 2528. ‘The Excelsior had its own gaming rooms in the 1920s, fashionably hung 
with fabrics designed by Mariano Fortuny’ (Plant, Venice, Fragile City, p. 302).
180 Plant, Venice, Fragile City, p. 302.
181 AMV, Determinazioni Podestarili, ‘Casino Municipale. Norme di esecuzione della convenzione 
per la gestione’, trim. I, 1940, n. 1759.
182 Ibid, ‘Provvedimento per lo sviluppo turistico veneziano’, trim. Ill, 1936, n. 1487.
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institution —the Cinema Festival- of high cultural and moral standard.183
With work on the winter venue underway in the Palazzo Giustinian in 
Venice, the town council approved a project for the construction of a permanent site 
for the casino at the Lido (in 1937 the state, under pressure from the Church, halted 
the refurbishment of Palazzo Giustinian, and gambling would henceforth only take 
place at the Lido).184 The project entailed the purchase of the ex-fortress ‘Quattro 
Fontane’ (deemed suitable because of its proximity to the Excelsior Palace) and the 
construction of the casa da gioco as well as a new cinematographic pavilion.185 On 
26 June 1936, the municipal administration applied again to the Government 
General Authority for the right to acquire the ex-fortress. Part of the area was to be 
let for thirty years to the Ente Biennale for the permanent cinema pavilion after
which all the buildings put in place by the Ente would pass into municipal
186ownership. In 1937, the Minister of Finance permitted the conclusion of the deal
between the State and the Venice Comune, and the Ente Biennale obtained part of
the area on which the ex-fortress ‘Quattro Fontane’ was built.187 The Fascio di
Lido, following the construction of the new casino was compelled to let out the
sports courts at ‘Quattro Fontane’ for which it sought compensation of 10,000 lire
from the municipality, meaning that even local Fascism was subject to the changes
1 88required by the new urban planning and the development of elite tourism.
According to Margaret Plant, ‘the casino would eventually be positioned as 
the central building in a large piazza fronting onto the sea, with the Cinema Palace
189to the left and the open-air cinema to the right; a loggia linked the buildings’, 
representing both symbolically and physically, the bond between upper-class 
entertainment and commodified cultural activities. The project would ultimately 
bring about a concentration of leisure adjacent to the Ciga chain of hotels, and as
183 Ibid, ‘Concessione d’uso al comune da parte della Compagnia Italiana dei Grandi Alberghi’, trim. 
IV, 1936, n. 716.
184 Barizza, II Casino Municipale di Venezia, p. 13.
185 AMV, Determinazioni Podestarili, ‘Lavori di sgombero terreno e demolizione dell’ex forte di 
Quattro Fontane al Lido’, trim. IV, 1936, n. 502.
186 AMV, Verbali delle sedute della Consulta Municipale di Venezia, session 24 March 1937.
187 AMV, Determinazioni Podestarili, ‘Acquisto dell’Ex-Forte di Quattro Fontane di Lido’, trim. Ill, 
1937, n. 2553.
188 Ibid, ‘Indennizzo al Fascio di Lido per forzato abbandono campo sportivo a Quattro Fontane’, 
trim. II, 1937, n. 1662.
227
soon as the casino was completed, the tourist appeal of the area would be further 
enhanced with the construction of brand new bathing facilities.190 It is significant 
that in all these projects, the Ciga was constantly involved alongside the Venice 
Comune.191 In particular, Alfredo Campione, a member of the Consulta Municipale 
and a representative of the Federazione Commercianti acted as a liaison between 
the company and the municipality.192
In the event, gambling successfully served all the tourist purposes it had 
originally been intended to promote. During a town council meeting in 1938, the 
Podesta declared that, despite the political controversy, the casino, the functioning 
of which was controlled by the Provincial Committee for Tourism,193 had clearly 
benefited the tourist industry, and had contributed to the development of other 
similar initiatives such as the new cinema pavilion. According to the Podesta, it had 
also stimulated a turnover of capital which had directly benefited the Venetian 
population on a number of levels.194
In 1940, according to the municipal accounts, the main source of income 
was still constituted by the profits of the casa da gioco (35 million lire).195 Thus, 
when the war forced the casino’s closure in 1941, the local administration was 
desperate for the central government in Rome to provide an alternative source of 
revenue. The Podesta admitted that since the casino had ceased operations, tourism 
at the Lido had virtually stopped. The wealth created by gambling, it was argued, 
had been the decisive factor in keeping the municipality afloat financially up to that 
point.196 The case of the casino helps us to understand the functioning of the 
various branches of the cultural machinery in Venice, and how it further expanded 
to allow more cultural diversification and welfare activities funded by the leisure 
industry.
189 Plant, Venice, Fragile City, p. 305.
190 AMV, Determinazioni Podestarili, ‘Turismo. Materiale arredamento capanne e stabilimenti in 
zona casino’, trim. Ill, 1939, n. 2042.
191 Barizza, II Casino Municipale di Venezia, p. 14.
192 Ibid.
193 200,000 lire had been confined to the ‘rebirth’ of the traditional Venetian Carnival (Barizza, II 
Casino Municipale di Venezia, p. 23).
194 AMV, Verbali delle sedute della Consulta Municipale di Venezia, session 15 October 1938.
195 Other incomes corresponded to various taxes and revenues.
196 AMV, Verbali delle sedute della Consulta Municipale di Venezia, session 22 October 1940.
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Once the casa da gioco had been established at the Lido, profits from 
gambling were channeled towards additional ‘good causes’ activities, and were 
used to develop other cultural initiatives, including a budget for the revival of 
traditional festivals and other attractions, such as open air theatrical and musical 
events. The town council had recognised that such contributions were the only way 
of justifying the existence of a casino in the eyes of Venetians and of the regime. 
Cultural events of ‘high’ educational standard could counterbalance the low 
morality of the casa da gioco, in tune with the wishes of the central government. It 
must be mentioned that the state had in fact allowed the city of Venice to open it 
only upon some precise conditions: that the municipality found a seat for the casa 
da gioco of the standard of the most luxurious ones already existing in Europe; that 
the municipality created a series of tourist attractions around it; that its management 
undertook the restoration of La Fenice Theatre (which had been recently acquired 
by the Venice Comune); that the municipality established a welcoming centre for 
foreign tourists; and that it participated in the construction of a new bathing 
establishment in the area next to the casino.197 This project would cost the city of 
Venice around 41 million lire.198 Not only was the regime backing the development 
of elite tourism in the area of ‘Quattro Fontane’ at the Lido, it was also pushing the 
city to use the casino profits for the renovation of eminent cultural venues.
Most importantly, the Carnival and the Theatre La Fenice benefited from 
casino revenue.199 At the beginning of 1941, when the Ente Autonomo Teatro La 
Fenice needed extensive subsidies for refurbishment, the bulk of the money came 
from the profits of gambling.200 The Podesta issued a decree forcing the licensees to 
settle nearly 11,000 lire in favour of La Fenice.201 After all, the revitalisation of the 
old theatre was considered by the Venetian municipality as being part of the central 
nucleus of the ‘new tourist life’ of Venice, and the revenue of the casino was seen 
as a vital ingredient of any project to re-establish the venerable theatrical
197 Ibid, session 6 July 1938.
198 AMV, Alvera, II Bilancio del Comune di Venezia e le Opere Realizzate dal 1930 al 1938, 
Venezia, 1938.
199 Ibid-
200 AMV, Determinazioni Podestarili, ‘Lavori di restauro al Teatro La Fenice richiesti dall’Ente 
Autonomo del teatro’, trim. I, 1941, n. 354.
201 Ibid, ‘Mutuo di 12.000.000 di lire con la SAVIAT’, trim. Ill, 1938, n. 1907.
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* • • 202  >institution. The Podesta also asked to see additional artistic initiatives promoted 
as part of the new La Fenice. As a result, a certain sum was set aside for the 
organisation of a concert season after refurbishment was completed.203
The phenomenon of the proceeds of gambling being used to finance more 
serious cultural events and institutions went further, and it was officially decided 
that every year the casa da gioco should subsidise the theatre to the tune of one 
million lire.204 Of this sum, 700,000 lire were devolved to the ordinary management 
of the institution while the rest was to cover restoration expenses.205 The patterns of 
cultural revitalization also involved working with a network of existing theatres 
scattered around Venice. For example, on 25 September 1936, the concessionary 
society of the casino signed an agreement with UN AT (Unione Nazionale dell’Arte 
Teatrale) establishing that the former should grant to the Theatre Goldoni 107,000 
lire for the drama seasons of 1936-37, 1937-38, and 1938-39, contributing to 
refurbishment costs and allowing the most renowned theatre companies to stage 
their plays there.206
Other high culture events such as the Biennale Music and Theatre festivals
907also received financial support from the casino. Indeed, its contributions were
considered so important that upon its wartime closure, officials in Venice expressed
* 208deep concerns about the future funding of the Biennale activities. According to 
the town council, the failure of the festivals in the early 1940s was due, not only to 
lack of interest on the part of the audience, but also to the absence of the guaranteed 
sum of 50,000 lire previously provided by gambling.209
The whole spectrum of cultural activities was covered by the casino 
revenue: it was not just supporting fine arts and high culture but also mass culture,
202 AMV, Verbali delle sedute della Consulta Municipale di Venezia, session 18 May 1938. T he 
Fenice renovations proceeded under the direction o f Eugenio Miozzi, with Nino Barbantini in 
charge o f interior decoration’ (Plant, Venice, Fragile City, p. 302).
203 Barizza, II Casino Municipale di Venezia, p. 13.
204 AMV, Verbali delle sedute della Consulta Municipale di Venezia, session 30 June 1936.
205 AMV, Determinazioni Podestarili, ‘Provvedimenti per lo sviluppo turistico veneziano’, trim. Ill, 
1936, n. 2351.
206 Barizza, II Casino Municipale di Venezia, p. 13.
207 Royal Decree 11 November 1938, n. 1844.
208 ASAC, Serie Verbali del Comitato di Amministrazione dell’Ente Biennale, vol. Ill, 28/01/35- 
30/01/43, session 17 December 1940.
209 Ibid.
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in keeping with the regime’s desire of spreading its propaganda and ‘going towards 
the people’. In this light, the mass media, especially radio and cinema, benefited 
greatly from the existence of the casa da gioco. In 1936, the town council discussed 
the possibility that a sum could be taken from its profits to support Italian cinema, 
in the expectation that this would contribute to the success of the annual Biennale 
Film Festival.210 Thus, when the festival registered losses in 1939, the Biennale 
administration made a request to the Minister for Press and Propaganda to cover
their expenses, on the basis that the Ministry was partly subsidized by the casino
211itself. Soon afterwards, the Podesta decreed that the casa da gioco should devote 
two million lire annually to the Ente Nazionale per la Cinematografia Educativa 
and 500,000 lire to the arrangement of art shows in the city.212 Articles 14 and 15 of 
the Royal Decree 17 November 1927, had established that every seaside resort 
should benefit, on an annual basis, to the national radio broadcast, with the amount 
of the contribution determined by the size of the existing bathing establishments. In 
1937, it was decided that the sum owed by the Venetian municipality (1,100 lire 
payable to the Intendenza di Finanza) should be taken from the balance of the casa
*71 Tda gioco. In 1939, the Regio Istituto d ’Arte of Venice developed a project for the 
establishment of a school of stage design. Again, the funds were to be drawn from 
the profits of gambling.214
The Venetian casino came to rank alongside other philanthropic institutions 
through its support of local artists, although it tended to do this only for those 
affiliated with the Fascist Syndicate of Fine Arts. Thus, by promoting the 
membership of a Fascist organisation, the casino also indirectly established itself as 
a Fascist institution. In such ways, it succeeded, at least in part, to dispel its image 
of amorality and decadence. In 1937, the Podesta referred to a letter sent on 4 June
210 AMV, Verbali delle sedute della Consulta Municipale di Venezia, session 30 June 1936.
211 ASAC, Serie Verbali del Comitato di Amministrazione dell’Ente Biennale, vol. Ill, 28/01/35- 
30/01/43, session 16 May 1940.
212 AMV, Determinazioni Podestarili, ‘Provvedimenti per lo sviluppo turistico veneziano’, trim. Ill, 
1936, n. 1409. The casino’s official charter, instead, had not mentioned ‘art shows in general’, but 
‘important outdoor theatre and musical events’ (Ibid, ‘Provvedimenti per lo sviluppo turistico 
veneziano’, trim. Ill, 1936, n. 2351).
213 Ibid, ‘Turismo. Contributo obbligatorio per la radiofonia anno 1937’, trim. IV, 1936, n. 347.
214 Ibid, ‘Convenzione fra l’Ente Autonomo del Teatro La Fenice e il Regio Istituto d’ Arte di 
Venezia per la istituzione di una scuola di scenografia’, trim. II, 1939, n. 1498.
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by the Prefect of Venice, directing his attention towards the difficult position of 
Venetian artists. According to the Podesta, the condition of the housing market in 
Venice was so bad as to make the application of the ‘2% law’ impossible.215 
Nonetheless, it was necessary to come to the aid of those struggling artists in a 
period in which the economic situation was particularly problematic. Therefore, the 
Podesta decided that the managers of the casino should establish a special fund of
25,000 lire in order to purchase the works of artists who were members of the 
Syndicates of Fine Arts of Venice, and who had been resident in the city for at least 
one year. Once the works of art had been finished, they could be ceded to the 
syndicates which were in charge of their sale to the public.216 The fund was set up 
every year with various sums; however, in 1941, during wartime, SAVIAT, the 
managing company of the casino, still devolved 25,000 lire in favour of needy, 
talented artists.217 The casino, therefore, could act to assist the Fascist cause. It did 
so in 1937, when an agreement was established between the town council and the 
Provincial Fascist Federation, determining that part of the expenses incurred by the 
federation for charity works should be covered by contributions from the casino.218 
On another occasion, the Podesta granted 200,000 lire drawn from the casino 
budget to the Provincial Federation of the Fasci di Combattimento, to be used for 
the development of the seaside camps and welfare activities for children.219
Finally, the question of casino funding for social and cultural projects was 
also applied to the direction of urban planning in the Lido in the 1930s. The 
SAVIAT was obliged by the terms of its official charter to provide accommodation
for the local population of the island. In view of this, it created a property company
220for the management of the future new houses.
215 The ‘2% law’ decreed that 2% of sums destined to public buildings should be devoted to the 
city’s arts projects.
216 AMV, Determinazioni Podestarili, ‘Provvedimenti a favore degli artisti veneziani’, trim. Ill, 
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1940, n. 1759.
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In such ways, a series of connections were established in Venice linking the 
interests of leisure-oriented and cultural tourism. On one hand, culture, in the form 
of exhibitions, concerts and public celebrations, was to serve tourism in the manner 
discussed in previous chapters, on the other, institutions of tourism and 
entertainment such as the casino, were intended to contribute to the funding of 
additional cultural, activities and social reforms. The casino was founded with the 
primary aim of relieving the shortcomings of the Venetian economy. Once again, 
little room was left for ideological factors; the final goal remained the economic 
well-being of Venice, rather than the ‘nationalisation of the masses’. Despite the 
fact that the municipality and the casino itself were connected to and sought the 
approval and participation of the central government, this partnership with Fascism 
did not bring with it the subservience of the town authorities to the ideological 
objectives of the regime.
5.6 The Lido between Fascist ideology and cosmopolitanism
Gian Piero Brunetta has argued that ‘while Rome increasingly identifi[ed] 
itself with the spirit of Fascism, Venice remain[ed] a bridge to the world, the most
9 9  1open and cosmopolitan place in Fascist Italy’. It was certainly true that the Lido 
was part of a Fascist state and subject to the ideological demands and consensus 
building efforts of the regime. It was also true, however, that it stood first and 
foremost as a renowned beach resort of international prestige, and that this identity 
was incompatible with any attempt to impose Fascist norms of nationalism and 
behaviour. To acknowledge all the laws on costumes and morality issued for other
Italian cities would simply be to erect barriers to the successful development of the
' 222 cosmopolitan tourist atmosphere upon which the Lido depended.
nearby Venice, as the city was going through a period o f severe economic depression (Ibid, 
‘Variazioni al bilancio preventivo del comune per l’esercizio 1941’, trim. II, 1941, n. 936). Venetian 
officials also discussed the fact that the pigeon shooting facilities at the Lido were funded by the 
municipal casino to the tune o f 250,000 lire. According to Gino Damerini, this was a sum that would 
have been better employed in the restoration o f Goldoni’s house or the library at the Correr museum 
(AMV, Verbali delle sedute della Consulta Municipale di Venezia, session 18 October 1939). Under 
pressure, SAVIAT promised to grant 180,000 lire to the upkeep o f the Palazzo Giustinian (Ibid, 
session 29 May 1940).
221 Brunetta, ‘La citta del cinema’, in Isnenghi, Woolf, (eds.), Storia di Venezia, p. 2195.
222 According to the Ciga, the so-called ‘industry o f the foreigner’ represented the third most
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For example, on 18 July 1929, the head of police administration of Venice 
wrote to the Prefect Gianni Bianchetti informing him of how the Podesta Ettore 
Zorzi, on 24 June, had been ordered to hang on the walls a public notice containing 
some regulations to be observed by tourists at the Lido, both at the seaside and in 
public streets.223 Numerous hotelkeepers then complained to the police office 
because policemen, acting under this order, had fined ‘honest citizens’.224 To make 
matters worse, Casattini, the President of the Consorzio Alberghi di Lido, 
complained to Zorzi, who replied that he had simply been following the specific 
directives received from Rome, 225 after the intervention of Cardinal La Fontaine.226
In view of this, on 19 August 1929, the General Direction of State Police of 
the Ministry of the Interior, hoping to restore a degree of common sense to the 
policing of Venice, wrote to the Prefect of Venice demanding an end to excessive 
interference with the prosperous tourist trade in the Lido, and by extension with the 
well being of the national economy. Some months later, the Prefect contacted 
Zorzi, warning him that, while it was important to follow instructions coming from 
Rome, it was also vital not to place any interpretation upon them which might lead 
to tourists deciding to take their custom elsewhere.
On 4 July 1932, Alfredo Campione thanked Prefect Bianchetti for having 
adopted a more flexible position on the question of regulating morality and 
behaviour at the Lido. ‘After all’, argued Campione, ‘the Lido beach resort retains
important contributor to the Italian national economy. The Ciga also welcomed the deals that Volpi, 
as Minister o f Finance, had struck with Great Britain and the United States because without ‘sincere 
cordiality and reciprocal faith, it [was] not possible to think about tourist development’. 
Internationalism, cosmopolitanism and political stability were essential if sufficient tourist numbers 
were to be attracted to Venice and the Lido. (Camera di Commercio, Industria e Artigianato di 
Venezia, Registro Ditte, I Fascicolo, n. 4905, ‘Compagnia Italiana dei Grandi Alberghi. Verbale di 
Assemblea, 8 aprile 1926’).
223 The regulations forbade: to wear bathing dresses at restaurants; to dance on the beach; women to 
wear bathing gowns above the knees; to have common changing shelters for men and women; to 
play or listen to music on the beach; to drink alcohol on the beach or the streets; any violent or 
harassing behaviour (ASV, Gabinetto della Prefettura di Venezia, anni 1893-1936, pacco n. 44, 
busta ‘Stazioni balneari e invemali. Disposizioni di massima. Tutela della moralita’).
224 ASV, Gabinetto della Prefettura di Venezia, anni 1893-1936, pacco n. 44, busta ‘Stazioni 
balneari e invemali. Disposizioni di massima. Tutela della moralita’.
225 However, according to the head o f police administration, Count Zorzi had made clear that in that 
period Venice did not need foreigners so much and if those foreigners, annoyed by the new 
regulations, should choose to leave the Lido, Venice would have surely earned her living from 
alternative commerce and industries (Ibid).
226 Ibid.
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special conditions compared to other Italian cities, and to foreign competitors any 
pretext is good to keep away tourists from the island’.228 One month later, the 
General Direction of State Police contacted Bianchetti. Apparently, the 
Commissariat for Tourism had informed the Minister of the Interior of the manner 
in which the Lido was being monitored. The Minister was of the opinion that the 
style of policing was inspired by a drive towards excessive discipline rather than 
any genuine need to regulate public morality at the Lido. Moreover, they contrasted 
the current situation with the general order issued on 12 June 1929, in which the 
Minister had demanded sensible monitoring in order to avoid any unnecessary 
authoritarian approaches that might damage the national economy. The Minister 
subsequently contacted the head of police administration to clarify the nature of the 
instructions handed down by the central government.229
In the meantime, the English press had started a campaign about tourist 
regulations at the Lido. An article in the Evening Standard on 24 June 1932 entitled 
‘The Lido in peril’ reported that
‘The sudden ban on dancing and the wearing o f bathing-dress at meals at restaurants at the 
Lido, is I imagine, a part o f Mussolini’s purity crusade. The Duce has already abolished 
night life in Rome, as seen in the absence o f the dance clubs, cabarets and supper 
restaurants which once flourished in the capital. He has also ‘cleaned up’ the once beggar 
and tout-infested city of Naples. His Spartan prohibition of roulette and other gambling 
games at San Remo, in spite of the consequent loss to the state Treasury, has resulted in 
making that once lively little rival to Monte Carlo as quiet as the grave. And now, at the 
beginning of the summer season, Mussolini has forced the Venetian authorities to issue 
their Draconian decree against dancing and laxity in dress at the Lido. The result will be, I 
predict, a sudden discovery by the Lido-lovers o f previous years that a disagreable odour 
rises on hot summer evenings from the shallow lagoons, and the popularity of the Lido will 
wane as suddenly as it waxed.230
Another article published in the Daily Herald of 25 June 1932, entitled ‘He 
and she must meet in the sea’ provides another example of this campaign against
the regulations im posed upon the Lido:
‘Women’s bathing costumes with skirts down to the knees; segregation of men’s and 
women’s bathing machines, so that the sexes can only meet in the water; no dancing in 
bathing costumes.
These are three o f the revolutionary regulations just promulgated for the Venice Lido and 
other Italian seaside resorts by the Italian Home Office, acting under strong pressure from 
the Vatican. Managers o f bathing establishments and the general public are furious at the 
new rules, which will substitute the cumbrous bathing suits of a generation ago for the 
fairy-like decolletes of today. Many protests have been received from foreign visitors at the 
Lido, where new regulations have just been posted up. Not only must bathing machines for 
women be placed at considerable distance from those occupied by men, but persons not 
fully clothed are not allowed to frequent the neighbouring cafes or walk in the 
neighbourhood.231
On 26 June, the Evening Standard continued its campaign reporting that
‘The authorities at Venice have prohibited dancing and taking meals in bathing costumes at 
the Lido bathing resort. It was the Lido that set fashion in ‘bathing costumes holidays’, in 
fact, it has become the ‘thing’ for other resorts to call their bathing beaches ‘the so and so 
Lido’. Every day in the season the terraces on the pleasure island in the Venetian lagoon 
have been thronged with holiday makers in the gayest and most daring o f beach costumes. 
The island is reached by steamer in about ten minutes, and it has become the most beautiful 
and fashionable bathing resort in Italy. The season begins in May and finishes in October, 
but the best months are May, June and September. The beach has fine sand and the water is 
only a foot or two deep for a long way out. Brightly decorated tents and cabins stretch for a 
mile or two along the seashore. In London today we are much more broadminded. At 
Serpentine, ‘London’s Lido’ bathers in costume can take light refreshment in a tent and sun 
themselves on the bank’.232
On 27 June 1932, representatives of the Ciga had written to the Prefect of
Venice that ‘the defamatory campaign emanating from the English press was 
causing great damage to the Lido’, and recommended that the Minister of the
230 Evening Standard, 24 June 1932.
231 ‘He and She must meet in the sea’, Daily Herald, 25 June 1932.
232 ‘Venice surprise. Italian resort that set the fashion’, Evening Standard, 26 June 1932.
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Interior issue orders so as to avoid the possibility that foreign countries could use 
the rules for morality issued by the Italian government as a weapon to discredit the 
Venetian municipality.233 Similar concerns were expressed by the Podesta, who 
also warned about the effects of the overseas press reporting. From these accounts it 
is clear that for the city of Venice, the image of subjection to Fascist laws and codes 
of behaviour had inflicted great harm to the international prestige of the Lido. The 
island needed to be seen to be a free and open place if wished to remain a popular 
holiday destination. According to Marco Fincardi, therefore, Venetian tourism and 
the Biennale festivals remained something of an island of liberalism and 
cosmopolitanism in a country under the influence of provincial moral codes and 
police controls. Tf in the OND circles Mussolini had demanded that cultural 
programs did not reflect any foreign influence’, wrote Fincardi, ‘in the hotel 
terraces and gardens at the Lido, guests danced to rhythms which were anything but 
autarchic’.234
In wartime, the problem of morality at the holiday resorts became even 
more acute. One Roman newspaper even complained that the spirit of Rome and of 
a Fascist and warlike Italy was utterly absent in Venice, adding that ‘in the 
nightmare of the war, the city stood passive and immobile with its numerous
235tourists expending their energies on mere trivialities’. As for the Venice 
Biennale, the Patriarch noticed how sixty-four salons were filled with still life 
paintings, landscapes and portraits, indicative of a ‘frightening void of spiritual and 
civic duty’ and an anti-religious and anti-national art. With Mussolini constantly 
announcing that war was at hand, in Venice there appeared to be extraordinarily 
few artists coming to terms with the martial spirit of the age. At the Biennale, there 
were a small number of participants capable ‘of interpreting the essence of the 
grandeur of Rome, and exalting her role in the conclusive act of the Fascist 
Revolution’.236
It was in this atmosphere of national moral anxiety that, on 9 July 1942, the
233 ASV, Gabinetto della Prefettura di Venezia, anni 1893-1936, pacco n. 44, busta ‘Stazioni 
balneari e invemali. Disposizioni di massima. Tutela della moralita’.
234 Fincardi, ‘Gli ‘Anni Ruggenti’ dell’antico leone’, p. 457.
235 Guido Guida, ‘Roma guerriera e fascista alia XXII Biennale di Venezia’, Roma, August 1940.
236 Ibid.
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Minister of the Interior warned the various Italian Prefects that life at the seaside 
resorts must be subject to rigid moral criteria, and that he intended to impose 
stricter regulations on the Lido in the new wartime conditions. Specifically, variety 
shows and bands were forbidden, and celebrations of a light-hearted, celebratory 
character were suspended in favour of competitive sports, and more serious artistic 
and cultural events.237 Shortly afterwards, a citizen named Arturo Vidal wrote to the 
Prefect of Venice bemoaning the fact that the most recent decree regarding morality 
at seaside resorts during the summer season had not been fully applied to the Lido. 
According to Vidal, this simply signified the acceptance of bad habits and slack 
moral codes. He complained: 41 live here and I can understand the sense of 
openness prevailing in this area, however, I ask, on behalf of lots and lots honest 
citizens that the Prefect enforce that decree to the Lido, too. (...) Here with us there 
are several evacuated families who live in mourning and grief.238
Sources such as this would appear to indicate that, inappropriately in the 
eyes of some, the Lido had continued in the spirit of light heartedness that 
characterised its peacetime activities and that the war had not deeply affected it. 
This suggests that, despite the worsening of the political situation, the island sought 
to preserve its international atmosphere regardless of the ruling political ideology. 
Even when Fascism was at its most xenophobic and autarchic, the Lido continued 
to foster its international ties.
To conclude, Bosworth’s account on Venice’s wartime experience is 
significant:
‘The special proof of surviving normality was to be the Cinema Biennale, due to open on 1 
September. ( ...)  1940 had become one of the most important years in the history of the 
world. Nonetheless, Volpi added, he had never for a moment thought of cancelling the film 
show. Cinema was ‘a necessity of our modem life’ and the Duce personally willed the 
Biennale’s continuation. Generally, Volpi believed, the present was a good time to reflect 
on ‘the European economy of tomorrow’, the world which would exist after the certain 
victory o f the Axis. Then Italian industry would develop even more swiftly under the happy 
impulse o f autarky, a policy which gave ‘a permanent expression to that dynamism which
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anim ates the Italian peop le and gu ides them  tow ards the h igh est econ om ic d estin y’ .239
5.7 Conclusions
This chapter has analysed the rise of the Lido as a renowned international 
beach resort, and the ambiguities surrounding the establishment of the island as a 
holidaying venue for wealthy tourists. Once the geographical distinctions between 
elite and mass tourism in the Lido had been decided upon, the resort started 
equipping itself with the most sophisticated tourist structures and facilities to meet 
expectations of an exclusive clientele.
In this framework, the Ciga acted as the architect of elite tourism in the 
island, emerging as a dynamic company which endorsed all the initiatives of 
cultural tourism. The Biennale Cinema Festival embodies the best example of 
‘tourist facilitator’ implemented at the Lido in the 1930s. Steeped in the culture of 
the grand hotels, the festival, from its very beginning, stood out as a tourist 
enterprise best understood as an extension of the glamorous nights already taking 
place at the Lido. It was more of a local business than a national agent for cultural 
change dictated by the Fascist ideology. It is thus unsurprising that the regime only 
started to pay close attention to the event after the mid-1930s when the first serious 
bids for greater control over the mass media were made. This chapter has argued 
that, in its first years, the festival was relatively free from Fascist influence, and that 
the atmosphere radically changed only in 1937 when propagandists aims began to 
overwhelm the event. Political affiliation with Nazi Germany and the ideological 
requirements of an imminent war put the festival under tighter censorship controls. 
Yet, it has been claimed that despite the Film Festival’s later submission to growing 
Fascist influence, the regime never employed a straightforward cultural policy 
towards cinema, with propaganda being channelled mainly into newsreels rather 
than movies. Finally, this section has revealed that, even when Fascism promoted a 
martial ethic in the late 1930s, the Lido retained the cosmopolitan allure of a laid- 
back beach resort which withstood the implementation of regulations against easy 
leisure and light heartedness. The opening of the casino in the late 1930s reinforces 
the thesis that, even approaching another world conflict, there was still room for
239 Ibid.
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idle leisure and money wasting, provided this brought additional wealth to the city 
of Venice. Mussolini might have taken Italy to war but Venice and the Lido 
continued to prioritise the demands of international tourism.
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6. Conclusions
Fascism condemned democracy as a doctrine of ultra-individualism that served 
to atomize society and replace those ethical values that gave individuals a sense of 
community with a capitalist materialism wholly concerned with self-interest. In 1932, 
Benito Mussolini, in collaboration with Giovanni Gentile laid down the ‘Foundations 
and Doctrine of Fascism’, which later appeared in Gentile’s monumental 
Encyclopedia. According to the entry:
‘Fascist man is not only an individual but also a nation and a country. He embodies the ideals 
o f individuals and generations bound together by a moral law, sharing traditions and a common 
mission. This moral law supplants the instinctual lure of a life enclosed within the circle of 
evanescent pleasures with a higher life founded upon duty: a life free from limitations of time 
and space; a life in which the individual, by means o f self-sacrifice, the renunciation of self- 
interest, through death itself, can achieve that purely spiritual existence in which his value as a 
man consists’.1
Some scholars have placed great emphasis on anti-materialism as a formative 
influence upon fascist culture and fascist ideology in general. In her book on Fascist 
identity, Mabel Berezin stresses how the activist fascist regime promoted a politics of 
ritual, symbol and spectacle to replace the ‘rational’ thinking of liberalism. Emilio 
Gentile has declared that ‘Fascism explicitly rejected rationalism and elevated mythical 
thinking, both as a mental attitude and as a form of political behaviour’. For Gentile, 
the politics of Fascism were ‘based on the conviction that both individuals and the 
masses were motivated by irrational and mythical thoughts’.3
1 As cited in Jeffrey Schnapp (ed.), A Primer o f  Italian Fascism, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln 
and London, 2000, p. 47: Benito Mussolini (in collaboration with Giovanni Gentile), ‘Fascism’, in 
Enciclopedia ltaliana, XIV, 1932.
2 Mabel Berezin, Making the Fascist Self. The Political Culture o f  lnterwar Italy, Cornell University 
Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1997.
3 Gentile, ‘Fascism as political religion’, p. 241.
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Zeev Stemhell’s interpretation of revolutionary' fascism suggests that the 
movement was a cultural phenomenon before it became a political force. For Stemhell, 
the growth of fascism would not have been possible without the revolt against the 
principles of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution.4 It was also an original 
reaction against materialism, as fascism was a rebellion ‘against modernity inasmuch 
as modernity was identified with the rationalism, optimism, and humanism of the 
eighteenth century’. Anti-materialism meant ‘the rejection of the rationalistic, 
individualistic and utilitarian heritage of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries’. 
This was a defining trait of Fascist ideology, as Fascism characterised itself as a 
spiritual ‘revolt against bourgeois decadence’.5 As Stemhell argues:
‘I have no doubt about the essential contribution which the anti-materialist revision of Marxism 
made to fascism. Once linked to organic nationalism, the refusal o f the Enlightenment heritage, 
the war against a whole humanistic and rationalist culture, this revision made possible the 
explosion o f the fascist synthesis. This synthesis is bom in France and reproduces itself in Italy. 
It impregnates French cultural and political life from the turn of the century: it is certainly this 
impregnation with fascist, fascistizing, antiliberal, authoritarian, ‘antimaterialist’ values which 
explains the failure of elites at the time of Vichy. It is certainly this impregnation which allows 
the formation o f mass movements in the 1930s’.6
For Stemhell, therefore, ‘Italian Fascism had deep roots, a coherent ideology 
and a wider -profoundly negative- significance as the first full-blown political 
manifestation of the wider cultural revolt against the Enlightenment tradition, with its 
rationalism and humanism’.7
4 Zeev Stemhell, The Birth o f  Fascist Ideology. From Cultural Rebellion to Political Revolution, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1994, pp. 4-5-6.
5 Ibid, pp. 7- 8, 30.
6 As cited in Griffin, ‘The current growth (or manufacture) of consensus within fascist studies’, p. 33: 
Stemell, Ni Droite, ni gauche. Morphologie et Historiographie du Fascisme in France, Paris, Fayard, 
2000, p. 82.
7 As cited in Roberts, ‘How not to think about fascism and ideology’, p. 188: Stemhell, The Birth o f 
Fascist Ideology, p. 256. Similarly, James Gregor considers fascism as a kind of cultural rebirth for the 
national renewal (as cited in Griffin, ‘The current growth (or manufacture) of consensus within fascist 
studies’, p. 30: Gregor, Phoenix, pp. 189, 30-1).
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Although Stemhell’s model has been undeniably influential, his interpretation 
of fascist ideology has received important criticism from those historians who claim 
that his history of ideas is divorced from any empirical history of fascism, which has 
resulted in the artificial separation of ‘fascist ideology from fascism itself.8 
Something akin to the intellectual middle ground is occupied by Pierre Milza who, in 
seeking to account for the evolution of fascism from its beginnings as a doctrine of 
anti-materialism advocated by small dissident groups to a totalitarian state in Italy, has 
spoken of a ‘first’ (idealist) fascism and a ‘second’ (pragmatic) fascism.9 This is useful 
insofar as the cultural politics in Venice in the inter-war period would appear to have 
been characterised by the pragmatic fascism which Milza describes.
As Bosworth noticed about the bureaucracy of tourism under Fascism:
‘One marked impression is o f the superficiality of fascism even as it favoured the 
swelling o f the Corporate State. Here were a regime and ideology that proclaimed that they 
would penetrate society as never before, yet, in the little world unveiled in the archives, Italians 
had gone on being self-interested and factionalised, as ordinary people often are’. The 
bureaucrats and experts of tourism in fascist Italy, it is plain, thought first of themselves (or 
their families), only second of ‘Italy’, and o f Fascism hardly at all, though they always 
remembered to express their admiration for Mussolini and, when occasion offered, gratefully 
deployed his influence in their own causes. Most often, it seems, rather than being defined by 
politics, they adapted politics to their own self-interest.10
In the same manner, Venetian Fascism was concerned with reviving the local 
economy and creating an industrial base which, while under the regime’s auspices, did 
not necessarily engage in the unthinking promotion of the Fascist doctrine. In fact, it 
seems that local politics in Venice were mostly guided by an opportunism and 
rationalism rather than dogma or ideology. As Alexander De Grand puts it, ‘the
8 Robert Soucy, French Fascism : The Second Wave 1933-1939, Yale University Press, New Haven, 
1995, pp. 1-25.
9 As cited in Roberts, ‘How not to think about fascism and ideology’, p. 204: Pierre Milza, Le Fascisme 
Frangais: Passe et Present, Paris, Flammarion, 1987.
10 Bosworth, ‘Tourist planning in Fascist Italy’, p. 24.
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aspirations of fascism’s middle-class constituencies were realized within the 
established order, not against it’.11 Equally, Venetian objectives were realized within 
Fascism, not against it: the municipality was always eager to search for formal 
recognition from the regime. Yet, as this thesis has consistently argued, cultural 
entertainment in the city was primarily the product of a rational and pragmatic set of 
concerns and objectives, and that rather than being produced by fascist ideology, 
cultural politics in Venice were the product of a ‘second, pragmatic’ fascism. Not only 
does this signify that Fascism in a sense contradicted itself by revealing a pragmatic 
side, it also meant that the regime had to come to terms with the development of self- 
interested factions and local ambitions within the city.
The pursuit of regional economic interests and the ideologically-driven Fascist 
project were by no means mutually exclusive and often overlapped, but close analysis 
of the Venetian case study strongly suggests that local objectives retained a position of 
primary importance while the interests of the Fascist regime were frequently relegated 
to a status of secondary importance. The fact that cultural events were at the heart of 
the Venetian tourist industry and local economy highlights the limited extent to which 
Fascist ideology imposed itself upon the cultural network of exhibitions, concerts and 
plays established in Venice. As has been extensively analysed, cultural showcases 
staged in Venice, whether they incorporated Fascist ideology or not, were primarily 
viewed by the municipality as a means of boosting local tourism and confronting the 
economic crisis. They were also conceptualised as part of a detailed plan of urban 
regeneration, according to which the historic town was to act as the site of cultural 
tourism while industrial activities were concentrated in the developing Porto Marghera 
area.
This thesis has deliberately taken into consideration the economic and civic 
functions of cultural events staged in Venice rather than their contents, arguing that 
their role as economic facilitators outweighed any propagandists elements. Analysing 
the pragmatic side of concerts, theatre plays and festivals, this thesis has offered an
11 Alexander De Grand, Italian Fascism. Its Origins and Development, Unversity of Nebraska Press,
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alternative interpretation to those cultural historians who have tended to produce a 
picture of Italian society as being completely fascistized through the use of culture. 
Despite the claim that the regime made ‘efforts both to aestheticize politics and to 
politicise art in the first decades of the Twentieth-century’,12 this study has revealed 
that the Venetian municipality cultivated significantly different goals. Local authorities 
were not as interested in conveying and popularising the Fascist message amongst 
Italians so much as they were concerned with the task of using culture to create an 
extensive series of popular attractions for the ‘international tourist’.
Cultural attractions were fundamental in Venice not so much as a means of 
nationalisation of the masses but as a ‘provider’ of revenues to the local community. 
This involved not only celebrations of popular character, such as the events organised 
by the OND but also high culture institutions such as the venerable La Fenice Theatre. 
The variety of entertainments programmed in the 1930s were primarily for the 
consumption of tourists, and the responsibility for their administration naturally fell to 
a large extent therefore upon the Tourist Office. Cosmopolitanism and interstate 
relations were far more important than any autarchic considerations. It is not a 
coincidence that the Biennale was called Exhibition of International Arts, and events 
such as the Titian, Tintoretto and Veronese exhibitions were drawing upon the 
international renown of artists specifically to attract an international audience. Cultural 
entertainments sold to the public as commercial products were regularly taxed, as to 
contribute to the well-being of the local Tourist Office and Venetian tourism in 
general. If these showcases were gradually reinforcing their mercantile standing, then it 
was increasingly difficult to incorporate a straightforward, autarchic ideology like 
Fascism. In the same manner, a programme that specifically targeted the Italian 
masses, such as the phenomenon of the ‘popular trains’, ran counter to the desires of an 
influential part of the Venetian citizenry which sought to foster elite tourism and which 
was far less concerned with the expressed aims of the Fascist regime.
Lincoln & London, 2000, p. 169.
12 Matthew Affron, Mark Antliff, (eds.), ‘Introduction’, in Fascist Visions. Art and Ideology in France 
and Italy, 1997, p. 18.
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The rapid development of tourism and its institutions in Venice was not only a 
response to the increasingly demanding requirements of the tourist industry, but a 
process that mirrored the realization of the vision of Porto Marghera. With the 
recognition that the old parts of Venice were to be reliant predominantly upon the 
profits of tourism, the economic functions attached to the cultural entertainment season 
were exploited to the maximum, leading to the establishment of the new Biennale 
festivals in the 1930s. As the centrepiece of the industry of cultural-tourism promoted 
by Volpi, the survival of the new festivals depended on their continuing profitability 
far more than on their propaganda potential. In particular, the Biennale Cinema 
Festival was clearly conceived as part of a wider programme of tourist industry 
development in the Lido in the 1930s. As has been demonstrated, the central 
government only expressed significant interest in the event in the second half of the 
1930s, when the festival was already an established feature on the Lido’s cultural 
landscape. The Cinema Festival, as the glamorous pinnacle of the island’s summer 
entertainment calendar, helped to consolidate the beach resort focus upon elite tourism. 
The establishment of the municipal casino and its subsequent contribution to the 
financing of numerous welfare activities and cultural events provide further evidence 
to support the contention that the Lido in the 1930s was witnessing a rapid process of 
cultural consumerism. All this was the product of a flexible Venetian accommodation 
with the Fascist authorities and their ideological concerns.
‘Anti-individualistic, the fascist conception of life stresses the importance of 
the state. It affirms the value of the individual only in so far as his interests coincide 
with those of the state’, the Enciclopedia Italiana pronounced in 1932.13 If we were to 
take into consideration what Fascist ideology dictated, then we should conclude that 
the Venetian municipality’s attitude was highly individualistic and therefore, in a 
sense, ‘anti-Fascist’. Or, more accurately, we should say that it was springing from a 
pragmatic Fascism, where a relatively non-constrictive ideology left room for the 
pursuit of local priorities and interests.
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Competitions introduced at the 1930 Biennale of International Arts exposed the 
failure of ideological Fascism to forge a definite Fascist aesthetic. The institution 
increasingly became a place of opportunism and entrepreneurialism rather than an 
agent of cultural change. Aesthetic diversification served to widen the artistic choices 
offered to the cultural consumer rather than responding to the regime’s patronage style, 
and most reforms implemented in the 1930s pointed at the growing commercialisation 
of the exhibition. At the same time, it also retained its original function of attracting 
crowds, showing a degree of continuity with the Liberal era.
The case of Venice strengthens the claim that Fascism could have both a 
dogmatic and an opportunistic side, and that the latter often produced very different 
policies and pronouncements from the former. Study of the relationship between the 
Venetian ruling class and the central government reveals the existence of major 
differences and disagreements over the cultural policy directives issued by the state. 
For instance, local authorities were of the opinion that the Lido was better suited to the 
cosmopolitan mood and rhythms of the Grand Hotels rather than the ‘autarchic’ 
atmosphere cherished by the Fascist regime. If Fascism had different, contrasting 
natures, the emerging picture, at least in Venice, is that of an imperfect, non-monolithic 
totalitarianism, where local cultural policies were driven by economic necessity and 
commercial considerations rather than loyalty to the regime. Therefore, it is no longer 
possible to view Italian Fascism as a form of totalitarianism with Mussolini dominating 
an omnipotent and ubiquitous state through the employment of sophisticated 
surveillance techniques and the use of terror. Forgacs is essentially correct when he 
argues that the regime ‘took a relatively laissez-faire attitude towards certain aspects of 
culture and education, at least until the mid-193 Os when the influence of Nazi Germany 
led to more interventionist policies and greater organizational centralization’.14
In this regard, Bosworth’s claim that ‘the rhythms of Italian economic and 
social life did not readily adjust to those of high politics, let alone of high ideology’
13 As cited in Schnapp (ed.), A Primer o f  Italian Fascism, p. 48: Mussolini, ‘Fascism’, in Enciclopedia 
Italiana, p. 847.
14 Forgacs, ‘Introduction’, in Rethinking Italian Fascism, p. 2.
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remains convincing.15 Rather than Venice being incorporated into the Fascist state, and 
thinking in unison with the regime, it was certain aspects that were drawn from 
Fascism, above all the rhetoric of economic reconstruction of the area, which obviously 
fitted so well with the Venetian population’s expectations. Many of the patterns of 
Venetian life moved in ways which were very different from those of Fascist ethics and 
such differences ensured that Fascism did not institute an all-controlling and 
completely alienating totalitarian society: ‘this Fascism, at least in its most accustomed 
local manifestations, was soon domesticated into rituals which doubtless aimed to be 
‘totalitarian’ but which in practice did not radically disrupt the deep structures of 
Venetian life’.16
This thesis contributes to a developing revisionist literature that challenges the 
image of a regime whose ideology dominated and shaped the everyday lives of 
ordinary Italians. In the case of Venice, fascistization was at best superficial. Fascist 
propaganda and ideology may have been inscribed onto cultural events in Venice, but 
the desire to use those events to produce a recognisably Fascist culture behind which 
the masses could be mobilized, insofar as it existed in Venice, remained subordinate to 
the requirement that the events retain the revenue generating potential to guarantee the 
economic future of the city and its people. The city made use of Fascism to realize its 
most important economic project, Porto Marghera, while at the same time popularising 
the image of a modem, vibrant, industrial Venice. As modem manufacturing industry 
was transferred to the newly developed areas, the economic future of the historic town 
was mortgaged to the ongoing success of the tourist industry. It was entirely logical for 
the town’s authorities, the well-being of Venice uppermost in their minds, to seek to 
use the town’s cultural and artistic heritage, its festivals, exhibitions and tourist season, 
to attract the largest numbers of consumers. Cultural tourism in Venice extended 
beyond the Fascist-imposed boundaries of a xenophobic and autarchic ideology.
15 Bosworth, ‘Tourist planning in Fascist Italy’, p. 25.
16 Ibidem, ‘Venice, 1911-45’, p. 18.
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